I would like to thank Mr. Lantos for calling this hearing today and the distinguished members of the panel for testifying on the challenges we are faced with in Afghanistan. 

 Our involvement in Afghanistan has brought down the fundamentalist Taliban government that murdered, mutilated and oppressed the Afghani people and served as a training ground for al-Qaeda radicals responsible for attacking our country on 9-11. 

Removal of the brutal Taliban regime has led to Afghanistan adopting a constitution, holding a presidential election in 2004 and parliamentary elections in 2005.

The people of Afghanistan are enjoying new freedoms that were prohibited under the Taliban, and women are now participating in political and economic life.

Schools and clinics are being built and efforts are underway to improve Afghanistan’s economic development.

However, these efforts are greatly compromised by the security situation.
 
Militant extremists are becoming increasingly active, seeking to reclaim Afghanistan as a safe haven for their nefarious activities.

These Islamist extremists pose a serious threat to the Afghan people and to U.S. and NATO troops. 

It is critical to understand that the drug trade is one of the primary factors contributing to the Taliban resurgence. 

Billions in illicit drug proceeds allow the extremists to finance sophisticated weapons used to target Afghani citizens and coalition forces.

In the Spring, we will again face another massive opium harvest in Afghanistan, ultimately triggering an offensive by anti-coalition militants, including the resurgent Taliban.
 
It is time to develop new strategies to ensure Afghanistan does not fall into a failed narco-state and once again a safe haven for terrorists. 

To effectively confront the militant insurgency in Afghanistan, we must deprive these fundamentalists of drug profits.

We welcome the Bush Administration’s recent call for increased aid to Afghanistan of $10.6 billion over the next two years.

However, the problem is unlikely to be resolved only through an increase in funding.  

In order to succeed, our strategy must also tackle the problems of drugs and terror simultaneously.

A failed Afghanistan controlled by these militants and narco-terrorists, would bolster the extremists and would endanger U.S. strategic interests.

U.S. policy against the narco-terrorist threat in Afghanistan require re-evaluation, new initiatives, and a unified inter-agency campaign against both illicit drugs the terror they sponsor and support.

However, to address the problems plaguing Afghanistan we must do more than merely throw money at them and we must provide an alternative.

Criticizing does not provide an alternative strategy.  Making broad rhetorical pronouncements does not provide an alternative strategy.

We must present concrete, specific recommendations on how to tackle the security situation at its core by countering the narco-terrorist threat.
 
We, on this side of the aisle, have long followed events in Afghanistan and have worked hard to give the Administration the tools they need to do the job there.

In a letter dated February 7, which I ask be made part of the record, several of the Subcommittee Ranking Members joined me in recommending a multi-prong plan for the Administration to consider.

Some of the key items in our proposed plan include:

• Appointment of a High Level Coordinator of overall Afghan narco-terrorism policy. We especially need some one at the top to lead a unified and well-coordinated campaign against both drugs and terror simultaneously, thereby putting all U.S. agencies, assets, and assistance into this fight against drugs and terror, as we successfully did in Colombia.

• Implementation of a new DEA ride-along policy with International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and our own Department of Defense military forces on the ground in Afghanistan, as initiated by former Chairman of this committee, Henry J. Hyde. We must do this to merge and maximize the ongoing U.S. and NATO military operations in those limited and specific cases where they overlap with the DEA’s own difficult struggle in unsecured areas against illicit drugs and major drug kingpins. 

• We must also convince our European allies, to whom much of Afghan heroin is now directed, to allow easy access to their markets for legitimate Afghan goods, as America does for cocaine-producing Andean nations. 

• Intensifying our dialogue with the government of Pakistan and make it clear to them that we can no longer tolerate the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area to be used as a safe haven by Taliban and other militants where they recruit, train, operate. We are deeply concerned by unmistakable trends toward an increasing number and sophistication of cross-border attacks.  Although we should work on building a long-term strategic partnership with Islamabad, the Congress cannot be expected to tolerate Taliban using Pakistan as a safe haven.

We hope the Administration will find these valuable and move forward on implementing these proposals.

I also look forward to working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle in further developing an effective strategy to establish peace and security in Afghanistan by depriving the militant extremists of revenue and safe haven. 

Without addressing the issue of security, prospects of achieving stability and economic development in Afghanistan is unlikely.

I would like to once again thank our experts for testifying here today and look forward to hearing their views and recommendations for U.S. policy in Afghanistan.