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POST-SENATE YEARS

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RITCHIE: When you left the Senate as secretary of the Senate, did you have any plans in mind what you wanted to do after that?

VALEO: Yes. About two years before I left the Senate, I sat down at the swimming pool in the apartment where I lived and began to jot down what the world would look like afterwards. I took a week off and just sat at the swimming pool and swam and jotted down notes on where I might go and what I might do. Among the things I listed was taking a shot at business, not necessarily to make any great profit, but just to see whether it was something I could do. It would be a business that I would relate to my experiences in government, although I wouldn't take on a lobbying job for profit per se. I didn't rule out lobbying, but I was not going to go the route which was then already becoming a fairly common one of working in the Senate for a while and then going out and making a lot of money on the strength of the Senate experience and contacts. I knew I couldn't do that, nor did I want to do that. But I thought there was a role for someone who understood both the Far East and the United States and the way government and politics work in both places, to act as a kind of bridge and

perhaps encourage or stimulate, as a catalytic agent, to promote more effective relations between the two places in a range of occupations.

That was one area which I thought I would try to develop. Then I put down a note that I'd want to write a couple of books or three books, possibly some fiction. I had thought of doing a play for years and years and years, but I had not written one since I was in my early twenties. I thought I might take another shot at drama as a form of expression. That went into the notes. I put down too that I wanted to do a good deal of traveling in places which I had been to before perhaps but never had gotten more than a quick glance while on congressional travel, the ones that had seemed to appeal to me most, with or without a wife—I think I added that—to my plans.

I was of course most interested in my son and seeing him come to maturity. He was still quite young at that point. I was almost prayerfully wishing that he'd make it to college and I noted that I would give as much time as necessary to him. That would have first priority. That's about the way it's come out. It hasn't changed. It's come close to it, very close to it. I did get out two printed studies; I didn't actually write the books, but I wrote the introductions to them and designed the studies that produced the books. Of course, they were group jobs.

I tried the play. I haven't thrown it away yet but I haven't shown it to anyone either because I don't think it's very good. I'm a pretty good judge of that, I think. It's interesting after a lapse of so many years how your whole approach to problems changes and your reaction to a theme that moves you does not necessarily lend itself to an artistic expression which would have been very natural when you were younger. But the draft is still there and I may still take one more look at it, although I don't feel under any great urgency to do so.

RITCHIE: Were there political themes to your fiction?

VALEO: The play was set in Hong Kong and concerned the efforts to penetrate the Chinese arms market, and the rivalry between the United States and Japan in that connection. That was the general theme. A twist was that the principal proponent of the American arms company was a woman who had "made" it in a man's world and had come out just as badly as a lot of men. I was also trying to show the breakdown of the structure that had flourished in Hong Kong for a couple of hundred years and how that would have to change. There was also the point that Japan would probably become the main outside stimulus for the China trade and that we would probably withdraw from Asia and our ships would come home so to speak. Those were the basic themes, but the subject didn't lend itself to an emotional treatment, or maybe I wasn't able to give it an emotional treatment at this point in my life. Someday

I might take another look at the draft. I've never even gone back to re-read it, but I did get something down on paper. That seemed to satisfy this inner irritant that has bothered me for all these years to put something down on paper in the form of a play.

RITCHIE: A lot of the journalists who come to Washington feel the urge to write a novel about their experiences. There's something that they can't say in their regular writing that they feel they can say through some form of fiction.

VALEO: Dean Acheson did some fiction writing at the end of his career in government too. I think he wrote some short stories, one of which I read. It was about on par with the way I'd write fiction at this point in my life!

RITCHIE: Well, did you seek institutional connections when you left the Senate?

VALEO: Yes. I was most anxious not to just fold up and stop. So I opened a small office on my own and did some work with the Association of Former Members of Congress, that was the writing part of it, and the conceptualization of studies. The association had no one really in that capacity, so I served them as a consultant. I also did lobby. I lobbied for the United Nations University, which was at that time getting underway in Tokyo. The president of the university, or the rector, was Jim Hester, who had been president of New York University. He came

down and asked me to please help him try to get the United States' promised contribution to the university, which had been held up in Congress for a couple of years. So the two of us really wore out a lot shoe leather walking the corridors here trying to persuade members, particularly in the Senate, to support a small contribution.

The failure to do so had left the State Department embarrassed because however reluctantly they may have been about the idea, they had agreed to try to get some money for it in an effort to encourage a Japanese initiative in international responsibility. After they had encouraged the Japanese, they seemed to fall away from the idea and the Japanese were left high and dry. They had put a lot of money up for it, and then the university looked more like a Japanese gimmick rather than a United Nations University. Hester tried to give the university another slant, not just a campus approach but rather as a hub for worldwide networks of intellectual and scientific specializations which could be brought to bear on specific worldwide problems. I don't think it ever really got off the ground.

We failed to get the contribution. Carl Marcy had tried it previously and he had failed for other reasons. We missed by about two votes, largely because of Chuck Percy, who was a very strong supporter and had taken the lead for us in the Senate. Then on the day of the vote he didn't show up on the floor. He

had an engagement somewhere else, so we failed by about two or three votes. We would have made it had Percy been there. Had we done it in the Senate, it was pretty clear that the House would go along in conference, although they were not prepared to take the initiative.

RITCHIE: Percy was also absent during the Baker-Griffith leadership fight. He was skiing in Europe apparently, and Griffith had counted on his vote.

VALEO: This was probably part of Percy's problem and why he didn't make it again on the last reelection try.

RITCHIE: Did the Senate look any different to you from a lobbyist's point of view?

VALEO: Not really. It came along about the way I expected. I knew the limitations of past Senate friendships. I didn't expect too much. There were one or two I thought I might have persuaded almost on the basis of their trust in my judgment, but I was wrong. There were a number who came through that I really did not expect. One I'm thinking of particularly was [Harry] Byrd, [Jr.] of Virginia. He had been one of the leading and articulate opponents of an appropriation for the university on the earlier attempts. I spoke with him about it and brought Jim Hester in to talk with him. He agreed to reserve judgment. He said, "You know, I've been opposed to this." He did not take the

lead in the second round. I think he voted against it, but he did not get out in front on it. [Dennis] DeConcini was the principal opponent. In a way I blame myself. I went to see him and he was waiting for me to persuade him to drop his opposition to it. I don't think I was as effective as I might have been, although it's hard to tell. I went without Hester. It would have been better had I gone with Hester, because Hester was an evangelist and he could really put the pitch in for the university.

RITCHIE: What does it take to be a good lobbyist on Capitol Hill?

VALEO: It depends on what you're lobbying for in part. If you are lobbying for what amounts to money favors, you just have to have a thick skin on your behind so that you don't mind taking kicks. I think that's the main requirement. And then I think you've got to be someone who does not easily make enemies, who doesn't get his own feelings involved, and who's prepared to do a lot of begging. It's sophisticated begging, as someone has once spoken of a similar occupation, that of trying to get money out of foundations. And one way or another you've got to be able to put thousands of dollars into campaigns that you don't really believe in just to build up the goodwill and the access which might pay off in a vote at some point on something you want which is worth millions of dollars to your client.

My own view is that Charles McC. Mathias is absolutely right: unless we get public financing of campaigns in the United States, we're going to have a government, particularly in the legislative branch, which will grow increasingly corrupt—corrupt in the sense that money will become more and more the dominant factor in deciding how votes are cast. I think TV is primarily responsible for this and I think it's outrageous that we've let an instrument which belongs properly to the entire nation get so far away from any kind of reasonable control by the nation's government. That's the way I see it.

RITCHIE: You mean television advertising?

VALEO: Yes, of course. The need for revenue. I don't mean just the advertising of politicians, that's part of it, but it's only part of it. We've touched on it in other respects as well. I think it has got to be an instrument of public educational and cultural enrichment and entertainment and in that order. It's not enough to have one public station. I think you need a lot more than that, and I think you've got to get some recognition that in political campaigns, this instrument has to be neutral, separated from money entirely. There is no way you can run a commercial television station in that fashion. So until we face that problem squarely, I think we're going to be in trouble, and I think our politics and government will grow increasingly corrupt. I see no alternative to that.

RITCHIE: Did you find that there was any difference in lobbying the Senate than there was in lobbying the House?

VALEO: I personally didn't find a great deal of difficulty. House members usually have more time for you, for one thing. They're much more specialized and much more interested in their specialization and are willing to listen. I didn't have much trouble with access anywhere, really, at that point. It was shortly after I had left and my name was still pretty well known. Most members I think realized I wouldn't be down there wasting their time and mine on something trivial, and this was not trivial. While the money amount was small, the significance of what was involved was, in my judgment, substantial. I'm sorry we didn't win it. I think it would have been a great help in our relations with Japan as well in our whole approach to the U.N.

RITCHIE: Have you had any other lobbying experiences?

VALEO: No, that's it. I've been approached on a number of occasions, including lobbying for Philippine sugar, which I turned down.

RITCHIE: I understand that you continued your international traveling.

VALEO: I did, mostly to Asia. I went to China as a guest of the Chinese government. Spent a week in Beijing as their

guest. This was shortly after Reagan's first victory and they were quite concerned as to what might happen and asked me if I would come and talk to them a little bit about the significance of the election, which I did.

I took my son with me as a beginner for a tour of the Far East, where he had never been before. I wanted him to see it, and I think I aroused an interest in him that he has subsequently followed. He did make it to college, by the skin of his teeth, in a special program at New York University for kids who looked and spoke as though they ought to be in college but whose responses to questions on exams indicated they had little background for college. They had a special program there—a kind of make-up program—that he got into, again by the skin of his teeth, largely because he made such a strong impression on the interviewer.

He told me the story later, he said, "I went in to see the interviewer and he asked me what I was going to do with my future. I said 'I'm going to be a senator.' And he said, 'Oh, you are? What makes you so interested in the Senate?' And I told him about you being the secretary of the Senate and how I'd spent a lot of my life hanging around the Senate. And the interviewer said, 'I'm curious, what does the secretary of the Senate do?'" He said, "I wanted to tell him 'he takes notes,' but instead I said, 'If you want it in a sentence, he's the hundred and first senator.' After that, the fellow said he'd try to get me into the special

course." He did get into it and he was elected in his first year to the New York University Senate as representing this special school of underdeveloped kids, I guess that's the best way to describe them. The plan of the school provided for two years in this special course, which was almost like the hundred great books kind of approach, and if the student made it, then he'd go into the third year of a regular college at the university. If he didn't, they'd give a two-year certificate that he had been there and say good-bye. Well, he made it, and he graduated with a B.A. with honors.

RITCHIE: I can tell you're really proud of him.

VALEO: Yes, I had my fingers crossed for him. I didn't know which way he was going to go. He could have gotten into drugs or something like that, like so many of the kids did. He really had no interest in studies in high school. Now he's in law school at Boston University and he'll be finishing this year.

RITCHIE: Well, he got an unusual education, growing up in the Senate.

VALEO: He did. He used to come down very frequently, especially when the Senate was in session late and he'd hang around. When he was little he had everybody naturally wound around his finger. And he'd break the typewriters and steal the supplies, but he'd do it all with a good sense of humor so that

nobody could really take after him and give him a hard time. He got to be known a good deal around the Senate. He didn't work there as a page. I didn't think that was proper. Also, I saw in some instances what the consequences of kids working as pages are and I did not like what I saw. I never believed in the page system. I thought it was one of those things, unlike the barbershop, which you didn't really need to keep for its historical curiosity value. I really think the system is bad and I think it's bad for the kids and I think it's bad for the Senate.

When the question came up of adding girls to the pages I simply thought that would multiply the original error by another factor. I can remember Everett Jordan as chairman of the Rules Committee on this. He took the matter up with me and with the majority leader and several other members. He was really very reluctant. He didn't want one of these kids getting in trouble, that was his main objection. He was in favor, I think, of getting rid of the whole system too. But it was too much ingrained and it was too much a perk that had some meaning back in the states. You could always give the appointment to the child of one of your favorite constituents and consolidate his support. Jacob Javits was pushing the idea of girl pages. Jordan finally went along with it on one condition, that if senators were going to bring girl pages in, the senators who brought them in would have to be totally and individually responsible for their appointees. There

was discussion at that time of setting up a page residence to go with the page school. That was something that started on the House side. John McCormack was especially interested, and some senators had mentioned it, but it never got to that. I think it's lucky that it didn't. We don't really need a West Point for congressional pages.

RITCHIE: As secretary you were responsible for the page school, weren't you?

VALEO: No, that came under the sergeant at arms, and I did not seek to have that shifted in any way at that time. I really did not want the responsibility. The District school system supplied the teachers for the pages. And the school had a very fine reputation. But it's hard for kids to get up and go to school for four or five hours and then work for six or seven. It's not an easy task. They are pretty much on their own. It has a lot of drawbacks.

RITCHIE: I wanted to ask you about some of the projects that you worked on in your post-Senate career. You did the book on comparing the American Congress and the Japanese Diet. What were the origins of that project?

VALEO: Well, I always felt that I personally knew too little about how the Diet functioned and I was interested in Asia. We would take groups of senators over to Japan from time to time

on a mission and I realized that they knew nothing about the Japanese system, and they read into it the same kinds of concepts that we have of ourselves and our own legislative body. I knew that was wrong, that it was misleading. So it occurred to me when I had time to think about it that there would be a very valid basis for doing comparative studies, not only of the Japanese legislature but of a number of other significant countries in terms of our relationships. This was especially true if the Congress intended to play an increasing role in foreign relations, which seemed to be the trend that didn't look as though it was going to be reversed. Jed Johnson and I discussed this, Jed Johnson is the executive director of the Association of Former Members, Cale Boggs had introduced me to him. Cale was president of the association at the time. He knew me well, and he suggested to Jed that I could be of help to them.

So we presented the idea to the Japan-United States Friendship Commission. We were able to get a small grant to pursue it. Then I had connections in Japan with a research institute that had done some work on Congress and was interested in Congress. We got them to line it up in Japan. I designed the studies for comparative purposes, trying to put them in really comparative terms. We had papers prepared in Japan through the Japanese research group, and then we put together a group of writers who were capable of handling the specific papers on

the United States Congress. We had an advisory group of some well-known scholars on Japan and the Congress. Out of that came a series of papers on the Japanese Diet and on comparative aspects of the United States Congress. We then took up the papers in discussions at a subsequent meeting, using both sitting members and former members of the Diet and the Congress. The results were, I thought, a very effective comparative survey. That book is now, I guess, in its second or third edition. It's been translated into Japanese and is used quite widely there and here.

RITCHIE: I was wondering which way you thought the people were more curious. Do you think the Japanese are more curious about the American system or vice versa?

VALEO: At that time the Japanese were. I think they know an awful lot about us now. We are now, I believe, showing a rapidly increasing interest in Japan. I don't know how far our knowledge of the Japanese Diet has gone, but I would still give that book out as a basic handbook for anybody who wants to understand what happens in the Japanese political system and the United States system. I think it does point up the things that are meaningful in our terms, and those which are not, and the limitations of any Japanese or United States government.

RITCHIE: The American Congress is so different than most parliamentary governments. Do you find that there is a problem of

perception between a parliament that has executive functions and the American Congress which is so divorced from the executive branch?

VALEO: This has always interested me as a problem and I did personal research on the subject. You find that the American institution of divided powers were adopted, oh, maybe 90 percent of the institutions in the original concept, were adopted from the British system as it existed in the eighteenth century, which was, of course, the time we began to move away from the crown. The various colonial governments were essentially designed from the same British pattern. We didn't have the equivalent of the House of Lords, but we had the governors' councils, which were something like the lords in the American colonies. What we started from as a nation was basically the British system of the eighteenth century elaborated and modified in the original structural design for our system of government.

After the breakaway of the colonies, the British system continued to evolve into what eventually amounted to the absolute dominance of the House of Commons with the executive power shifting from the crown into the House of Commons. Whereas the American system tended to atrophy in the form of the eighteenth century, that is, as a system of divided powers. The pressures on us were not that urgent to consolidate authority and responsibility as was the case in Britain. We were a big country.

We had lots of surplus and room for error, or for inadequate or ineffective functioning, without the whole falling apart. The British were no longer in that position, so their modifications came as a necessity. I have used this explanation for those whose systems were modeled at a later date essentially after the British system as it had worked into parliamentary dominance. Putting the comparison in historic perspective makes it a lot clearer for people to understand. This is especially true of Europeans. If you describe it in these terms, they know what you're talking about. They can see it a lot more clearly. Otherwise, it's very difficult for them to understand what amounts to a three and sometimes a four-part government, when the two houses of Congress are not getting along.

RITCHIE: I recall that Senator Fulbright used to bemoan the fact that we didn't have more of a British system, where the Foreign Relations Committee would actually be more involved in the foreign affairs of the country than it was.

VALEO: He would not have liked it had we had the British system, because by the time the British system had evolved to where it is now, the parliamentary committees had lost most of their significance, whereas ours remain as they were in the nineteenth century—highly significant. One of the reasons for evolutionary reforms of the British system was the runaway committees of the Commons. To a great extent they did what they

pleased until the advent of party responsibility. So I don't think he would have liked it quite as much as he thought he would.

RITCHIE: So the value of comparative studies sometimes is to appreciate what you have.

VALEO: Precisely, and to understand better what you have. In some ways it was an education for us and for our people to go back and to reexamine our system in terms of how it looked from another country. It's a very useful device. I'd like to see more of it done. The association has tried it in connection with Germany, but the study was primarily designed by executive branch people and they don't fully appreciate the problem of what it takes to make things clear to a legislative body, so I don't know how that study will come out. It has not been printed yet.

RITCHIE: Did you see any value in the Interparliamentary Union trips that were made, in the relations between the Congress and the various parliaments?

VALEO: Some. I only went to one or two of them. Darrell St. Claire used to handle that. All of these legislative exchanges and contacts, again in the context of the time, had value because they exposed members of Congress to other systems, other ways of thinking. If you keep in mind that in the first twenty years after the war, our only exposure to other countries to speak of was derived from the World War II experience. That

really was inadequate because we were overwhelmingly present in other countries at that time, and their governments meant relatively little because we had all the military power and later the economic power that was going to save them. So it didn't seem of any necessity to us to learn very much about their governments or anything else. We were still emerging from our own period of isolationism. I think there was a Gallup Poll that showed that right after Pearl Harbor, 70 or 80 percent of the people in the United States still didn't know that the country of India was in Asia. That gives you some measure. Anything that helped to move members of Congress abroad, to me, made sense. That's no longer necessarily the case, but at that time I think it was very desirable to encourage it in every possible way.

The congressional travel then created few problems. There was very little inclination on the part of members at the time to presume powers in foreign affairs, and to presume capabilities which they did not have. So it was essentially an educational process which put them, when they returned to the United States, in a better position to make better-informed judgments in foreign policy. They did not become so involved in detail as to intrude on the powers of the presidency. That has changed. The congressional traveling now is in quite a different vein. Today's congressmen and staff are people who often presume to deal with the kind of details in their contacts abroad that cannot be within

the purview of Congress without it being essentially a serious encroachment on the executive branch's prerogatives.

Now, if we're going to move toward an expansion of congressional power, if we're going to move towards a parliamentary system as Mr. Fulbright would have had us do, then that's different, but then you have to have a structure within the Congress which makes clear the lines of responsibility. It must also be a structure that delineates one committee's powers as a very small fraction of the total congressional powers, and each house has a set share of the constitutional powers of the government. Moreover, you've got to move the executive power, as a practical matter, into the Congress and reduce the president to a ceremonial figure. What you have now, in effect, is the staff of the president, that is the executive departments, moving very often independently of the president and making its own deals with the committees on the Hill. Somewhere in this process the integration of our policies has completely disappeared. You have a government now not by four bodies but by forty or fifty committees plus forty or fifty departments or subdepartments in the executive branch. Instead of moving towards an integrated parliamentary system, we've had a further fragmentation of a very serious nature.

RITCHIE: You've spent a lot of your time in recent years working on things connected to the Philippines. I noticed in your

files that your trips to the Philippines go back to the 1960s. In 1969 you were Senator Mansfield's representative at the inauguration of Ferdinand Marcos.

VALEO: Even earlier. My first trip to the Philippines was in 1952, out of the Foreign Relations Committee with Bourke Hickenlooper. That was my first exposure. At that time, it was a terribly war torn country. As Senator Inouye noted in a recent speech on the floor, Manila was the most devastated city of the war. It suffered really greatly, and very little was done to repair it. The initial magnanimous United States gestures to the Philippines, which included independence and war damage compensation, were also coupled with some things that were designed to protect both our military interests and our economic interests in the situation. We paid off in a kind of odd way the sacrifices of the Philippines in terms of the common effort in the war. The money was distributed randomly, and those who had lost more got more naturally. It had a certain rationale, but in terms of the situation which then existed in the Philippines, all it did was to build back the inequitable economic structure which had existed there during the colonial period. It made the newly independent country very heavily dependent on us in the early period. I think that had something to do with their rather slow recovery from the war and their slow development. This is not the whole picture, but it was part of it. We can't divorce ourselves from our own

role. We have some responsibility for what happened, even though we had divested ourselves of political control.

I saw the devastation in the first visit. I didn't know much more about it than that. I had no particular interest in the Philippines at that time, except for some research at the Library of Congress. Then I went back again during the governments of Garcia, Macapagal and one or two others of the earlier presidents. I really became interested in the country at the time the Marcoses came to power. I use the term in plural because they were a political team. We met them on a trip shortly after his first presidential victory, which was in 1964. We were coming back from a trip, Muskie was on that trip, Inouye was on that trip. We had been around the world but the trip centered on Vietnam. The Marcoses were young and had engendered great enthusiasm in the country. He was then the president-elect. We had a fellow named Bill Blair as ambassador. He was a Kennedy friend and had mis-guessed the election. The embassy assumed that Macapagal was going to win, and I guess the C.I.A. had thrown whatever financial support we were putting into it to Macapagal. He was a known quantity and we wanted to work with him. Instead, Marcos won in a very unexpected victory in that first election.

Well, that was an eye-opener to me. The embassy in Manila never forgave Marcos for winning the election. The quarrel with Marcos began at that point when he won that election. It did not

happen just over human rights later on. This is a much, much later interpretation of the difficulty. But that experience, going out to the embassy subsequently and knowing a lot of the subsequent ambassadors, and talking with a lot of the people who moved in and out of the embassy in that period impressed something on me very deeply—every embassy has its own personality. I'm talking now about almost the building. If the walls could speak they would all say a different thing but it would be the same thing over a long period of time no matter how the personnel changed. The attitudes which were formulated in the original moment of creation of the embassy seem to persist right through up until years and years later.

I'm thinking now of the first time I went to the Philippines. The embassy was in the hands of an Admiral Spruance. The embassy had all the characteristics of a high commissioner's office. They expected everything that happened in the Philippines to clear through the embassy still, even though at this point the Philippines were four or five years beyond independence. The whole attitude in the embassy was that this is the core and this is the center of Philippine life, which is clearly the kind of thing that would have happened in a high commissioner's office. Even the costumes at that point were white linen, which were again a carry over from the days of the high commissioner. That was a characteristic uniform of imperialism in Asia. You found it in Vietnam,

you found it in Hong Kong, you found it in Indonesia. Wherever you went, the foreign men wore white linen suits, which were good only for about a half a day and they would have to be laundered. The United States Embassy definitely had the personality of the office of a high commissioner. There was something known as Philippine independence, but to the embassy personnel that seemed almost an irrelevant factor. Our people, at least in their own minds, were still running the show.

At this point, the Filipinos, if they were rich enough to have anything to do with the embassy, also wore the white linen suit. But they had begun to change to the barong, which was the symbol of national dress and which Marcos wore exclusively. At the first time at embassy functions you would see Filipinos showing up in barongs, which are those embroidered long shirts that you don't put in your pants. Over the years after that, there was a slow modification of the embassy, changes from essentially a high commissioner's office in which the core of everything that happened in the Philippines really had to center on the embassy. I think that kind of thinking was challenged for the first time by the election of the Marcoses.

The Marcoses were young, first of all. The president was in his forties and she was probably thirty-five at the time. They had worked very hard to get elected—in our sense of the term "get elected." They had done a lot of campaigning up and down the

island chain, they'd organized very well for it. And they came in with a lot of promise of a new Philippines, essentially a more nationalist-oriented Philippines. They immediately ran into what you run into when you come in with anything new; you run into what's entrenched. The entrenchments were not only the United States Embassy but also those Filipinos who had been, in effect, the closest friends of the embassy, who were not necessarily the friends of the Marcoses. So as far as the embassy was concerned the Marcoses started out with two strikes against them right off the bat. They were to be regarded with high suspicion.

At this point the embassy was still wearing—I guess it had begun to shift to business suits at this point. The white linen gradually disappeared because it had become recognized as a kind of mark of the old imperialism which presumably was disappearing throughout Asia. So business suits were in order. But very few people in the embassy were ever caught in a barong, although it's perfectly good in that climate. It's a nice cool kind of clothing and rather neat looking. There was always a lot of gossip and titillation over the elaborately embroidered barongs that were worn by Marcos. The hostility toward Marcos was very apparent in Ambassador Blair, who had called the election wrong, basing his estimates, I would think, on his staff's estimate of the situation. Then embassy personnel began to suggest that Marcos had won only because he had spent so much money. But I suspect

that his opponent, Macapagal, must have had at least as much. I think his victory had very little to do with money. The Marcoses represented the new spirit of nationalism, and they represented it very well. They also represented a younger generation of leadership, United States educated and less Spanish oriented, if you will, "Filipino firsters" who were the emerging political leaders of the nation.

The revolutionaries and outlaws up in the hills were there even then. In fact, they had been there for hundreds of years. They were the products of periodic revolts on the part of farmers against oppression from a number of sources including the church—from economic oppression. The movements of rebellion in the Philippines are not new, they did not begin with the Communists, or with Marcos; they began a long, long time ago. The names changed, but essentially they derive from a number of factors in the Philippines. The armed lawlessness has to do with serious economic difficulties, and landlordism, with great family feuds, the importance of which, again, is not understood in the United States, and local injustices. The Philippine system had many parallels in old Spain. We did very little to disturb that in our period of control of the country. Instead, we added our own layer of complications and sources of lawlessness.

Marcos told me this personally. I had mentioned that I was going to Mindinao, and he said, "The problem in Mindinao is essen-

tially one you people left for us." I said, "How is, that?" He said, "Well, originally when the Americans came, Mindinao was Moslem, and the Moslems had no concept of land ownership. They were tribal groupings and the land was owned in common. There was plenty of land, there was no problem, there was no pressure on the land. If you wanted to farm, all you did was to take a piece of the tribal land and farm it. Nobody ever questioned your right to do that." He said, "But when the Americans came, the first thing they did when they took over the islands, when they got to Mindinao was to ask 'who owns this land?' They wanted to register it in some name. People looked around and said 'nobody owns it, it's anybody's.'" He said, "That was inadmissible under the American system. Somebody had to own the land. What they did was to register it in the names of the tribal chiefs."

So the tribal chiefs became the owners of the land from the point of view of American record keeping. When the pressures of immigration started to come down from the other islands and higher birth rates reached Mindinao, he explained "Christians and others came down to buy land. And who did they buy it from? They bought it from the chiefs. When they started to move into the land, the rest of the Moslems said 'This is our tribal land, you have no business here.' And they said, 'Well, I've got a piece of paper. I bought it.'" He said, "And that was the beginning of the major Moslem problem in Mindinao." Later great plantations were formed

too in this way to grow export crops. Obviously the pressures would have happened in any event, but it would have been more difficult and it might have slowed the process of land transfer which is a major source of rural violence in Mindinao.

I'm sort of rambling on this. I want to focus it, but I'm not sure how to focus it. There was also a social aspect of the breakdown of our relationships with Marcos, which happened during [G. Mennen] "Soapy" Williams' time. This is where Mrs. Marcos came into the problem. Mrs. Marcos is a very attractive, very charming woman. She was a very beautiful woman as a younger woman. She still is, but as a younger woman she was extraordinarily beautiful. And she was very talented. She was Miss Manila, I think, in some year, or Miss Philippines. But she was also a very astute and activist politician, Philippine style. The press paints her as an extravagant, over-indulged jet-setter. But I've seen her in black dresses going around among poor Filipinos and knowing exactly what needs to be done in a political sense among poor Filipinos.

To appreciate somebody like Mrs. Marcos, you really have to appreciate Philippine society. It is an extraordinary mixture of an original Malay base, well-integrated with early waves of Chinese migration, and a very powerful overlay of Spanish cultural values, eighteenth and nineteenth century cultural values from Spain. Then finally there is the powerful American input of the

twentieth century, vastly intensified as a result of World War II and its aftermath. All of this is mixed together. When Mrs. Marcos is in Europe, she is the height of elegance, which is straight out of the Spanish background. When she's on the stump, she's the Philippine equivalent of an Eleanor Roosevelt. When she's dealing with social welfare work, which is again one of her strong points, she's like a crusading nun from the churches. Her concern and her ability to move among the very poor is extraordinary. But she is also a highly competitive woman and a driving woman who in twenty years brought about a major transformation in the metropolitan area of Manila.

I think in that early period the comparisons were very evident between Jack and Jackie Kennedy and the Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos in the Philippines. I think it became almost a kind of unspoken rivalry. "If they can do it, we can do it better" kind of thing for Imelda Marcos. Probably this was a reaction to the humiliations of the American imperial period in the Philippines. People forget that that period was not a happy one in all respects for Filipinos. In order to pacify the Philippines in the early period, it took 150 thousand American troops. These were used—not against the Spaniards but against the Filipinos, who were in high revolt. The province of Samar, for example, suffered greatly as a result of the American occupation where an American commander pursued a scorched-earth

policy. The devastation there was something like the My Ly incident in Vietnam visited on a whole province. Samar never really recovered. It is still the most backward province in the Philippines.

So we did some very bad things in the Philippines, along with some of the things we like to pat ourselves on the back for which are genuine and valid. I would think the most important of these was the contribution of American educators to the islands. The transfer of American constitutional values and legal concepts, as distinct from the transfer of American political institutions, was also important. However, the political institutions transferred into the Philippines at that time were those characteristic of Tammany Hall which was flourishing in this period, 1900 to 1910. As in the aftermath of any war, there were a lot of carpetbaggers and other seedy characters who went to seek a quick fortune in the new colony. Many of them introduced the political and other practices of our big cities of the early 1900s. The American takeover from Spain also brought a new branch of the Catholic Church in at that point, which was essentially, I think, the New York based Catholic Church. Various protestant sects also joined in contesting what had previously been an exclusive Spanish Catholic missionary field.

During the Spanish period the persistent theme in Philippine history is the struggle between the temporal power and the

spiritual power for dominance of Philippine affairs. The church and the Spanish military governors struggled with one another for power over the poor, hapless Filipino, who was caught in the middle. The temporal power at that time came out of the Spanish government, and it was military. The religious power came out of the Spanish church, not directly from Rome. Because of the arrangements between the Spanish church and the Vatican; the Spanish kings, I believe had the power to control the appointments of Spanish cardinals and bishops. It was an exception, as I recall, in the Catholic hierarchy's usual practices.

The Philippine novels of Jose Rizal in the nineteenth century depict this struggle between the church and the temporal power for control of the country. That still persists. In its contemporary form, the Filipino Cardinal Jaime Sin, who loves to speak of his house as the "House of Sin" is its personification. He's a Filipino, but he's essentially carrying on the same historic struggle between the temporal power—which is now a Philippine-based power as personified by President Marcos—and the church. I think this is one of the underlying aspects of what we are dealing with in this situation.

It is not a recent development. Very early in the game, within the first three or four years of Marcos' first term, I had Jesuits coming in to see me at the secretary's office complaining about the deteriorating conditions in the Philippines. Now, this

is in the first three or four years when there was a lot of hope. These were American Jesuits who had been working with Philippine conferees and I suspect they sensed their own positions gradually being undermined by what might be called the stimulation of "Philippinization" by the promising Marcos administration. What we're seeing now in political strife in the Philippines is, in part, a reflection of this background. There are other factors, but the church-state tension is certainly a part of it.

RITCHIE: You also mentioned Soapy Williams.

VALEO: Oh, that's the social part of it. Soapy Williams went out there as ambassador. And Soapy Williams was the first U.S. ambassador to put on a barong. He went up and down the islands campaigning as though he were running for governor of Michigan. It was a little perplexing as to why he was running for office so vigorously in the Philippines. I don't think Filipinos disliked him per se, they just thought he was some sort of an odd ball. They couldn't quite figure out what he was trying to do. His wife clashed with Imelda Marcos immediately for the feminine leadership of Manila society, if you will. That apparently was a factor of the burgeoning hostility with the embassy towards Mrs. Marcos.

I have this second hand, but I was told that Mrs. Marcos was beginning to make a collection of Chinese antiquities which were

being unearthed in the Philippines and was filling Malacanon with these treasures. Again at the embassy, not to be outdone, Mrs. Williams was also buying a lot of these things. The Philippine Congress in the meantime had passed a law against the export of antiquities, which apparently was unknown to Mrs. Williams or ignored by her. She then decided that she was going to hold an auction of these things among the American community to raise money for charity. She did, and of course the people who bought them wanted to take them home. She was accused then of trying to take out Philippine artifacts. So there was a flap. It was petty stuff, but it fed the growing antagonism in the embassy towards Marcos.

He was the first president of the Philippines to be reelected. He invited Mansfield to the second inauguration in 1969, and Mansfield sent me instead to represent him. I had good connections at the United States Embassy at the time. The prevailing wisdom at the embassy at that point—again they had misread the election and expected him to be defeated—was that his victory was due to fraud and the expenditure of vast amounts of money. They couldn't understand how anybody could get reelected to the presidency in the Philippines. It had never happened before. In the second Marcos administration the unsuitability of the political institutions that were left behind by us began to become apparent. For example Marcos had tried to get a land

reform underway, something almost everybody acknowledged was desperately needed. But it was tied up in the Philippine Congress for years and years. For the four years of his first term he could get nowhere with the land reform. The problem meanwhile got worse and worse.

You had almost a completely bought legislative body at the time. You had a press which was as corrupt as it was free. You could get an article to condemn any politician you wanted written for you at any price you wanted to pay. It was called the freest press in the world, and that's true in the sense that the *New York Post* reflects the freest press in the United States. It was about on that same or even a lower level of sensationalism. That was true of just about the whole press in the Philippines. There was nothing else in the field except that, with one possible exception, the *Manila Times*, which apparently tried to do something more responsible.

Well, I was watching the situation at the time in a number of ways, mostly by first-hand observations and discussions in Manila, almost always with Mansfield. An exception was the inauguration when he couldn't leave and he asked me to go in his place. Henry Byrode was ambassador at the time martial law was declared. Byrode may have stimulated or encouraged Marcos to invoke it because he believed the government was about to break down. A constitutional convention had been in session for some time

because the Philippine politicians recognized that they had to do something with the form of government which we left there. The convention was getting slowly nowhere. Well, it had made some progress but then it had bogged down. The government was totally strapped. There was no land reform, which was the key to the problem of maintaining stability, especially in Luzon province. Manila and other cities had become centers of crime and violence on a very large scale.

In view of what happened in the Philippines in that period I worry sometimes about what happens now in Congress. That is especially true when I see the government being conducted by continuing resolutions, repeated rises in debt ceiling limitations and other stop-gaps. We're not talking about comparable situations of course, but you catch echoes of the same kind of thing which was at that point endemic in the Philippine government. Marcos was stopped from bringing about the changes that he had promised. There was some road building, probably with U.S. aid funds, and a few things of that sort, which were positive and constructive. But the real need was land reform, and nothing was happening. Meanwhile you had a great growth of crime in the cities, particularly Manila. Manila became a totally unsafe city. There seemed to be nothing that could be done to check the deterioration. The country was gradually slipping into total chaos. It was ripe for some kind of martial law.

It's my impression that Byrode encouraged Marcos to invoke it. He may have done so without instructions, because he was that kind of a man. He was a golfing companion of Marcos whom he liked. Marcos liked him in return. He was also a general; Byrode was the youngest general in World War II; he was an air force general. So I think these things added up to that moment. My guess is that Marcos may well have done it without Byrode's encouragement, but Byrode certainly did nothing to discourage it.

RITCHIE: Byrode had also been ambassador to a number of countries like Egypt and South Africa that were somewhat authoritarian democracies.

VALEO: Yes, that's right. He was a very interesting personality, a very colorful personality.

Martial law was declared, and I think it probably had almost universal approval in the Philippines, except among some opposition politicians. In the first week, Marcos put out an edict that the people had to turn in weapons, and anyone who didn't was subsequently going to be subject to death penalties and so forth. Several million pieces of arms showed up at police and fire stations in the first week after martial law. That's how bad it was, really. Much of this was a carry over from World War II, arms abandoned there by us and the Japanese. The declaration of martial law also made it possible for Marcos to dissolve the

legislature and to shut off the press. That was, I think, the beginning of the hostility of the U.S. press to him. Among the papers he closed down was the *Manila Times*. I don't think the U.S. press cared so much about the rest of the papers, but the *Manila Times* was something special. They kind of looked on it as the nearest reflection of American journalism in the Philippines. There were a lot of personal friendships involved between the American press people and the *Manila Times* people. I think that action won Marcos the undying enmity of the press in the United States.

So far as I can recall, there were few complaints from the American embassy or from the United States government on the declaration of martial law. No second guessing, nothing of the sort. It was generally recognized that this was going to be, and it was a popular move in the Philippines, there was no question about that. There was a curfew, I remember being out in it one time. It ran from about midnight to four in the morning. It was regarded as a great blessing in many Philippine households because it brought the men back home. That was the case until some clever operators found out that they could also offer overnight accommodations along with the bar and other amenities in many places, so you wouldn't have to worry about the curfew. There was a lot of joking about it. It was a mild kind of thing. There were no deaths. There was one execution in the whole period, a Chinese

drug manufacturer right in Manila, who had four factories in Manila. They made an example of him. But Marcos, interestingly enough, has opposed the death penalty. There have been no executions in the Philippines during his regime for routine crimes. He opposes that as a matter of principle. He's basically an American-trained lawyer and his views are essentially those of American jurisprudence. Again, I think to see him otherwise is a serious misreading of the situation in the Philippines.

But I'm not here to apologize for Marcos. I don't want to do that, except that I think some balance is needed. He's not some sort of monster. You're not dealing with an El Salvador kind of situation. You're not dealing with a South African kind of situation. As a matter of fact, the Marcos government has been much more ready to put pressure and sanctions on South Africa than we have over the years at the U.N. Marcos is a Filipino phenomenon. His government is a mixed thing. And it can't be divorced from its Filipino background. If we read our values into the situation, and only our values, it can look monstrous. But then many, many governments look monstrous in that context, including both Chinese governments, Pakistan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and wherever. Looking back over the various countries I've known in the world, if I had to be caught in a place for the rest of my life, I can think of a lot of others than the Philippines that I would be much more fearful of repression, Indonesia, for example.

In terms of repression, cruelty, and ruthlessness, Indonesia is worse than the Philippines, and I use the word worse cautiously. It's infinitely worse. Thousands of people have died there as a result of political repression. Singapore is probably just as bad, or worse in terms of its repressive rules and regulations. Hong Kong never had any sort of representative government to begin with. Thailand is probably a crueler government, and probably at least as repressive. But we single out the Philippines, and you ask yourself: well, why? And that's when you begin to wonder whether we've gotten over our own past imperial experience, or our imperial thrust. I think we've gotten over it in terms of the gross exploitation of other people. But it's taken on a new slant. We almost experience it in reverse through their gross exploitation of us. Those who exploit us the most, providing they also permit us the illusion of omnipotent power which comes with an imperialist bent of mind, why we seem most satisfied with.

The Philippines is moving in a political sense, I don't mean just under Marcos, I think the whole trend of the country is towards a genuinely independent national structure, which will be comparable to others in Asia, which it was not before Marcos. This I think is what we find difficult to handle. We do have more power in the Philippines, largely as a carry over of our past experience with them, than we have in Indonesia, or in Singapore,

or even in Bangkok. I think this troubles us. We need to have this place where we can tell someone what to do for their own good as we see it, and to feel good ourselves about it. Tie that in with some less amorphous interests, like military bases, and the fact that we are the largest investors in the Philippines—then add the huge Filipino community in the United States. All of this produces a very strong tie. It's a love-hate kind of tie, but it's a tie. We have not yet learned to live fully with an independent Philippines and, perhaps, neither have the Filipinos.

Unconsciously, at least those Americans who make official decisions still think in terms of that pre-embassy period in Manila, they think as high commissioners, with anything good or bad that happens in the Philippines ultimately passing through us. They act as though what happens in the Philippines will be the result of what we do or what we do not do. Well, that is now a formula for disaster in the same sense that it was in Vietnam. The only explanation for why we to take more note of human rights violations in the Philippines as against Indonesia, or a dozen other countries where violations are far more rampant, the only explanation seems to me to be in terms of the imperial thrust in our history. If our interest were only the military bases, we would recognize that we are doing everything to ensure that we shall have trouble with these bases in the years ahead. Our best prospects of keeping the bases is to get ourselves out the middle

of Philippine politics rather than into it, because if you pick the wrong faction in the process of involving yourself in internal Philippine politics, there's almost a certainty that you will have to give up the bases at some point.

So to me, a sensible policy on the Philippines now would be first of all to make a firm determination on the essentiality of the bases. If they're not essential, get the hell out of there as soon as possible. Get out without any question. If they are that essential—and I'm not at all sure they are, but if they are—then your best bet is to pay rent for them. If we need them, if they are essential to our defense; we do what we are doing in Spain which got us through the Franco period and got us into a republican successor without losing the bases; we do what we did in Greece—pay rent—which got us through the colonels into a socialist situation, and we're still there. You do it because you stay out of their politics, not because you get into them. So if there's any hope of keeping those bases in the long run, through a collapse of the Marcos regime or whatever, it's to minimize our involvement in internal politics. Instead we're moving in exactly the opposite direction.

This is what happened to us in Vietnam. Instead of staying out of the internal politics of the country and deciding whether we really ought to be in Vietnam or not, we attributed our problems in Vietnam to an inadequate government in the form of

Diem, and we got ourselves up to our ears in their politics and ultimately into their war. In both cases we did it from what we thought were very decent motivations. We needed a more representative government, a more responsive government, and we're doing the same thing now with Marcos. But the reasons why we're dissatisfied with Marcos, in my judgment, may be deeper than simply whether Marcos is a good government or a bad government, they go back to these longer roots that we've been discussing.

RITCHIE: You've drawn parallels to Vietnam and to Diem. Why do you think we've been unable to draw lessons from our experiences, especially an experience as traumatic as the one in Vietnam?

VALEO: I think it's the imperial impulse. We have not yet overcome that. This has troubled me from the time I was young, that our attitude towards other countries is one essentially of superiority. It's one of our national attitudes, we have others, some redeeming, but the attitude I'm talking about now is one of superiority, that American society, American ideals, American business, American capabilities are essentially better than anyone else. A certain amount of that is inherent in any nationalism. But I think it gets us into trouble when it goes beyond what's reasonable, such as saluting the flag and feeling a certain amount of emotion and pride when you do that. I think if you go too far beyond that, if you begin to see yourself as some

sort of conqueror or savior, you're in trouble. And we see ourselves at different times in both roles.

RITCHIE: Last year, in the presidential debates, President Reagan suggested that the alternative was between Marcos and a Communist takeover of the Philippines. Is there any other alternative that you can see?

VALEO: Not among the orthodox politicians, those who are running against him now, and from whom we have been hearing most of the criticism. The Cory [Corazon] Aquino-Laurel ticket is the church selection, Jaime Sin's selection. He thinks you can beat Marcos with a return to morality, if you will.

RITCHIE: I was asking to get your opinion of whether the American government had any alternative than just to back the administration that is in power at this stage?

VALEO: The American government is in a dilemma. The bureaucracy, not necessarily Reagan, would like to see somebody from the opposition beat Marcos in an election. I don't know how much money they're willing to put into it, but they would certainly like to see him defeated. I think they have wanted that all along. I don't think it just started with this election. When I say "they," I'm talking about the bureaucracy basically, not who happens to be in the White House in any given moment. That changes, but the bureaucratic continuity of policy remains,

and colors what we do in terms of our relationships with that country. I think they have never wanted Marcos, from the very time he was first elected, which is quite contrary to the popular conception. They have been able to live with Marcos even though they didn't want him, but they realize he's getting older and they're now deathly afraid that his wife will take over. I suspect that's the great fear, and if they like anybody less than Marcos, they like Mrs. Marcos even less. I'm talking now again about the bureaucracy.

So they look around among the opposition. Well, you can't look up in the hills, which is probably the only bona fide opposition in the country, because at least many of them—not all, but some of those—are really alienated by very real grievances. They have grievances against local chieftains who exploit them miserably. There are some up in the northern part of Luzon who are concerned about dam building, because it's going to flood their centuries-old terraces and that sort of thing. Those are legitimate grievances which an effective government would have dealt with, and which have only been partially dealt with by the Philippine government. That's not to fault that government necessarily, the problems are difficult and they don't have the resources. But people get hurt, and if they pick up guns and go up in the hills, at least you can understand that kind of opposition. That's what's generally called the Communist threat.

Well, in the hills there are others, the result of family feuds. Somebody takes the local mayor's seat and does some damage to a family, so those family members take off to the hills 'till they can get back and shoot the offending mayor. This is very much a part of the pattern of Philippine violence. There are still others in the hills who are highwaymen; anything that comes along the road they'll just hold up and take. There are many of them. They talk about fifteen thousand and twenty thousand Communists. The numbers are meaningless and so is the description. They go up and down depending upon factors which have nothing to do with ideology.

I personally think that unless we recognize that we are dealing not with one unified country but a country that is only gradually moving towards a concept of one nation, we are lost in this situation. Much of the difficulty comes from the very fragmented aspects of the society. Each region and sub-region very often have their own particular problems that give rise to the violence. It's not all just the opposition to Marcos per se. As a matter of fact, you very rarely read any New People's Army statements against Marcos. They'll say that he can't do anything about the situation in the country; even if he wanted to, only we can do it. They have no great gripe against him personally, that isn't what it is. It's much deeper. It's against local conditions, economic hopelessness, and oppression.

RITCHIE: What has your role been? Have you been a consultant?

VALEO: No. I've seen Marcos maybe three times in the last seven or eight years, and then only briefly and just by accident. I've seen her about the same. No, my role has been primarily in connection with her brother, who is an old friend. The friendship goes back twenty years. He has widespread interests in the Philippines, which have come partly as a result of the Marcos' government's control of office, partly because he happens to be a very capable man. So I go over and I consult with him, without pay, in terms of United States-Philippine relations. I think some of it probably filters into the palace and may have some influence on what policies they adopt. I'm not sure of that, but I would think it might have some. That's basically it.

RITCHIE: Have you tried to advise people here in Washington about the Philippines?

VALEO: Nobody's ever asked me. It's as simple of that. And I don't volunteer it.

RITCHIE: I read an article the other day about Senator [John] Melcher, who has become very interested in the Philippines.

VALEO: Yes, now he has several reasons for that. First of all he's in the tradition of Mansfield who was very interested.

Also, the Philippines is a big buyer of Montana wheat, and that's an important element in his interest. It's a perfectly legitimate kind of state interest, really.

RITCHIE: I noted the Montana connection, and I wondered if you were in any way advising Melcher?

VALEO: No; as a matter of fact I was asked to go up and see him the other day and explain to him why he should support a larger Philippine sugar quota, and I said, "Well, I'll be glad to talk to him if he calls me. But I won't go to see him otherwise." The request was not from a Filipino, but from one of their American lobbyists.

RITCHIE: That's been your policy in general, not to interfere?

VALEO: Yes, unless I have something that's a really burning issue and I think somebody's being done an injustice like [Mark] Hatfield, I'll write a letter once in a while. If I think Byrd does something good, like vote for the Panama Treaty, I'll write him a letter. But that's unusual. I don't do a lot of that.

RITCHIE: Do you see anybody in Washington getting a good grip on what's happening in the Philippines?

VALEO: No, because people in this city are too much in a hurry, and you can't get a grip on a situation as complex as that in a hurry. It's easier to reduce it to a human rights problem and feel good about upholding human rights, and go back to your constituents and tell them "I'm all for human rights in the Philippines." No, I don't think so. I think there are some signs that some of the scholars are now beginning to look a little more deeply into the Philippine situation. But it's still on a scholarly level; it's not in this government yet and not in the press yet.

RITCHIE: It does seem that with the latest developments over the reinstatement of General Ver, it's quite clear the Marcos administration doesn't really care about what the American government thinks. It would have been a great public relations move not to reinstate him.

VALEO: They care. They care a great deal. I had a call from there on what the reactions were in the United States! They care a great deal, but they care more about a basic Philippine characteristic, which is loyalty. If you were to let that happen to one of the people who has been as close to you as Ver has been to Marcos, that would have been unforgivable, and it would have been criticized very widely in the Philippines—quietly, but the appearance of that in Philippine eyes would have been totally the opposite. The opposition would say, "At last, we've got him. If

we can break him with Ver, we've got him." Not because they're worried about Ver running the army against them, but because Marcos would be losing a characteristic which is very fundamental in the Philippines. The other aspect of it, which is not understood by [Stephen] Solarz and people like that is dignity. If you demean the dignity of Filipinos, that's almost a sure fire cause of mayhem. We've done that repeatedly in the case of Marcos. He may not react because he's smart in the old Kennedy tradition: "Don't get mad, get even." But that's what's happened. Did you notice that Australian flights have been cut off to the bases? That was in response to some trivial, but demeaning remark that the Prime Minister of Australia had made on the Philippines; they had their rights to fly into the bases cut.

RITCHIE: By contrast, when the Reagan administration has trouble with one of its loyalists, it appoints them an ambassador somewhere and gets rid of them.

VALEO: Well, that may actually happen in the Philippines, but the reinstatement of Ver was a matter of honor. And in the Philippines this is derived from the Spanish concept of honor. The last thing you do would be to betray one of the people who has been close to you. Even if he was a murderer or whatever he was, you still wouldn't betray him. But in this case, I think the evidence was not at all clear on Ver. It wasn't clear in the Agrava commission's hearing and it was certainly not clear in the

trial. Even though the commission clearly pointed to the military involvement in this in some way, to what degree and at what level I don't think came clear. I followed the commission hearings very closely. To what degree Ver was involved was not clear. Those in the United States who clamored for Ver's scalp forget the fact that the Philippines also has a government of laws. They forget the Miranda decision, when Miranda was so obviously guilty and yet he was let go by the Supreme Court. There is a difference. You can say, "Well, gee, that was just a common criminal. This is a whole government." But if you are going to have a government of laws you have got to accept the idea of legal jurisdiction and legal processes. As one of the lawyers in the trial said, it was the prosecutor or the defense attorney, "What's just is not always legal, and what is legal is not always just." But we don't see that because we've got ourselves wedded now to the idea that Marcos is not what we want in the Philippines. At least some people have that, and it's spreading in the United States. Well, eventually he'll accommodate them by dying, but he's not about to die yet, and my guess is that the opposition, whether they get together or they don't, he'll still beat them in the election.

RITCHIE: We seem to have a pattern of identifying all the problems in a particular person.

VALEO: Exactly.

RITCHIE: If you get rid of Diem, then things will get better in Vietnam. If you remove Marcos, things will get better in the Philippines. Do you think it's because we don't understand oriental culture and politics, and so therefore it's easier to focus on an individual?

VALEO: It's simplistic. It used to be we would do the same thing in our own government. It was all Hoover's fault; or if it was good it was all Roosevelt's doing. The situations kind of went bad because of Truman, but then we discovered it wasn't quite that bad also because of Truman. It's always in terms of a personality. This is part of a superficial view of events. It's easy; it doesn't take a lot of thinking, and the TV, of course, encourages this greatly. We're even more now this way than ever before. The Filipinos have an immensely complex problem, and any government would have to face that. Marcos happens to be, in my judgment, the best of the presidents of the Philippines since independence. I would say he's better than the last governor generals, too, that we had in that situation. He will leave the Philippines in a lot better shape than he found it. Anyone who knows the earlier situation will recognize that. And Mrs. Marcos will have done several things: she will first of all have made women a much more powerful factor in Philippine politics. The idea of their even thinking about Cory Aquino running is only attributable to the fact that Imelda Marcos has been out there in

the forefront of politics and public life for the last twenty or so years. She will also have made a major contribution to the development of a sense of Philippine national identity. She provided, for example, the leadership and the drive to build the great cultural center in Manila and that, in turn, has been a growing source of cultural revival and enrichment for the Philippines. She has also been responsible for forcing the attention of the country to take a look at the condition of the poor in Manila and on the plight of the rural areas. She has set some wheels in motion in this connection that will continue to run regardless of who is in power.

End of Interview #16