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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TACTICAL AIR AND
LAND FORCES**

TESTIMONY OF

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(ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS)

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Chairman Weldon, Congressman Abercrombie, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before your Subcommittee today to discuss the concerns expressed over delaying integration of the Israeli Active Protection System (APS), named Trophy, onto the Full Spectrum Effects Platform, commonly called "FSEP".

As the Director of the Department's Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, I am responsible for facilitating the Department's response to immediate warfighting needs submitted to the Department from the Combatant Commanders that are not Improvised Explosive Defeat requirements. I believe you are aware, that improvised explosive defeat initiatives are the responsibility of the Joint IED Defeat Organization.

This committee and the Congress have supported the Department's efforts to respond rapidly to the unforeseen needs of our forces that are engaged in the Global War on Terror. The FSEP is an example of how the Department expedites new and evolving capabilities that can provide our warfighters with safe and effective systems while serving as a good steward of the taxpayers' dollars. The Department is able to speed these new capabilities to the warfighter as a result of the flexibility and cooperation provided to the Department by the Congress. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) (USD(AT&L)) provides oversight of major weapons acquisitions and not components or subsystems that may be part of those systems.

I will discuss the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell's mission and involvement in the decision to delay integrating Trophy on the FSEP, and provide the rationale for that decision. Also, I intend to address the other issues of concern to the Subcommittee.

Role and Oversight in Fulfilling Requirements

The Deputy Secretary of Defense created the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell in September 2004 to help overcome the institutional barriers that inhibit timely and effective responses to immediate Warfighter needs. I have been the Director of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell since its inception. As the Director, I am responsible to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for accomplishing the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell's mission. I work through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, to respond to the immediate warfighter needs that have been validated by the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell provides a single point of contact in the Department for facilitating solutions to these Immediate Warfighter Needs. We focus on near-term, materiel solutions, typically involving existing, off-the-shelf, capabilities that can satisfy, to some degree, the urgent need of the Combatant Commander.

On April 19, 2005, the United States Central Command's Chief of Staff sent the Joint Staff's Deputy Director for Resources and Acquisition an urgent operational need statement for a capability that included a suite of scalable non-lethal weapons combined with a set of lethal weapons mounted onto an existing military vehicle, such as the Stryker. The suite of weapons, non-lethal and lethal, would enable the warfighters' use of a full spectrum of components in conducting force protection missions, route reconnaissance, crowd control, raids, and point defense – all in the effort to save lives and reduce collateral damage.

The Central Command believed that the requested weapon system, the Full-Spectrum Effects Platform, represented a combination of near-term technologies, which were critical to success in the counter-insurgency battle and recommended it be evaluated as a potential solution.

In fact, at the time of the Central Command's request, FSEP was a concept. That concept included a component for a fully automated, active protection system against rocket propelled grenades and anti-tank missiles. This component subsystem for FSEP was the *Trophy* Active Protection System, and was to be used on the candidate Stryker vehicles in lieu of the slat armor, or the reactive tile armor subsystem. Slat armor forms a metal cage around the vehicle, and detonates rocket propelled grenades before they can penetrate the vehicle. In a similar manner, the reactive armor tiles defeat the threat through deflection and/or attenuation of the penetrating mechanism.

Besides the *Trophy* Active Protection System, the suite of lethal and non-lethal components included the Gun Slinger counter-sniper and enemy Fire Detection System; a Mobile Multi-Band Jammer to Counter IEDs; an Active Denial Technology using millimeter wave technology; a Long Range Acoustic Device; and a Laser Dazzler. These components represented a range of potential capabilities with different technology readiness levels, insofar as being integrated onto a single platform for the operational concept intended by the warfighter.

On April 28, 2005, after evaluating the Central Command's request, the Joint Staff's Deputy Director for Resources and Acquisition supported the Central Command's need, but stated that the proposed FSEP solution, with all its subcomponent systems, was "unachievable in the near-term," which is a prerequisite for taking action to resolve an Immediate Warfighter Need. The time frame for defining "near-term" is flexible, and can extend up to two years in order to deliver some capability to the warfighter to satisfy, or mitigate, an immediate need. However, the near-term time period does not include weapon systems development.

Subsequently, the Office of Force Transformation, working with the Army officials and Naval Surface Warfare Center engineers at Dahlgren, Virginia, planned a more thorough and accelerated schedule for integrating subsystems onto and developing the FSEP vehicle.

Representatives from the Office of Force Transformation presented their accelerated schedule to the JRAC on September 19, 2005.

Their plan included an aggressive effort for testing, evaluation, and spiral development, which would lead to deployment of some capability to the warfighter in 2007. The JRAC accepted the aggressive schedule after review with the Office of Force Transformation and after discussion with Army Force Developers.

Based on the JRAC's recommendation, in January 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the use of \$31.3 million for the Army to proceed with Spiral 1 Development of FSEP. The Army received funding in February 2006. In May 2006, however; the Army Program Manager identified potential delays in delivering Spiral 1 capabilities. The Active Denial Technology Subsystem and the Active Protection Subsystem, *Trophy*, displayed technical development and performance risks which ultimately led to the decision to delay the integration of these capabilities onto the FSEP Spiral I Strykers.

Since the focus of this Subcommittee is primarily on the Active Protection subsystem, the remainder of my remarks will focus on it.

System Operation

The Army program manager, working with the Army Test and Evaluation Command, highlighted the risks to Spiral 1 objectives should the *Trophy* Active Protection subsystem be a component of the overall suite of capabilities. Issues included technical immaturity of major subsystem components, such as the autoloader, and the risk of collateral hazards from *Trophy* to friendly forces and noncombatants in an area where it might be used.

The *Trophy* auto-loader, a key component for quickly engaging multiple rocket-propelled grenades, had not then been built and was not forecasted to be available until May 2007, too late for the planned integration and testing prior to operational demonstrations and use.

Retaining *Trophy* as a component of Spiral 1 would add, at a minimum, an additional six to fourteen months to the schedule, thereby delaying other useful *FSEP* capabilities for the warfighter. A simple, readily available interim solution was to equip the Spiral 1 *FSEPs* with slat armor protection, which is currently in use and extremely successful in protecting Strykers and our service members against rocket-propelled grenades.

Organizational Recommendations

During my deliberations, I consulted with numerous stakeholders that included the Joint Staff's Deputy Director for Resources and Acquisition; the Commander, Army Test and Evaluation Command; the Deputy Director of Land and Expeditionary Warfare from the Office of the Director for Operational Test and Evaluation; and the Director of Capabilities Developments from the US Army Capabilities Integration Center; representatives from the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren and Office of Force Transformation who advised me on their perspectives of the availability and readiness of the Active Protection Subsystem. The preponderance of stakeholders advised me that the Active Protection Subsystem would slip significantly due to its technological immaturity and qualification testing requirements.

I presented the available facts to the CENTCOM Chief of Staff, and asked that the requested capability be revalidated. In doing this, I specifically raised the issues about the potential cost and schedule impacts of the Active Protection Subsystem on the *FSEP*.

On May 16, 2006, Central Command responded that proceeding with Spiral 1 with readily available capabilities was preferred, and that the Active Protection capability could be integrated as it became mature in a later spiral of *FSEP* development, if it proved successful.

Based upon these consultations, I validated the Army program manager's decision to integrate the Active Protection capability in subsequent development. This action allows the Department to demonstrate the *FSEP* Spiral 1 capability in response to the warfighter's

immediate need. The FSEP Spiral 1 vehicles will have significant non-lethal capabilities, within a rapid time frame, and with balanced cost, schedule and technical performance risks.

Office of Force Transformation

Throughout this effort, we have had a collaborative relationship with the Office of Force Transformation and we are partners in the FSEP initiative. The OFT was initially the lead for the FSEP effort and facilitated Dahlgren's basic research in its Spiral 0 development. The DepSecDef's January 13, 2006 memo provided \$31.3 million in funding to the Army for FSEP Spiral 1 development and the Army has since been responsible for program management.

The Future Combat System APS

Although not directly related to the FSEP discussion, the Army and Marine Corps acquired their active protection subsystem as a component of a larger acquisition program. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics did not have oversight of the particular subsystem acquisition; however, the Defense Contract Management Command did provide the Active Protection System Source Selection Committee with past performance evaluations on bidders, which is their normal responsibility. I am not aware of any other involvement that AT&L had in the April 2006 contract awarded to Raytheon.

Conclusion

In closing, Mr. Chairman, there was much thought, consultation and thorough consideration of alternatives that went into the decision to delay fielding of the FSEP APS. The acquisition community is committed to the safety of our warfighters and ensuring they are provided with the best protection and weapon systems available. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee. I will be happy to answer any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee might have.