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Legislation to Drastically Improve Security at Chemical Plants

Thursday, March 30, 2006

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Washington Contact: Robert Gibbs or Tommy Vietor, (202) 228-5511
Durbin Contact: Sandra Abrevaya, (202) 224-7115
Date: March 30, 2006

Illinois and New Jersey Senators Introduce Legislation to Drastically Improve Security at Chemical Plants
Two Plants in Chicago Area Could Threaten More than 1 million People

CHICAGO - U.S. Senators Barack Obama (D-IL), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) and Bob Menendez (D-NJ) today introduced legislation to drastically improve security at our nation's chemical plants.

"There may be no greater failure of our government than the fact that we have done almost nothing to secure one of America's most vulnerable targets - the 15,000 chemical plants in America," said Obama. "These chemical plants represent some of the most attractive targets for terrorists looking to cause widespread death and destruction. Despite this, security at our chemical plants is voluntary - left to the individual plant owners. While many chemical plant owners have taken steps to beef up security, too many have not. In Illinois, there have been recent reports by ABC-7 in Chicago of chemical plants with dilapidated fences, insufficient guard forces, and unprotected tanks of hazardous chemicals. These plants are basically stationary weapons of mass destruction. Their security is light, their facilities are easily entered, and their contents are deadly."

"Chemical plant security is a serious problem and the combination of lax security and deadly chemicals is a toxic mix," said Durbin. "Illinois has more facilities that store extremely hazardous materials then any other state- with over 100,000 pounds of hazardous substances stored in over 600 facilities. It is unacceptable that we have chemical plant facilities in our state and in other parts of this country that anyone can stroll onto. This bill puts a lock on the door and real fencing in the yard."

There are 111 facilities in the United States where a worst-case scenario attack on a chemical plant could threaten more than one million people, according to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Two of these facilities are within Chicago's city limits. Illinois has at least 11 facilities where a large-scale chemical release could threaten more than a million people.

The Chemical Safety and Security Act of 2006 would replace current weak voluntary chemical plant security standards with a clear set of federal regulations that all plants must abide by. Plants that are considered a high risk to large population areas or critical infrastructure would face more stringent standards.

Plant owners and employees would work together to tailor their security plans to address each individual facility's vulnerabilities, but they would face tough penalties for noncompliance. The bill would also protect the right of states to establish security standards that fit local needs so that states like New Jersey that have been leaders in chemical security do not see their current laws weakened.

The bill addresses all methods to reduce risk, including physical security such as security forces, perimeter defenses, hazard mitigation and emergency response. But the bill also requires the use of safer technologies to reduce the attractiveness of chemical plants as a target. This concept, known as Inherently Safer Technology, involves methods such as changing the flow of chemical processes to avoid dangerous chemical byproducts, reducing the pressures or temperatures of chemical reactions to minimize the risk of explosions, reducing inventories of dangerous chemicals and replacing dangerous chemicals with benign ones. Each one of these methods reduces the danger that chemical plants pose to our communities and makes them less appealing targets for terrorists.

"Safety regulations can be implemented in a way that is flexible enough for the industry yet stringent enough to protect the American people," Senator Obama said. "It is long past time to put the security of our nation ahead of special interests or politics. Now is the time to act to protect our citizens."

"This is a comprehensive bill that will satisfy the need for tighter security at chemical plants with a minimum of disruption for chemical manufacturers," said Durbin. "It not only increases onsite security, it calls for stricter rules on chemical production and protects employees who expose security risks. We need tough, enforceable standards for chemical plant security and this bill will move us much closer to that goal."



Lautenberg/Obama

The Chemical Security and Safety Act



Establishes General Duty to Improve Security at Facilities Storing Threshold Amounts of Chemicals


Requires chemical facilities to take steps to improve security, including improving barriers, containment and mitigation, safety training, and, where possible, use safer technology. Known as "Inherently Safer Technology," or IST, includes using less toxic chemicals and employing safer procedures.

Identifies High-Priority Chemical Facilities


Directs the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to work with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), as well as state and local agencies, to identify "high-priority" chemical facilities that would receive priority oversight. Prioritization would be based on the threat posed to public health and safety due to proximity to population centers, type and amount of chemicals involved, and threats to national security and critical infrastructure.

Requires High-Priority Facilities to Conduct Vulnerability Assessments and Develop and Implement Response Plans


Directs DHS to work with EPA, as well as with state and local agencies, to establish regulations to require each high-priority facility to do the following:
  • Conduct a vulnerability/hazard assessment.

  • Develop a prevention, preparedness and response plan that incorporates the assessment results, and includes actions to reduce vulnerabilities by improving security measures and, where possible, uses safer technology. In developing the plans, facility operators must consult with facility employees and local first responders.

  • Participate in periodic scheduled and unscheduled site visits and inspections to assure compliance with security plans and other requirements.

  • Establish safety and security advisory committees at each facility that includes employees and managers.

  • Conduct drills to practice prevention, preparedness and response plans. Provide employees with security training every year. The bill would establish an information clearinghouse to disseminate best practices for risk assessment, security planning, and the use of Inherently Safer Technology.


Protects State Laws


Protects state and local government's right to establish chemical security and safety requirements more stringent than national standards.

Protects Whistleblowers


Protects employees who report dangerous gaps in security to the Department of Homeland Security.

Protects Sensitive Information


Protects security information from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act and other state or local disclosure laws.


Inherently Safer Technology (IST)



Widely-Accepted



The concept of Inherently Safer Technology (IST) was developed in 1977 by chemical industry insiders who were seeking innovative ways to reduce risk.

The Department of Homeland Security's July 2004 draft Chemical Sector-Specific Plan states that inherently safer chemistry and engineering practices can prevent or delay a terrorist incident, noting that it is important to make sure that facility owners and operators consider alternate ways to reduce risk, such as inherently safer design, implementing just-in-time manufacturing, or replacing high-risk chemicals with safer alternatives.

The Department of Justice recognized the value of IST in introducing a methodology to assess chemical facilities' vulnerabilities in 2002.

New Jersey requires chemical facilities to review the practicability of adopting inherently safer technology in its 2005 chemical security law.

Industry uses IST in its volunteer security standards. The American Chemistry Council's "Responsible Care(R) Security Code of Management Practices" requires that chemical sources take "into account inherently safer approaches to process design" in implementing security measures.

Options to Reduce Risk



  • Alternative reaction routes or plant layout: the sequence of reactions in the process may reduce or eliminate a hazardous exposure. For example, in producing the insecticide Carbaryl, one can change the sequence of steps in the reactions process so that the potentially dangerous methyl isocyanate is eliminated as an intermediate product.


  • Simplification: eliminate unnecessary complexity so workers can comprehend the process and recognize hazardous circumstances.


  • Energy limitation: the energy potential - whether electrical, chemical or kinetic - is reduced in order to reduce the hazard of an exposure. For example, reducing temperature or pressure in reactions can reduce potentials for explosions.


  • Substitution: safer materials or processes are substituted for more hazardous substances or processes. For example, substituting an inherently toxic substance for one that is biologically benign.


  • Intensification or minimization: avoid the catastrophic potential of an exposure by storing small amounts of a substance. For example, storing less volume of flammable chemicals.


Economically Viable



A recent study by an MIT Professor published in the journal Safety Science identified more than two-dozen feasible inherent safety alternatives. The majority of those options were shown to have payback times of less than two years. Overall, 25 percent of the options were implemented during the study.

Examples from across the Country



  • In Washington, DC, the Blue Plains Sewage Plant switched from volatile chlorine gas to less volatile sodium hypochlorite bleach, which has far less potential for airborne off-site impact.


  • In Cheshire, Ohio, American Electric Power selected a urea-based pollution control system rather than one involving large-scale storage of ammonia that would have endangered the surrounding community.


  • In Cuyahoga County, Ohio, ALCOA reduced its potential off-site impact by working with local emergency planners and ending on-site storage of hydrofluoric acid and nitric acid.


  • There are 148 gasoline refineries in the country. Fifty of them use hydrogen fluoride to increase the octane. Hydrogen fluoride is highly toxic. If released into the air, the liquid turns into a heavy, low-lying gas. In the last ten years, many refineries have switched to safer alternatives like sulfuric acid or modified hydrogen fluoride that does not turn into a gas.


Shifting Risk Rather than Eliminating Risk



There are few examples where shifting technologies appears safer, but actually increases risk. For example, at times, the only viable replacement for a toxic chemical is one that is more flammable or that risks public health. These examples are a minority and can be managed when IST is reviewed on a facility-by-facility basis and balanced against increases in overall threat.