

Statement to the House Armed Services Committee

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June 20, 2006

Chairman Hunter, Representative Skelton, and distinguished members of the committee, we appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Defense's continuing efforts to realign U.S. global defense posture.

Global Defense Posture Strategy

Mr. Chairman, the Administration's efforts to strengthen America's global defense posture will result in the most profound re-ordering of U.S. military forces overseas since the end of World War II and the Korean War.

Much of our in-place posture still reflects a Cold War structure – forward stationed forces configured to fight near where they are based. Now, nearly 16 years after the end of the Cold War, we know that the premises underlying our posture have changed fundamentally: our forces need to be able to rapidly project power into theaters that may be far from where they are based. Events like Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM and the 2004 tsunami relief effort have confirmed this principle. In concert with the Administration's approval of the global defense posture strategy and President Bush's August 2004 announcement that the U.S. would begin its realignment effort, the Department has begun establishing a diverse network of relationships and capabilities better suited to contending with a dynamic and uncertain geo-political landscape.

Mr. Chairman, shaping this realignment strategy have been five key themes the Department uses to guide its thinking on force posture changes:

First is the need to strengthen allied roles and build new partnerships. We want to ensure that our allies and friends recognize that we are strengthening our commitment to secure common interests. Changes to our global posture aim to help our allies and friends modernize their own forces, strategies, and doctrines. We are exploring ways in which we and they together can transform our

partnership to best enhance our collective defense capabilities. At the same time, we seek to tailor our military's overseas "footprint" to address local conditions. Ultimately, we aim to ensure that our alliances and partnerships are affordable, sustainable, and relevant.

Second is the need to improve flexibility to contend with uncertainty. Much of our existing overseas posture was established during the Cold War, when we thought we knew where we would fight. Today, however, we are operating in places that few, if any, would have predicted. Thus, we should recognize the limits of our ability to predict future security challenges and plan in ways that mitigate surprise. Our goal is to have forces positioned forward on a continual basis in areas with access and facilities that enable our forces to reach any potential crisis spots quickly.

Third is creating the capacity to act both within and across regions. During the Cold War, we tailored our military presence to fight within specific regions. Now we are dealing with challenges that are global in nature, and our relationships and capabilities must address those challenges accordingly. NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan is an excellent example of how our alliance is adapting to meet threats that lie beyond regional boundaries. Global force management allows us to adapt to these increasingly global challenges, relationships, and capability needs by establishing cross-regional priorities.

Fourth, we must develop rapidly deployable capabilities. Our forces must move smoothly into, through, and out of host nations, which puts a premium on establishing flexible legal and support arrangements with our allies and partners. We must also develop capabilities with global reach - such as expeditionary operational units like the Army's Stryker brigade combat teams, or the worldwide disposition of key prepositioned materials and equipment.

Finally, we need to focus on effective military capabilities, not numbers of personnel, units, or equipment. In the Cold War, the number of personnel in an administrative region was considered to be the most important indication of our ability to succeed in anticipated conflicts. But this is no longer the case. Capabilities matter, not numbers. We now can have far greater capabilities forward than in the past, with smaller numbers of permanently stationed forces.

Key Posture Changes and Implementation Status

Mr. Chairman, through implementation of our posture plans, we are reshaping our ability to support diplomacy and project necessary military power in and across all theaters. Many of these posture changes are already well underway.

Peace in Europe is no longer threatened by an enemy with tens of thousands of armored vehicles poised to invade across the North German plains. We no longer need heavy maneuver forces as the central element of our defense posture in Europe. Our future posture in the region will thus be characterized by lighter and more deployable ground capabilities that support NATO's own transformation goals, and by having leading-edge air and naval power and advanced training facilities.

Our presence in Europe will increasingly shift south and east in orientation. In Italy, we are transforming the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Vicenza and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe is consolidating in Naples. We are strengthening ground and air rotations to Southern and Southeastern Europe. The United States has signed agreements with the Governments of Romania and Bulgaria that will allow the U.S. access to facilities and training sites in those countries as part of establishing the Eastern European Task Force (EETAF). These posture changes will allow for more rapid deployment to the Middle East, Africa, and other potential hot spots. Another major change will be the return of the two legacy maneuver divisions from Europe to the United States, replacing them with our transformational Stryker capability. In July 2005, we announced the return of eleven Army bases to Germany as part of plans for the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division headquarters, scheduled to occur this summer. Redeployment of major elements of the 1st Armored Division is expected to occur in summer of 2007. To support future operations, however, we also are retaining our advanced mobility infrastructure in places like Ramstein in Germany.

In the Asia-Pacific region, we are improving our ability to meet alliance commitments by strengthening our deterrent against threats, such as that posed by North Korea, while helping allies strengthen their own military capabilities. We also seek to solidify relationships with newer partners who can help prosecute and win the Global War on Terrorism. We are building upon our traditional ground, air, and naval access in Northeast Asia to operate effectively throughout the theater. The forward deployment of additional expeditionary maritime capabilities and long-range strike assets in Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam will increase both our deterrent effect and our capacity for rapid response. We are consolidating facilities and headquarters in Japan and Korea to better enable regional and global action. Key to this effort is reducing the number of American forces in host nations where those forces abut large urban populations. Our plans also include developing access, logistical, and training arrangements and opportunities in Southeast Asia.

As is the case in Europe, implementation of our posture plans in the Asia-Pacific region is well underway. On the Korean peninsula, our planned enhancements are intended to strengthen our overall military effectiveness for the

combined defense of the Republic of Korea. Stationed forces are relocating away from the increasing congestion of the Seoul area and will be consolidated into two major hubs in the central and southern sections of the country. The first units to leave South Korea have already redeployed from the peninsula. We are planning for rotational and rapidly deployable combat capabilities such as Stryker units and air expeditionary forces to complement remaining permanently stationed units.

Over the past two years we have engaged with our Japanese hosts in a series of sustained security consultations aimed at strengthening the U.S.-Japan security alliance to better address today's rapidly changing global security environment. Through the Defense Policy Review Initiative, we have consulted with Japan on several important force realignment initiatives designed to improve our security relationship with Japan while strengthening deterrence and global flexibility. These changes will have far-reaching, beneficial impacts for the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Among these initiatives are the relocation of carrier air wing jet aircraft based on mainland Japan to facilities less encroached by surrounding communities, and a significant reduction and reorganization of the Marine Corps posture on Okinawa, to include relocating approximately 8,000 Marines and their approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam. The Government of Japan has agreed to fund a significant portion (approximately 60%) of the estimated facilities development costs associated with the Marine Corps relocation from Okinawa to Guam, as well as all costs associated with the relocation of U.S. forces within Japan.

In the Middle East, we seek to have a posture that strengthens our ability to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism and to assure allies and partners, but without unduly heavy military footprints. Cooperation and access provided by host nations during Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM provide us with a solid basis for long-term, cooperative relationships in this region. Our posture also aims to strengthen our capabilities in other parts of the CENTCOM area of responsibility, including in the Horn of Africa and in Central Asia.

In Africa and the Western Hemisphere, our aim is to broaden relationships, build partnership capacity, obtain contingency access, and facilitate practical security cooperation activities, without creating new bases or permanent military presence.

Generally, our posture plans seek to consolidate facilities and headquarters for more streamlined command and control and increased jointness. We will retain critical Main Operating Bases (MOBs) where we have permanently-stationed operating forces, maintaining and upgrading key existing infrastructure at these locations. In addition, we are seeking strengthened access to two other types of facilities: Forward Operating Sites (FOSs), which are expandable "warm

facilities” for use by rotational forces and maintained with limited U.S. military support presence; and Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs), which are facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence and maintained with periodic contractor or host-nation support. The use of and moderate investment in FOSs and CSLs will decrease the need for large supporting overseas infrastructure. In our changing world, diversified access is critical for enabling military activities and operations, especially in non-traditional areas.

Funding requested in the FY 2007 President’s Budget for overseas changes supports many of the initiatives in our posture plans:

- Establishment of EETAF headquarters and rotational presence in Southeastern Europe;
- Transformation of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and Southern European Task Force (SETAF);
- Transformation of Army, Navy, and Air Force Headquarters in Europe;
- Establishment of a Stryker brigade in Germany;
- Consolidation and reduction of forces in Korea;
- Establishment of the ISR/Strike Task Force on Guam; and,
- Redeployment of Army units from Germany to the U.S.

The current cost estimate for implementing global defense posture realignment remains between \$9-\$12 billion. This estimate includes not only posture changes reflected in the FY 2007 President’s Budget, but also accounts for other posture changes where individual estimates are still maturing through negotiations or updates to the plans, e.g.: further consolidations in Korea, Japan/Okinawa realignments, and the establishment of an airborne Brigade Combat Team in Alaska. As negotiations with host nations progress or as global defense posture plans mature, this estimate is subject to change.

Importantly, posture changes are subject to the same resource constraints as other defense initiatives. The Department carefully assesses the value-to-cost ratio of its posture plans because they compete for the same resources as other key DoD programs. Where necessary, the Department revisits those plans, for example, if cost-sharing with key host nations does not materialize.

Focused Attention to Quality of Life

The Secretary of Defense has made it a top priority to relieve the stresses on our military forces and their families. Accompanied overseas tours that were designed in an era of static deployments have become an increasing hardship for families as service members deploy more frequently from their forward stations. Changing the way in which we posture US forces globally was therefore driven in large part by our desire to keep faith with our people.

As President Bush has emphasized, the new global defense posture will have a positive effect on our military forces and their families. Rotations of our military forces into forward areas will be balanced by providing more stability at home, with fewer overseas moves and less disruption for families. Specifically, posture changes will help to address the issue of family members often finding themselves in states of “double separation” – separated both from the service member and from their loved ones and extended support networks back in the U.S. Additionally, our posture changes are phased over several years to help ensure quality of life is sustained.

Planned changes to our posture also support Service initiatives aimed at keeping faith with our military personnel – such as the Army’s modularity and unit rotation concepts, the Navy’s Fleet Response Concept, and the Air Force’s ongoing force management improvements. These initiatives, along with the Department’s move to a global force management system, have been designed into the global defense posture strategy to help strengthen personnel management, provide greater predictability in scheduling, and offer more stability at home.

A Complex Undertaking

Mr. Chairman, this undertaking to strengthen U.S. global defense posture is incredibly complex. The global posture effort involves not only transforming our footprint of facilities overseas, but also strengthening our relationships and legal arrangements with key host nations, and dynamically managing our military activities to support security cooperation and contingency response through a global force management process.

Numerous supporting efforts are critical to transforming our global defense posture. These include: our consultations and negotiations with allies and partners, our continuous deliberations with Congress and the interagency, the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, and the implementation of the Service transformation initiatives described earlier. These processes are interdependent, each informing the others.

Notably, the BRAC 2005 process was fully informed by our posture realignment; the two processes are key, interdependent components of the administration’s defense transformation agenda. This linkage is most relevant for the Army, which will be realigning fully one-third of its force structure due to relocations from implementation of the Army Modular Force initiative, BRAC, and global defense posture changes. Once complete, the Department expects more than \$4 billion in annual recurring savings to accrue from BRAC, and another \$1 billion from the BRAC-related global defense posture changes overseas. Additionally, BRAC implementation will maximize joint utilization of facilities at

locations like Guam by reducing overhead, improving cross-Service efficiencies, and facilitating joint training and operations. Through both BRAC and global defense posture realignment, the Department will shed assets amounting to approximately \$45 billion in plant replacement value.

We conducted our global defense posture review thoroughly and deliberately. We collaborated with our interagency partners through broad, sustained deliberations – particularly with the State Department – early in the process. We also have consulted extensively with our allies and partners to incorporate their views, beginning in December 2003 and continuing on a sustained basis since then.

Mr. Chairman, we also have regularly briefed Members of Congress and personal and committee staffs throughout the review and implementation of posture changes, with over 50 such briefings from July 2003 to present. Secretary Rumsfeld, the Combatant Commanders, and others have all testified on our posture realignment effort. Additionally, we provided a detailed Report to Congress in September 2004, followed by submission of comprehensive master plans for changing infrastructure requirements at overseas facilities in 2005 and 2006. Most recently, we provided you another report in response to an FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act reporting requirement, providing cost and negotiations updates and insights into our decision-making criteria for posture changes.

Our global defense posture strategy truly is a complex endeavor. We are implementing aspects of global defense posture realignment or its supporting processes every day across the Department of Defense – in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military Services, the Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, and other areas – and in the Department of State. This activity is overseen by the senior civilian and military officials of the Departments of State and Defense, including by Secretary Rumsfeld. These efforts are integrated and managed systematically and at the highest levels of government.

Conclusion

The Department appreciates this Committee's vision and support as we seek to transform our defense relationships, presence, and footprint overseas to better contend with uncertainties in the new strategic landscape.

We will continue to consult with Members of Congress and their staff and will further seek your support as we work to implement these far-reaching and enduring changes to strengthen America's global defense posture.