House Foreign Affairs Committee U.S. House of Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Republican
	Opening Remarks of Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen at Hearing,  Russia, Iran and Nuclear Weapons: Implications of the Proposed U.S.-Russia Agreement
	June 12, 2008
	Thank you Mr. Chairman. There have been many concerns expressed regarding this agreement by Members of both parties in the House and Senate in public and private statements, as well as in writing. These have in common a request that the Administration not submit this agreement to Congress at this time.  Those requests were ignored. Last August, former Chairman Lantos and I sent letters to Secretary Rice and National Security Advisor Hadley, asking that the agreement not be sent to Congress until Members’ concerns had been addressed, especially those relating to Russia’s links to the Iranian regime. The reply we received was vague and noncommittal. The House as a whole has clearly spoken on this issue.  By a vote of 397 to 16, the House adopted the Iran Counter-Proliferation Act of 2007, which prohibits the submission to Congress of a nuclear agreement with any country that is assisting Iran’s nuclear, conventional weapons, or missile programs. And 73 senators – nearly three-fourths of that chamber – have signed on to S. 970, the companion bill in the Senate. Even though the Senate has yet to act on it, the intent of Congress is unmistakable. Yet, the Administration decided to ignore this clear, forcefully expressed, and widespread opinion and proceeded with an agreement that it admits will be of little or no benefit to the U.S. There are, however, very real drawbacks. The most important drawback is that the agreement will inevitably be seen in Moscow and elsewhere as a political reward, one bestowed by the U.S. despite the Russian government’s continuing assistance to Iran. The support of the Russian government and private sector have provided to Iran’s nuclear program is extensive and well documented. This includes direct and open assistance, such as constructing Iran’s first nuclear power plant at Bushehr, as well as that given to Iran’s covert nuclear weapons program. Russia’s strenuous efforts to weaken UN Security Council sanctions on Iran are especially objectionable. I emphasize the nuclear aspects, but there are many other Russian policies toward Iran that are as troubling. The sale of advanced conventional weapons and missiles to Iran poses a very real threat to our interests, as Tehran is using these to expand its influence in the region, and threaten our friends and allies.   Tied to this, Moscow has vigorously opposed U.S. plans to construct an anti-ballistic missile defense in Europe to guard us and our allies against Iran’s growing missile capabilities. The regime in Tehran has good reason to believe that it has a reliable ally in Moscow. Why then does the U.S. seek to reward the Russian Federation? When asked, the State Department has agreed that little or no commercial benefit to the U.S. is expected from this agreement in terms of sales of reactors, equipment, or materials. And it is difficult to see how our strategic interests will be advanced. Nevertheless, it is certain to be regarded around the world as a major political victory by the Russian government. The Administration’s principal argument for this agreement is that Russia’s recently improved record on Iran merits expanded nuclear cooperation. This is an interesting assertion for many reasons.  The most interesting is that the Administration itself apparently does not believe it. The Administration has requested that this Committee extend the President’s authority to waive sanctions in the Iran/North Korea/Syria Nonproliferation Act. Without the waiver, the U.S. could no longer purchase spacecraft from the Russian space agency to be used for emergency and other purposes regarding the International Space Station. But this waiver would not be needed if the President certifies that Russia has stopped proliferating weapons of mass destruction and missiles to Iran, along with Syria and North Korea. It is obvious that, as was the case a few years ago when the first waiver was requested, the President cannot make that certification and therefore an extension of the waiver is needed. Either Russia is assisting Iran or it is not. You cannot have it both ways. At a minimum, the President should not have submitted this agreement until Russia halted all cooperation with Iran’s nuclear sector, including its obstruction of tough UN Security Council resolutions and sanctions, and also stopped selling Tehran advanced conventional weapons, including missiles. But Russia’s arming of rogue regimes is not limited to Iran.  It is following a similar track with Syria—another country of proliferation concern designated by our own Department of State as a state-sponsor of terrorism. Given the widespread opposition to this agreement, the conflicting request for a waiver of nonproliferation laws due to Russia’s problematic activities with Iran, and the likelihood that there is too little time remaining for approval, I believe the soundest course would be to withdraw this agreement until a more appropriate time. I know that I speak for many others as well and strongly encourage the Administration to reconsider this approach. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.