WASHINGTON – Congresswoman Nita M. Lowey (D-Westchester/Rockland) and Congressman Eliot Engel (D-NY) requested today that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) hold a local public meeting regarding the plan for storing spent fuel at the Indian Point power plants.  They also urged the agency to address deficiencies in force-on-force drills identified in a September 2003 General Accounting Office (GAO) study and a Project on Government Oversight (POGO) report.

“The residents who share their community with Indian Point need to feel confident that every possible security measure is taken at these plants.  They deserve the opportunity to voice their concerns and hear firsthand about proposals for spent fuel storage,” said Lowey, a Member of the Select Committee on Homeland Security.  “NRC must also take every step possible to address inadequacies in the exercises used to measure the capability of security personnel.” 

“We know that terrorists in the Middle East consider nuclear power plants as viable targets,” said Engel.  “But, here we are, almost three years after 9/11, and we are still glossing over key security vulnerabilities at Indian Point.  That is unacceptable.”

The Members of Congress made their requests in two letters to NRC officials today.  In a letter to Regional Administrator Hubert Miller, they called for a meeting in Westchester County regarding plans to transfer 2,500,000 pounds of irradiated fuel into a temporary, on-site facility.  They said local residents “are entitled to complete information on these plans, including possible safety and security risks.”

In a separate letter, Lowey and Engel called on NRC Chairman Nils Diaz to address deficiencies in the force-on-force pilot program in an assessment due late this month.  The program, which includes periodic drills to test the security force at Indian Point, has come under fire by GAO and POGO for multiple inadequacies including, a low number of attackers in the Design Basis Threat, the largest force against which plants can be expected to defend; advance notice of drills for guards; and failure to accurately simulate terrorist tactics.

“Force-on-force tests that fail to simulate real conflict tell us little about guards’ ability to thwart a terrorist attack,” Lowey and Engel wrote Diaz.  “Success on diluted drills only breeds complacency.  Continued vigilance remains our most potent weapon.”