WASHINGTON,
D.C. – U.S. Representative Jan Schakowsky (D-IL) issued today’s “Bush
Administration’s Misstatement of the Day” on prewar intelligence.
According
to the Washington Post (“Inquiry Faults Intelligence on Iraq; Threat
From Saddam Hussein Was Overstated, Senate Committee Report Finds,” 10/24/03):
The
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is preparing a blistering report
on prewar intelligence on Iraq that is critical of CIA Director George
J. Tenet and other intelligence officials for overstating the weapons and
terrorism case against Saddam Hussein, according to congressional officials.
The
committee staff was surprised by the amount of circumstantial evidence
and single-source or disputed information used to write key intelligence
documents -- in particular the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate
-- summarizing Iraq's capabilities and intentions, according to Republican
and Democratic sources.
However,
prior to the invasion of Iraq, Bush Administration officials pointed to
US intelligence reports as evidence that Iraq presented an imminent threat
to the United States:
-
“We
know where the [WMD] are.” – Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, (ABC
“This Week with George Stephanopoulos,” 3/30/03)
-
“We
believe
Saddam has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.”
– Vice President Cheney (NBC “Meet the Press,” 3/16/03)
-
“There
can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability
to rapidly produce more, many more…Our conservative estimate is that Iraq
today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent.
That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets.” – Secretary
of State Colin Powell (Address before UN Security Council, 2/5/03)
-
“Our
intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to
produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent.”
– President Bush (State of the Union Address, 1/28/03)
-
“Simply
stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction.
There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends,
against our allies, and against us.” –Vice President Cheney (Speech
to VFW 103rd National Convention, 8/26/02)
Schakowsky
said, “Did the Bush Administration knowingly deceive us and manufacture
intelligence in order to build public support for the invasion of Iraq?
The answer to that question is becoming clearer everyday.”
The
Washington Post
October
24, 2003
Inquiry
Faults Intelligence on Iraq; Threat From Saddam Hussein Was Overstated,
Senate Committee Report Finds
BYLINE:
Dana Priest, Washington Post Staff Writer
The
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is preparing a blistering report
on prewar intelligence on Iraq that is critical of CIA Director George
J. Tenet and other intelligence officials for overstating the weapons and
terrorism case against Saddam Hussein, according to congressional officials.
The
committee staff was surprised by the amount of circumstantial evidence
and single-source or disputed information used to write key intelligence
documents -- in particular the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate
-- summarizing Iraq's capabilities and intentions, according to Republican
and Democratic sources. Staff members interviewed more than 100 people
who collected and analyzed the intelligence used to back up statements
about Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons capabilities, and
its possible links to terrorist groups.
Like
a similar but less exhaustive inquiry being completed by the House intelligence
committee, the Senate report shifts attention toward the intelligence community
and away from White House officials, who have been criticized for exaggerating
the Iraqi threat. At stake as the presidential political season approaches,
said committee sources and intelligence figures, is who gets blamed for
misleading the American public if weapons of mass destruction are never
found in Iraq -- the president or his intelligence chief.
Asked
about the upcoming report, Sen. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.), chairman of the committee,
said "the executive was ill-served by the intelligence community." The
intelligence was sometimes "sloppy" and inconclusive, he said. "That's
a concern I have with the total report" on Iraq.
"I
worry about the credibility of the intelligence community," said Roberts,
who added that he is concerned about demoralizing the intelligence agencies
when intensive counterterrorism operations are going on overseas. Still,
he insisted, "If there's stuff on the fan, we have to get the fan cleaned."
Despite
the progress it has made since June in poring over 19 volumes of classified
material, the committee is deeply divided over investigating how the Bush
administration used intelligence in its public statements about Iraq.
Sen.
John "Jay" Rockefeller IV (D-W. Va.) said yesterday he had secured a promise
from Roberts to ask one executive agency, the Defense Department and, in
particular, its Office of Special Plans, for information about the intelligence
it collected or analyzed on Iraq.
The
office has been accused by some congressional Democrats and administration
critics of gathering unreliable intelligence on Iraq that bolstered the
administration's case for war. Those allegations have not been substantiated,
and the director of the office, William Luti, has denied them.
Rockefeller
is under considerable pressure from the Senate Democratic leadership not
to allow Roberts to focus only on intelligence bureaucrats while avoiding
questions about whether Bush, Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary
Donald H. Rumsfeld and others exaggerated the threat from Iraq.
But
it is unclear whether the committee has jurisdiction on this topic. Also,
the administration could cite executive privilege and refuse to give the
committee information related to internal White House discussions, as it
did when a congressional inquiry tried to find out what Bush had been told
about al Qaeda and the possibility of civilian aircraft used as weapons
before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
"We're
going to get this one way or the other," Rockefeller said yesterday. "If
the majority declines to put the executive branch at risk, then they are
going to have a very difficult minority to deal with."
He
said that if that turned out be the case, he has the five votes necessary,
under Rule 6 of the committee's rules of procedure, to launch an inquiry
into the administration's use of intelligence.
The
House and Senate intelligence committees have traditionally worked in a
more bipartisan fashion than other congressional committees.
CIA
spokesman Bill Harlow defended the intelligence community's performance.
"The NIE reflects 10 years of work regarding Iraq's WMD [weapons of mass
destruction] programs. It is based on many sources and disciplines, both
ours and those of partners around the world," he said.
Harlow
said that "the committee has yet to take the opportunity to hear a comprehensive
explanation of how and why we reached our conclusions," nor has it accepted
an offer made Wednesday by Tenet to hear from him and senior intelligence
officials.
The
Senate panel's report, congressional sources said, will be harsher and
better substantiated than the inquiry near completion by the House counterpart.
Last month, leaders of the House panel sent Tenet a letter criticizing
him for having relied too heavily on "past assessments" dating to 1998
and on "some new 'piecemeal' intelligence," both of which "were not challenged
as a routine matter."
Tenet
shot back an angry letter criticizing the committee for not interviewing
enough people.
Among
the more than 100 people interviewed by the Senate are analysts, scientists,
operators and supervisory officials from the CIA, the departments of Energy
and State, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency,
as well as officials at the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Roberts
said none of those questioned have said they were pressured to change their
work to fit the administration's point of view. Other committee members
pointed out, however, that some analysts may not have felt free to speak
candidly because there were supervisors in the room during their interviews.
Several
sources said the committee report is also critical "of the substantiation
the intelligence community gave the administration" on many of its assessments
of weapons of mass destruction. They said caveats by agencies other than
the CIA often were played down.
The
committee also has not found underlying intelligence that would support
some changes in the intelligence community's public conclusions about Iraq
in the months leading up to the war. For example, the declassified version
of the October 2002 NIE declares in the first paragraph that "Baghdad has
chemical and biological weapons . . . "
In
all other documents, the intelligence community used more qualified language.
A
CIA spokesman said the statement, like the entire NIE, was written under
extreme time pressure, and that the information was qualified in supporting
material later in the report.
The
committee is also looking at why some exculpatory information contained
in the raw intelligence reports "seems to not have filtered up" to finished
intelligence reports.
Roberts
described the report as "95 percent done." But others on the committee,
including Rockefeller, want to broaden the inquiry. They insist the report
is in the preliminary stage and will not be finished until the end of the
year, or later. |