


**John W. Lainhart IV**  
Inspector General

**Office of Inspector General**  
**U.S. House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515-9990**

**MEMORANDUM**

TO: Wilson Livingood  
Sergeant at Arms

FROM:   
John W. Lainhart IV  
Inspector General

DATE: December 31, 1996

SUBJECT: Audit Report - Opportunities Exist To Improve The Management Of The  
Sergeant At Arms (Report No. 96-SAA-13)

This is our final report on the audit of the operations of the Sergeant at Arms (SAA). This audit was part of our annual audit plan and was approved by the Committee on House Oversight. The objective of our review was to provide an operational assessment of the SAA during the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress. In this report, we identified one finding and one "other matters" issue, and made three recommendations for corrective action.

In response to our November 15, 1996 draft report, your office fully concurred with our finding and recommendations. The November 21, 1996 management response is incorporated into this final report and included in its entirety as an appendix.

We appreciate the courtesy and cooperation extended to us by your staff. If you have any questions or require additional information regarding this report, please call me or Craig W. Silverthorne at x61250.

cc: Speaker of the House  
Majority Leader of the House  
Minority Leader of the House  
Chairman, Committee on House Oversight  
Ranking Minority Member, Committee on House Oversight  
Members, Committee on House Oversight

# OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT OF THE SERGEANT AT ARMS

*Report No. 96-SAA-13*

*December 31, 1996*

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## RESULTS IN BRIEF

### CONCLUSIONS

At the beginning of the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress, the House of Representatives (House) undertook extensive measures to improve operations and efficiencies, as well as financial reporting and accountability. Each of the three Officers of the House set baseline objectives in order to prioritize their transition roles. The Sergeant at Arms (SAA) had the following 12 baseline objectives when the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress convened:

- Initiate merger of Doorkeeper Office into SAA.
- Initiate Chamber Security posts and equipment study.
- Initiate garage entry security enhancement study.
- Initiate threat assessment study in regards to threats to Members of Congress.
- Initiate study of personnel practices of the Capitol Police.
- Initiate assessment of Capitol Police policies.
- Update critical incidents response plan.
- Conduct a police supervisory review of watch command positions.
- Conduct risk assessment and security survey of U.S. Capitol and all House and Senate Office Buildings.
- Review Capitol Police posts and number of personnel.
- Unify police payroll into one payroll system.

The SAA fully implemented 11 of the Office's 12 baseline objectives during the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress. The remaining baseline objective, unification of police payroll into one payroll system, is in process. The SAA also collects performance measurement data for a number of performance indicators and uses the results of this data as the basis for improving operations. In addition, the SAA has completed a number of other significant actions

during the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress to improve operations, increase accountability, and improve resource management. These improvements include the following:

- **Improved Policies and Procedures** - All departments under the SAA's direction have begun developing policies and procedures for procurement activities. In addition, policies and procedures relating to a contingency/disaster recovery plan for the House Identification System have been developed, tested, and documented.
- **Improved Systems Controls** - The SAA has made improvements in access and security controls over its computer systems by (1) requiring periodic changing of systems passwords, (2) limiting remote access to SAA systems to authorized personnel only, (3) segregating programming and computer operation functions, (4) establishing systems access controls and security procedures, and (5) assigning a systems administrator in June 1996.
- **New Filing System** - Prior to the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress, the SAA had no formal centralized filing system. The SAA has implemented a newly designed, fully functional, filing system which is centralized and automated.
- **Increased Management Controls** - The SAA implemented formal timekeeping for all employees via the use of magnetic cards and computer log-ons to the network. Also, regular supervisory reviews and data entry verifications improved the SAA's controls over the House Identification System.
- **Increased Training Initiatives** - The SAA also implemented formalized training initiatives in 1996. For instance, SAA parking personnel received training related to security (i.e., bomb detection, communications, and computers), and selected individuals received cross-training in other functional areas, (i.e. parking security individuals were cross-trained in the identification office and office staff cross-trained in Special Events). The SAA also trained House Identification personnel on its newly developed contingency/disaster recovery plan.
- **New Human Resources Programs** - Prior to the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress, no formal written job position descriptions and no performance evaluation or employee recognition programs existed. The SAA has since formally documented, in writing, job position descriptions and been successful in implementing a new performance evaluation and employee recognition program. Preliminary performance evaluations were completed at the beginning of the year, mid-year, and at yearend. The SAA also implemented a formal *Employee of the Month* program for Parking Security and Garage personnel and plans to implement the program throughout the entire SAA organization. The awards consist of a framed photograph of the individual taken with the SAA, a day off with pay, and tickets to the House Gallery to observe House proceedings. Both employees and management have reacted very favorably to both of these programs which have contributed to very high employee morale.

- **Prior Office of Inspector General (OIG) Audit Recommendations** - The SAA has undertaken measures to improve resource utilization and internal controls over the House Identification System. This was in response to OIG audits entitled *Opportunities Exist To Improve Resource Utilization In The Office Of the Sergeant At Arms* (Report No. 95-SAA-14, dated July 18, 1995) and *Poor Planning, Questionable Contracting, and Numerous Internal Control Deficiencies Undermine Integrity and Usefulness of House Identification System* (Report No. 96-SAA-03, dated March 5, 1996). These audits produced 47 recommendations relating to the SAA's Office. The SAA has fully implemented 31 recommendations and partially implemented the other 16 recommendations. (See Exhibit for detailed information.)

The SAA's immediate office has managed its duties in a *hands on* manner and at the same time empowered its employees to make improvements in their daily tasks. As a result, the SAA has made improvements in process and product while reducing appropriated FTEs from 103 in 1994 to 87 in 1996 and reducing total noncapital appropriations to \$3,410,000 in 1996. Additionally, employee morale appears good as evidenced by the fact that, of the approximately 30 Job Activity Questionnaires (JAQs) and 15 employee interviews, all of the feedback suggested that working conditions have improved.

Although the SAA has implemented numerous initiatives, opportunities exist for the SAA to utilize Chamber Security staff more efficiently and achieve cost savings. This is demonstrated by the following:

- Chamber Security personnel are paid using "Belo" agreements that assumed a workload of 60 hours per week when the average workload is approximately 22 hours per week. Based on individual "Belo" agreements provided by the SAA, these employees were paid \$291,823 in wages for the eight months ended October 31, 1996, which was \$181,335 or 61 percent more than if Chamber Security staff had been paid on an hourly basis with overtime paid after the first 40 hours worked in a given week.

The OIG previously identified overstaffing of Chamber Security personnel in *Opportunities Exist To Improve Resource Utilization In The Office Of The Sergeant At Arms* (Report No. 95-SAA-14, dated July 18, 1995). In responding to the related recommendation, the SAA reassigned Chamber Security personnel to other tasks to avoid over-staffing. However, over-staffing is still occurring.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

We recommend that the Sergeant at Arms:

1. Prepare a proposal, for approval by the Committee on House Oversight, based upon one of the following options:
  - Option 1: Pay Chamber Security Aides on an hourly basis, with overtime accrued after a 40-hour workweek.
  - Option 2: Pay Chamber Security Aides on an hourly basis, with overtime accrued after an 8-hour day.
  - Option 3: Reduce the “Belo” agreements to amounts more consistent with the workload, and re-evaluate “Belo” calculations bi-annually.
2. Work with the Chief Administrative Officer and the Clerk to establish a consistent system for tracking and managing the implementation of prior audit recommendations.
3. Establish target dates for all unimplemented prior audit recommendations.

## **MANAGEMENT RESPONSE**

In his November 21, 1996 response to our draft report, the SAA concurred with the finding and recommendations in this report. (See Appendix.)

## **OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL COMMENTS**

The SAA’s planned actions are responsive to the issues we identified and, when fully implemented, should fully satisfy the intent of the recommendations.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### Background

**Election of the Sergeant at Arms (SAA).** The Rules of the House of Representatives effective for the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress (dated January 4, 1995) detail the duties of the Speaker of the House (Rule I), the Election of Officers (Rule II), the duties of the Office of the SAA (Rule IV) and the duties of the Standing Committees, including the Committee on House Oversight (Rule X 1.(h) and 4.(d)(2)).

Rule II for the election of Officers states:

“There shall be elected by a viva voce vote, at the commencement of each Congress, to continue in office until their successors are chosen and qualified, a Clerk, Sergeant at Arms, Chief Administrative Officer, and Chaplain, each of whom shall take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, and for the true and faithful discharge of the duties of his office to the best of his knowledge and ability, and to keep the secrets of the House; and each shall appoint all of the employees of his department provided for by law. The Clerk, Sergeant at Arms, and Chief Administrative Officer may be removed by the House or by the Speaker.”

Thus, the SAA is chosen and qualified and submitted to the House for a voice vote. The SAA may be removed either by the House or by the Speaker.

**Role of the Committee on House Oversight (CHO).** The CHO has certain responsibilities detailed in Rule X regarding the SAA, including:

- 1.(h)(1) “Appropriations from accounts for committee salaries and expenses (except for the Committee on Appropriations), House Information Systems, and allowances and expenses of Members, House Officers and administrative offices of the House.”
- 1.(h)(2) “Auditing and settling of all accounts described in subparagraph (1).”
- 1.(h)(3) “Employment of persons by the House, including clerks for Members and committees, and reporters of debates.”
- 1.(h)(6) “Expenditures of accounts described in subparagraph (1).”
- 1.(h)(13) “Measures relating to services to the House, including the House Restaurant, parking facilities and administration of the House Office Buildings and of the House wing of the Capitol.”
- 1.(h)(16) “Measures relating to the compensation, retirement and other benefits of the Members, officers, and employees of the Congress.”

- 4.(d)(2) “providing policy direction for, and oversight of, the Clerk, Sergeant at Arms, Chief Administrative Officer, and Inspector General.”

Despite the inability of the CHO to directly or indirectly hire or remove the SAA, according to House Rules, the CHO has direct oversight of the SAA. The CHO also has the responsibility to oversee appropriations, personnel decisions, and expenditures of the SAA.

The CHO provides the following critical functions in relation to the Officers of the House:

- The three Officers of the House must work together on several administrative areas including: finance and accounting issues; purchasing and procurement issues; technology issues; issues relating to media and support services; and human resources issues. The CHO provides for the oversight to ensure that the three Officers work together on key cross organizational issues.
- Rule X 1.(h)(2) provides for the CHO to oversee the audit activities of the House. As such, the CHO functions as an Audit Committee to ensure that the House is accountable for its public funding.
- The CHO ensures that the goals and objectives of the Members in general and the Speaker in particular are met.
- The CHO operates as a bipartisan committee to provide oversight to each of the Officers. The Rules of the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress created the CHO to replace the House Administration Committee from the 103<sup>rd</sup> Congress. The change in name of the Committee reflects the change in philosophy of this Committee from administration by elected officials to oversight of professional administrators by elected officials.

**Role of the SAA.** The SAA has certain responsibilities detailed in Rule IV regarding its interaction with the CHO and Speaker, including:

5. “In addition to any other reports required by the Speaker or the Committee on House Oversight, the Sergeant at Arms shall report to the Committee on House Oversight not later than 45 days following the close of each semiannual period ending June 30 or on December 31 on the financial and operational status of each function under the jurisdiction of the Sergeant at Arms. Each report shall include financial statements, a description or explanation of current operations, the implementation of new policies and procedures, and future plans for each function.”
6. “The Sergeant at Arms shall fully cooperate with the appropriate offices and persons in the performance of reviews and audits of financial records and administrative operations.”



Thus, the SAA has a responsibility to provide the CHO an accounting of its operations as part of the oversight by the CHO.

The mission of the SAA is to ensure that the safety of Members, staff, and the public on Capitol Hill is maintained, and protocol and tradition are followed with respect to the Legislative body and its Members. The major responsibilities of the SAA include:

- Monitoring access to the Gallery and the House Floor when the House is in session, delivering documents to the Members on the floor, paging Members on the floor, and helping coordinate special events.
- Managing and operating 13 parking facilities consisting of 4 underground garages, 5 surface lots, and various street parking areas throughout Capitol Hill.
- Issuing identification badges to Members and their families, staff, interns liaison offices, pages, lobbyists, and House contractors.
- Coordinating SAA activities with the Capitol Hill Police and other law enforcement agencies.
- Assisting the House Leadership, Congressional Offices, and House Committees in planning and organizing special events, including the State of the Union, arrival of foreign dignitaries, and funerals.
- Reporting on the financial and operational jurisdiction semi-annually.
- Fully cooperating in the performance of reviews and audits of financial records and administrative operations.

The SAA is organized into five divisions, as follows:

- **House Chamber Security** employs 23 personnel, 20 of which are Chamber Security staff. The Chamber Security staff monitors access to the Gallery and the House Floor when the House is in session, delivers documents to the Members on the floor, pages Members on the floor, and helps coordinate special events.
- **House Parking** employs 39 staff to operate parking facilities consisting of four underground garages, five surface lots, and street parking areas throughout Capitol Hill.
- **Identification Office** employs four staff to issue identification badges to Members and their families, staff, interns, liaison offices, pages, lobbyists, and House contractors.
- **Police Services** employs one full-time Director and five staff positions, including three Assistant Sergeants at Arms. This office serves as the SAA liaison to the Capitol Hill Police and other law enforcement agencies.

- **Special Events and Protocol** employs one full-time Director and three staff positions, two of which are vacant. This office helps the House Leadership, Congressional Offices, and House Committees plan and organize special events, including the State of the Union, arrival of foreign dignitaries, and funerals.

### **Objective, Scope and Methodology**

The objective of our review of the SAA was to provide an operational assessment of the SAA during the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress. Specifically, we examined the existence and use of performance measures, and policies and procedures in use by the SAA. We also assessed the implementation status of the 47 recommendations in the 2 prior OIG audit reports issued with respect to the SAA, and baseline objectives presented by the SAA to the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress.

We conducted our review in accordance with *Government Auditing Standards*, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States. Our review included the following steps:

- Conducted entrance interview with the SAA;
- Conducted interviews and walk-through tours with each SAA division head and other SAA staff;
- Gathered and analyzed documents related to operations, organization, staffing, policies and procedures, performance standards, and prior reviews and audits; and
- Surveyed employees of the SAA and analyzed responses to determine job activities and responsibilities.

### **Internal Controls**

We reviewed the implementation of internal control recommendations from prior OIG audit reports (see below—*Prior Audit Coverage*). We also reviewed the SAA's internal control process over the implementation of prior audit recommendations (see the *Other Matters* section).

### **Prior Audit Coverage**

OIG audit report, *Poor Planning, Questionable Contracting, And Numerous Internal Control Deficiencies Undermine Integrity And Usefulness of House Identification System* (Report No. 96-SAA-03, dated March 5, 1996). This audit evaluated the management and internal controls of the House Identification System and made 40 recommendations to correct identified deficiencies. Twenty-seven (27) recommendations have been fully implemented, and the other 13 recommendations have been partially implemented. (See Exhibit.)

OIG audit report, *Opportunities Exist To Improve Resource Utilization In The Office Of The Sergeant At Arms* (Report No. 95-SAA-14, dated July 18, 1995). This audit

evaluated the efficiency of Office of Sergeant At Arms resources during times of seasonal fluctuations and made six recommendations to improve those activities. Four recommendations have been fully implemented and two have been partially implemented. (See Exhibit.)

## II. FINDING AND RECOMMENDATION

### **Finding A: Chamber Security Personnel Are Being Funded At A Level Which Exceeds Their Utilization**

Despite an attempt to implement a prior year audit recommendation from OIG Report No. 95-SAA-14 to reassign Chamber Security staff to other tasks to avoid over-staffing when the House is not in session, over-staffing is still occurring. As a result, Chamber Security staff are being paid for more hours than actually worked. According to individual "Belo" agreements for the eight months ended October 31, 1996, employees were paid \$291,823 in wages based upon an assumed 60-hour work week when actual hours averaged only about 22 hours per week. Therefore, Chamber Security staff were overpaid approximately 61 percent, or \$181,335, more than they should have been paid if payments were based on hourly wages with overtime pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

OIG Report No. 95-SAA-14 recommended that the SAA either pay Chamber Security Aides based on an hourly basis, or reassign Chamber Security Aides to other duties when the House is not in session. The SAA, however, has not fully reassigned Chamber Security staff to other duties when the House is not in session or paid employees on an hourly basis.

Chamber Security staff are currently paid as full time staff under "Belo" agreements. Under Section 207(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, a "Belo" Plan enables employers to give employees compensatory time in lieu of overtime pay over a specified number of hours per week. The SAA "Belo" agreements guarantee compensated employees at a fixed rate for the first 40 hours of work per week, and a fixed overtime rate over 40 and up to 60 hours of work per week. Any additional hours beyond 60 would be credited to the employee in the form of compensatory time at a rate of 1.5 hours per hour worked.

We obtained time reports for the periods from March 3, 1996 through October 31, 1996 and calculated the total *actual* weekly hours worked for each employee. We then calculated the average weekly hours worked per employee. Chamber Security staff worked an average of 21.75 hours per week. The highest weekly average during the period we reviewed was 58.95 hours and the lowest average hours, for weeks where Chamber Security staff were assigned to work, was 5.71 hours.

Furthermore, only 23 percent of the employee weeks were in excess of 40 hours and 57 percent were less than 30 hours (see the following chart). No employee worked more than 40 hours per week for more than 7 of the 35 weeks reviewed.

	Total # <u>Employee Weeks</u>	Percent <u>% of Total</u>
Weeks with less than 10 hours worked	27	6%
Weeks with 10 to 19.99 hours worked	80	18%
Weeks with 20 to 29.99 hours worked	155	33%
Weeks with 30 to 39.99 hours worked	90	20%
Weeks with 40 to 49.99 hours worked	72	16%
Weeks with 50 to 59.99 hours worked	25	6%
Weeks with 60 or more hours worked	<u>4</u>	<u>1%</u>
Total employee weeks	<u><u>453</u></u>	<u><u>100%</u></u>

Based on individual "Belo" agreements provided by the SAA, these employees were paid \$291,823 in wages for the 35 weeks from the week of March 9, 1996 to the week of November 1, 1996. This is 61 percent or \$181,335 more than if Chamber Security staff had been paid on an hourly basis with overtime paid after the first 40 hours worked in a given week.

The relationship between pay under the "Belo" agreements and actual hours worked will vary for each Congressional session, depending upon the number of hours that Congress is in session each week. For example, SAA management stated that the hours worked by Chamber Security Aides more closely approximated full-time employment during the First Session of the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress than during the Second Session. The reduced workload during the Second Session was due to an election year, and Congress was not in session for as many days as during the First Session. However, the foregoing example reinforces the fact that time worked by Chamber Security Aides does not always reflect a full-time equivalent work year and illustrates that overpayments are still continuing to occur by not linking pay to actual time worked.

According to SAA management, Chamber Security staff have been reassigned to other tasks, but on a limited basis only (when the House is not in session) because of very limited opportunities for reassignment. The reassignments that have been made are for participation in one week Member recognition training classes to be held in December 1996 and for work in the House Identification Office during the convening of the 105<sup>th</sup> Congress.

### **Recommendation**

We recommend that the Sergeant at Arms prepare a proposal, for approval by the Committee on House Oversight, based upon one of the following options:

- Option 1: Pay Chamber Security Aides on an hourly basis, with overtime accrued after a 40-hour workweek.
- Option 2: Pay Chamber Security Aides on an hourly basis, with overtime accrued after an 8-hour day.
- Option 3: Reduce the "Belo" agreements to amounts more consistent with the workload, and re-evaluate "Belo" calculations bi-annually.

### **Management Response**

In his November 21, 1996 response to our draft report, the SAA concurred with Option 3 of the recommendation. In his response, the SAA stated that regarding Option 3, it is important to note that his office has previously committed to re-evaluating the "Belo" agreement after the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress. Therefore, the he concurs with the need for readjustment regarding these contracts, taking into consideration the total weekly hours worked for the First and Second Session rather than focusing on either Session. Further, the schedule of the Congress (and those individuals who work irregular hours tied to that schedule) has traditionally been affected by a variety of factors including, for example, election year cycles.

### **Office of Inspector General Comments**

The SAA's planned action is responsive to the issue we identified and, when fully implemented, should fully satisfy the intent of the recommendation.

### **III. OTHER MATTERS**

During the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress, the House of Representatives has undertaken extensive measures to improve operations and efficiencies, as well as financial reporting and accountability. These measures evolved, in part, from numerous recommendations made in several audits on the operations of each of the three House Officers. As a result of the findings and recommendations included in the audit reports, considerable progress has been made to date. However, due to the number and complexity of the recommendations, additional procedures are needed to ensure that recommendation status is kept up-to-date, and that implementation is supported by adequate documentation. While the SAA only had a limited number of findings and recommendations over the past two years, we believe a system for tracking and managing implementation of prior audit recommendations should be implemented which is consistent among all three Officers of the House.

#### **Recommendations**

We recommend that the Sergeant at Arms:

1. Work with the Chief Administrative Officer and the Clerk to establish a consistent system for tracking and managing the implementation of prior audit recommendations.
2. Establish target dates for all unimplemented prior audit recommendations. (See Exhibit.)

#### **Management Response**

In his November 21, 1996 to our draft report, the SAA concurred with both recommendations. In his response to Recommendation 1, the he stated that his office would be happy to work with the CAO and Clerk to set up a common system. Additionally, the SAA has set up their his own system to monitor prior audit recommendations and will continue this practice. In his response to Recommendation 2, the SAA will provide target dates for the prior audit recommendations which are still not implemented by December 31, 1996.

#### **Office of Inspector General Comments**

The SAA's planned actions are responsive to the issues we identified and, when fully implemented, should fully satisfy the intent of the recommendations.

**Sergeant At Arms  
Status of Implementation of Prior OIG Audit Recommendations  
Summary**

Audit Number	Audit Title	Implementation Status			
		Fully	Partially	None	Total
95-SAA-14	Opportunities Exist To Improve Resource Utilization In The Office Of The Sergeant At Arms	4	2	0	6
96-SAA-03	Poor Planning, Questionable Contracting, And Numerous Internal Control Deficiencies Undermine Integrity And Usefulness Of House Identification System	27	14	0	41
	Total	31	16	0	47



**Sergeant at Arms**  
**Status of Implementation of Prior Audit Recommendations**  
*Opportunities Exist To Improve Resource Utilization In The Office Of The Sergeant At Arms*  
**Report No. 95-SAA-14**

No.	Recommendations (Addressed to SAA)	Implementation Status			Comments	Estimated Implementation Date
		Fully	Partially	None		
A.	Prepare a proposal, for approval by the Committee on House Oversight (CHO), to pay Chamber Security Aides on an hourly basis or reassign Chamber Security Aides to other duties when the House is not in session.		1		Doorkeeper was replaced with Office of Chamber Security and the staff was reduced from 48 to 20. Management staff was reduced from 6 to 3. Chamber Security duties now include crowd control, however, <u>only 2 employees have extra duties.</u>	To be determined (TBD)
B.	Prepare a proposal, for approval by the CHO, to revise House Parking facilities staffing in accordance with garage and lot peak and non-peak activity levels.		1		A study was conducted to determine parking lot peak and non peak activity resulting in the elimination of one third of the positions.	Not applicable
C.	Develop a proposal to place House Parking personnel under the House Employee Schedule at a rate that more closely reflects private industry standards or assign them additional duties.		1		House parking personnel were transferred to SAA. The positions are basically entry level law enforcement. This is at the lowest pay scale (approximately \$14,000 - \$30,000 range) with an average of \$18,000. This transfer occurred about one year ago.	Not applicable
D.	Assign parking permits by a unique, unalterable identifier--such as the House employee ID number--to ensure that only one parking permit is issued per employee.		1		SAA is in the process of developing new parking permits which are basically color coded hanging tags. The tags are printed on both sides and contain holographic data. The tags must be hung from the rear view mirror.	At the start of the 105th Congress
E.1.	Improve workload planning within the Identification Office by analyzing the demand for ID badges, including an analysis of its human resources, on a daily, monthly, and yearly basis. Stagger ID badge issuance by office.		1		Specific scheduling and staggering of offices for issuing ID badges is done. Badge issuance is documented and analyzed on a weekly, monthly, and yearly basis, except during January when volume is great. There is another site for processing and entering data for badge issuance.	Not applicable
E.2.	Institute a formal training program for temporary staff to provide adequate help in peak times. Trained staff should work specified periods and replacements should be available when the need for temporary staff arises.		1		Written procedures now describe on the job mentoring programs for temporary employees. Temporary employees are now available at peak times.	Not applicable
6	Total recommendations	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>		

**Sergeant at Arms**  
**Status of Implementation of Prior Audit Recommendations**  
*Poor Planning, Questionable Contracting, And Numerous Internal Control Deficiencies Undermine Integrity And Usefulness Of House Identification System*  
**Report No. 96-SAA-03**

No.	Recommendations (Addressed to Sergeant at Arms)	Implementation Status			Comments	Estimated Implementation Date
		Fully	Partially	None		
A.1.	Terminate pending and planned expenditures for system upgrades until a system re-evaluation can be	1			In December 1995, the SAA suspended 2 outstanding purchase requests for House ID equipment.	Not applicable
A.2.	Enforce the technical support contracted for with CAC or cancel the contract with CAC and seek another contractor.		1		SAA met with a representative from CAC in February, 1996 to discuss the issue. A new system (software) will be implemented for the next Congress which will elevate this problem .	TBD
A.3.	Re-assess House needs to determine if further investment in the current House ID system is warranted.	1			A complete ID System assessment of needs was completed on January 20, 1996 by the NSA and was complimented by a Capitol Complex Security Survey by the U.S. Secret Service, the Capitol Police, and the SAA (April 1996). The result was the decision to change to a new software system for ID Services for the 105th Congress.	Not applicable
A.4.	Adopt procurement policies and procedures being developed in relation to 95-CAO-11.	1			As of October 1, 1995, all departments under the SAA's jurisdiction have been complying.	Not applicable
A.5.	Adopt System Development Lifecycle (SDLC) policies and procedures that are being developed by the House Information Resources (HIR) in response to 95-CAO-20.		1		Per the SAA, the policies will be followed when they are completed. Per HIR, the SDLC methodology is awaiting approval by the CHO. In the interim, the National Institute of Standards and Technology's SDLC guidelines will be followed.	Early 1997
B.	Develop, in conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), a proposal for CHO approval to establish a House-wide pre-exit clearance procedure for all employees.		1		On February 21, 1996, the SAA requested that the CAO develop a proposal, for approval by CHO, to require a House-wide pre-exit clearance process for all House employees necessary from a security standpoint. The SAA has periodically followed up with the CAO and plans to continue following up on the status until completion.	TBD

**Sergeant at Arms**  
**Status of Implementation of Prior Audit Recommendations**  
*Poor Planning, Questionable Contracting, And Numerous Internal Control Deficiencies Undermine Integrity And Usefulness Of House Identification System*  
**Report No. 96-SAA-03**

No.	Recommendations (Addressed to Sergeant at Arms)	Implementation Status			Comments	Estimated Implementation Date
		Fully	Partially	None		
B.1.	Require CAC to take immediate steps to correct deficiencies in the Host to Host update process.	1			See comments on Recommendation A.2.	Not applicable
B.2.	Require CAC to correct software deficiency which prevents a simple, one-step deletion of records.		1		Per the SAA Data Base Administrator, records can be deleted easily. However, the photos must be deleted in a separate step. This is necessary in the case of lost IDs, where the original photo is to be used for a replacement ID.	Early 1997
B.3.	Require CAC to eliminate users' ability to access Host-2 to modify data, except on an emergency basis.		1		Host-2 was down until September 1996. Implementation of the new system scheduled to be in place in early 1997 will address the recommendation.	Early 1997
B.4.	Require CAC to correct problems which prevent consistent operation of the image compression process at the rate proposed in their bid.	1			As of November 1995, the image compression process is operating at the bided rate. Although some old images have not been compressed, the process is operating properly.	Not applicable
B.5.	Require CAC to modify ID software to delete non-essential data elements and screen modules that may be contributing to system capacity problems.		1		The new system will be easily tailored by the system administrator to include only essential data elements and screen modules.	Early 1997
B.6.	Order a capacity analysis of the ID System after all unnecessary records have been deleted.	1			A capacity analysis was performed in May 1996. The addition of new hard drives and the change to the new system should take care of any capacity problems.	Not applicable
B.7.	Conduct a market research analysis to identify reasonably-priced hard drives if an upgrade is needed.	1			As of October 1, 1995, all purchases, including the new ID system purchase made by the Office of the SAA, have complied with Office of Procurements policies and procedures.	Not applicable

**Sergeant at Arms**  
**Status of Implementation of Prior Audit Recommendations**  
*Poor Planning, Questionable Contracting, And Numerous Internal Control Deficiencies Undermine Integrity And Usefulness Of House Identification System*  
**Report No. 96-SAA-03**

No.	Recommendations (Addressed to Sergeant at Arms)	Implementation Status			Comments	Estimated Implementation Date
		Fully	Partially	None		
B.8.	Prohibit the practice of issuing ID cards to "generic" users and ensure that all cards are issued to only authorized users.	1			All "generic" ID's were eliminated and replaced with specific ID's in May 1996. New procedures will prohibit their production.	Not applicable
C.1.	Assign a technically qualified UNIX systems administrator.	1			An HIR employee was assigned as the UNIX systems administrator in June 1996.	Not applicable
C.2.	Remove the UNIX system passwords from the Computer Operations Guide.	1			On December 11, 1995, the SAA requested that HIR remove all passwords from the Computer Operations Guide including future editions. Additionally, all passwords were changed.	Not applicable
C.3.	Implement procedures to ensure that all remote access into House resources is authorized, logged, and performed in a secure environment.	1			HIR investigated dial-back access for all remote access to the system. This was not implemented. As a mitigating control, the modem is only turned on when it is needed by authorized personnel.	Not applicable
C.4.	Ensure computer operation functions and application programmer functions, relative to the House ID System, are appropriately segregated.	1			The computer operation functions and applications programmer functions were transferred to the Operations Division in the Computer Center of HIR in April 1996.	Not applicable
C.5.	Assign a database administrator to the ID System with experience in UNIX, Informix, and relational databases.	1			The SAA assigned an experienced UNIX data base administrator in January, 1996.	Not applicable
C.6.	Establish security controls to limit access to Informix Viewpoint and Informix DBA to only authorized users.	1			Using Norton Desktop, SAA has installed passwords on system Windows icons (June 1996). Since Informix will not be used under the new system, this recommendation is no longer applicable.	Not applicable

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		Fully	Partially	None		
C.7.	Ensure that the Informix DBA module is only accessible by the database administrator.	1			The DBA module has not been moved to an area accessible only to the database administrator. However, the Norton Desktop password for the DBA module is known only by the database administrator.	Not applicable
C.8.	Establish system access controls to eliminate access to the system outside of the applications software, directly to database files and tables.	1			See comments for recommendation C.6.	Not applicable
C.9.	Limit the number of users with system administrator access to the ID System to a minimal number necessary to perform system administration functions.	1			See comments for recommendation C.7.	Not applicable
C.10.	Establish security administration procedures for the ID System that includes password and access control procedures.	1			Security administration procedures, which include policies regarding passwords and access controls, were included in the SAA's System and Operations Manual that was completed in September 1996.	Not applicable
C.11.	Change the access level of the ID System security administrator to a "read-only" access level.	1			The ID System security administrator's access level was changed to "read-only" in December 1995.	Not applicable
C.12.	Assign technically qualified personnel to provide access control procedures, including reviewing access level capabilities by module.	1			A qualified data base administrator was assigned in 1996 with duties such as establishing procedures for access control included in the SAA's System and Operations Manual.	Not applicable
C.13.	Implement a structured methodology to ensure that system access is granted based upon job function.		1		Although the database administrator has a structured methodology to review access level capabilities by module for each category of user, this policy has not been documented.	Early 1997

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		Fully	Partially	None		
D.1.	Enforce contractual requirements with CAC to provide system documentation, including identification of the system of internal controls over data entry.		1		CAC has not specifically identified the system of internal controls over data entry. However, a new system will be implemented in early 1997.	TBD
D.2.	Request assistance from qualified HIR staff to identify additional edits that are necessary to compliment the edits provided by the contractor.		1		A new system will be implemented in early 1997 that will address this recommendation.	TBD
D.3.	Submit edits developed in D.2. to the contractor of record if and when upgrades are permitted under user-controlled terms and conditions.		1		A new system will be implemented in early 1997 that will address this recommendation.	TBD
D.4.	Implement interim compensating controls (e.g., supervisory review, data entry verification) to ensure that information maintained in the lost ID database is no longer necessary.	1			As of December 11, 1995, supervisory review and data entry verification of the lost ID database was being performed by a minimum of two people on a daily basis.	Not applicable
D.5.	Request contractually required documentation from CAC to insure that information necessary to generate accurate reports is available.		1		A new system will be implemented in early 1997 that will address this recommendation.	TBD
D.6.	Provide adequate training in Informix to ID System users to allow them to generate necessary reports in an efficient and accurate manner.	1			Supervisory employees of the ID office received a basic course in the fundamentals of Informix in July 1995. However, since the new system will be installed in early 1997, it was not considered necessary to train anyone beyond the fundamentals.	Not applicable
D.7.	Identify all management reporting requirements for the ID System and establish reporting formats to generate necessary reports on a scheduled basis.		1		SAA has instructed its staff to analyze their reporting needs. When the new system is implemented, the employees will be trained on how to query the system for needed reports.	TBD

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		Fully	Partially	None		
D.8.	Implement a formal system of user testing, approval, and acceptance for all proposed changes to the ID System		1		This will be implemented with the new system in early 1997.	TBD
D.9.	Withhold acceptance of changes to the Receptors software that do not correct the problem or that eliminate useful functions as part of the change.		1		A new system will be implemented in early 1997 that will address this recommendation.	TBD
E.1.	Establish a contingency/disaster recovery plan for the ID System and assign responsibilities to appropriate individuals.	1			A contingency/disaster recovery plan for the ID System was established in June 1996, and responsibilities were assigned to appropriate individuals.	Not applicable
E.2.	Develop policies and procedures for the plan established above and routinely test these procedures to ensure they are adequately maintained.	1			All policies and procedures related to the plan have been included in the SAA's System and Operations Manual (September 1996). In addition, a separate document with the actual plan is kept at a separate location (the SAA's office). The plan was first tested in July 1996, with periodic testing to follow.	Not applicable
E.3.	Schedule House ID personnel for training in an appropriate contingency/disaster recovery training program.	1			All appropriate House ID personnel received training in the plan in July 1996.	Not applicable
E.4.	Develop detailed on-site and off-site tape rotation/storage and handling procedures for the system backup tapes.	1			Included in the plan developed in response to Recommendation E.1. are detailed on- and off-site rotation, storage, and handling procedures. The plan was included in the SAA's System and Operations Manual in September 1996.	Not applicable

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E.5.	Designate an individual to assist and/or take over the duties of backing up the system, including the UNIX computers, in the absence of the primary backup personnel.	1			The database administrator has established backup personnel to assist and/or take over the duties of backing up the system, including the UNIX computers, in the absence of primary personnel. The plan was included in the manual completed September 1996.	Not applicable
40	Total recommendations	<u>27</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>0</u>		




Office of the Sergeant at Arms  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-6634

November 21, 1996

MEMORANDUM

TO: John W. Lainhart, IV  
Inspector General

FROM: Wilson Livingood   
Sergeant at Arms

SUBJECT: Response to Audit Report titled Opportunities Exist to Improve the Management of the Sergeant at Arms

I am pleased to respond to the Draft Audit Report sent to Mr. Jim Varey, the Deputy Sergeant at Arms, from Mr. Robert B. Frey III, the Deputy Inspector General. As the report notes, the management of the Office of the Sergeant at Arms has made significant improvements during the 104th Congress. All employees have worked diligently to implement the policies and procedures of the Office of the Sergeant at Arms.

I think that it is important to point out some of the savings that have occurred since assuming the functions of Chamber Security, formerly known as the Office of the Doorkeeper. Effective September 1, 1995, the number of FTEs was reduced from 49 to 23. Additionally, the payment of all personnel, with the exception of the Administrative staff, is now based upon the House Schedule, Level 3 (salary range \$21,583 - \$30,844). Formerly, staff pay was based on House Schedule, Level 3 through Level 8 (salary range \$21,160 through \$53,715).

The Draft Audit Report believes that Chamber Security Personnel are being funded at a level which exceeds their utilization. It recommends that the staff be paid hourly. The proposed options 1 and 2 to pay Chamber Security Staff at an hourly rate is simply not feasible since these security positions would be reduced to part-time and sporadic work due to the nature of Congressional floor activity. Essentially, the Sergeant at Arms (SAA) would be forced to hire hourly, untrained, and unfamiliar workers to fill positions with varying demands. Due to the piecemeal and sporadic nature of this work, it would be virtually impossible to attract and maintain individuals, who could be readily available at all times based on changing needs, with the background, knowledge, and integrity necessary to perform this important function. In addition, it would be an intolerable situation from a security standpoint, to allow such individuals unlimited access to Members of Congress and floor procedures.

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Regarding option 3, it is important to note that the SAA has previously committed to re-evaluating the "Belo" agreement after the 104th Congress. Therefore, the SAA concurs with the need for readjustment regarding these contracts, taking into consideration the total weekly hours worked for the First and Second Session rather than focusing on either Session. Further, the schedule of the Congress (and those individuals who work irregular hours tied to that schedule), has traditionally been affected by a variety of factors including, for example, election year cycles.

Other matters

In response to the recommendation that a consistent system for tracking and implementation of prior audit recommendations be established, the office of the Sergeant at Arms will be happy to work with the Chief Administrative Officer and the Clerk. Additionally, the Office of the Sergeant at Arms has individually set up a system to monitor prior audit recommendations and will continue this practice.

Regarding recommendation 2, the SAA concurs and will provide target dates for the nine prior audit recommendations by December 31, 1996.