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SENATE LEADERS

Interview #17

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RITCHIE: I wondered if there was anything else that you wanted to add either on the Philippines or on your post-Senate career that we didn't cover last week?

VALEO: No. I think it's pretty much there. I'd like to only say this, that if the structure that I think Marcos is trying to build in the Philippines doesn't work, and if he doesn't set it up, then I think at the time of his death there's going to be a very serious problem in the Philippines. To me, that should be an encouragement to try to help him make it work, not to oppose him on every turn. It is the form of representative government, whether we agree with the particular form or not. It's different from the one we left there, and I think that a change from that was absolutely essential. A system of divided powers, especially one that is legislature dominant, does not seem to work in a place like the Philippines any more than it worked in France. Interestingly enough, much of the form that they are trying to put in place now is derived from the French experience.

As a matter of fact, I can recall suggesting that when they were groping, right after martial law, for a new approach, and they were having trouble in the constitutional convention at the

time, I remember suggesting that to the president's brother-in-law, that they ought to examine the situation in France, that it might make a lot more sense in the Philippines than the American system. I said that partly because of the tendency in the Philippines to gravitate around a leading figure or strongman, not necessarily a dictator but a strongman, an Apo or a wise clan chieftain, that sort of thing, which is common to the Moslem parts of the Philippines and to a great extent common to those that felt the predominant weight of Spanish culture. I was thinking, too, of the functioning of the U.S. system during the Roosevelt era. I thought that combined with a legislative body or a parliamentary body, at least vaguely derived from the British system, even through the Americans, and an independent judiciary, might give them about the best possible setup in terms of what they needed. They did examine that, I know that, and eventually the system that they put in place took on a lot of the characteristics of the French system.

One of the things I remember talking many, many years ago, talking to President Marcos about, I think I had lunch with him once when they were at that time experimenting with government on the local level. He said they were trying to find forms that had some roots in the old Malay structure in a sort of village town meeting approach in which everybody was involved, not just a certain older group. He said that the village chiefs in olden

days had to have a way of hearing what the feelings were in the village, and that they had developed forums that were comparable to our town meetings. The system that they did adopt, I forget what they call it now in Tagalog, but it is a village town meeting approach. How successful that's been, I don't know. On the other hand, the need for a lot of politics on the local level is very minimum in the Philippines. It's still essentially a very rural society, certainly not a sophisticated one in our sense, except among a small percentage of the people in Manila, Cebu City, and a few other urban centers.

I'm afraid that if what he's trying to do in terms of the central government does not work, then I think that there might be a brief moment in which the opposition and the church might predominate in the situation, but I think it will quickly give way to some sort of a military structure. And that has been the pattern that we have become involved with in many, many places. When we got rid of Diem, who was essentially a civilian, we got a military structure. We got rid of the fellow in Chile—Salvatore Allende—and we got a military structure. You can think of a number of cases where this has happened. And I can't imagine that the interests of this country lie in establishing military structures all over the world, unless we propose to move in that direction ourselves, and then we will really have our difficulties. That's about all I want to say on the Philippines.

RITCHIE: Is there anything in your recent activities that you think we should record as well?

VALEO: No, I don't think there's anything special in them that would be useful. I'm still hard at work. Beyond the Philippines I'm trying to work with an American company which has some important devices for use in water pollution control, which they'd like to sell in Asia. I'm going to try to open some doors for them in China and a few other places where they might possibly utilize this kind of technology. It also has relevance in terms of aqua-culture, which is an extremely important thing, particularly in a place like China. I should point out that most of the Asian countries have practiced a crude form of aqua-culture for centuries. In the Philippines it's highly developed. What they do is to pen off the fish as fingerlings and then let them grow in captivity. A main source of fish supply in the Philippines is derived from that. Something similar happens in many parts of China. Japan has it, and I think Korea would have it as well. Taiwan is a major center of aqua-culture. The devices I'm involved with simply would improve the cultivation practices and increase the output very greatly. So this is my most immediate interest. I still see a lot of the Chinese in the Chinese embassy, and keep my interests up in what goes on in Asia.

RITCHIE: I understand that you are still studying the Chinese language.

VALEO: Still studying the language. There really is no other way if you want to keep any kind of a fluency in it at all, you have to have at least one or two meetings a month with someone with whom you can talk for an hour or two on end. It gets better. I think memorization is a little harder when you get older, but I think basically your discipline improves too, so that you can put up with a lot more drudgery than you did when you were younger. Maybe in the end the theory that only the young can learn languages is not necessarily so valid. I think it's probably a little slower for older people, but if you want to do it badly enough you can do it.

RITCHIE: The United States seems to be at a real disadvantage against the Chinese, in that there are far more Chinese studying English than Americans studying Chinese.

VALEO: Very much so, and that is interesting because in the first contact, it was amazing how few Chinese spoke English in '72 and '73, but that has changed so rapidly in the last few years. There's a mass movement to learn English. But that apparently has been a pattern in Chinese education for a long, long time. Whatever country is most in vogue is the language of concentration. For a while apparently there was a lot of Russian studied in China, also Russian music and Russian ballet. You could see a good deal of that in the early period of the renewal of our contact, you could see a lot of vestiges of the Russian

period of foreign ascendancy in China. They were making a lot of Russian-type peasant instruments and using them a good deal, and the ballets we saw clearly showed the influence of Russian practices.

RITCHIE: Now they've replaced it with rock music.

VALEO: Well, not quite. This gets to another problem in China, the question of maintaining certain "moral standards," or what they regard as moral standards, which still have a good deal in common with the Confucian ethics and the proprieties. That has not gone as far as a lot of people would assume from reading the press, which zeroes in on things that are primarily of interest to us. It reminds me of one story: after the Nixon trip and before we went on our first trip to China, one of the newsmen who covered the trip with Nixon was Teddy White, who had thirty years before written with an old friend of mine, Annalee Whitmore Jacoby, a book of the month selection, which was called *Thunder Out of China*. The book, in effect, was a kind of last abandonment of the Kuomintang government and Chiang Kai-shek. Teddy White had been very friendly with Chiang Kai-shek for many years, and had covered China for years for *Life* and *Time*. Then when he finally broke with Chiang and wrote that book, it was pretty clear that Chiang was on his way out. I think it was about 1948.

Well, Teddy White never went back to China until the Nixon trip. He remembered the China of 1940, 1941, 1945 that period. He came and had lunch with Mansfield and me and he said he and William Buckley were standing on a corner of a street in Shanghai looking for some old haunts. He said, "You know, they say they have no prostitution in China, but I swear we were approached on that corner!" Well, I wanted to say: Teddy, you probably have forgotten a lot of Chinese that you used to know. At that time an approach by a prostitute would have not been likely. It would have been highly, highly unlikely. It was still in the closing days of the cultural revolution and even the remotest suggestion of something like that would have been subject to great condemnation. Now, it is true that the Shanghai people, as I remember from my own experience, were very friendly and very curious, particularly about clothes. They might very well have gesticulated towards his clothes and he may have interpreted it in a somewhat different fashion. But I was amused that Teddy White would single that out, of all things. He, of course, had experienced the China where that would have been very common. Not only common, it was appallingly common. People were selling their wives just to survive, not to speak of their children. But in that period, in '72, that was highly unlikely. I thought Teddy White was groping for a continuity of perspective of China, as have many other old China hands.

RITCHIE: Did people like White, who were interested in China, seek Mansfield out because they knew he was a China specialist? Or did Mansfield seek them out?

VALEO: In that instance, as I recall, Mansfield sought Teddy White out. No, I don't think they really sought Mansfield out. It was that there was such a hiatus on China after the McCarthy period, nobody even talked about it. The only people who were concerned were some of the political scientists at the universities, and they were mostly talking about Taiwan. Even they avoided a real, honest examination of the situation on the Mainland. In part that was because they had no real contacts, but in part, too, because I think they were frightened to death like everyone else who had had anything at all to do with China. Ironically, they probably analyzed the situation far more accurately before McCarthy than they estimated it afterwards.

RITCHIE: Well, if there are no other areas of your post-Senate career that you think we should explore, I also wanted to spend some time talking about the various senators that you served with. But before we go into the specific ones, I wanted to ask a general question: how do the current senators compare with those you first met when you began to work for the Senate in the 1950s?

VALEO: I'm sure there are just as many geniuses and as many ordinary senators as there were in that period. But what strikes me as the principal difference is the tendency towards homogeneity in the current Senate. I think this is clearly the influence of television. One of the cartoonists has caught this as a touchstone in grasping the present Senate. You have to look a certain way and you have to sound a certain way. Now, that doesn't mean you have to say the same thing, but basically the TV has drawn a new stereotype of a senator. For a while there, before the Mansfield Senate, the outline was the Claghorn. This came largely I think out of Lyndon Johnson's garrulous voice, but also out of other factors. The comedians of that day would caricature senators on the basis of a Senator Claghorn who was a Southerner, who had a Southern accent, usually wore a string tie, and so forth. But it was a caricature.

In actual practice there was great, great diversity in the Senate, even before Mansfield's time and even to a degree during Mansfield's time, although I must say the process of homogenizing began somewhere in the Mansfield period. I don't think Mansfield was responsible for that so much as I think the TV was. He was responsible only in the fact that he let individuals have a much freer reign and therefore aroused a good deal of press interest in individual members of the Senate. But as the process wore on and as the image makers got more and more into the act in terms of

electing senators, when it became a kind of prize to get instead of something you did in part out of a party responsibility, then the homogenizing began to go full force.

Quite frankly now, if I were trying to help someone get elected, I'd first give him a screen test and make sure of how he came across on TV. Well, that would have been unthinkable fifteen or twenty years ago. That would be the last thing you'd look for. Most senators tried to look humble or meek or whatever. They didn't really want to project a Hollywood image of the romantic lead. For the most part, they couldn't even if they wanted to. But especially with Reagan in the White House this has become the accepted image of the politician. It's a kind of moving of Hollywood into Washington, progressively. I understand some other actor is about to take off and try to get the Senate seat in California or somewhere, and there will be more and more of this, because the TV has become almost the arbiter of who gets into the Senate and who doesn't, which is one of the reasons why money has become such an overbearing, overwhelming factor in American politics, and a corrupting influence. It has to be corrupting, if it hasn't already started. If TV is the key, money is the key maker. I go along with Millicent Fenwick who says you either buy your seat or sell your vote. If it does come to that, the Senate itself will lose a great deal of meaning, because institutions can retain their vitality on their own momentum only for a relatively

short historical time. And if they don't deliver what they're supposed to deliver, sooner or later they atrophy and begin to disintegrate, like human beings.

So that's my primary reaction to the difference. The Mansfield Senate, and certainly the Johnson Senate before it, were definitely places of great individuality. In part, it is this individuality that gives the Senate one of its higher meanings. Apart from simply representing a state, the individuality permits a great variety of inputs into the nation's leadership. The Senate can become under those circumstances the source of a good deal of creative political thinking, which is not likely in a homogenized Senate. It may be that we'll move eventually back to a party system, and any creativity that there might be will be expressed through a party approach rather than through individuals. That's a possibility but there are no signs of it at present.

RITCHIE: In the 1950s there was a lot of talk about the "Inner Club" of the Senate. Was there really an Inner Club?

VALEO: Well, there was and there wasn't. Apparently it depended on the seniority element. Those who had been around for a long time were members of the so-called Inner Club. A lot of it had to do with drinking in the secretary's office, as a matter of fact. When Johnson used to run those late sessions, why, the secretary's office became the setting for a lot of that off-the-floor

drinking. It was one of the things Mansfield wanted changed when I took over the job. People could still get a drink, but it was not encouraged and it gradually disappeared. Eventually there were very few people who would come in except on the late nights. But for one thing, the late nights disappeared greatly, and the late nights were one of the stimuli to the drinking.

Yes, there was a kind of Johnson High Command—I would put it that way—or a Johnson staff, of which he was the chief of staff. They were mostly the people like Kerr, to a lesser extent Russell. Mostly southerners, there were some westerners like Magnuson involved. Hayden you could certainly have talked of as being part of that Inner Club. It always amazed me how Hubert Humphrey's supporters would come to the conclusion that Hubert had at last made the inner circle of the Senate. Well, by the time he made the inner circle of the Senate, it really didn't matter that much anymore. I couldn't imagine why they felt such a great sense of achievement because Hubert had made the inner circle. If they knew the inner circle, there were plenty of the Senate scoundrels in the inner circle. I saw that as not really an achievement, and I don't think it was justified in Humphrey's case. I don't think Humphrey himself cared that much about being a part of anything except the politics of his times. His sight was set on the White House at least from the time he became mayor of Minneapolis.

Well, that was my reaction to the Inner Club. Yes, there was some such thing. My main source of information on that was Elsworth Dozier, who for many years had been the man who ran the office and did the bar work. He was a black man who became very close to me on a personal basis. But he had had to run those chores, and his great relief at no longer having to do them was a thing that impressed me greatly. He would tell me some of the stories of the people who had been involved in it, and he had lived through two Inner Clubs, one Republican and one Democrat. Apparently the Republicans favored card playing in the secretary's office, whereas the Democrats favored drinking. I'm not sure how far it went, but that was the picture that came from Elsworth Dozier, who was really a great man and who kept his tongue for a long time and suffered greatly, and did much for the Senate above and beyond the call of duty.

RITCHIE: I wanted to start by asking about some of the old bulls of the Senate of that era, someone like Carl Hayden who had a lot of power yet rarely ever made it into public awareness.

VALEO: And he never really wanted to. Darrell St. Claire, of course, can tell you a great deal more about Hayden than I could even begin to do. My association with Hayden began when I became secretary and I had to open the Senate every morning with the chaplain and the presiding officer. Hayden was then president pro tem, and whenever the vice president wasn't there he would

open the Senate. So we'd sit and chat in the lobby before the opening. I remember one of his comments. At that time, I guess he was ninety already. When I first became secretary he said, "Come sit down here and talk with me." He said, "Is Darrell St. Claire in there working with you now?" I said, "Yes. He's a very old friend." "Well, you take good care of him," he said, "he's a mighty fine boy." Darrell at that time was maybe sixty or thereabouts! He said, "I brought him here years ago, and I know he's a mighty fine boy."

The other thing was Hayden's hostility to cloture. He would never vote for cloture. In the 1964 civil rights bill we got almost to the point where we thought his vote might be essential. Mike Mansfield spoke to him and laid it out to him as a party duty and a national duty. He didn't want to vote cloture. We were getting very close to the time of the vote and we needed to have a little extra in reserve in case something went wrong during the vote. We finally got Hayden reluctantly to stay off the floor and not vote against cloture unless his vote was not necessary, or his absence was not necessary. He agreed to absent himself. I thought that was a great achievement to get Hayden to that point. He agreed to absent himself if necessary, and at the last minute we found out it wasn't necessary, so he came on the floor and voted against cloture. But he did go that far for Mansfield.

Apparently his reluctance on cloture was due primarily to something involving the admission of Arizona to the union. Somehow or other it was related to that. Of course, he had a lot of company. There were other members from the west generally who would take the same view that they would never vote for cloture, because cloture was their weapon against the unbridled majority largely in the House. They felt it was a weapon which gave the sparsely inhabited western states a good deal of extra power, which is true, it did do that. But the question is not whether it should have done that or not, or whether that's good government or not.

RITCHIE: Was the main source of Hayden's influence his position on the Appropriations Committee?

VALEO: I think you have to consider it more in terms of his having been around for so long. Yes, he had influence on the Appropriations Committee, but he never wielded that as it sometimes has been wielded, as a device of great power. I don't think he could ever have been accused of doing that. No, I think it had more to do with the fact he'd been around for such a long time. He didn't really have an enemy anywhere, so far as I know.

RITCHIE: Richard Russell was always cited as the king of the Inner Club.

VALEO: Well, Russell was a brilliant lawyer and a very able senator. I always felt how horrible it was that he had to spend most of his life defending Jim Crow in the south. In the end, that became his main claim to fame, that and getting military installations for the southern states and particularly for Georgia to restore their economy. You have to put Russell in the context of World War II. In World War II everybody in the South was immensely eager for the military installations. Part of that was because the South was a natural place to locate them because of the warmer weather, but much of it had to do with the military activity offering a way out of poverty for the South. People like Russell understood that. The South put up with a lot in World War II. As you know, the adverse impact of the military on a community can be very great, and they got some flack from it, but the dollars in the end counted more.

So as a result, the light of Russell's real abilities lay under two bushels, one being this slavish necessity for placating the military so that they'd set up their installations in the South, or be encouraged to set them up, particularly in Georgia, and the second one being the necessity for opposing any kind of legislation which would have equalized black rights in the South. With those two strikes against him, I don't know how he could have

ever become a national figure, although he aspired to it, and at one time actively sought the presidency or vice presidency. But he saw quickly how futile it was, in great part because of the Democratic party's dependence upon black voters, or the need to keep black voters on the Democratic side, a place where Roosevelt had gathered them.

RITCHIE: What about Harry Byrd, Sr.

VALEO: Senior. He was one the most amiable of men on a personal basis. I knew him, of course, in his later years, I guess during his last term in the Senate. He was an amiable man, but you couldn't move him on any fiscal problem. He used every trick in the bag to delay action on bills so that he could handle them the way he wanted to handle them, and that would mean that he waited very much till the end of the session and then he could swing it more easily as he wished. So he fell back repeatedly, whenever anyone tried to move a bill by such shortcuts as perhaps holding hearings simultaneously with the House, he would fall back on the Constitution and say no, the House gets very angry and it's their prerogative, and so forth. He used that as a device primarily to handle fiscal matters in the Senate as he wanted to handle them.

As I say, he was very amiable. His son was much the same way. He was almost an absolute replica of his father, especially

as he got older, he became more and more like him. I was a good friend of Harry Byrd, Jr. and liked him personally a great deal. He also had a personal fondness for me. What I liked particularly was that he would not go the route to the Republicans. He would not break finally with his Democratic heritage. In the end he stayed with the Democrats, he organized with the Democrats, and whenever possible he voted with the Democrats, which wasn't often, but he did vote that way. He never became a part of an anti-Democratic coalition as some other Southerners did. He never became a part of that. He never switched over. I had a lot of respect for him personally and I liked him. But he was just like his father.

RITCHIE: John McClellan was another old guard powerhouse.

VALEO: Yes, and I had the experience of going to Latin America with him. His first wife had died and he had married his secretary whose name was Norma. I think she was also from Arkansas. John McClellan was a man of very fixed, staid habits. He was a loner. He used to remind me a great deal of Bourke Hickenlooper. He was a kind of southern Democratic edition of Bourke Hickenlooper in his views. He had a stentorian voice and could really snap people when he wanted to. He had two odd mannerisms. He used to eat every day alone, almost all the time. At that time there was a large table in the Senate dining room. When I ate alone, which I did a good deal, I would sit at that table

and I'd very often run into him. He ate the same thing everyday. He always ordered a hamburger and a piece of apple pie and coffee. That was it.

McClellan had a great deal of courage. He was one of the people who took McCarthy on at a very early time in the McCarthy era. He was not afraid of McCarthy, so in a way he did a certain Democratic chore, because McCarthy in the end was after Democrats—well, he was after anybody, but primarily after Democrats. McClellan, as did Kerr, were two of the people who were extremely effective against McCarthy. Their own status as non-Communists—if I can put it that way, I don't want to say anti-Communists, but at that point it was mostly non-Communist, it wasn't quite as anti-Communist as it became later—was obviously unassailable, so they had no qualms about taking on McCarthy. Both of them saw him as a kind of guttersnipe and they had no fears of him. They were solid in their own states, they didn't have any problems on that score. McClellan took him on primarily because he thought he was outraging the Constitution.

On our trip to Latin America, the thing that stands out in connection with him was that he ran into some arrogance on the part of the U.S. military attaché in Mexico, I believe it was. He didn't like it one bit and he thought the man was being very disrespectful of the Senate. And he said, "We'll take care of him when he comes up for confirmation the next time." I don't know

whether he ever did or not, but it was very clear that he was not going to put up with that sort of nonsense. Beyond that he made an effective chairman of that group. We traveled around to maybe six or seven countries in Latin America.

RITCHIE: Did you have any dealings with Lister Hill?

VALEO: Yes, not a great number, but I knew him. Again, a very amiable man, who knew what he wanted. He was determined to put his name on some medical legislation that was going to be meaningful to the country, particularly medical research. I think NIH probably owes more to Lister Hill than to any other single man in the American government. He really was a key person in developing the institutions of NIH. I kept in touch with him after he left the Senate. I'd send him a Christmas card and I think I continued his subscription to the *Congressional Record*, and a few things of that sort. I'd get occasional letters from him from Alabama, where he was in retirement. I liked him. He was a different kind of man than either McClellan or Kerr. I link those together, although I had far more respect for McClellan than I had for Kerr. I think McClellan—in terms of personal integrity—was unassailable. I'm not sure that's at all true of Kerr. But Hill had a more pronounced humanistic characteristic than either of the other two men. The other two were pretty callous to the rest of mankind. Hill was a human man. He had a real human dimension.

RITCHIE: I think of these people as physically big, for the most part, booming, demanding type of people.

VALEO: McClellan wasn't so much that way. Kerr certainly was, and Hill in his own way was a big man, physically. He was a tall man, not heavy but tall. He sort of towered over people.

RITCHIE: Does the position attract a person like that?

VALEO: Well, no you had Pastore, who was on the other end of the scale, and Theodore Francis Green. It looks like states seem to produce certain types. No, Fulbright also came from Arkansas, and he wasn't the same type. I can't think of others from Oklahoma. No, I don't think that's it. What you found in that early period of the Mansfield Senate, it was an odd phenomenon, very often you'd get a state where you'd have two totally different ideologically inclined people. A perfect example being Fulbright and McClellan. They worked well over a long period of time, but they were really on different ends of the scale in an ideological sense, except on those matters which were highly relevant to Arkansas, in which case Fulbright went the way of McClellan on civil rights, and I'm sure against his deeper convictions. There are other examples of that. I'm trying to think of some others, but I recall being conscious of this many times in the Senate. If you look around you'll see that there are a number, and I often wondered why that would happen.

I thought that probably one of the explanations for this was that in a state like Arkansas, considering the time that these men served, coming after the Roosevelt period, Fulbright would have to be regarded as a direct descendant of the Roosevelt period, that without Roosevelt you probably would not have had a Fulbright. What made Fulbright significant in Arkansas was the recognition, probably for the first time after the Civil War, of the significance of education. Fulbright, being an educator, took on a particular meaning for the people in Arkansas, also in addition, of course, to his ability to deal on a one-to-one basis with people in the state. If he weren't able to do that, he would have no relevance in the Senate. Whereas McClellan, I'm not sure where it would come from there, he was more a kind of county official, a small town official who worried perhaps a great deal about local people's problems, much more so than Fulbright. But he was also in many respects in his outlook much more conservative than Fulbright.

You had a Wiley and a McCarthy coming from Wisconsin. Wiley being amiable and pleasant and not doing an excessive amount of the anti-Communist game—because it was a game largely. He did only what he had to do, whereas you had McCarthy shooting from the hip all over the place. Interestingly enough in that, when the question came on the censure of McCarthy, Wiley was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee at the time. God he went through

all sorts of agonies on how to vote on that. His instincts said to censure him, but he was afraid of the political consequences in Wisconsin, and finally decided to vote present. He was looking for a justification for that position. I think Carl Marcy or somebody helped him figure out that since he came from the same state he should not actually become a party to the proceeding against McCarthy.

RITCHIE: You mentioned several of the chairmen of the Foreign Relations Committee, and again in any mention of an Inner Club their names always pop up. I wondered if you would talk about people like Wiley and Walter George and Theodore Green.

VALEO: Yes, I knew them all. While they were chairmen I worked on the committee. Part of this Inner Club thing came from a newspaperman, he worked for the *New York Times*.

RITCHIE: William S. White.

VALEO: Right, Bill White. It was his invention. He loved the Senate—he loved Johnson's Senate. He didn't like Mansfield's Senate but he loved Johnson's Senate, and he loved the idea of colorful figures. He was in the Senate press gallery whenever Johnson staged one of his political melodramas on the floor. But we saw less and less of him after Mansfield took over. At first he treated Mansfield gently but after awhile he became increasingly nostalgic for Johnson's Senate. Eventually, he became

openly critical of Mansfield's leadership. Mansfield's only response was an enigmatic smile and greater deference to White. Mansfield was still around long after White had faded from the scene.

I'm trying to remember who was chairman when I first came over to the Senate on loan from the Library. Fulbright was chairman and then it went to Wiley.

RITCHIE: Tom Connally was chairman in 1952.

VALEO: I was tremendously impressed by Connally's constant sparring—not really sparring, he used to run a spear through Bill Knowland time after time on the China issue. He called Knowland the senator from Taiwan—no, from Formosa, he never would use the word Taiwan. But I didn't really know him at that point. Wiley took over the following year. Wiley was always very pleasant to me. We had a series of public hearings on the U.N. Charter. I set them up because I was single at the time and freer to travel, I went out as the advance man. We developed, Carl Marcy and I, this concept of holding hearings around the country on a foreign policy issue as an experiment. I can't say a great deal resulted from it, but I think it helped to spread some interest about foreign policy in the communities where we went. The hearings got a lot of local coverage. Wiley was always very willing to work on that. I remember he was married to an English woman at the time,

a very nice woman, a very lovely woman, and she'd travel with him a good deal on those trips. He always wanted to be sure he had orange juice in his room. He drank it incessantly.

The other thing I remember about him was his reluctance to plan very far in advance. He used to say, "You've got to move very slowly because every time you get your head above the water a little bit somebody's waiting over there with the old shillelagh to hit you over the head." He was very cautious in many ways. And the final thing I remember about him was—this was indirect from reading the hearings at the time, [Millard] Tydings was holding some hearings at the very beginning of the McCarthy thing on China. Much of the dispute at the beginning was that we had made a great mistake by allowing the Russians to come into the war in the Pacific, that they'd only stayed in for two weeks and they'd taken Manchuria and they'd gotten all these rights in Korea and so forth. This was beginning to be described as part of the Democratic plot to sell out the country to the Soviet Union. At one point during the hearings I mentioned, Tydings read a quote from the record. It went something like: "Well, what are the Russians waiting for, when are they going to get into the war in the Pacific? We've helped them out in Europe and they've made a pledge to us that they were going to get into the war and help us in Asia, and why aren't they in it? What are they waiting for?" And Wiley said, "Who said that? Who said that?" And Tydings

said, "You did." That was typical. Everybody at that point was shifting from "Why aren't they in?" to "Why did we bring them in?"

But that was Wiley. He was not a profound man. He was kind of roly-poly, with a good sense of humor. He used to pass out dollar bills as Christmas presents to people on the staff, and you couldn't refuse to take it. If you refused to take it he would have been deeply hurt. He was not profound, and he knew it. He did not make any pretenses of being other than a nice guy from a small town in Wisconsin.

RITCHIE: And Wiley was then succeeded by Walter George in 1955.

VALEO: Yes, and Walter George took that committee, it is said, at Johnson's urging, to prevent Theodore Francis Green from getting it. He gave up Finance in order to do that. Of course, George was in the southern tradition of a man of learning, a judicious man, a very able legislator and a very effective—from his point of view and for the interests that he reflected—chairman of the Finance Committee. He didn't know much about foreign policy. He was friendly with Mike Mansfield, thought very highly of him. In effect he sponsored him and pushed him when Mansfield first came into the Senate, and was probably responsible for Mansfield becoming a member of the Foreign Relations Committee in his first year in the Senate. Mansfield told me that, that he

had spoken with George and that George had been very friendly and seemed very anxious for him to get on the committee.

I can only remember one direct contact with him. For some reason or other I was left in charge of the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee. I think everybody else was on vacation in the period. A question came up that the press wanted George to answer, and George was in Georgia at the time. I drafted what I thought would be a responsible comment, and called him. He was campaigning, I think, and got him on the phone and told him about the press request. I think it had something to do with Eisenhower. He said, "Well, do you have any ideas?" And I said, "Yes, I've written out something," and I read it to him over the phone. "Well, that's fine," he said, "just give them that. That's all right." That was my only direct contact with him.

But I remember two things: I had a secretary at the time who was from Georgia. She had been brought in by George as a matter of fact. When the news of his death came, why she just burst into tears. There was a really strong bond between him and the people in Georgia who supported him. The other thing was the general feeling that it probably broke his heart to be challenged by Herman Talmadge at that time, and that he went back determined to hold on to his seat, but he just didn't have the strength. He was quite an old man at that point. He didn't have the strength to do

it and decided that he couldn't make it. He didn't do anything extraordinary as chairman of the committee. We were still in the era where Congress deferred greatly to the president and George had no trouble deferring to Eisenhower on almost everything in that period. You had the Formosa Resolution and a number of others of those that Dulles was pushing for Eisenhower. They were essentially anti-Russian resolutions of one kind or another and there was no problem in getting them through. If Eisenhower wanted them, they went through. There was virtually no opposition to it.

RITCHIE: What about George's successor, Theodore Green?

VALEO: Theodore Green was a charming man. He's easy to caricature too. He was an old man by the time he took over the committee. I had worked with him a little bit earlier in connection with the Information Program study and I had heard stories about his parsimony and his eccentric habits. I remember we had some hearings in New York at the Voice of America. I was making the arrangements for the hearings and I called him as a member of the committee. The per diem in the government at that time for travel was ten dollars a day. That included your hotel and everything else. He said, "I'm going up to New York. Where is the party staying in New York?" I gave him the name of the hotel, and I explained to him that there would be a ten dollar per diem allowance for it. "Oh," he said, "will you make the arrange-

ments?" I said, "Yes, I'll make the reservations, but each member is going to pay his own bill at the hotel." He said, "I could stay at my club, but I'd better stay where the rest of the party is." We went up to New York and held the hearings. He had to leave early but we still had a morning of hearings. Green called me about seven in the morning in my room and he said, "Now, I have to leave today. Will you take care of my hotel bill?" I reminded him that each person was going to take care of his own hotel bill. He said, "But the per diem is only ten dollars a day, and this hotel costs twelve dollars a day." I said, "I know, I'm sorry Senator, but that's the only allowance." "Well, I could have stayed at my club." I said, "Yes, you could have." He grumbled and grumbled, but finally he paid his bill.

Green was all right. I think we referred to him on occasion throughout these interviews. His problem was partly that he didn't hear too well, and partly that his mind was moving slower than most of his colleagues at that point. Moreover he had this unusual penchant for being caught up in a word or a sentence. The witness would drone on and Green would still be fixed on paragraph one or sentence one and the witness would be on paragraph four of his statement. Green would still be studying the syntax of the particular sentence in paragraph one. Whenever he found anything wrong grammatically with a sentence or a misuse of a word he could not resist fixing on it and trying to get it straightened out. So

when he'd look up he'd ask the witness a question having to do with the syntax in paragraph one. The witness wouldn't know what he was talking about because he had already reached paragraph four. So you used to have this terrible confusion and long silences whenever Green questioned a witness. I thought in the end he showed great wisdom in deciding to resign as chairman of the committee when he did. He was not forced to do that. The seniority rule was in very, very strong favor at the time. Nobody would have thought to force him out of it. There were senators in worse physical shape than he was. Kenneth McKeller of Tennessee, for example, had gone much further towards senility than Green. I rather liked Green personally.

RITCHIE: One of the interesting things about Green was that he was willing to take unpopular stands, and in the middle of the 1950s he endorsed admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, which was absolutely forbidden for anyone else to mention politically.

VALEO: Yes. Well, that's one of the things that sometimes comes with age. Not always, many senators act just the same at ninety as they do at nineteen. But in the case of Green, I think that he felt that he had reached a status where he could express his views pretty freely. Yes, and he was a wise man in many ways, not a foolish man. The foolishness might have been the foolishness of age, but it was not innate in him. He was a wise man,

and a very tough Democratic politician. He had fought a lot of battles up there in Rhode Island.

RITCHIE: Was that one of the reasons why Senator George and the Eisenhower administration didn't want Green to become chairman in 1955?

VALEO: Yes, they thought partly that he might be too radical for the policies we were following at that time. Very likely. I don't know if it was specifically the China question, but generally speaking he was not a man to repress his views, and I think they were looking for someone who would be much more amenable to Eisenhower's guidance.

RITCHIE: After Green resigned, then Fulbright took over as chairman. We've talked about Fulbright throughout the interview, but I wonder if there is anything else you'd like to say about him.

VALEO: Yes. I had a high regard for Fulbright. We didn't have any personal relationship. I didn't dislike him, but he was a somewhat distant figure. Actually, Marcy took care of him most of the time at that point. It was at the base of one of the problems I had with Marcy. Fulbright began to have second thoughts about his strong stand in favor of foreign aid. It's interesting, I mentioned already that Morse had undergone the same change just after the run-in I had with him. Then his attitude of hostility

toward me was reversed by a job on foreign aid I had done for him. I never had had a run-in with Fulbright, but he was a remote figure. He asked for a statement on foreign aid changing his previous stand. Marcy asked me to do it, and I did it. It was for use on the floor.

It was the first time Fulbright expressed formal hostility or doubt on the foreign aid program in any way. The statement is the first time he had expressed any kind of critical judgment on it. Up until that time he had accepted it almost automatically because it came from the executive branch. After he made the statement, a few days later he called me over to his office. He had this big pile of mail, much of it favorable to the statement he had made. Apparently the statement had been widely covered in Arkansas and elsewhere, because it represented a shift. He was amazed himself at the amount of mail that the statement had generated. He wanted then afterwards to go directly to me for statements, and I think Carl took exception to that, and I can understand it. But as a committee staff person in that period you were in a somewhat ambiguous position. You were a non-partisan professional and could not say no to a member's legislative request, or at least I never felt that I could say no or even, "Take this to your staff director, don't bring it to me." So it put me in a somewhat embarrassing position.

It was one of the reasons why I felt I had to really leave the committee at that point. I had the opportunity to, so I left. Fulbright was angry when I left; he was irritated with me. He said, "Why are you doing it?" And I said, "Well, I think Senator Mansfield wants some help." "Oh," he said, "we need help down on the committee too." In any event, he put through a resolution of commendation for me when I left the committee, and presented it himself to the committee.

As I told you, I think that he was embittered because under two Democratic presidents he was not made secretary of state, and he would have been an excellent secretary of state. He would have been a meaningful secretary of state. It's unfortunate that he did not get that assignment either under Kennedy or Johnson, and I'm quite sure that in both cases it had to do with the Israeli and Middle Eastern question.

RITCHIE: Overall, how would you assess Fulbright as chairman? Would you count him as a successful chairman or an ultimately frustrated chairman?

VALEO: I don't know. He personally certainly felt frustrated as a senator. I would guess that he felt frustrated in life generally because he didn't become secretary of state. I think he felt that what he did at the committee was not that much. He did not, at first, regard the legislative branch as too

relevant to foreign policy. He was a little bit like Phil Hart, in a way, not as bad as Hart but I think there was some of the same reaction. I think he felt that he had not used his talents fully. He became increasingly ineffective—well, I'd better not say that. The hearings, coming as they did on Vietnam and in that period of upheaval—were probably a very positive factor in finally clearing up those situations. But his personal irritation, his personal sense of frustration, communicated itself to other people and I think reduced his effectiveness on the floor. So it's a sort of mixed bag in the case of Fulbright. He did some highly constructive things. Certainly the Fulbright program and that concept in that earlier period were immensely valuable and pretty much permanent contributions to the country. But as chairman of the committee, I think you'd have to regard his tenure as a mixed bag.

RITCHIE: And how would you assess John Sparkman, as a long time member of the committee and briefly as its chairman?

VALEO: John Sparkman was on those U.N. hearings and I saw a lot of him. I also ran into him a couple of times traveling abroad. John Sparkman was an extremely able younger man. I think one of the brighter lights of the new south of that period, again a product basically of the Roosevelt revolution, if I can use that term, in politics in the south, and very vastly underrated nationally. I think he was a very logical and very desirable choice as

vice presidential candidate with Stevenson. At the time of his selection as the vice presidential candidate he was an outstanding senator in my judgment. He went through some sort of deterioration as time went on. I used to hear all sorts of rumors about him, much like [Clinton] Anderson and one or two of the others. But you can't take away from the fact that he came from a difficult place to run. His personal achievements were very great: a sharecropper's son, my goodness, that's a long way to come. And he was an enlightened man. Anywhere else in the country his position on civil rights would have been considerably different in my judgment than it was.

RITCHIE: You meant physical deterioration?

VALEO: Well, there were rumors that he was chasing the women around the Senate. But I don't know how much one gives credence to things like that. I never saw any personal evidence of it, but some of the women assured me that it was true. But that's an aberration, and as far as I'm concerned a minor one.

RITCHIE: He's a man who, in a sense, was always in Fulbright's shadow, at least in terms of foreign relations.

VALEO: Until he became chairman, and by that time he was old.

RITCHIE: Which is one of the problems of the seniority system.

VALEO: Yes.

RITCHIE: John Kennedy was also a member of the Foreign Relations Committee then.

VALEO: He was a minor figure on the committee.

RITCHIE: Did you have many dealings with him?

VALEO: No. I watched him on the committee a few times. I knew him only as president. I talked to him on the phone maybe two or three times when he was president, but I didn't really know him. I watched him a couple of times at committee hearings. I was impressed by him, but not as a senator. That was clearly not where his ambitions lay.

RITCHIE: And Stewart Symington came on the committee.

VALEO: Yes, Stewart Symington is a good example of somebody who learned as time went on. He was a sort of a Peck's bad boy type when he came over after being secretary of the air force. He was brash and he was much too aggressive for my taste. But that changed as time went on. I think his wisdom increased and he began to worry greatly about the effects of military expenditures and then the costs of the war in Vietnam on the whole American

financial structure. In a sense he was somewhat prophetic in having seen at a very early date the effect that these military expenditures would have on the country's finances. Then on top of that, he apparently felt some family pressure about the pointlessness of the war and what it was doing to the country, apart from the terrible toll it was taking on the young people in the country and all for some very obscure and amorphous reason of policy.

I think I said once before that I heard him make one of the really great speeches, it came off the cuff at a Democratic caucus, quite spontaneous. He first, and then Inouye both made immensely moving speeches against the war, that it was time to bring it to a halt. Symington and Inouye were highly respected and certainly would have had a lot to do with finally getting those first resolutions of the Democratic caucus, that made very clear that the concern with the war was deepening and that we needed to try to bring it to an end. I give him and Inouye a great deal of credit for that.

RITCHIE: On the Republican side you've talked about Wiley and Bourke Hickenlooper. What about George Aiken?

VALEO: Well, George Aiken went around the world with us on one of two trips as I recall. He was a great personality. Simple man but wise, and in his own way very sophisticated. His habits were simple but his wisdom was very sophisticated. He was I guess

the only enduring, close friend that Senator Mansfield had in the Senate. I don't need to go into the details. You know they breakfasted every morning together. George Aiken was here alone for a long time, his wife never came down to live here. Then I believe she died and he married Lola Perotti, who had been his right hand for years and years, even as governor of Vermont.

He also made a very important contribution to bringing the war in Vietnam to an end by an amusing twist, which is well known: his saying we ought to just declare victory and get out. Because he saw that we were carrying on that war as though it were a football game, and that all we were really concerned with was winning. Winning for what? Nobody had ever asked for what or why, this whole question of why. You're in a war, you win it automatically, nobody asks what it might take and what meaning it might have in terms of the real interests of the United States. Unfortunately, Johnson thought about war as though it were a football game, as did a lot of other people. So part of the problem was to get that mind-set, that kind of a thought process, broken up in some way, and Aiken's humor I think helped because it was quoted widely and repeatedly afterwards, and helped to bring the war to an end.

Beyond that, I don't know how much you know about him. Did you know that he was a wildflower authority? He wrote a book on wildflowers, an authoritative book, on wildflowers as a matter of fact. He raised them—I don't know how you raise wildflowers, but

I think he raised them. He had a marvelous sense of humor. It was a wry, New England sense of humor, but a good one. He was invariably cheerful. I can't remember ever seeing him depressed or ever depressing anyone else around him. He was a very even-tempered, charming, warm and lovable man. That's about the best way to describe him.

RITCHIE: On a different temperament, what about William Knowland, who was also on the Foreign Relations Committee?

VALEO: When Knowland committed suicide, all I could think of was that one time I had seen him out in Denver, Colorado. Carl Marcy and I had been out there on U.N. hearings. The hearings were over and we were at the airport and Knowland was already there, he was in the waiting room. We were going to take the same plane. Suddenly the skies opened up and the snow just poured out. It was a spring snowstorm and it piled up about six inches of snow in a half hour or so. So we sat there and talked. It was the only time I ever saw Knowland relaxed. He told some funny stories. He was not an unpleasant man in that period. But I never saw him in the Senate, or around the Senate—I didn't know him well—but I never saw him other than with his shoulders hunched and he looking as though he were either to take a blow or give a blow. He just had that look. He looked as though he were carrying the world around on his shoulders all the time. In retrospect I had the feeling that he was a man who disliked what

he was doing intensely, but was being driven to do it by some unknown element, or some known element that I didn't know. I can't think of him as being particularly an effective leader. He would have been a terrible president. He was a sad man, really.

RITCHIE: What about Knowland's successor as Republican leader, Everett Dirksen?

VALEO: Of course I liked Dirksen personally a great deal. He was a ham but a lovable ham. We had a great deal to do with him during the civil rights bill. Dirksen had a capacity for coming through in a crisis, a national crisis, and coming down in the end on the right side. He would clown. I don't know if anybody has mentioned that marvelous exchange with Humphrey on the Marigold. If you've got the story I'm not going to go over it, but it completely flabbergasted Hubert Humphrey when Dirksen took off on the Marigold and didn't stop for about ten or fifteen minutes. I happened to be on the floor when that happened, and it was a most impressive thing. You could hardly keep from laughing right through it. He did it in such erudite terms, and the ham in him was marvelous when he was doing something that was light. I must say, he did not ham when the issues were serious, that was not where he did it. I thought that he was the key figure not only in civil rights but in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and there were one or two other issues where he was decisive.

One has to credit Mansfield largely for his handling of Dirksen that made a lot of this possible, because Dirksen was decisive in the sense that many of these issues found the Democratic minority, that is the southern Democrats, potentially aligned with the majority of the Republicans and therefore controlling the vote. But Mansfield's handling of Dirksen acted to break that alignment between the southern Democrats and Dirksen and to keep it broken with his successors for that matter. Dirksen never opposed Mansfield on a strictly political basis just to get political gains from it. He opposed him on principle on a number of issues, but not in terms of political purpose, and that is not true of Johnson. Johnson was opposed many times for two reasons: first of all to deflate his ego and often for the purposes of political advantage.

Dirksen was a perfect example of what cigarettes do to you. They eventually kill you. I'm told that when he came out of the operation for lung cancer he was reaching into his breast pocket to get a cigarette. I don't know who told me that story, but I suspect it's probably true, knowing how he smoked constantly. He drank a lot, but he wasn't an alcoholic. His back room was a place for meetings and having a drink. He had a man named Oliver Dompierre who was very close to him and worked the floor with him. We had a lot to do with Dompierre, never had any trouble working with him. On all Senate matters I could count on him. I was

still feeling my own way when Dirksen was leader, but there were no real problems working with Dirksen. I think he was a fine Republican and a great American.

RITCHIE: When you think about those senators in the late '50s and early '60s, Johnson and Dirksen, you think of hard-drinking, hard-smoking, hard-working, long hours. Was that more characteristic at that stage or was that just a necessity of being a United States senator?

VALEO: I think it was more characteristic in part because it was still close to the war, and that was the pattern of wartime behavior on a much broader scale, not just in the Senate. I mean, people worked harder, people drank more, all hours of the day and night. They were reflective of their times, I think.

RITCHIE: I think of the younger senators now playing squash and swimming in the pool, but I can't imagine some of the old bulls of the '50s doing things like that.

VALEO: Well, they tended to go for the massage in the Senate gym. That reminds me of a story Everett Jordan told. I never used the Senate gym, but Everett Jordan told the story about being in the pool one day and the bells rang. He said, "You should have seen those senators jumping out. They looked like frogs coming out of a pond." He had such colorful language, it was really a marvelous expression of Americanism from his own

sector of the country. Another time we were in Canada, in Quebec and we were snowed in at the Frontenac for about three days. It was really a roaring blizzard. He went out and just as he came back covered with snow I caught him at the door of the hotel. He had taken a walk in it and he was wrapped up in his scarf and overcoat with his hat pulled down over his ears. He came in and said, "Oh, it's bad out there Frank, bad. You see those people out there? They're all walking around like chickens." That was his style of language.

And I must put this story in too because it was a classic for Jordan. One time he had owned, among other things, a gasoline station down in North Carolina, his family owned it. He said they had a fellow working for them at the station, he was a loner, never talked very much, never did very much. It was about the time during the early Roosevelt period when they decided to pay a bonus to the veterans of World War I and this fellow was a veteran. He'd been in the war practically from before it began until a couple of years after it ended, so he had a very sizeable amount of money coming to him, something like ten or twelve thousand dollars. After he got the bonus he came in and said, "Mr. Jordan, I think I'm going to be leaving you." "Oh," he said, "what are you going to do that for?" And the fellow said, "Well, I've got all of this money, I thought I'd go down the coast and look around a little bit." So Jordan wished him good luck and the

guy left. About two weeks later he came back and said, "Can I have my job back?" He said, "What do you need a job for? I thought you went down to the coast to look around." "Yeah, " he said, "I did, but I don't have any money left." "What did you do with all that money from the bonus?" The fellow said, "I spent half of it on women and drink and I wasted the rest." That was typical, he had a marvelous sense of humor.

RITCHIE: There must have been many of them who used their story-telling abilities for their own political advantage.

VALEO: Yes, very much so, and it's still done. Of course it was a classic characteristic of politicians in that period and I suppose to some degree it's still true. You start a speech after dinner with a joke.

RITCHIE: There's a certain persona that develops, you expect a Dirksen to have a story to tell, and someone else to be more brittle and abrupt.

VALEO: Nobody ever expected Mansfield to tell stories, and he didn't.

RITCHIE: Also in the Republican leadership of those days was Thomas Kuchel. What were your observations of him?

VALEO: I didn't know him too well, and I didn't have a great deal of actual dealings with him, but he was a very nice person, generally very highly thought of in the Senate as a decent human being. I think I mentioned he served as a designee on the congressional group which was advising Secretary of the Treasury John Connally on Secret Service protection for presidential candidates. When the issue came up as to whether or not Ted Kennedy should have it, he was one that strongly endorsed protection. I had proposed that it be given to him. Treasury did not act on it at that point, but Kuchel joined me very strongly and for much the same reasons. They spread some very spurious stories about him in California, but I didn't know much about that aspect of him. He was a liberal Republican and spoke well on the floor. I don't think he was a major force on the floor, but he was right on a lot of issues of that period—what I would regard as right.

RITCHIE: Another Republican who was more of a behind-the-scenes leader was Styles Bridges. Did you have any dealings with him?

VALEO: Yes, I did. I was in the Library of Congress at the time. I didn't know him in the Senate per se, but he was very much an ally of McCarthy. There were many who said Bridges was the one who was egging McCarthy on, he being behind the scenes. Ernest Griffith knew him very well, and Ernest called me one day and said "We have a very secret job to do, and it's for Senator

Bridges," who was the chairman of the Appropriations Committee in that period—that was in the '47 to '48 period. He said, "It's a translating job from Chinese. I want you to take a group of translators and do the job for him." So I said, "Do you have the material?" He said, "Oh, no, you can't have it. You've got to go over to his office to do it." It was right about the time that people were beginning to defect, not Communists but other Nationalist leaders were beginning to leave Chiang Kai-shek, and apparently one had gotten out with a big load of papers, and maybe some cash. These papers had to do largely with that situation. This Chinese had come here to the United States and then he had gone to Mexico. He was one of the quasi-independent generals from Kuangxi province who had worked with Chiang Kai-shek.

So I got two or three Chinese from the Orientalia Division of the Library and we went over to do the translation. We worked a whole weekend, about fourteen hours a day for three days, I think, and we got the job done. He had a fellow named Scott McLeod who was his administrative assistant and later became ambassador to Ireland. Well, McLeod was the immediate supervisor of this job. Bridges came in occasionally, wrote a lovely letter to Ernest Griffith about the marvelous job we had done for him and so forth. But I remember Scott McLeod because he would open the door just a crack to see who might be outside trying to come in the office. He was very conspiratorial. I didn't really know much about

Bridges other than in these two connections. His reputation at least in Democratic circles was not a good one.

RITCHIE: He seemed to be the kind of person who liked to operate behind the scenes.

VALEO: Apparently, and that would be borne out by the McCarthy thing. He was a total Republican, a totally partisan man.

RITCHIE: I also wanted to ask you about Mansfield's colleagues from Montana. James Murray was the senior senator when he arrived.

VALEO: I didn't know Murray. I met him once or twice, just about at the very end of his career. Mansfield, I think, introduced me to him. He was the only one that Mansfield called "Senator." Somebody asked him about that in my presence once. He said, "Well, that's the only name that I've ever known him by and I'm not going to call him anything else." He called everybody else by their first name, which is customary in the Senate. But he never called him Jim or James, he always called Murray "Senator."

Then came Lee Metcalf after that. Mansfield described him as the "ablest congressman that ever came out of Montana," but there were two things that were involved with Metcalf. I got to know him quite well because Mansfield set up the job of permanent

acting president pro tem for him. He did that almost as a palliative for Metcalf, because Metcalf was in his shadow and he knew that, and he knew Metcalf was beginning to resent that in his own way.

When I first met Metcalf he was a bright young fellow, and I watched a kind of progressive personal deterioration over the years. He was heavy on booze and I think it got worse as time went on. And he was very aggressive when he drank. The problem for him in the Senate was that there was no place for him to go. His interests were in foreign relations. Here was Mansfield, a huge presence in that field, in front of him. You can't have two from the same state interested in a subject like foreign affairs without one of them suffering some adverse consequences. Metcalf was destined to suffer. Mansfield tried to defer to him very frequently, but you knew it was synthetic. In an odd way, Mansfield, not unlike all the rest, liked that spotlight, particularly in foreign relations. He gave it up only with reluctance, except when it became a part of his own strategy to give it up, as he did in many instances. In a way you can't blame him, this would have happened with anyone. I'm trying to say in effect he was no different than any other senator on that score. So when he tried to defer to Metcalf it came over to me at least synthetically. And I'm sure Metcalf was aware of that.

I'm not suggesting that Mansfield drove Metcalf to drink. Nobody drives anybody to drink; you either drink or you don't drink. But the net result was that whatever Metcalf's potential was, it was never fully realized when he was in the Senate. I think he yearned at one time to be a judge, or he had been a judge in Montana on a local level, and there was some consideration being given to possibly putting him in a judgeship somewhere, but nothing ever came of that. I think he died a very disillusioned man and a very unhappy man basically.

RITCHIE: You mentioned earlier about the states sending different types of people. It also seems to me that the fact that there are two senators from each state means that no one is the senator representing that state; there's always someone else that they have to deal with as both a colleague and a competitor. Even within the same party it must create competition and tension.

VALEO: I'd like to say that it's almost like a marriage. I mean, if you've got the right combination of two senators, you have the state fully represented and all of its various facets fully represented. If it isn't well represented, you would have either two competing ones, and in this case I would say it was not well represented because Metcalf and Mansfield were essentially the same kind of men and their views ideologically were almost identical. I don't think they ever voted differently on a measure in all the while they were in the Senate together. Only once, yes

they did, on the gun control bill. Metcalf voted against it and Mansfield voted for it. And Metcalf said afterwards that "Mike is the only man in any Western state who could vote for gun control and still get reelected."

End of Interview #17