WASHINGTON,
D.C. – Mr. Chairman, I recently had an opportunity to visit Colombia along
with Congressman McGovern and a number of Congressional staff, journalists,
and others on a trip that was organized by the Washington Office on Latin
America. We had a very busy 6 days during which we had an opportunity
to travel around Colombia and to meet with various sectors of society that
are impacted by the current U.S. policy. In addition to meeting President
Pastrana, the Minister of Defense, the Attorney General, the Head of the
National Police, the head of the Colombian Army, and numerous other Colombian
and U.S. officials, including Ambassador Patterson, we were able to hear
testimony from hundreds of Colombian people. We heard from farmers
and human rights workers in Putumayo. We met with non-governmental
organizations like Peace Brigades International and ASFADES. We met
with communities of displaced people living in poverty because of the violence
in Colombia. We met with ambassadors from other countries and representatives
from the United Nations, and we visited a peace community in San Jose de
Apartado.
Mr.
Chairman, as you know, during previous hearings in this subcommittee about
U.S. aid to Colombia, I have raised numerous concerns: That U.S. aid to
Colombia is too heavily weighted in helicopters and military hardware,
instead of support for civil society, democratic institutions, and human
rights defenders. I have shared with my colleagues my fear that U.S. military
involvement in Colombia may actually escalate the current conflict in that
country. I have stated on numerous occasions that our current policy
toward Colombia and the billions of dollars we are poised to spend in addition
to the over $1 billion appropriated last year will not achieve the stated
goal of reducing the flow of illegal drugs to the United States.
I have called attention to the fact that dollar for dollar it is more effective
to invest in treatment and prevention as opposed to interdiction and eradication
at the source. I have also questioned whether the United States can
be actively involved in counter-narcotics efforts in Colombia without being
drawn into the violence that rages in that country.
Unfortunately,
Mr. Chairman, my recent trip has only reinforced and added to many of the
concerns I had before going to Colombia.
It
is clear to me that collusion continues between the Colombian military
and the paramilitary death squads in Colombia.
The
Military has made ineffective and insufficient efforts to protect civilians
who are targeted by paramilitary and guerrilla forces.
Our
fumigation efforts in Putumayo may be causing health problems for the local
population, including children. And, despite the embassy’s enthusiasm
about the accuracy of our spray planes, I heard testimony from farmers
whose legal crops were destroyed-leaving them and their families without
a source of income or food. Fortunately, Ambassador Patterson was
with us in Putumayo and she agreed the concern warrants sending medical
professionals there to do more research on the possible human and environmental
effects of aerial fumigation.
There
is a human rights emergency in Colombia. Peaceful civilians are harassed,
robbed, and attacked on a daily basis. Entire communities have been
displaced by the violence in Colombia and despite their dire situation
and commitments by the U.S. and Colombian governments to help, there are
hundreds of thousands of displaced Colombian people struggling to survive
and failing to receive basic services.
The
press in Colombia while uncensored by the government is censored by intimidation-numerous
journalists have disappeared, been killed, or forced into exile.
While
helicopters are on the way, fumigation is in full force, and U.S. military
personnel are on the ground, desperately needed funds for those charged
with protecting against and investigating human rights abuse are still
being held up by the United States. While I was in Colombia there
was a massacre in Cauca and the human rights unit of the Colombian prosecutor
general’s office did not even have the money to send investigators to the
scene. The $3 million dollars promised to the unit held up apparently
because of a dispute between the State Department and the Department of
Justice. The Human Rights division of the national police in Colombia
has an operating budget of just $140, 000-as you know Mr. Chairman, members
of Congress earn more than that.
Clear
violations of human rights remain unpunished even when evidence of the
perpetrators exists. The Santo Domingo massacre that took place on
December 23, 1998, during which 17 civilians including 6 children were
murdered remains an unresolved case-despite extensive evidence of Colombian
military involvement and a cover-up. And the Colombian Air Force
unit and others implicated in the case remain cleared to receive U.S. military
aid despite the fact that this appears to be a clear breach of the Leahy
law.
A
few days after I returned from Colombia, the State Department released
its Human Rights Report and I want to read to my colleagues an exert from
the section on Colombia.
The
Government's human rights record remained poor; there were some improvements
in the legal framework and in institutional mechanisms, but implementation
lagged, and serious problems remain in many areas. Government security
forces continued to commit serious abuses, including extrajudicial killings.
Despite some prosecutions and convictions, the authorities rarely brought
higher-ranking officers of the security forces and the police charged with
human rights offenses to justice, and impunity remains a problem. Members
of the security forces collaborated with paramilitary groups that committed
abuses, in some instances allowing such groups to pass through roadblocks,
sharing information, or providing them with supplies or ammunition. Despite
increased government efforts to combat and capture members of paramilitary
groups, often security forces failed to take action to prevent paramilitary
attacks. Paramilitary forces find a ready support base within the military
and police, as well as among local civilian elites in many areas.
Now
I know how my constituents feel about this situation. They want to
help Colombia and the people there and so do I. And we want to deal
with the drug problem in the U.S., but do not want to send hundreds of
millions of dollars worth of military aid to an army that has been known
to brutalize the same people it is supposed to protect.
What
is even more troubling is that, despite the express will of Congress in
attaching human rights conditions to the aid approved last year, the President
saw it fit to waive those conditions- a decision that has sent a message
to the Colombian military that they can keep doing what they are doing
and U.S. aid will continue to pour in.
I
want to mention one other concern:
Less
than two weeks ago US citizens working for the private military contractor
Dyncorp came under fire from FARC guerrillas. The privatization of
our military and police assistance to Colombia raises important oversight
questions as we get drawn deeper into Colombia's civil war.
The
most obvious question is why do we need to outsource and privatize our
efforts in Colombia? The American taxpayers already pay $300 billion
per year to fund the world's most powerful military. Why should they
have to pay a second time in order to privatize our operations? Proponents
of privatizing government functions argue that it will save taxpayers'
money, but a February 23 Miami Herald article states that these private
American pilots earn about $90,000 a year while mechanics earn about $60,000.
Does it make sense to pay a private contractor to duplicate the capabilities
of the world's most advanced military?
Or
are we outsourcing to in order avoid public scrutiny, controversy or embarrassment?
Is it to hide body bags from the media and thus shield them from public
opinion? After all, three Dyncorp pilots have already died in crashes.
Or is it to provide deniability because these private contractors
(many
of them former U.S. military personnel) are not covered by the same rules
as active duty US service persons in Colombia? The Miami Herald article
states, "DynCorp employees are under strict orders to avoid journalists"
and that "DynCorp and MPRI officials said they could not comment on their
operations in Colombia under the terms of their contracts with the U.S.
government." If they will not talk to the press or to US citizens
then where is the accountability? Are the terms of their contracts
secret as well? How is the public to know what their tax dollars
are being used for?
Going
to war is one of the most grave decisions that we as a nation can make.
If there is a potential for a privatized Gulf of Tonkin incident, then
the American people deserve to have a full and open debate before this
policy goes any farther. Backing into this military quagmire through
private military contractors should raise a red flag to the American people
as well as their representatives. I urge this subcommittee to hold
oversight hearings on this matter as soon as possible.
Mr.
Chairman, the list of questions and concerns goes on and on. One
thing that is clear to me is that our current policy in Colombia is misguided.
If we really want to deal with the drug problem in the United States, we
need to take along hard look at our selves and we need to learn from the
mistakes we have made in the past. I believe our current plan will
prove to be a failure. It will fail to reduce drug availability and
drug use in the U.S. and it will do nothing to improve or even protect
the lives of Colombians.
When
we begin to consider additional aid for Colombia this year, I hope all
of my colleagues take a close look at what we will be trying to accomplish.
I will also be working to include strong and enforceable human rights conditions
on any future aid that can not simply be waived. |