Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is universally recognized as one of the highest priorities for the U.S. and for the world.

The prospect of countries such as Iran, with its radical and unstable regime, acquiring nuclear weapons, along with the option of passing these to third parties, is among the most frightening scenarios we face.

And Iran is not the only country of concern that is seeking them.

Over the past several decades, the United States, along with other countries, has put together a far-reaching and robust nonproliferation regime.

President Bush has been particularly active in this arena and outlined an ambitious agenda in his February 11, 2004 speech at the National Defense University.

Prominent among his proposals was the strengthening of the Proliferation Security Initiative.

The PSI was instrumental in uncovering the A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network and led directly to the dismantling of Libya’s extensive WMD programs.

PSI is widely recognized as an essential component in the global nonproliferation effort, and it continues to gain adherents and new capabilities.

Similarly, the President’s proposal for a UN Security Council resolution requiring all states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders was quickly adopted as UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

Further, this Administration greatly expanded the resources available to assist states in dismantling their unneeded and outdated nuclear facilities, and in securing nuclear materials by securing pledges of several billion dollars from other advanced countries.

But even these new and expanded measures address only part of this complex problem.

A gaping hole remains in the nonproliferation regime, stemming from the ability of countries to manufacture their own nuclear fuel, including enriched uranium and plutonium.

Although the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, or NPT, requires all signatories-- other than the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China-- to foreswear the pursuit of nuclear weapons, it also is interpreted as recognizing the right of all countries to develop nuclear energy and other non-military uses of nuclear technology.

Unfortunately, the processes by which enriched uranium and plutonium are produced are largely the same for both nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons.

This means that a country can use what appears to be a legitimate program to develop nuclear energy, to mask or support a nuclear weapons program.

To address this problem, President Bush has proposed that countries possessing enrichment and reprocessing materials and technology, not sell or transfer these to any state that does not already have a full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing program.

An additional measure would make countries ineligible to purchase equipment for their civilian programs, unless they have agreed to expanded inspections by the IAEA, known as the Additional Protocol.

However, although these measures represent an important step forward, they will not eliminate the problem.

Countries cheat, lie, and manipulate the monitoring mechanisms.  No inspection system is foolproof, as we have seen on many occasions.

The heart of the problem is: the assertion that every NPT signatory has “an absolute right” under Article IV to a nuclear program in all of its aspects, including enrichment and reprocessing.

Iran constantly asserts this right, in its refusal to abide by UN Security Council resolutions to halt its nuclear program, a position which many countries in the Third World support.

In this reading, it is up to the IAEA and the international community to prove that a country has a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

But because civilian and military programs are very similar, and because the IAEA cannot search every crevice and hiding place in a country, proving the existence of an offensive nuclear program, to any sufficient level of confidence, can be all but impossible.

I believe this interpretation is a profound misreading of Article IV, one which many of those committed to halting proliferation, unfortunately and mistakenly support.

In fact, the language of Article IV is unambiguous in conditioning a country’s so-called right to a peaceful nuclear program on the country demonstrating that it is complying with the Treaty’s overriding purpose of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

For that reason, the burden of proof that a country is not pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program, falls directly on that country and not on the IAEA or the international community.
 
As Mr. Sokolski, one of our witnesses today, has emphasized in many of his writings and statements, producing nuclear fuel makes little or no economic sense for most countries. 

The mere fact that they are pursuing it, is, in itself, a warning sign that they may have purposes other than peaceful nuclear energy.

These countries counter the argument of economic irrationality with a national security rationale, namely, that they must have their own reliable supply of nuclear fuel to prevent them being held hostage by a foreign supplier.

To address that argument, the idea of an international nuclear fuel bank has been put forward by many, as a means of guaranteeing fuel supplies to participating countries, in return for their pledge not to develop a domestic capacity to manufacture nuclear fuel.

These proposals have taken many forms, ranging from multiple guarantees of contracts in a freely functioning international nuclear fuel market, to an autonomous stockpile, overseen by an international organization, such as the IAEA.

The IAEA is presently working on its own proposal based on this latter option, and is scheduled to be unveiled this year.

A separate proposal has been put forward by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, or NTI, headed by former Senator Sam Nunn, whom we are honored to have with us today.

NTI has pledged $50 million toward the establishment of a fuel bank under the auspices of the IAEA, on the condition that it be matched by $50 million from the IAEA. 

The premise is that $100 million would be sufficient to allow the fuel bank to be established and begin functioning.

Chairman Lantos has built upon this proposal in his bill H.R. 885 which, among other provisions, would authorize an additional $50 million contingent upon a number of conditions.

I will leave it to our distinguished witnesses to elaborate on these and other proposals, but I must point out that the most important component of any fuel bank, is the requirement that participating countries must give up any ambition to manufacture nuclear fuel.

Unfortunately, it is my understanding that the IAEA proposal will not contain this requirement, thereby rendering the benefit of its proposed fuel bank questionable.

I will end my remarks there and say that I look forward to the testimony of our panel of distinguished witnesses.

I hope that this will be the first of many sessions addressing broader nonproliferation issues and, specifically, the pros and cons of different nuclear fuel bank proposals.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.