Mr. Chairman, a case can be made that Annapolis has launched a serious effort toward a democratic Palestinian state not compromised by terror, living in peace and security beside the Jewish State of Israel.

The most significant outcome of the Conference was a Joint Understanding read aloud by President Bush during his remarks at Annapolis in which the Israelis and the Palestinians:

• recommit themselves to the implementation of the Road Map;
• have agreed to the establishment of a steering committee to oversee the work of negotiations teams; and
• have agreed to the establishment of an American-Israeli-Palestinian mechanism to monitor its implementation. 

The Joint Understanding settled for a commitment to try and reach an agreement by the end of 2008, instead of specifying a deadline for the completion of negotiations.

However, while Abbas and Olmert have agreed to “meet on a bi-weekly basis to follow up the negotiations” little has been publicly reported on the scope and parameters of the negotiations.

This clearly illustrates that the framework and institutions necessary to support a serious process remain in their infancy.

Furthermore, as one of our witnesses today, Dr. Wurmser, noted in his written testimony, the threat that the situation in Gaza poses to the security interests of the United States and our allies, was not adequately addressed by the conference.

How does this alter the framework for discussion of a “Palestinian state”?

What did Annapolis accomplish that is different from Oslo and other previous efforts?

Apart from the nomination of former NATO Commander General James Jones as the American monitor and judge, how would the monitoring mechanism function?

What will the consequences be if General Jones finds one side or the other delinquent in their undertakings? 

What are the criteria for determining a failure to fulfill a commitment? 

How will General Jones’ mission be synchronized with that of the U.S. Security Coordinator General Keith Dayton, particularly, in light of Israeli criticisms regarding the effectiveness of U.S. security assistance to the Palestinian Authority? 

How do our security assistance programs to the Palestinians fit into the larger strategic framework, and advance U.S. national security interests? 

And although the parties have agreed to begin sustained negotiations soon, have we received any indication of how the substantive gaps on core issues – especially borders, refugees, and Jerusalem -- might be overcome?  

Looking at the broader context in which these discussions will be held, I would appreciate it if our witnesses were to address the respective roles of the regimes in Damascus and Tehran in influencing the peace process. 

With the completion of the Annapolis Conference, and the revival of US-sponsored direct negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, the Administration is, again, thoroughly engaged in attempting to succeed where its predecessors have failed.

The U.S. is, once again, seeking a lasting peace agreement between the two sides. 

We must approach Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking with due caution, discretion, and prudence and must not assume the existence of a viable Palestinian partner for peace.

Abbas, for example, has taken few steps that could be considered conducive to peace.

He joined a unity government with Hamas earlier this year, and would have remained in such an arrangement had Hamas not decided to oust Fatah forces from Gaza in June.

We continue to receive public reports of renewed attempts to reach a modicum with Hamas, in which Abbas would again assume the role of a junior partner. 

Abbas is also the head of the Fatah organization—a group that, since the Palestinian war against Israel in September 2000, has carried out more terror attacks against Israeli targets than either Hamas or Islamic Jihad.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Fayyed, who has gained a reputation as an effective technocrat and a truly moderate, independent voice, has been given a marginal role in the post-Annapolis framework, while the “old guard” of Fatah is empowered and charged with negotiating with Israel. 

Mr. Chairman, U.S. law is as clear, as Fatah’s old guard is opaque.

A recent op-ed in the Jerusalem Post that I authored with my dear friend and colleague Congresswoman Shelley Berkeley, argued for providing the Palestinians with a political objective that finally sets and enforces higher standards for their behavior, providing consequences if they fail to perform.

We must not substitute hope for reality. 

Despite the uncertainties raised by the current process, one thing remains certain: we must finally stop following in Oslo’s missteps.

I want to thank our distinguished witnesses for appearing before the Committee today, and I look forward to receiving your remarks.