I would like to thank the Chairman for holding this timely hearing on the status of Kosovo, and thank Under Secretary Burns for making himself available to the Committee.  I look forward to your testimony.

In January, I joined Chairman Lantos in introducing H.Res. 36, endorsing the independence for Kosovo.

Last month, former Finnish President Ahtisaari presented his proposal on Kosovo’s final status to the UN Security Council.

Because the basic positions of Serbia and the Kosovo government on final status are irreconcilable, there can be no perfect plan.

But the Ahtisaari proposal, which makes difficult demands of both sides, appears to be a step in the right direction.

It outlines an internationally-supervised transition to full independence, and a decentralized form of government that would allow a high degree of autonomy for Serb-majority municipalities.

I hope that today’s discussion will help to clarify the details, limitations, and implications of the Ahtisaari plan.

In many ways, we are looking for the least painful way forward, to responsibly move beyond a zero-sum standoff on status, to the critical work of building a functioning economy and responsive political institutions, that will benefit all the people of Kosovo, regardless of ethnic background.

In today’s imperfect circumstances, delay is not an option.  Indeed, it is a danger.

It is important to understand that the real choice we face is not between supervised independence and the status quo but, rather, between supervised independence and unsupervised, unilaterally-declared independence by Kosovo, with the potential threat of chaos and renewed violence in the region.

As underscored by public demonstrations in Pristina [prish-TEE-na] earlier this year, the legitimate expectations of the overwhelming Albanian majority cannot be suppressed indefinitely.

On the other hand, the legitimate fears of the Serbian minority inside Kosovo also must be addressed.

Any workable plan must provide for the credible protection of minority rights and opportunities, as well as the preservation of Serbian patrimonial sites within Kosovo, such as the historic Orthodox monasteries, whose roots stretch back most of a millennium.

Furthermore, Kosovo must be freed from the economic and political limbo that has contributed to its current malaise: 50% unemployment and 40% near-poverty rates would be a recipe for unrest even in the best of political circumstances.

It simply will not be possible to attract the foreign investment so desperately needed in Kosovo until its status is finally determined. 

At the same time, the mere fact of independence will not magically fix those daunting economic challenges.

Finally, there is growing public dissatisfaction with the governing UN Mission in Kosovo, whose approval ratings have fallen to 24 percent.

For all these reasons, the consensus is that, although it will not be easy, the time for the independent self-government of Kosovo has arrived.

Before concluding my remarks, I want to express my admiration and gratitude for the efforts and sacrifices of our troops participating in the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

KFOR has done a superb job in maintaining a safe and secure environment, and the professionalism and integrity of the U.S. contingent has earned the respect of both Albanian and Serbian community leaders within Kosovo.

Finally, let us appeal to the leaders of all communities within Kosovo for a commitment to peaceful cooperation in the months ahead.

The temptation to provocation and overreaction among radicals will only increase in the near future.

All parties must resolve now to resist those temptations, lest they derail the significant opportunities and benefits that all Kosovars stand to enjoy as participants integrated into greater Europe.