Implications of a **Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit** for Retiree Health Care Coverage AN UPDATE BASED ON THE MEDICARE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT

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Overview

The congressional conference agreement on Medicare prescription drug proposals would provide employers that provide equivalent prescription drug coverage (i.e., to the standard benefit) with a subsidy.

Employers that sponsor a qualified prescription drug benefit would receive a federal payment equal to 28 percent of enrollee drug costs between \$250 and \$5,000 in spending.

If retirees receive their drug benefit under a Medicare drug plan, that plan would receive a higher federal subsidy for the qualified benefit.

Such plans would receive both a direct and reinsurance subsidy financing about 73 percent of the costs of a typical plan.

The lower federal subsidy received by a retiree receiving coverage through their former employer or union creates a federal "subsidy wedge." This subsidy wedge creates strong incentives for employers to drop drug coverage and enroll retirees in less expensive drug plans.

The recent conference agreement has essentially adopted the subsidy structure outlined in H.R. 1. The agreement has not materially modified the subsidy, other than to clarify the point that federal subsidies to employers would not be treated as taxable income. Previous estimates of the impact of this provision by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) had assumed the subsidies originally detailed in H.R. 1 and S. 1 would be treated as taxable income.

This note revises my previous estimate from September 13, 2003, and calculates the impact of this clarification. The results are presented in Tables 1 and 2.

Plan Sponsor	Number of Beneficiaries (Millions)	% of Tota
Federal government	1.8	15.4%
State governments	1.8	15.4%
Private sector*	8.1	69.1%
Total	11.7	100.0%

SOURCE: OPM tabulations and Kaiser Family Foundation, 2003.

The clarification of retiree provisions in the recent conference agreement would affect about 8.1 million retirees who receive their benefits through private sector plan. Whether the subsidy is taxable or not has no impact on those receiving coverage through federal, state and local government plans.

Using data on the effective corporate tax rate, I have recalculated earlier estimates of the number of retirees potentially losing their current coverage. The results are displayed in Table 2.

If federal subsidies were not treated as taxable income, it would still provide incentives for

employers with a quarter of employees with retiree coverage to drop.¹ That is because employers sponsoring retiree benefits receive fewer federal subsidies than other plans sponsoring qualified Medicare benefits.

Which employers face these incentives? If we assume that the federal government retirees retain their current coverage, approximately 2.1 million private sector retirees would likely lose their retiree benefits.

Of course, some states have considered scaling back, or even dropping (about 10 percent of states

Table 2.Distribution of Average Monthly Employer and Retiree Premium Contributionsfor Retiree Coverage Compared to Medicare and Supplemental Benefits, 2006

Percent of Medicare Beneficiaries with Retiree Coverage	Dollar Value of Subsidy Wedge per Year	Percent Subsidy Wedge*	Percent of Total Employers Dropping Retiree Coverage
5%	\$ 98	11.5%	0.5%
10%	\$205	22.3%	2.2%
5%	\$218	22.5%	1.1%
17%	17% \$265 25.6%		4.3%
26%	\$296	26.3%	6.8%
17%	\$328	27.0%	4.6%
5%	\$366	27.8%	1.4%
10%	\$399	28.1%	2.8%
5%	\$456	30.2%	1.5%
TOTALS	\$295	25.1%	25.3%

* Assumes federal subsidies to employers are tax free

surveyed did not rule this out in a recent Kaiser Family Foundation survey²) even before this proposal. Since the conference agreement increases the financial incentives for states to drop coverage, the total number of retirees (when including state government retirees) could be as high as 2.7 million.

In short, since the federal government would contribute about \$300 per year more to non-retiree plans to provide the Medicare benefit, the current agreement retains a substantial subsidy wedge.

Solutions

The current conference agreement still discriminates against employers that seek to sponsor qualified

retiree drug benefits. Other plans that provide retirees the same qualified Medicare drug benefits would receive an average of \$300 more per retiree in federal assistance. This federal subsidy wedge would provide strong incentives for employers to drop their current coverage.

Eliminating the subsidy wedge would require one of two solutions:

- Count all non-Medicare payments for prescribed drugs toward the out-of-pocket cap that attracts reinsurance payments (i.e., eliminate the true out-of-pocket provision).
- Provide employers a tax credit that effectively eliminates the federal subsidy wedge—this would total approximately \$300 per year retiree with a drug benefit today.

¹ I assume that a 1 percent increase in the federal subsidy wedge is associated with a 1 percent increase in retirees losing their coverage. This is the same assumption used in my previous analysis from September 13, 2003.

² Kaiser Family Foundation, *How States are Responding to the Challenge of Financing Health Care for Retirees*, September 2003, p 35. About 10 percent of states surveyed note that it was somewhat likely or somewhat unlikely (compared to very unlikely) that they would terminate retiree coverage.

Medicare Beneficiaries with Employer-Sponsored Insurance (ESI) and Counts of Beneficiaries Likely to Lose ESI Coverage Under the Medicare Conference Agreement by State (Thousands of Enrollees)				
State	Medicare Enrollees (000) 12/31/01	Percent of Medicare Beneficiaries with ESI	Number of Medicare Beneficiaries with ESI (000)	Number of Medicare Enrollees Losing Retiree Coverage (000)
ALABAMA	696	31.17%	217	47
ALASKA	44	32.32%	14	3
ARIZONA	697	30.22%	211	46
ARKANSAS	442	19.52%	86	19
CALIFORNIA	3,945	29.56%	1,166	253
COLORADO	476	31.33%	149	32
CONNECTICUT	515	36.26%	187	41
DELAWARE	114	41.21%	47	10
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	74	37.60%	28	6
FLORIDA	2,859	26.72%	764	166
GEORGIA	936	26.18%	245	53
HAWAII	168	50.40%	85	18
IDAHO	169	33.64%	57	12
ILLINOIS	1,634	30.31%	495	107
INDIANA	858	31.77%	273	59
IOWA	477	28.33%	135	29
KANSAS	391	25.62%	100	22
KENTUCKY	630	33.03%	208	45
LOUISIANA	605	27.55%	167	36
MAINE	219	31.85%	70	15
MARYLAND	654	43.44%	284	62
MASSACHUSETTS	958	29.75%	285	62
MICHIGAN	1,410	46.87%	661	143

IVIAL	37,134	J I.OV %0	12,443	2,7VI
TOTAL	39,134	31.80%	12,445	2,701
WYOMING	66	22.48%	15	3
WISCONSIN	787	35.16%	277	60
WEST VIRGINIA	339	41.59%	141	31
WASHINGTON	747	30.14%	238	49
VIRGINIA	911	32.70%	298	65
VERMONT	90	26.61%	24	5
UTAH	2,303	40.17%	85	137
TEXAS	2,303	27.34%	630	137
TENNESSEE	844	29.83%	252	55
SOUTH DAKOTA	120	17.89%	21	5
SOUTH CAROLINA	582	31.26%	182	39
RHODE ISLAND	2,095	25.48%	44	10
PENNSYLVANIA	498 2,093	30.49%	638	138
oklahoma oregon	498	31.16% 29.06%	139	35 31
	1,703 511		159	35
		18.17% 43.27%	737	4 160
NORTH CAROLINA	1,158 103	29.12%	337 19	73 4
	2,712	36.48%	989	215
	239	29.76%	71	15
	1,204	36.07%	434	94
	173	32.69%	57	12
	254	27.22%	69	15
NEBRASKA	255	21.45%	55	12
MONTANA	138	24.86%	34	7
MISSOURI	867	32.91%	285	62
MISSISSIPPI	424	23.28%	99	21
MINNESOTA	659	28.56%	188	41

http://www.cms.hhs.gov/healthplans/statistics/mmcc/
Data Source: CPS 2000–2002 Pooled