Watt Statement on Iraq Surge Resolution

WASHINGTON, DC— Congressman Melvin Watt (D-NC) made the following statement on the floor of the U.S. House during a week-long  debate on a Resolution condemning the President’s decision to deploy more than 20,000 additional combat troops to Iraq:

“Mr. Speaker: I rise in strong support of the Resolution.  Simply stated, as the Resolution says, I support the troops and I oppose the increase in the number of troops.  Simply stated, I support a redeployment of the rest of our troops from Iraq as soon as possible. 

But I can’t go forward before I review how we got here in the first place.  Looking back helps me to put a time perspective on this because this War is now approaching five years in duration, a period longer than the Second World War.  And looking back also helps me to put a substantive perspective on this that I think is absolutely critical to my constituents’ understanding of my vote.   

It’s gut wrenching for me to recall that as early as October 2002 – several months before the President proceeded to war in Iraq and long before I was later elected to serve the two-year term that I have now completed as Chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus – I worked meticulously with every member of the Congressional Black Caucus to craft a Statement of Principles that have proven to be so absolutely prophetic.  Listen to what our 2002 Principles said and it will put in context why I feel so strongly that this War has taken us in the wrong direction and why this Resolution is so necessary and worthy of support:

• First 2002 Congressional Black Caucus Principle: “We oppose a unilateral, first-strike action by the United States without a clearly demonstrated and imminent threat of attack on the United States.”  My colleagues, history will record that the President took first strike action and that there was neither a clearly demonstrated nor an imminent threat of attack on the United States. 
• Second Principle: “Only Congress has the authority to declare war.”  History will record that Congress delegated that authority to the President, but I say unapologetically that history will also record that I voted against that delegation of authority.  I never believed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and – perhaps more importantly – even if Iraq did, I never believed that they posed any imminent threat to the United States.  Saddam Hussein was a dastardly tyrant and bully toward his own people, but he was a coward and no threat to the United States.
• Third Principle: “Every conceivable diplomatic option must be exhausted.”  History will record that our President, instead, thumbed his nose at the United Nations and at virtually every diplomatic option in his rush to lead us into this foolhardy war.
• Fourth Principle: “A unilateral first strike would undermine the moral authority of the United States, destabilize the Middle East region and undermine the ability of our Nation to address unmet domestic priorities.”  The passage of time has demonstrated and history will record that every single one of those concerns was legitimate and warranted.
• Fifth Principle: “Any post-strike plan for maintaining stability in the region would be costly and require a long-term commitment.”  We haven’t yet gotten to a level of stability that we’re trying to maintain, but the cost of this War to date exceeds $500 billion.  That’s “costly” and with no end in sight.  If we continue to follow the President, the duration of our commitment has no end in sight and no plan to bring home or redeploy our troops.

Increasing the number of troops in Iraq does not make ending the War more foreseeable.  It will only escalate the number of troops and the prospects of casualties and will likely only increase the resolve of the enemy, the same thing that increases in troop levels have done in the past.  Past troop increases in Iraq have paraded under different names than “surge”.  But, make no mistake about it, this is not the first time the United States will have increased troop levels.  And each time they have been met with greater violence.

• From December of 2003 to April of 2004, the troop increase paraded under the name “troop rotation” and resulted in an increase from 122,000 to 137,000 troops.  Yet April of 2004 was the second deadliest month for U.S. forces. 
• From November 2004 to March 2005, the increase paraded under the name “improving counterinsurgency operations after the Fallujah offensive” or “increasing security before the January 2005 constitutional elections” and increased troops to 150,000.  The result was a short term positive impact, but longer term the result was an increase in violence and resistance.
• Between September and December 2005, troop levels were increased again, taking the number up to 160,000, around the constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections.  The referendum and elections proceeded without major violence, but the increase had little long term impact on sectarian violence.

In most respects, what the President has proposed is business as usual, simply under a different name.  It did not work before and there is little prospect that it will work this time. 

Mr. Speaker, this Resolution is our attempt to make it clear that we do not support a troop increase or an escalation of this War.  I intend to vote for the Resolution.  I just hope the President is listening.”