FIGHTING TERRORISM IN AFRICA

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OF THE
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The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:32 p.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce presiding.

Mr. ROYCE. We are going to ask that this hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa come to order. This hearing, like one that we had 2 months after September 11th, is focused on fighting terrorism in Africa, and at that hearing several years ago, I said “Africa must be placed in the United States’s strategic spotlight.” And I know that, at the time, other Committee Members here expressed the same concept. I think we are getting there.

Last May, the head of the U.S. European Command, General James Jones, said,

“I think Africa is a continent that is going to be of very, very significant interest in the 21st century.”

The European Command now spends more and more time focused on Africa. Earlier this month, it assisted Chad in successfully hunting down Algeria-based, Islamic militants with ties to al-Qaeda. The Administration has launched several anti-terrorism initiatives in the last few years, and this includes the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, based in Djibouti, which now has 1,800 personnel combating and countering terrorism.

Much of Africa, unfortunately, is hospitable ground to terrorist groups, as the continent has very vast and very remote areas, and it has a number of weak governments and weak security services as well. For the past 2 decades, Wahabist charities have supported a growing number of madrassas throughout Africa. This mostly Gulf State-sponsored phenomenon, unfortunately, is often aimed at radicalizing Islam in Africa. For example, if we look at North Africa, several Moroccans and a Tunisian are believed to have been involved in the recent Madrid bombings. Africa, indeed, with resource-strapped governments, is unable often to effectively control their territories, and this has been, frankly, described as the “soft underbelly of the war on terror.”

Africa faced enough challenges, frankly, without the emerging terrorist threat, and at the hearing of several years ago, I mentioned, at that time, that our concern, as Members of this Committee, is to make certain that the resources necessary to tackle HIV/AIDS and economic development would not be short changed.
in this effort to engage Africa on this issue of terror. The Administration and Congress, I believe, have allayed these concerns because we have passed a historic HIV/AIDS commitment, and we passed the Millennium Challenge Account.

A good anti-terrorism strategy, I think, requires a multi-track approach with military, diplomatic, and financial tactics. We need more resources devoted to these pursuits in Africa, including more resources devoted for the intelligence operations there. We significantly trimmed our diplomatic presence, unfortunately, and trimmed our intelligence capabilities in Africa post-cold war. Embassies and consulates were, at that time, shuttered, and this left us short of valuable intelligence about the continent. One of today’s witnesses has reported on an al-Qaeda activity in West Africa, where Charles Taylor and President Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso reportedly profited from al-Qaeda’s trade in diamonds. So I do not think that activity has been properly registered.

United States officials have reported generally good cooperation in fighting terrorism from African governments. Looking ahead, we need to be sensitive to the fact that this is Africa’s fight every bit as much as it is ours. For example, the Revolutionary United Front, with the assistance of Libya’s Colonel Qaddafi, and then Liberian President Charles Taylor, used terror in an attempt to seize power in Sierra Leone. The Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda is terrorizing civilians. The spread of militant Islam provides an increasing number of African recruits for international terrorist groups, but it also undermines social harmony and undercuts the development of stable African governments by pushing aside the traditionally tolerant Islam of Africa. It is our interest to help combat these brutal attacks.

The Administration reports that Sudan and Libya, designated state sponsors of terrorism in the past, have moved away from supporting terrorism. Needless to say, this bears constant watching. Sudan’s government is backing militant forces that are carrying out gross human rights abuses, essentially terrorizing civilians in the Darfur region.

I will now turn to Mr. Payne, the Ranking Member of this Committee, for his comments.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

WASHINGTON, D.C.—The following is the opening statement of Africa Subcommittee Chairman Ed Royce (R–CA–40) at this afternoon’s hearing on terrorism in Africa:

“At a hearing the Subcommittee held on terrorism in Africa, two months after September 11th, I said, ‘Africa must be placed in the U.S.’s strategic spotlight.’ Other Subcommittee Members expressed similar sentiments. We’re getting there, I believe.

“Last May, the head of the U.S. European Command, General James Jones, said, ‘I think Africa is a continent that is going to be of very, very significant interest in the 21st century.’ EUCOM now spends more and more time focused on Africa. Earlier this month, it assisted Chad in successfully hunting down Algeria-based Islamic militants with ties to al-Qaeda. The Administration has launched several anti-terrorism initiatives in the last few years. This includes the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, based in Djibouti, which now has approximately 1,800 personnel countering terrorism.
“Much of Africa, unfortunately, is hospitable ground to terrorist groups, as the continent has vast and remote areas, with far too many weak governments and security services. For the past two decades, Wahabist charities have supported a growing number of madrassas throughout Africa. This mostly Gulf State-sponsored activity, unfortunately, is often aimed at radicalizing Islam in Africa. Several Moroccans and a Tunisian are believed to have been involved in the recent Madrid bombing. Africa, indeed, with resource-strapped governments unable to effectively control their territories, has been described as the ‘soft underbelly’ in the war on terror.

“Africa faces enough challenges without the emerging terrorist threat. At the hearing I mentioned, concerns were expressed that resources to tackle HIV/AIDS and economic development would be shortchanged. The Administration and Congress, I believe, have allayed these concerns with a historic HIV/AIDS commitment and the Millennium Challenge Account.

“A good antiterrorism strategy requires a multi-track approach—with military, diplomatic, and financial tactics. We need more resources devoted to these pursuits in Africa. We significantly trimmed our diplomatic presence and intelligence capabilities in Africa post-cold war. Embassies and consulates were shuttered. This left us short of valuable intelligence about the continent. One of today’s witnesses has reported on al Qaeda activities in West Africa, where Charles Taylor and President Blaise Campaore of Burkino Faso reportedly profited from al Qaeda’s trade in diamonds. I don’t think this activity was properly registered.

“U.S. officials have reported generally good cooperation in fighting terrorism from African governments. Looking ahead, we need to be sensitive to the fact that this is Africa’s fight every bit as much as ours. The Revolutionary United Front—under the sponsorship of Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi and then-Liberian President Charles Taylor—used terror in an attempt to seize power in Sierra Leone. The Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda is terrorizing civilians. The spread of militant Islam provides an increasing number of African recruits for international terrorist groups; but it also undermines social harmony and undercuts the development of stable African governments by pushing aside the traditionally tolerant Islam of Africa. It’s our interest to help combat these brutal attacks.

“The Administration reports that Sudan and Libya, designated state sponsors of terrorism, have moved away from supporting terrorism. Needless to say, this bears constant watching. Sudan’s government is backing militant forces that are carrying out gross human rights abuses, essentially terrorizing, civilians in the Darfur region.”

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this very important and timely hearing. It is good to see the witnesses—Mr. Wycoff, just to mention, have worked together in Asia and Burma, and, of course, Princeton Lyman, who has such a distinguished career dealing with Africa in his diplomatic assignments throughout the year. It is also good to see Howard Wolpe, former Chair of the African Subcommittee, in the audience. So I would like to welcome all of the witnesses and the participants.

On August 7, 1998, two bombs exploded almost simultaneously at the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. At least 213 people died, including 12 United States citizens, and more than 5,000 were injured in Nairobi’s explosion, and 11 people, none of them Americans, in Dar es Salaam. This tragic act of violence called the attention of the world to the Horn of Africa and raised serious questions about terrorism there. The United States Government still has yet to adequately compensate victims of this heinous act that occurred, in effect, on U.S. soil. I had been to the Kenyan Embassy several times that year, and to go back and to find that there are still people who were affected by that terrible act and the same way in Tanzania is disturbing.

We also, if we had a strong policy dealing with Sudan at that time, where Osama bin Laden lived for 6 years planning this dastardly act, if we had aggressively had a policy of dealing with Sudan and the government of Khartoum, this, too, may have been prevented.
Now, the United States counterterrorism initiatives in the region are carried out through the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, in Djibouti. It was created to not only provide a staging point for Middle East engagements such as the invasion of Iraq but also because the Horn of Africa is a key region for counterterrorism. The task force coordinates activities between Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. Needless to say, this is certainly a tough neighborhood.

However, I have to commend the IGAD organization, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development process, for its hosting of the Somali peace talks, which is in its third and final stage. IGAD, as you probably know, consists of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somali, Sudan, and Uganda, and I had the provide to sit in on discussions with the Somali factions as the process was going on in order to come up with a government of reconciliation several months ago.

United States support of African initiatives and talks are key, and strengthening existing efforts, such as the IGAD process, only makes these efforts even more successful. It is so key that the United States remains engaged with these organizations.

Recently, there have been disturbing reports of renewed flows of arms into Somalia. This is in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia imposed by Security Council Resolution 733 in 1992. Reports such as these send a message that there is more that needs to be done in fighting terrorism and that more attention needs to be paid to Somalia. While we urge African nations to join us in the war on terrorism, which many have done, more willingly, we must also put our money where our mouth is. We must support these African governments with resources and support if we expect them to be able to do an adequate job.

After all, what is it that is driving the growth of terrorism in Africa and around the world? We know what they are. They have been discussed for decades and decades: Severe poverty, extreme frustration, with the feeling of being left out and forgotten by the rest of the world and, in particular, the West. This is not to say that poor people are more prone to turn to violent acts of aggressions, but we must understand that if we are not paying attention and meeting people’s needs, in that vacuum someone else will, and that is what we have found, in particular, in Africa.

Extremists, fundamentalist groups know where the roots will be and where the fertile ground and where the growth can come about, and they invest their resources in that area so that they can use these problems of the region for their benefit. They build madrassas, as the Chairman mentioned, where they indoctrinate the youth with anti-American and anti-western rhetoric. We should be targeting these social problems and helping governments to not only actively fight terrorism but also to keep it from ever taking root in the first place. And if we had had different policies throughout the years, I think that much of this could be prevented.

President Bush’s initiative on fighting global terrorism should have a similar premise to his education initiative. We have an education initiative, Leave No Child Behind; let us leave no country or community behind. Here is the caveat: If we do not support African nations in this fight, they will be forced to divert resources
from basic social programs and, therefore, will be fighting a losing battle. We fight terrorism by paying attention to people, the poor and the uneducated.

Reviving economies is also paramount because once governments increase revenues, they can not only invest more in education, health, and other basic services, but they will be able to have more of a capacity to beef up counterterrorism efforts by strengthening infrastructures and institutions.

If we are going to strengthen ecotourism in Africa, as laid out by AGOA III, where some of us may have to go to a press conference that is going to be held on AGOA III, it is imperative that we work closer with African governments and provide resources and training on border patrol and such things, especially, as game parks and cross-border programs that are near international airports where they are vulnerable to terrorists.

So as I conclude, lastly, let me make our counterterrorism efforts a constructive effort for African countries. Kenya, which has been one of our biggest supporters and collaborators of global anti-terrorism campaigns, has suffered greatly by virtue of their friendship with the United States, and now because of the U.S. State Department’s warning against nonessential travel to Kenya, which has been in effect since May 2003, it has actually just about driven the tourist sector out of Kenya and is creating a terrible problem because there is an estimated seven million pounds being lost to the Kenya Wildlife Service because of this new policy. The Kenyan government, under Mr. Kibaki, elected in 2002, has significantly improved the national security apparatus of the country over the last 12 months, has formed the National Counterterrorism Coordinating Center to enhance these efforts, and forced a regional cooperation.

It is my hope that we support such efforts as the Counterterrorism Coordinating Center and that we keep a reasonable approach to stamping out terrorism in East Africa. We must also revisit such actions as the renewal and expansion of the travel advisory to other countries in the region. We do not fight terrorism by isolating countries and cutting them off from foreign investment in terrorism. There has got to be more a constructive way to deal with terrorism in the region. Some examples are training police, cross-border intelligence, and so forth.

So, therefore, I applaud the United States pledge of $100 million for the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative and around $30 million for Kenya. Let us always remember to take a reasonable approach to terrorism in the Horn of Africa. This is an important issue, and I commend the Chairman for calling this hearing. Thank you again.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Payne.

We are now going to go to our first panel. Karl Wycoff is the Associate Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the Department of State. He has held that position since June 2003. Mr. Wycoff is a career Foreign Service officer. He served in Africa and, most recently, in Asia. Mr. Wycoff, please.
STATEMENT OF KARL WYCOFF, ASSOCIATE COORDINATOR FOR PRESS, POLICY, PROGRAMS AND PLANS, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Wycoff. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Distinguished Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today. Africa is an important front in the global war on terrorism, and this hearing provides a good opportunity to bring you up to date on the many programs we are implementing to combat terrorism in that region. In the interest of time, I would like to give you a summary of my testimony and ask your permission to submit the rest of it for the record.

Mr. Royce. Without objection.

Mr. Wycoff. Africa is vulnerable to the threat of international terrorism and important in our efforts to counter that menace. While 9/11 is generally regarded as the watershed event in the threat from al-Qaeda and its allies, the horrible August 7, 1998, attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were, in fact, an earlier wake-up call. These attacks killed and wounded far more Kenyans and Tanzanians than Americans and brutally demonstrated the willingness of these terrorists to kill and maim large numbers of persons in far-flung corners of the earth.

Additional attacks in Mombasa in November 2002 showed that terrorist cells were still active. Although we are concerned about attacks elsewhere in Africa, we consider the Horn to be the area most at risk.

The main contributing factors, as Members of the Committee have noted, include proximity to the Arabian Peninsula and the failed state of Somalia. There are large areas in this region where government control is weak, and the countries have inadequate counterterrorism and police capabilities, and there is the probable continued presence of al-Qaeda cell in East Africa that carried out the 1998 bombings. Working with the African front-line states, we are implementing a policy that encompasses both containment and action against al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. We are working with partner countries to closely monitor the situation in the Horn and are prepared to take appropriate action when we can.

One of our principal tenets in the war on terrorism is that, whenever possible, our foreign partners should take the lead in combating terrorism in their own territory, with the U.S. Government in a strong support role when needed. The ability of most African states to effectively participate in our campaign against terrorism is getting stronger day by day with U.S. help. The President’s $100 million East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative, announced in June 2003, is designed to strengthen these capabilities.

I would like to briefly describe some of the programs that the U.S. uses to that end. On the CT finance front, for example, the interagency Terrorist Finance Working Group is working closely with Kenyan officials to develop a comprehensive, antимoney-laundering/counterterrorist (CT), finance regime. An interagency team conducted an assessment of Kenya’s financial systems in August 2003. Kenya is in the process of considering comprehensive counterterrorism legislation, a process which we have supported. Once
the law is enacted, we will provide a variety of assistance, including, most likely, a resident legal adviser.

In an effort to assist countries threatened by terrorist transit, we have instituted the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP). Since mid-2003, this program has been operational at select airports in Kenya, Tanzania, and Ethiopia and is expected to be operational later this year in Djibouti and Uganda. The TIP hardware/ software package is intended to significantly reduce terrorists’ freedom of movement between countries by providing the participating nations with a state-of-the-art computer network that enables immigration and border-control officials to quickly identify suspect persons attempting to enter or leave the country. We have requested $5 million for this program in fiscal year 2005 to allow us to continue to implement it on a global basis.

On the CT police-training front, Kenya has been a prime beneficiary of training and assistance provided to front-line states under the State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program. This counterterrorism/law enforcement-training program helps countries to develop and institutionalize their own capabilities. The types of training including detection and rendering safe explosive devices, post-blast investigation techniques, VIP protection, senior leadership crisis management, hostage negotiations, and a variety of other courses.

For fiscal year 2005, the Administration has requested $128 million worldwide for this program. We ask for your support. We also note that requests for this program are backed up substantially as a result of cuts in our fiscal year 2004 appropriation request for the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program.

The Sahel region is also an area of deep concern to the Administration and to the U.S. as a whole. We are implementing the Pan-Sahel Initiative, which provides training and equipment for quick-reaction forces to secure the vast borders of the region. Mali and Mauritania are completing their training cycles, and Chad and Niger will begin training cycles later this year.

Events over the past several months have underscored the need for continued training and cooperation in this very region. After European tourists were kidnapped by members of the Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat, known as GSPC, in 2003, this group was said to have received a large ransom payment for their release. After reportedly using this money to purchase weapons, ammunition, and equipment, members of the GSPC were pursued across the desert, as Congressman Payne noted. One portion of this group was cornered and forced out of Mali and promptly captured by Algerian security forces. Another portion turned up in Chad, where Chadian and Nigerian forces attacked and defeated this group, suffering casualties in the process.

In parts of West Africa, we have seen dramatic rises in the level of anti-American and extremist Islamic rhetoric, most notably in northern Nigeria. We are working to support effective and inclusive governance in these countries to dilute the appeal of extremists.

We continue to work with the nations of southern Africa to find and capture known terrorist operatives and to disrupt terrorist financing. South Africa has set up its own financial intelligence unit to track terrorist assets and place them out of terrorists’ reach.
Last year, we held a major counterterrorism conference for 13 nations in southern Africa. These sessions included crisis-management workshops and discussions of ways to strengthen counterterrorism laws. The year before, in 2002, six African countries took part in a week-long, counterterrorism legislation seminar that we co-sponsored with the Justice Department.

We are currently in the process of organizing an international conference later this month to discuss progress made in fighting terrorism in East Africa. As part of the conference’s goals, the participants will be considering ways to make further progress against terrorist cells, as well as to diminish the conditions which allow extremists and terrorists to recruit new followers.

The states of North Africa have had long experience with terrorism and continue to combat this scourge. In the aftermath of the May 16, 2003, bombings, Moroccan authorities conducted an investigation that uncovered extremist Islamist cells in nearly every major city in Morocco. Through the summer and fall of 2003, over a thousand suspects were arrested on terrorism charges, and over 800 have now been prosecuted under Morocco’s new terrorism law.

In the aftermath of last month’s horrible Madrid bombings, Moroccan authorities immediately sent a team of investigators to Madrid to work with Spanish authorities. I understand that the cooperation between the two governments in this investigation is exceptionally close and productive.

We are assisting the Moroccan authorities in a number of key areas of counterterrorism through a variety of programs, including the ATA program and the Terrorist Interdiction Program.

Throughout Africa, the prevalence of poverty, famine, and disorder offers terrorists an opportunity to insert themselves and to troll for new members for their groups. Charitable and nongovernmental organizations have been abused by terrorists. One such organization, al-Haramayn, has been identified in several locations in Africa. Its offices are being closed. However, in addition to serving extremist ends, it also did a variety of good works. Closing these offices has had the unintended consequence of depriving some of the needy of help.

It is, therefore, essential that the U.S. pay attention to development issues and to public outreach. USAID has designed and implemented programs to assist Muslim schools. Department of State public diplomacy programs promote discussions, seminars, and travel by selected policy and opinion-makers to explore Islam in America, to explore U.S. values, traditions, and American society as part of our effort to expand mutual understanding. These long-range programs are essential to ultimate success in the war on terrorism.

We at the State Department deeply appreciate your support and partnership for these efforts and seek your continued support for our future efforts.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I look forward to hearing your comments and will be happy to take any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wycoff follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF KARL WYCOFF, ASSOCIATE COORDINATOR FOR PRESS, POLICY, PROGRAMS AND PLANS, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today at your hearing on “Fighting Terrorism in Africa.” This hearing provides a good opportunity to bring you and your colleagues up to date on the many, and varied, programs we have developed and are implementing to combat terrorism in Africa.

Africa is vulnerable to the threat of international terrorism and important in our efforts to counter that menace. While 9–11 is generally regarded as the watershed in the threat from al-Qaida and its allies, the horrible August 7, 1998, attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania were an even earlier wake-up call. These attacks killed and wounded far more Kenyans and Tanzanians than Americans, the ostensible target. These mass bombings brutally demonstrated the willingness of these terrorists to kill and maim large numbers of persons in far-flung corners of the earth, in countries that were not directly involved in the grievances of South Asia and the Middle East.

Additional attacks in Mombasa in November 2002 showed that terrorist cells were still active. Although we are concerned about attacks elsewhere in Africa, we consider the Horn of Africa—Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Kenya, and Tanzania—to be the area most at risk.

The main contributing factors include proximity to the Arabian Peninsula and the failed state of Somalia, large areas where the governments’ control is weak or non-existent, weak CT and police capabilities of host nations, the probable continued presence of the al-Qaida cell that carried out the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi, and armed conflicts that have long plagued the region. Working with the African front-line states of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, we have developed and are implementing a policy that encompasses both containment and action against al-Qaida and other terrorists and terrorist organizations. We are working with partner countries to closely monitor the situation in the Horn and are prepared to take appropriate action.

We are very concerned about the possibility of terrorist attacks in the Horn region, especially in Kenya and Tanzania because, as the attacks of 9/11 showed, al-Qaida will continue to plan and carry out attacks against a target if its initial efforts failed or were only partially successful. Despite the construction of new embassy facilities in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam, and continuing efforts of the host nations and their neighbors, the terrorism threat in the region remains high.

USG EFFORTS TO BUILD CT CAPACITY IN THE HORN

One of our principal tenets in the war on terrorism is that, whenever possible, our foreign partners should take the lead in combating terrorism on their own territories or in their own financial systems, with the USG in a strong support role. The ability of most African states to effectively participate in the campaign against terrorism is getting stronger with U.S. help. The President’s $100 million East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) announced in June of 2003 is designed to strengthen the capabilities of our partners in the region to combat terrorism and foster cooperation among these governments. It includes military training for border and coastal security, a variety of programs to strengthen control of the movement of people and goods across borders, aviation security capacity-building, assistance for regional efforts against terrorist financing, and police training. EACTI also includes an education program to counter extremist influence and a robust outreach program. The program is on track.

The Department of State is currently organizing an international conference to be held later this month to discuss progress made in fighting terrorism in East Africa in the context of the President’s East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative. All East African nations participating in EACTI will be invited to attend, along with observers from other regional partners, and international partners in the global war on terrorism. As part of the conference’s goals and objectives, the participants will be considering ways and means to make further progress against indigenous terrorist cells, as well as to diminish the conditions which allow extremists and terrorists to recruit and train new followers.

In addition to EACTI, we are using NADR funds, Economic Support Funds, and other diplomatic and developmental tools to help strengthen democratic institutions and support effective governance. At the conference I just mentioned, we hope to encourage allies and partners to coordinate resources to ensure the sustained effectiveness of our common efforts in the war against terrorism.
I would like to briefly describe some of the programs that the U.S. uses to strengthen African capacity.

**CT Finance Assistance:**

The interagency Terrorist Finance Working Group (TFWG) chaired by my office, is working closely with Kenyan officials to develop a comprehensive anti-money laundering/counterterrorist financing regime in Kenya. An interagency team conducted an assessment of Kenya's financial systems in August of 2003, and has developed and begun implementing a plan to develop Kenya's capacity in this field. In January 2004, a DOJ representative, along with a legal expert from the United Kingdom and a representative from the Caribbean Anti-Money Laundering Program (CALP) conducted a legislative drafting seminar for Kenyan officials that resulted in draft Anti-Money Laundering/ Counterterrorist Finance (AML/CTF) legislation that conforms to most international standards to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

These same representatives traveled to Kenya last week to conduct a seminar to educate legislators and the public on the urgent need for an AML/CTF law. Once the law is enacted we will provide a Resident Legal Advisor to train prosecutors and judicial officials, conduct financial investigative courses, steer financial intelligence unit development and advise on financial regulatory assistance. Curbing the flow of money to terrorists is important not only as part of the global war against terrorism but also to help countries protect their own citizens from attacks by groups operating locally.

**Immigration Monitoring and Control**

In an effort to assist countries threatened by terrorist transit, the Department of State instituted the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP). Since mid-2003, the Terrorist Interdiction Program computer system has been operational at select airports in Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia, and is expected to be operational this year in Djibouti and Uganda as well. TIP is a good example of international cooperation. The program was conceived as a result of conversations with Kenyan officials who, after the 1998 Nairobi attack, suggested that post-attack investigations could be aided if a system were available for quickly checking suspects who might have fled a country just before or after a major terrorist attack.

The TIP hardware/software package is intended to significantly impact terrorists' freedom of movement between countries by providing participating nations with a state-of-the-art computer name-check network that enables immigration and border control officials to quickly identify suspect persons attempting to enter or leave the country.

For example, Kenya previously had little or no capability to identify and thereby apprehend suspect persons traveling through air, land and sea ports of entry. TIP is jumping Kenya forward on this front by providing it with a fast, secure and reliable means to check each traveler's identity against a current terrorist watch list. The TIP watch list is developed by each country but it may incorporate information from INTERPOL or individual nations. TIP also provides nations with an increased capability to collect, compare, and analyze traveler data and thereby contribute to the global effort to understand terrorist methods and track their movements.

**General Law Enforcement Training**

The Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is funding a police development program begun in 2002 for national police in Tanzania, Uganda, and Ethiopia. While not specifically CT focused, the program is introducing essential skills-based learning and problem solving techniques to build the capacity of these East African police forces to detect and investigate all manner of crime, including terrorist incidents. INL is also funding forensic laboratory development programs in Tanzania and Uganda, designed to build the capacity of these governments to analyze evidence collected at crime scenes. In Kenya, INL is funding technical assistance and training for the Anti-narcotics Unit of the Kenyan national police and the anti-smuggling unit that work out of the Port of Mombasa. These units jointly search containers entering the port of Mombasa for drugs and other contraband that may be brought into Kenya otherwise undetected.

**Export Controls Assistance**

The Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program, which is funded through the NADR account of the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, will be used in FY04 to assist Kenya and Tanzania to improve their border controls to prevent transfers through their territory of weapons of mass destruction and other items of proliferation concern.
Department of State Anti-Terrorism Assistance—the Kenyan Example

Kenya is an example of the many types of training and assistance provided to front-line states under the State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program which was established in 1983. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, headed by my boss, Ambassador Cofer Black, provides policy guidance for the program. It is implemented by the ATA division of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which works closely with the Department’s Regional Security Officers in each embassy. Funded through the S/CT NADR account, these law enforcement training programs are intended to help a country develop its own indigenous counter-terrorism capability. Types of training include detection and rendering safe explosive devices, post-blast investigation techniques, VIP protection, senior leadership crisis management exercises, hostage negotiations and much more.

For Fiscal Year 2005, the Administration is requesting $128.3 Million dollars worldwide. We hope Congress this year will support the full funding request as requests for training are backed up as a result of cuts in the FY 2004 Appropriation.

DS/ATA has maintained a training partnership with the Government of Kenya since 1989. Since that time ATA has trained 594 personnel and has expended over $4.05-million. As part of the President’s East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), ATA has recently conducted a comprehensive needs assessment and is currently developing an in-country training and equipment program, including at least seven training events in FY04 for Kenyan law enforcement agencies. Kenya’s commitment to this effort is reflected in its passage of anti-corruption legislation, its efforts to pass counterterrorism legislation, the recent creation of an Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, establishment of a National Security Advisory Committee to provide policy guidance to its CT structures, and the opening early this year of a National Counter-Terrorism Center. Kenya’s National Security Minister Dr. Christopher Murungaru, on a visit to Washington last month, reaffirmed Kenya’s commitment to partnering with the United States and neighboring African nations in fighting terrorism.

Sudanese Peace Process and Somali Stability

In the longer run, reestablishing an orderly governance mechanism in Somalia and a successful conclusion to the Sudanese Peace Process will help make the region more stable and less vulnerable to terrorists and their facilitators. We are working diligently to bring the Sudanese peace talks to a successful conclusion. Restoration of a functioning central authority in Somalia would remove a failed state and thus the disorder that provides haven and transit opportunities for extremist groups. We support the efforts of regional leaders under the IGAD process to promote peace and reconciliation talks in Somalia.

The Pan Sahel Initiative

The Sahel region, including Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania, is also an area of concern. The immense size of these countries, their physical geography combined with weak central authority, and the traditional independence of nomadic life styles, make border control and law enforcement exceedingly difficult. No longer isolated from the rest of the world, the traditional caravan routes in this region now serve as conduits for illegal migration and drugs and arms trafficking, as well as a hideout and staging areas for international and regional terrorists and criminals.

The State Department has formulated and implemented the Pan-Sahel Initiative, which is providing training and equipment for quick reaction forces to secure the vast borders of the region. Mali and Mauritania are completing their training cycles, and Chad and Niger will begin training cycles later this year. In light of recent events, we are looking at what other forms of engagement may be useful.

Events over the past several months have underscored the need for continued training and cooperation in this region. When European tourists were kidnapped by members of the Algerian terrorist group Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) in 2003, the GSPC was said to have received a large ransom payment. After reportedly using this money to purchase weapons, ammunition and equipment, they were pursued across the desert with the cooperation of all four Sahel countries. One portion of this group was cornered and forced out of Mali and promptly captured by Algerian security forces. Another turned up in Chad, where Chadian and Nigerien forces attacked and defeated this group.

West Africa

In parts of West Africa, we have seen dramatic rises in the level of anti-American and extremist Islamic rhetoric, most notably in northern Nigeria. We are working to support effective and inclusive governance in these countries to dilute the appeal of extremists. The end of conflict in Liberia and on-going efforts to stabilize Sierra
Leone and Cote d'Ivoire are fundamental to our interest in stabilizing the wider region. The US is cooperating with other countries to address the enormous security, development, and other needs of Liberia and to support efforts in neighboring countries to ensure that this region does not become a haven for terrorist and criminal activity.

Southern Africa

We continue to work with the nations of southern Africa to find and capture known terrorist operatives and to disrupt terrorist financing. South Africa has set up its own Financial Intelligence Unit to track terrorist assets and place them out of terrorists' reach. We are encouraging South Africa, one of Africa's powerhouses of resources and expertise, to begin exporting training, intelligence, know-how, and other assistance to neighboring countries. Regional stability is essential, and we continue to watch for indications of trouble in southern and central African countries.

Last year we held a major counterterrorism conference for 13 nations in southern Africa. The sessions, held in the International Law Enforcement Academy in Botswana, included crisis management workshops and discussions of ways to strengthen counterterrorism laws. In 2002, six African countries from various parts of the continent took part in a week long CT legislation seminar in Washington that State co-sponsored with the with the Justice Department.

North Africa

The states of north Africa have had long experience with terrorism, and continue to fight this scourge. In the aftermath of the May 16, 2003, bombings, Moroccan authorities conducted an investigation that uncovered extremist Islamist cells (Salafiya Jihadiya) in nearly every major city in the country. These 'cells' were in various stages of planning and organizing terrorist actions against the Government of Morocco. Senior Moroccan authorities concede that if it were not for the Casablanca bombings, in which 45 people were killed and over a hundred injured, they would never have uncovered planned terrorist operations in Morocco that could have resulted in several hundred deaths. Throughout the Summer and Fall of 2003, over a thousand people were arrested on terrorism charges and over 800 have now been prosecuted under the new terrorism law passed in the aftermath of the May 16 attacks.

In February 2004, the Moroccan Authorities disrupted two Salafiya Jihadiya cells in Fez and Meknes. Thirty-seven people were arrested in the raids. Explosives, detonators and rudimentary weapons were found in the safe-houses. Two of the people arrested were wanted in connection the May 16 bombings and were believed responsible for other murders of Moroccan police and officials.

In the aftermath of last month's Madrid bombings, Moroccan authorities immediately sent a team of investigators to Madrid to work with Spanish authorities. The cooperation between the two governments in this investigation is exceptionally close and productive.

We are assisting the Moroccan authorities in a number of key areas of counterterrorism through a variety of programs including the State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance and Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP). ATA has so far provided $6.5 million in training to the Moroccans in targeted CT skills, such as investigations, forensics, and Post Blast investigation. We hope to expand the TIP in FY 05 to assist Morocco with security and enforcement at its seaports, airports, land border crossings and porous borders.

Tunisia has been an effective partner in the GWOT. We have an ongoing, high-level dialogue with the Tunisian government about ways to increase their cooperation including information sharing. The Tunisian government passed anti-terrorism legislation at the beginning of its Fall 2003 session, and the government has introduced state-of-the-art machine readable passport in an on-going effort to secure its borders. Tunisia also became more active in the State ATA program, participating in First Responder Awareness course and Explosive Incident Countermeasures Courses in 2003.

Counterterrorism cooperation with Algeria remains an important part of our bilateral relationship, one that has expanded significantly since 9/11. Algeria has provided consistently outstanding support and cooperation in the global war against terrorism. Cooperation has increased particularly in the areas of information sharing, military cooperation, and the tracking of financial assets. However, the Algerians continue to need assistance in building their CT capabilities so as to better contribute to both regional and international efforts against terrorism.

Although there have been significant improvements in the security environment in Algeria and terrorism no longer threatens the regime, a residual, significant ter-
rorist threat exists. Hundreds of Algerians still die every year as a result of terrorism. The government’s ability to deal with this remaining threat will be key. We hope to continue our close CT cooperation.

A LONG-TERM CONTINENT-WIDE EFFORT

Throughout the continent, the prevalence of poverty, famine and disorder offers terrorists an opportunity to insert themselves into a region, to develop support systems, and to troll for new members for their groups. Charitable and non-governmental organizations have been abused by terrorists and their supporters to raise funds, disguise their true intentions, and travel internationally. Some terrorists have been able to use charitable organizations, turning those organizations into producers of ever larger numbers of extremists. One such organization, al-Haramayn, has been identified in several locations in Africa. Its offices are being closed. However, in addition to serving extremist ends, it also built schools, hospitals, and engaged in normal charitable activities. Closing these offices has had the unintended consequence of depriving some of the needy of a source of help.

It is therefore essential that the US pay attention to development issues and to public outreach. U.S. A.I.D. has designed and implemented programs to reach out to Muslim schools and offer support, materials, and training. Department of State Public Diplomacy programs offer opportunities for discussions, conferences, seminars, and travel by selected policy- and opinion-makers to explore Islam in America, U.S. values and traditions, and American society in an effort to expand mutual understanding. These long-range programs, are essential to ultimate success in the war on terrorism.

This concludes my outline of the current regional threat and our efforts to date to combat it. I hope my testimony has provided you with a clear understanding of the broad and deep range of challenges that we confront as we aggressively move to reduce terrorist activity and sympathies on a continent that is rife with both. As all of us know, the global war on terrorism cannot be won by half-measures or temporary commitments. Attacking terrorism in Africa requires a mix of short-, medium- and long-term strategies, and it will require additional resources.

Many of the short and medium-term programs are in place and working. Longer-term strategies to address the factors that create an enabling environment for terrorism—poverty, intolerance, political alienation, and corruption—are being formulated and will require support not only from our African and other international partners but also from this chamber. Our adversaries are committed for the long term. I know that the State Department and the members of the subcommittee are equally committed to helping African governments defeat terrorists and eliminate their support base in Africa. The State Department appreciates your support and partnership for these efforts and seeks your continued support as we resolutely maintain and increase these efforts in the future.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I will be happy to try to answer any questions.

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I thank you, Mr. Wycoff. Let me start with some conversations we recently had with General James Jones of the European Command, and he was speaking about the United States-backed Chadian operation against the Algerian-based militants operating there in Chad, the GSPC, or the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, as you call it. He said that that operation was a near-death blow, if not a death blow, to this al-Qaeda-linked organization that has been a problem for many, many years. I wanted to ask you for your assessment on that. Do you feel that we were that successful?

Mr. WYCOFF. We were clearly successful, and I should say, really, the bulk of the credit should, of course, go to our partners, to the Chadians, the Algerians, who did, in fact, suffer casualties in what amounted to combat operations against this group. From my perspective, I would not want to say that we have been successful. We would want to take a look at the future before we declare the GSPC to be out of things, to have been terminated in this operation, but it clearly was a success.
Mr. Royce. One of the rhetorical arguments we hear is what is truly the chance of a successful operation stemming terrorism on the continent, given all of the challenges there, and when we have the successful culmination of an operation like this, I think it encourages those of us who are arguing that this is worth the resources, that we have to pursue these efforts to work with these African states to go after these terrorist cells.

One of the questions I wanted to ask you was the commitment for those resources, and if you were to quantify in some way the attention and the financial support, the effort that we are making on the African continent and compare with the effort we are making worldwide on the war on terrorism, how would you rate that participation on our part? Is the challenge commensurate with the threat on the continent?

Mr. Wycoff. Mr. Chairman, if I could start by saying that we fully support DoD’s efforts, EUCOM’s efforts, to engage with the militaries in Sahel. We view that as a critical part of the Pan-Sahel Initiative, to try to improve the capability of those countries militaries to protect their borders, to patrol, to have rapid-reaction forces. We also are firmly convinced that we have no choice but to continue our engagement—political, diplomatic, economic, financial, and so forth—with that region as we attempt to completely eradicate terrorism in that area.

In terms of the United States Government’s attention to Africa, is it commensurate with the role of terrorism, with the threat of terrorism on that continent? I believe it is. It is an integral part of our global strategy. The only figure that comes to mind that I could give you off the top of my head would be in the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, in recent years, say, about 5 years, about 22 percent of global funds for that program have been spent in Africa.

Mr. Royce. One question that I know that all of the Members of this Committee are very interested in is your assessment of any country in Africa that we may not be receiving full cooperation with in terms of our mutual fight on the war on terror. Would you want to single out for us any example right now of where you are running into difficulty and where we might want to focus some attention?

Mr. Wycoff. We do face some challenges in engagement on specific program activities in Eritrea, where we are trying to get them to engage on certain activities with us, but we remain convinced that Eritrea shares our commitment to fighting global terrorism and note that it has been a solid partner in that battle in the past. Other than that, there is no other country that comes to mind at this time.

Mr. Royce. Thank you.

Mr. Wycoff. I think we have very good cooperation from the governments of Africa, and I would leave it at that.

Mr. Royce. I appreciate that. I am going to go to Mr. Payne.

Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. Mr. Wycoff, maybe about 10 years ago, there was, from what I understand, a restructuring, maybe 8 or 10 years ago, of the whole intelligence operation around the world. There was a cutback in funding and so forth. Do you have any knowledge, going back, that there might have been a dis-
proportionate reduction in Africa of intelligence apparatus during that time? It was reported that the resources were made very, very scarce, and it was practically virtually very limited, to almost no intelligence agencies working.

Mr. Wycoff. Congressman Payne, I would not have any comment. I am very leery of addressing intelligence questions in an open session like this, in any event. What I can say, sir, is that the U.S. Government has a policy, implemented in a variety of ways, to increase information sharing, information gathering in Africa and in every region of the world as part of the global war on terrorism, and I would leave it there, sir.

Mr. Payne. When the Embassies were attacked in Africa, I ask once again, could you compare the security of our Embassies in Africa today as compared to prior to the attacks? I know you just indicated you cannot talk about the past, but where do they stand today?

Mr. Wycoff. I am familiar, basically, only with our Embassies in Nairobi and in Dar es Salaam. As you know, we have new facilities there. They meet the requisite standards, as I understand it. We are happy with that.

One other comment that I could make: We have a mission in Khartoum, and the Sudanese have been very helpful in trying to ensure the security of that. I think it is safe to say, for the State Department and other agencies that operate overseas, we are very focused on the security of our Embassies. We are very focused on the safety of Americans resident and traveling overseas, and I would leave it at that.

Mr. Payne. Finally, as we all know, and as I was attempting when the debate was going on about whether to have preemptive strikes in Iraq or not, my concern primarily was that Iraq was important but that al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, the cells that were around, the fact that, of course, he left Sudan and went to Afghanistan, and that is where our attention should have gone, to Afghanistan to attempt to eliminate al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and to do damage to that command/control that was going on in that country. The decision was made to do Iraq, and so presently al-Qaeda perhaps is not as strong as it was but, in my opinion, could have possibly been eliminated or inoperable at this time.

So my question, though, is, there are some beliefs that al-Qaeda is starting and having a growing influence in West Africa and even in Nigeria, in particular. I just wonder if there is any evidence that you know that al-Qaeda is targeting and moving into West African countries.

Mr. Wycoff. It is certainly something that we are very interested in, and that we try to monitor and gather information on a daily basis. I would not have anything to confirm that al-Qaeda is actually active in West Africa.

Mr. Payne. Okay. Well, once again, I certainly appreciate the attention that is currently being given. I still believe, as I have indicated in my remarks, that in addition to anti-terrorism moves with military and other kinds of intelligence gathering and so forth, I think that if we do a better job at trying to eliminate poverty, trying to eradicate poverty, trying to get to some of the systemic problems that keep Africa behind and, therefore, becomes a breeding
ground for discontent and frustration, I think that we could probably have had money better spent in the past, and hopefully in the future we could convince the authorities that the best way, in my opinion, to fight terrorism is by eliminating these breeding grounds that people live in. So I will yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. TANCREDO [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Payne.

Let me, before I go to questions, recognize the presence of a group of students here with us today from the American school in Abuja. Where are you all? Welcome, welcome.

Mr. Wycoff, in your written testimony and in listening to your oral remarks, I was looking for and listening diligently for a little greater explanation of the situation, as you see it now, in Sudan, especially, and in your written remarks there is just a cursory reference to it, that “the Sudan peace process will help make the region more stable and less vulnerable to terrorists and their facilitators.” Well, of course, I think that is probably true.

We have been getting, however, quite a bit of conflicting information about what is exactly going on in Sudan. Though this hearing is not on specifically Sudan, it does, I think, have the situation there, in terms of the peace process, that certainly, as you reference, will affect our ability to deal with the terrorist activity emanating out of that country. And so, therefore, I am concerned about the fact that many people whose observations we rely upon and whose credibility we hold in high regard have indicated to us that there are some severe problems. Certainly, Darfur is one. It does not look as though things are as rosy as certainly the State Department continues to try to paint it, in terms of the actual status of those negotiations and the conditions in Sudan.

One of the things, it seems to me, that is important for us to be watching for in Sudan is exactly what happens to the people who are presently in the government, still part of the government of Sudan, who have direct ties or have been linked to terrorist activities in the past. And I would like to get an indication from you, if you would, of what you think we should be doing about that. Do you believe that should be part of the negotiating process, the peace process, there, requiring that these people be at least brought to justice or at least ousted from the government? And I guess I would like to ask you to start from there.

Mr. Wycoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In terms of the peace process for the Sudan, I know that the State Department and others have been very active. Secretary Powell has been very active on it. As you know, I work in the Counterterrorism Office, so I am not in a position to address the situation in Darfur or the peace process writ large.

Mr. TANCREDO. I understand.

Mr. Wycoff. In terms of counterterrorism cooperation with Sudan, we have seen significant improvement in sharing of information. I think the Sudanese, last year, raided a suspected terrorist training camp, in May of last year, I believe it was. There was a Syrian who was convicted in a Sudanese court, along with a couple of Sudanese nationals, I believe, last year also, of engaging in terrorist activities, training possibly for an attack against United States interests. So I think it is clear that there has been
a significant improvement in the Sudan's situation vis-a-vis terrorism, cooperation with us.

In terms of how personalities within that government should be dealt with, I am not in a position to give you an answer on that. Sudan remains a state sponsor of terrorism. That is part of the mix of the overall United States policy toward Sudan, and as we move forward in Sudanese policies, we will have to take a close look at exactly where they are in the Sudan.

The other specific thing that I could say is that we understand that there is a Hamas office and a Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) office still in Khartoum, and we have made it clear that they need to close those offices down and need to cut links with terrorists.

Mr. TANCREDO. How about Hizballah?

Mr. WYCOFF. Not to my knowledge. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TANCREDO. All right. Well, I will only suggest to you that the presence of folks who, as I say, have been linked to terrorist activities in the past and who are still part of the government in Khartoum; I think that that is one of the reasons why we are having a difficult time actually making our way through this piece process and reaching an accord.

I think that they are part of the problem, and I hope that the State Department is rigorously pursuing some sort of solution to this that will make sure that when we come to the end of the road in Sudan for us, we are looking at a peace process that, in fact, includes some admission of the fact that these people were in the government, that they have been put out of office or in some way dealt with because I think if they are still there after the ink has dried, we will not have a successful peace process in Sudan.

The staff has just handed me a note saying that Hizballah does, in fact, have an office in Khartoum.

Mr. WYCOFF. I could check on that and see if I can submit anything else in writing at a later time, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]

POST-HEARING WRITTEN RESPONSE SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY KARL WYCOFF, ASSOCIATE COORDINATOR FOR PRESS, POLICY, PROGRAMS AND PLANS, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

We have researched this issue, and have been unable to identify an active Hizballah operational presence in Sudan for several years. As you know, however, there are both terrorist and political aspects to the organization we know as Lebanese Hizballah. There may be individuals sympathetic to or affiliated with Hizballah who engage in fundraising, propaganda, political or religious activities in Sudan. Current reporting indicates that Hizballah is not engaged in operational activities in Sudan.

Mr. TANCREDO. Yes. That would be certainly very helpful, and we will also be willing to provide you with the information that we have upon which we make that claim.

Mr. WYCOFF. Thank you, sir.

Mr. TANCREDO. Okay, Ms. Lee?

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Good afternoon, Mr. Wycoff. Good to see you here.

Let me ask you a couple of questions. First of all, you know, like many, we believe that it is important to approach the issue of terrorism in a very thoughtful and comprehensive manner, and we
need a strategy that, yes, is part military but also goes beyond military in terms of addressing poverty reduction, development, aid, and trade. Desperate people do desperate things, and as Congressman Payne mentioned earlier, many countries, because of poverty and all of the other issues of underdevelopment, are a breeding ground for terrorists.

So in our anti-terrorism strategy, how do you factor in the comprehensive approach, for instance, in Tanzania or whatever country that we have military bases? In fact, could you tell me where we have bases? Then where we have the bases, how do we put that and package that military strategy with the fuller comprehensive strategy?

Mr. Wycoff. In Africa, I believe we have a base of forces located only in Djibouti, at Camp Lemonier, and what I could say, for purposes of my office, we focus more on operational counterterrorism issues, and we look at all of the elements of national power to try to prevent attacks on the homeland, first and foremost, attacks on American interests abroad, and that is our primary focus.

In a broader sense, what I could say to you is that the U.S. Government, as a whole, is seized with these issues. USAID, for instance, is engaged in a strategic policy dialogue and a joint planning process with the Department of State, and as part of that process, my office was involved in developing AID’s strategic plan and seeing how that melded with the Department of State’s strategic plan not only on the counterterrorism front but in security areas that might relate to military bases, military interests, and other diplomatic and economic interests worldwide.

Ms. Lee. So you do incorporate your counterterrorism strategy with other strategies as part of a full antiterrorist package.

Mr. Wycoff. Yes, ma’am. Congressman Lee, we do, indeed. We also try to do that on the public diplomacy front in terms of trying to combat the anti-Americanism and the Islamic fundamentalism, the extremism that is out there. We do try to attack it on all fronts.

Ms. Lee. Let me ask you, how are our efforts not perceived as anti-Muslim in countries that have heavy Muslim populations? Do we have a way of making sure, because I know the President indicated that the war on terror was not addressed at Islam? Are we sensitive to that in our overall plans?

Mr. Wycoff. Yes, ma’am, we are. We are very sensitive. I cannot say that we are 100 percent successful because it is a perception problem among many of the audience, if you will, who are prone to see something that we do in the war on terrorism as a strike against Islam in some fashion. That is just totally untrue, and we try, through our public diplomacy and through our public outreach programs, to combat that kind of misunderstanding and misinformation, but there is, in the Arabic press, for instance, a lot of misinformation that alleges that the global war on terrorism is somehow a war on Islam. So we are very cognizant of it, and we do try, in all of our information operations, public diplomacy, to take that into account and to combat that phenomenon.

Ms. Lee. Let me ask you now about the Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya. What is going on with regard to the compensation of all of the victims of those bombings? Do you have an
idea of what has happened? We have tried to get a sense of why these Kenyans and Tanzanians have not received compensation.

Mr. Wycoff. I am afraid I would have nothing to say on that. I would not be a good source for the Committee on that. I would have to take that question and submit something for the record at a later date.

[The information referred to follows:]

POST-HEARING WRITTEN RESPONSE SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY KARL WYCOFF, ASSOCIATE COORDINATOR FOR PRESS, POLICY, PROGRAMS AND PLANS, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

In the aftermath of the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombings, the U.S. Congress made available some $48 million in funding for assistance to victims and their survivors. In both Kenya and Tanzania, these funds were used to reimburse hospitals for treatment they provided to victims, pay for mental health services, finance reconstructive surgeries, pay school fees for children of deceased and permanently disabled victims, provide grants to affected businesses to allow them to start up again, and to provide grants to building owners to pay for repairs. In addition, Foreign Service National employee victims and their survivors are receiving all benefits to which they are entitled under U.S. law.

Ms. Lee. Okay. I guess my final question is, once a country allows the United States to work with them on a counterterrorism strategy, what is expected of the country? Is there any quid pro quo? Is there any requirement of a country? Do you know how countries perceive our being there? Do we provide the type of resources they need on the development front in exchange for the presence?

Mr. Wycoff. No, ma’am. From our perspective, the global war on terrorism is in everyone’s interest. It is in Kenya’s interest, it is in Djibouti’s interest, it is in Tanzania’s interest, and it is a partnership. We try to approach this as a partnership with host countries. We certainly try to be responsive to their needs, to their requirements, to their situation, to their public relations needs even, if you will, but in terms of quid pro quos, I do not believe so.

Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. McCollum.

Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chair. To follow up a little more on Ms. Lee’s question about the perception that the war on terrorism is not a war against the people who practice the Muslim faith, Sharia law, which is an extreme form that they have pushed as practice in some parts of Africa; there are many of us here in Congress and people around the world who feel the stoning death of women for the way that they are tried for adultery is a gross violation of human rights. What, if anything, are you aware of, in dealing with issues of Sharia law, in countries that we are active in? Are we seeing that as a concern, or are we staying away from the issue of dealing with that at all because we do not want to be perceived as being anti-Muslim?

Mr. Wycoff. I think we deal with those issues directly. As you know, the State Department puts out human rights reports on countries around the world, engages in human rights dialogue and human rights advocacy through most of our Embassies, and those are the kinds of things that we would focus on.

Ms. McCollum. But could you tell me, as we have had a discussion about many of the challenges that Africa countries are fac-
ing,—poverty, AIDS, and other disease, and these countries are struggling to private basic human needs—what is the capacity of these countries to provide their own, self-sustaining organizations to combat terrorism?

Mr. WYCOFF. It is difficult for many of these countries. It is, however, for them an important security issue, and so most of them are focused on it and are doing their best, are devoting resources to counterterrorist organizations, counterterrorist activities, and we, obviously, are trying to support those efforts.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Do we encourage groups of countries to work together to share information?

Mr. WYCOFF. Yes, we do, indeed. The Pan-Sahel Initiative has an information-sharing component to it, and then the East Asia Counterterrorist Initiative also has an information-sharing component to it. And as I mentioned, we are putting together a regional conference in East Africa, and that will bring together officials that are involved in counterterrorism, as well as some officials from donor countries, to help networking and to help sharing of information in that capacity.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Who is helping to organize that and share and collect the information and then get it distributed? Is the United States funding that? How is that funded so that it is self-sustaining?

Mr. WYCOFF. It is a matter of developing the networks and the communication path as opposed to having an organization or a fusion cell or whatnot at this stage. So it is more a matter of developing habits of communication, patterns of communication, and providing information through those channels and encouraging countries to communicate with each other.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. As you have shared with and the panel has discussed, once again, going back to the issue of AIDS and poverty and failed states being breeding grounds for terrorism, when we talk about terrorism up here, we are talking about al-Qaeda and threats to our country. Do we help also with information that would help with terrorist organization that threaten the stability of every day life among people who live in a country that might not necessarily be a direct threat to the United States? In other words, we might not see it as a terrorist organization to ourselves, but in many of the conflicts in Africa with cross-border raiding going on, they view that as a terrorist threat to themselves.

Mr. WYCOFF. The counterterrorism assistance that we provide to countries does not have a string attached to it, that the country can use it only for international terrorists that might threaten U.S. interests. We try to provide those countries with a counterterrorist capability that they can use in accordance with their laws and with their human rights concerns against any terrorist organization, so the answer to your question is yes.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you. I have one more question for you. There was a program we operated, the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, and it was designed to provide support and training for Kenyan officers in anti-terrorism activities. In the Mombassa bombing in 2001, we found that none of them were there. None of them were available. They were not around. And so I wondered,
have you looked into that at all and determined what happened there, what happened to the people, and whether things have improved in that particular program and in Kenya, in particular.

Mr. WYCOFF. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. We are, indeed, aware of the situation in Kenya. The problems are not, in any way, shape, or form, restricted only to Kenya of making sure that graduates of ATA-assistance-training programs remain in their current positions for at least 2 years, which is part of the agreement when we provide training, and that they be used wisely.

What I can say is, in Kenya, specifically, we are very concerned about the sustainability of their counterterrorism capabilities, as is the Kenyan government. Their minister for national security, Christopher Murungaru, was in town 2 weeks ago for meetings. He met with Deputy Secretary Armitage. He met with my boss, Ambassador Black. He met with Assistant Secretary Taylor from Diplomatic Security. And that was one of the central focuses of our discussions was how to put together a way forward with Kenya that would be sustainable so that the Kenyans could keep working it in the years ahead.

The Kenyans, as I mentioned, are considering comprehensive counterterrorism legislation. They have made some changes to their governmental structure. They have added a National Security Advisory Council, which will provide CT guidance to the various ministries. They have established a CTC, a counterterrorism center, headed by a very impressive brigadier, and they are establishing an anti-terrorism police unit.

We, on our side, are looking at ways of helping them to institutionalize those changes that they have made so that they will function well and then of providing the training and equipment that will be needed to actually implement those kinds of policies so that when there is a crisis of some kind, God forbid, be it a WMD attack or be it another bombing or whatever contingency might arise, that Kenya and our other partners will have a CT counterterrorism capability that can swing into action.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Wycoff. Thank you very much for your presence here today and for your testimony.

We will have the second panel come on up now.

Mr. WYCOFF. It has been a privilege, sir. Good day to you. Thank you.

[Pause.]

Mr. TANCREDO. Welcome. Douglas Farah spent 19 years as a foreign correspondent and investigative reporter. In November 2001, Farah broke the story of al-Qaeda's ties to the “blood-diamond” trade in West Africa. He has also written on the ties of Hizballah and other terrorist organizations to the diamond trade in Africa. In January, Mr. Farah joined the National Strategy Information Center as a Senior Fellow. Welcome, Mr. Farah.

Ambassador Princeton Lyman is the Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow and Director of Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Ambassador Lyman’s accomplished career in the State Department and at USAID includes stints as Ambassador to South Africa and Nigeria, as well as serving as a Deputy Assistant Secretary. He has published books and articles on foreign policy, Afri-
can affairs, economic development, HIV/AIDS, U.N. reform, and peacekeeping. Welcome, Dr. Lyman.

Mr. Farah.

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS FARAH, FORMER “WASHINGTON POST” CORRESPONDENT

Mr. Farah. Thank you for the opportunity to talk with you today about the extremely important issue of terrorism in West Africa.

We know there are at least two international terrorist groups operating in West Africa: Hizballah, which has long-standing, historic ties to the Lebanese diasporas centered in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, and dominating trade throughout the region; and al-Qaeda, which has had an interest in the regional diamond trade that extends at least back to the mid-1990s.

Why would al-Qaeda choose to operate in West Africa? There are multiple reasons, but one of the most important factors is that in such states as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and most others in the region, governments are weak, corrupt, and exercise little control over much of their national territory. Some states, like Liberia under Charles Taylor, were, in essence, functioning criminal enterprises. For the right price, Taylor let al-Qaeda, Russian organized crime, Balkan organized crime, Hizballah, and other criminal elements to operate under his protection.

Al-Qaeda sought to exploit the diamond business in West Africa, East Africa, and Europe for many years. New evidence has emerged to support the data already public on the al-Qaeda ties to the African diamond trade. The existing data comes largely from testimony of al-Qaeda members convicted in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa, my own investigations on the ground into al-Qaeda’s ties in West Africa, particularly to Charles Taylor in Liberia and the RUF in Sierra Leone; and investigations by the London-based Global Witness group.

Among the new elements are public statements by the prosecutor and chief investigators for the Special Court of Sierra Leone, the U.N.-backed body investigating crimes against humanity committed in Sierra Leone’s brutal civil war. Both men, veteran Department of Defense employees, have verified the presence not only of the three al-Qaeda members I had identified as running the diamond business but the presence of at least two other senior al-Qaeda terrorists in West Africa.

One of the most interesting confirmations of bin Laden’s personal interest in the West African diamond trade came in November 2003. Shayk Abdul Qadir Fadlallah Mamour, a radical Senegalese Muslim cleric expelled from Italy for supporting al-Qaeda, was asked by reporters if he had, in fact, met bin Laden. He replied, yes, three times between 1993 and 1996 because, he said, bin Laden was financing Mamour’s diamond business, which consisted of “selling diamonds between West Africa and Belgium.”

The documentary and anecdotal evidence points to two phases in al-Qaeda’s diamond activities. The first started sometime before 1996, when bin Laden lived in Sudan, and was aimed at helping finance the organization. This lasted until the end of 2000.

Some of the evidence was provided by Wadi el Hage, bin Laden’s personal secretary until he was arrested in September 1998. Dur-
ing his trial, el Hage’s files of business cards, personal telephone
directories, and handwritten notebooks were introduced as evi-
dence. The notebooks contain extensive notes on buying diamonds,
setting up diamond-mining operations, setting up diamond-buying
businesses, and chronicle the attempt to sell diamonds across Afri-
can and Europe. There is a page on Liberia, with telephone numbers
and names. His address books and business card files are full of
the names of diamond dealers and jewelers, often including the
purchasers’ home phone numbers.

Unfortunately, United States and European intelligence agencies
paid little attention to what was viewed as secondary documents
and statements in the trial. Most of el Hage’s notebooks, written
in Arabic, are still not translated into English.

It is not clear how profitable al-Qaeda’s diamond ventures were.
El Hage and others did not keep sales records. The record in Sierra
Leone and Liberia is also a little sketchy. The first known contacts
with the Taylor regime came in September 1998, just weeks after
the bombing of the two U.S. Embassies in East Africa. It appears
that a group of senior al-Qaeda leaders involved in those attacks
simply moved to West Africa to avoid the heat, and they intermit-
tently sought to buy diamonds for the next 2 years.

The picture changes dramatically at the end of 2000, when senior
al-Qaeda operatives arrived in Monrovia, Liberia. They held a se-
ries of meetings with senior Liberian officials and the commanders
of the RUF. They set up a monopoly arrangement for the purchase
of diamonds through Taylor with the RUF. Then al-Qaeda buyers
went on a buying spree that lasted several months. But here the
intention was not to make money for the organization but, rather,
to buy the stones as a way of transferring value from other assets.
This was in the months immediately prior to 9/11, when the terror-
ists were moving their money out of traceable financial structures
into commodities in preparation for the aftermath of the attacks.

To do this, the al-Qaeda operatives were paying a premium over
the going rate for uncut stones, leaving regular buyers without
merchandise. This was my first clue that something was terribly
the matter with the market that year. The pace of the purchases
picked up, beginning in January 2001, and lasted until just before
9/11. Telephone records from the middlemen seized by Belgian po-
lice handling the purchases show calls to Afghanistan until Sep-
tember 10, 2001. The available evidence points to al-Qaeda pur-
chasing some $30 million to $50 million worth of RUF diamonds
in the 8 months prior to 9/11.

Hizballah operates in a more institutional manner in West Afri-
cana, where it has been operational almost since its birth in the early
1980s. Because of the hundreds of thousands of Lebanese in West
Africa, the vast majority being Shiite Muslims, the organization
has a natural constituency and family ties that bind the region to
the Lebanese conflict. Hizballah collects donations from businesses,
shakes down business operations, operates front companies, and is
deeply involved in the blood diamond trade.

For a glimpse of how much money Hizballah raises in the region,
consider one recent case. On December 25, 2003, a flight from
Cotonou, Benin, in West Africa, to Beirut crashed on takeoff. On
board were senior Hizballah members carrying $2 million in cash and contributions to the organization from across the region.

In the diamond trade, Hizballah operates in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These three countries all provided diamonds as a revenue stream to all factions in the Lebanese civil war.

In short, al-Qaeda and Hizballah have maintained an active presence in West Africa for a significant period of time. There is extensive European intelligence reporting on the presence of Hizballah there. I have found very little awareness among the U.S. intelligence agencies of their operations.

Al-Qaeda does not appear to have an extensive infrastructure in West Africa. Rather, the group was able to take advantage of the settings and personal contacts, including their key contact, who had been a mujahadeen in Afghanistan in the early 1980s, to further its cause.

I concur with General Charles Wald, the deputy commander of United States forces in Europe, who recently noted signs of al-Qaeda in northern Nigeria and Mauritania, where radical Islamic clerics appear to have gained a foothold:

“They are there for a purpose, whether looking for real estate or recruiting or looking for arms; whatever it is, there is a presence . . .''

Wald said.

“It may be small, but it is a bad indicator.”

Hizballah uses the region extensively to raise funds, recruit new members, and launder money. Because it is part of a large community, its presence there is much greater than that of al-Qaeda and more institutional. Because of that, it is both easier to identify and more difficult to uproot.

If the United States is serious about dealing with terrorism in Africa, the first step must be to greatly enhance human intelligence on the ground. Societies in which telephones are rare, Internet communications limited to a small percentage of the population in the capital, and business deals depend largely on family relationships, our high-tech monitoring systems are simply of little use. People must be on the ground, not just in the capital but in the hinterland, to be able to map the connections and trace financial patterns that can be used by terrorists.

The United States intelligence community must also take West Africa more seriously. Since the end of the cold war, West Africa has been a backwater assignment, where reports by even the most enterprising officials were often ignored. The conditions that favored al-Qaeda in West Africa—corruption, conflicts over natural resources that are little studied or understood, the lack of government control in vast areas, the emergence of sophisticated organize criminal networks—all continue to exist. These “failed states” or “stateless regions” are the ideal breeding grounds for terrorist and other groups that pose significant threats to United States national security and the stability of much of Africa.

Thank you, and I would be happy to take any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Farah follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS FARAH, FORMER Washington Post Correspondent

Thank you for the opportunity to talk to you today about the extremely important issue of terrorism in West Africa.

We know there are at least two international terrorist groups operating in West Africa: Hezbollah, which has long-standing, historic ties to the Lebanese diasporas centered in Abidjan, Ivory Coast and dominating trade throughout the region; and al Qaeda, which has had an interest in the regional diamond trade that extends at least back to the mid-1990s. Why would these groups chose West Africa? There are multiple reasons, but one of the most important factors is that states such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and most others in the region, governments are weak, corrupt and exercise little control over most of the national territory. Some states, like Liberia under Charles Taylor, were in essence functioning criminal enterprises. For the right price, Taylor let al Qaeda, Russian organized crime, Balkan organized crime, Hezbollah, and other criminal elements operate under his protection in Liberia.

Al Qaeda sought to exploit the diamond businesses in West Africa, East Africa and Europe for many years. Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the Northern Alliance all exploited Afghanistan’s emerald fields to finance their activities, so gemstones were not an unknown revenue source.

New evidence has emerged to support the data already public on the al Qaeda ties to the African diamond trade. The existing data comes largely from the testimony of al Qaeda members convicted of the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa; my own investigations on the ground into al Qaeda’s ties in West Africa, particularly to Charles Taylor in Liberia and the RUF in Sierra Leone; and investigations by the London-based NGO Global Witness. Among the new elements are public statements by the prosecutor and chief investigator for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the U.N.-backed body investigating crimes against humanity committed in Sierra Leone’s brutal civil war. Both men, veteran Department of Defense employees, have verified the presence not only of the three senior al Qaeda members I had identified as running the diamond business, but the presence of at least two other senior terrorists.

One of the most interesting confirmations of bin Laden’s personal interest in the West African diamond trade came in November 2003. Shaykh Abdul Qadir Fadlallah Mamour, a radical Senegalese Muslim cleric expelled from Italy for supporting al Qaeda, was asked by reporters if he had ever met bin Laden. Yes, Mamour replied, he had met bin Laden three times between 1993 and 1996. The reason, he said, was because bin Laden had financed Mamour’s diamond business, which consisted of “selling diamonds between West Africa and Belgium.”

The documentary and anecdotal evidence points to two phases in al Qaeda’s diamond activities. The first started sometime before 1996, when bin Laden lived in the Sudan, and was aimed at helping finance the organization. This lasted until the end of 2000. Some of the evidence was provided by Wadi el Hage, bin Laden’s personal secretary until he was arrested in September 1998. During his trial, El Hage’s file of business cards, personal telephone directory and handwritten notebooks were introduced as evidence. The notebooks contain extensive notes on buying diamonds and chronicles attempts to sell diamonds across Africa and Europe. There is a page on Liberia, with telephone numbers and names. His address book and business card file were full of the names of diamond dealers and jewelers, often including the purchaser’s home phone number.

Unfortunately, U.S. and European intelligence agencies paid little attention to what was viewed as secondary documents and statements in the trials. Most of el Hage’s notebooks, written in Arabic, have still not been translated into English.

It is not clear how profitable al Qaeda’s diamonds ventures were. El Hage and others did not keep sales records. The record in Sierra Leone and Liberia is also sketchy. The first known contacts with the Taylor regime came in September 1998—just weeks after the bombmings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa. A group of senior al Qaeda leaders involved in those attacks moved to West Africa, where they intermittently bought diamonds for the next two years.

Because Taylor controlled the notoriously brutal rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in neighboring Sierra Leone, he was able to grant al Qaeda access to the some of the world’s richest diamond fields.

The picture in West Africa changes dramatically toward the end of 2000, when senior al Qaeda operatives arrived in Monrovia, Liberia. They set up a monopoly

3 Farah, Blood From Stones, op cit, pp. 64–65.
arrangement for the purchase of diamonds through Taylor with the RUF. Then, al Qaeda buyers went on a spree that lasted several months. But here the intention was not to make money, but rather to buy the stones as a way of transferring value from other assets. This was in the months immediately prior to 9/11, when the terrorists were moving their money out of traceable financial structures into commodities in preparation for the aftermath of the attacks. To do this, the al Qaeda operatives were paying a premium over the going rate for uncut stones, leaving regular buyers without any merchandise. The pace of the purchases picked up beginning in January 2001 and lasted until just before 9/11. Telephone records from the middlemen handling the purchases show calls to Afghanistan until Sept. 10. The available evidence points to al Qaeda purchasing some $30 million to $50 million worth of RUP diamonds during the eight months prior to 9/11.1

Hezbollah operates in a more institutional manner in West Africa, where it has been operational almost since its birth in the early 1980s. Because of the hundreds of thousands of Lebanese in West Africa—the vast majority being Shi'ite Muslims—the organization has a natural constituency and family ties that bind the region to the Lebanese conflict. Hezbollah collects donations from businesses, runs shakedown operations, operates front companies, and is also deeply involved in the “blood diamond” trade. For a glimpse of how much money Hezbollah raises in the region, consider one known case. On Dec. 25, 2003, a Union Transport Africaines flight from Cotonou, Benin, in West Africa to Beirut, crashed on takeoff. On board were senior Hezbollah members, carrying $2 million in contributions to the organization from across the region.2

In the diamond trade, Hezbollah operates in Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These three countries all provided diamonds as a revenue stream to all factions of the Lebanese civil war. Hezbollah remains the strongest of the groups involved in the trade. I have spoken to Hezbollah loyalists in the diamond trade in Africa. In one of the more unusual twists, these same merchants do businesses with Israeli diamond merchants. The war, one explained to me, was in the Middle East, while business was done in Africa.

In short, al Qaeda and Hezbollah have maintained an active presence in West Africa for a significant period of time.

Al Qaeda does not appear to have an extensive infrastructure in West Africa. Rather, a friendly member of the mujahadeen, the group was able to take advantages of the setting and resources to further its cause. I concur with Gen. Charles Wald, the deputy commander of U.S. forces in Europe, who recently noted signs of al Qaeda in regions such as northern Nigeria and Mauritania, where radical Islamic clerics have gained a foothold. “They are there for a purpose, whether looking for real estate, or recruiting or looking for arms, whatever it is, there’s a presence,” Wald said. “It may be small, but it’s a bad indicator.”3

Hezbollah uses the region extensively to raise funds, recruit new members and launder money. Because it is part of a large community, it’s presence there is much greater than that of al Qaeda, and more institutional. Because of that, it is both easier to identify and more difficult to uproot.

If the United States is serious about dealing with terrorism in Africa, the first step must be to greatly enhance human intelligence on the ground. Societies in which telephones are rare, Internet communications limited to a small percentage of the population in the capital and business deals depend largely on familial relationships, our high-tech monitoring systems are of little use. People must be on the ground, not just in the capital but in the hinterland, to be able to map the connections and trace financial patterns that can be used by terrorists.

The United States intelligence community must also take Africa more seriously. Since the end of the Cold War West Africa, at least, has been a backwater assignment, where reports by even the most enterprising agents were ignored. The conditions that favored al Qaeda in West Africa: corruption; conflicts over natural resources that are little studied or understood; lack of government control in vast areas; the emergence of sophisticated organized criminal networks; all continue to exist. These “failed states” or “stateless regions” are the ideal operating grounds for terrorists and other groups that pose significant threats U.S. national security and the stability of much of Africa.
Thank you.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Farah.

Ambassador Lyman?

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PRINCETON N. LYMAN, RALPH BUNCHE SENIOR FELLOW IN AFRICA POLICY STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. LYMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am pleased to be asked to testify concerning the terrorist situation in Africa.

It will not be possible for the United States to have an effective worldwide campaign against terrorism unless the threat is addressed in Africa. But it is important that we distinguish among the threats. There are some immediate threats from existing terrorist networks. This is particularly true in the Horn and East Africa.

There are other dangers arising from failed or failing states, as Mr. Farah has just very clearly explained. That is true in Central and West Africa. Another threat is in the sparsely populated area of the Sahel, which we heard about from Mr. Wycoff and the Pan-Sahel Initiative.

But perhaps the most challenging of all are the threats that arise from deepening economic and political crises in countries like Nigeria. The brew of religious tension, economic deprivation, declining law and order, and political instability could open that country of 130 million people to some of the most serious forms of criminal and terrorist activity. In fact, in all parts of sub-Saharan Africa, our response to the terrorist threat must be a broadly based one, as several of the Members here have said, bringing political, economic, and sensitive public diplomacy assets to bear.

Let me touch on those factors in just the few cases that we have been talking about today. Take East Africa and the Horn. First of all, in spite of a very aggressive response by the United States and the countries in this area to terrorism, intelligence capabilities remain weak. Much cross-border information is simply not available. That is just one example.

Coastal control of shipments of arms in this area, the Horn, is almost nonexistent, in spite of the Combined Joint Task Force and allied naval efforts, because most of the arms shipments come in small dhows which are not inspected. Therefore, the proliferation of arms coming in down from Somalia into Kenya, Tanzania, and elsewhere, including shoulder-fired missiles, remains a major threat.

The politics of this region are important. One of the difficulties of coming to a political solution in Somalia is some of the surrounding countries, like Ethiopia, have different interests from Kenya. We know that the differences between Eritrea and Sudan and between Uganda and Sudan contribute to the inability to deal with such horrific groups as the Lord’s Resistance Army.

Now, we have talked about the response in that area and the response that the U.S. has made, the $100 million that the President committed last year, but let us also be candid. The $100 million really represented cobbling together a lot of existing programs from existing funds. In the following year, and I think Congress has to
take responsibility here, the funds for these programs in Africa have declined. We need a steady and adequately funded program in this area.

We also have to be sensitive to the politics. Congressman Payne has talked about the problems for Kenya and the tourist advisory that has so affected Kenya’s foreign exchange earnings. There is also a case of the anti-terrorism legislation that Kenya was seeking to pass, with American backing. But pro-democracy groups and Muslim leaders of Kenya were worried that the legislation, as written, was really rolling back elements of Kenya’s democracy and really fomenting an anti-Muslim attitude. The Kenyan government, rightly, stepped back to adjust that law. We have to be sensitive to the fact that we cannot run against democracy in working against terrorism.

We have talked about failed and failing states. Let me just add one element to that where we have difficulty. We have a problem in the United States in being able to respond rapidly to conflict situations and in putting peacekeeping operations together. Largely because of our budgetary situation, when a new U.N. peacekeeping operation is proposed, we look around for how we are going to fund it. So we say, well, let us cut down on what we have in Sierra Leone in order to put one in Liberia, or let us do a smaller one in the Democratic Republic of Congo than is really needed. Then violence occurs where the forces are inadequate and the situation gets worse. Then we have to respond with more peacekeepers, but late.

Again, Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, Congress has a role to play here because Congress has resisted Administration requests to create a contingency fund that would allow the U.S. to respond to new situations like that more rapidly.

Let me, then, say a few words about Islam in Africa, particularly West Africa. Let me emphasize, first, the positive potential for American policy in this region. The Islamic tradition in West Africa is a rich one, with many facets that lend themselves to close understanding and cooperation with the West. We hear a lot of debates these days about whether Islam is compatible with democracy. Well, in Senegal, Mali, and Niger, we have examples of Muslim-majority states that have fashioned working democracies. Two Muslim countries in the region, Senegal and Mauritania, and Nigeria, which has over 60 million Muslims, have diplomatic relations with Israel.

Islamic traditions in West Africa are moderate and are absent often the emotional antagonism toward United States policy found elsewhere. We can learn much from close relations with the political and religious leaders in this region.

But there is a struggle going on in the minds of the Muslim population in countries like Nigeria, and it is tied up in the economic conditions and the political turmoil that that country has experienced. I will not go into it in detail. We have heard about the introduction of Sharia for criminal offenses. The motive in some cases was political but the rapid spread was also a response to the apparent loss of a sense of control and of order and of economic possibilities on the part of the people in the street.

Nigeria has experienced, over the last 15 years, a ¾ decline in per capita GNP. It is knowing poverty that it has not known for
decades. When you add to that migration and land pressures, it is not surprising that there have been a lot of clashes over the last 4 years, some religious, some otherwise, that have taken an estimated 10,000 lives. In that atmosphere, Osama bin Laden has said Nigeria is a prime target. It has not happened yet in Nigeria, but we have to be able to reach out and interact with the people for more than we now do.

Let me go, then, straight to the question of our own access and capability. We have talked about intelligence. Let me talk about just normal, diplomatic outreach. In Nigeria, a country of 130 million, of which half roughly are Muslims, we have no diplomatic presence in northern Nigeria where most Muslims live. We have no eyes and ears there. We have no day-to-day contact. We have no learning capacity or interaction capacity on a regular basis. That makes it almost impossible to monitor what is happening, to interact, to know, and to carry out public diplomacy.

We have few senior officers in the political or the economic sections of our Embassy in Nigeria. It is not just religious tension that leads to terrorism. We have a serious insurgency going on in the oil-rich delta area of Nigeria because of decades of perceived inequality. That is a very important area for the United States, but we do not have a diplomatic presence in the delta either.

These are things we must overcome if we are going to be serious about dealing with the complexity of Africa.

Let me just conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying that one of the parts of the United States Government that has responded most actively and aggressively to the threats in Africa has been the United States military. The Chairman mentioned—you did, Mr. Tancredo—General Jones of NATO and General Charles Wald, who have been traveling all over the continent, and the aggressive action in the Pan-Sahel Initiative. This is terrific. This is very welcome interest. But if it is not matched by diplomatic and economic capability, we could stumble badly. We could make mistakes.

Let me give you just one example in the Sahel area. It is a very thin line in a country like Mauritania between who is in the political opposition and who is a terrorist, and we have to be extremely careful that we do not find ourselves inadvertently pushing legitimate opposition people into the extremist camps. That is the kind of political sensitivity we need as part of a total response effort.

Finally, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, the important thing here is that we stop thinking of Africa just in humanitarian terms. That is obviously very important to us. But once we begin to think of Africa in strategic terms, for all of the reasons, not only terrorism but its role in energy, its role in trade, and in all of the other areas, then we can look at the kinds of resources we need—diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and military—that can deal with the problems we face there. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lyman follows:]
to distinguish among the threats. There are some immediate threats from existing terrorist networks. This is particularly true in the Horn and east Africa. Some arise from failed or failing states that allow financial exploitation by terrorist groups or exploitation of internal conflicts to recruit members to terrorist networks. This has been the case in central and West Africa. Another threat is in the sparsely populated regions such as the Sahel where terrorist groups, like the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) from Algeria, can find sanctuary and even set up training sites. Finally, and perhaps most challenging of all, there is the threat that arise from deepening economic and political crises in key states like Nigeria. The brew of religious tension, economic deprivation, declining law and order and political instability could open that country of 130 million people to some of the most serious forms of terrorist activity. In fact in all parts of sub-Saharan Africa, our response to the terrorist threat must be a broadly based one, bringing political, economic, and sensitive public diplomacy assets to bear.

EXISTING NETWORKS

Terrorist networks have already been established in the Horn and along the eastern coast of Africa. The bombings of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the attacks on an Israel-owned hotel and airliner in Kenya in 2001 attest to the immediacy of the situation there. While the African governments in the area have responded with determination to stem the growth of these networks, their abilities are limited. For one thing, coastal control of shipments is almost non-existent, allowing arms to be smuggled from Somalia or elsewhere into Kenya, Tanzania and other places. This is despite efforts by the U.S. Combined Joint Task Force, headquartered in Djibouti and by allied naval forces to police the area. Most arms shipments come by small dhows that escape such surveillance. Intelligence capabilities are similarly limited and cross-country cooperation is complicated by political rivalries. For example, efforts led by Kenya to bring about a solution to the failed state of Somalia founder in part by differing interests of Ethiopia and other countries in the region as well as by continuing differences among the Somali parties. That leaves Somalia a place where at the least terrorists can transit fairly easily into and out of East Africa and perhaps conduct other business. Continuing differences between Eritrea and Sudan, Uganda and Sudan as well as Ethiopia limit efforts to control border regions and eliminate such horrific groups like the Lord’s Resistance Army that plagues northern Uganda.

The U.S. has responded fairly aggressively in this part of Africa. Not only the Combined Joint Task Force, but a $100 million pledge of counter-terrorism assistance from President Bush has provided a strong impetus to counter-terrorism activities. The head of the CJTF recently reported arrests of members of terrorist organizations in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya, and Djibouti. The U.S. will have to provide much more support, however, to maintain this momentum. The $100 million was less new money than programs cobbled together from existing funds. Future funding has not been identified on the same scale. There has to be a sustained focus on east Africa in our anti-terrorism budgets.

The U.S. has also been playing an active role in bringing about an end to the decades long civil war in Sudan. Sudan once was home to Osama Bin Laden and hosted other terrorist groups and individuals. Now the government is interested in improving its relations with the U.S. Only a peace settlement with the south, and an end to the government’s punitive military action against the people of Darfur in the west, will open that door. Once achieved it will close off what was once a principal entree for terrorist networking in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond.

Experience in this region however also demonstrates the need for greater political sensitivity. The U.S. strongly backed anti-terrorism legislation being proposed by the government of Kenya. But democracy advocates and civil society groups in Kenya, fresh from having rid the country of one-party, one-man rule, resisted, seeing in the legislation the seeds of new political oppression. In addition, Kenyan Muslims argued that the legislation was anti-Muslim, aggravating the alienation in that community that opened the door to terrorist infiltration in the first place. The Kenyan Government finally agreed to redraft the legislation. Here as elsewhere, the U.S. has to be sensitive to fledging democracies in Africa, and not fall into the trap of promoting actions and leadership that would undermine the democratic trend. Kenya also has suffered from the loss of tourism, its principal source of foreign exchange, as a result of U.S. travel advisories related to the terrorist threat. There may be no easy answer to this problem, but we must be wary of creating a political backlash in as strong an ally in the war on terrorism as Kenya.
FAILED AND FAILING STATES

Failed or failing states in central and west Africa have already provided opportunity for al Qaeda and criminal networks possibly affiliated with it to profit from the marketing of diamonds and other precious gems. Wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone and Liberia opened this door and local warlords like Charles Taylor readily collaborated.

These states remain at best in a fragile peace. The U.S. response however has been constrained by what are in the end, or should be, extraneous issues. For example, the U.S. has been slow to support aggressive and adequate UN peacekeeping missions in these countries because of budgeting processes that do not allow for rapid response to new situations. So, to finance the UN peacekeeping force in Liberia, the US has urged a rapid drawdown of the UN force in Sierra Leone, a risky step when the two civil wars are related and when the peace processes in Sierra Leone remain incomplete. The US has urged a reduction in the proposed UN peacekeeping operation in Cote d’Ivoire, again largely for budgetary reasons, when it is apparent that the peace process there is on the verge of breakdown. Earlier, provision of too small and inadequately provisioned a UN force led to the UN’s inability to prevent massacres in eastern DRC and the need for an emergency European and South African military response while the UN beefed up its presence.

Congress has an important role here. Congress has consistently resisted Administration requests for a peacekeeping contingency fund. That is no longer tenable if the U.S. is to respond rapidly and responsibly to the volatile situations across Africa. Delays in providing peacekeepers, and constant efforts to cut back on their size and capability, prolong crises and weaken conflict resolution efforts. If failed or failing states are as much a threat to terrorist exploitation as has been demonstrated in Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone, then we must reconcile ourselves to a larger and more consistent commitment of resources to overcome those situations.

ISLAM IN AFRICA

Beyond the obvious immediate threats, the more difficult conditions for the U.S. to address lie in the economic and political instability that grips many of the West African States where the majority of African Muslim live. If terrorism will arise through the doors of religious strife and political exploitation of religion, then Africa is indeed a major area for attention. We need to remember that Africa has more Muslims than the Middle East or Southeast Asia. In sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria alone, with some 66 million Muslims, has as many if not more Muslims than Egypt.

Let me emphasize first the positive potential for American policy in this region. The Islamic tradition in West Africa is a rich one, with many facets that lend themselves to close understanding and cooperation with the West. We hear debates these days whether Islam is compatible with democracy. In Senegal, Mali, and Niger, we have examples of Muslim majority states that have fashioned working democracies. Two Muslim countries in the region—Senegal and Mauritania—and Nigeria with its large Muslim population enjoy diplomatic relations with Israel. Islamic traditions in West Africa are moderate and are absent the often emotional antagonism toward U.S. policy in the Middle East that one finds elsewhere. We can learn much from close relations with these countries and their political and religious leaders.

But there is a struggle going on for the minds of the Muslim population in countries like Nigeria, one that is tied up in the economic conditions and political turmoil in that country over the past several years. Introduction of shari’a for criminal acts has taken hold in twelve of Nigeria’s thirty-six states, across the largely Muslim north. That has led to religious tension with Christians who live in those states and heightened traditional tension between Christians and Muslims in the country. Growing Christian evangelical activities have also contributed to growing tension between the two religions. In several states of Nigeria local militias have grown up, sometimes with the political support of state governors, producing extra legal enforcement of religious laws or just political power of one group over another. Within Nigerian Islam, religious debate has spilled over to national political debate, even health issues. The degree of tension and suspicion within Nigerian Islam toward the Nigerian government itself, and beyond to the international community, is demonstrated by the resistance today in Kano state to the vaccinations against polio. Some Nigerian religious figures have preached that the vaccines are a Western plot to sterilize Muslims. The dispute has stopped in its tracks the final stages of the World Health Organization’s program to eradicate polio worldwide.

This tension and debate, which I can only touch on here, has to be seen in the context of the economic and political situation within Nigeria. In the past fifteen years, per capita GNP in Nigeria declined by two-thirds. Nigerians are experiencing
an almost unprecedented level of poverty. Migration and land pressures have added
to the mix. Finally, after nine years of one of the most repressive military leaders
in Nigeria’s history, Nigerians are experiencing a new democracy, with less repres-
sion of political activity but without strong governing or law enforcement institu-
tions. All together these factors have led to ethnic, religious, political and other
sources of violence that took 10,000 lives from 1999–2003.

In this atmosphere, the openings for terrorist infiltration cannot be overlooked.
Osama Bin Laden himself listed Nigeria as a priority target. So far, there is no indi-
cation that terrorist networks have taken hold in Nigeria nor that even many rad-
ical Islamic figures have contemplated a policy of violence. But the potential for
linkages between terrorist groups and Nigeria’s already well developed criminal and
drug trafficking groups is a worrisome prospect.

We must also be careful to recognize that not all terrorism or political violence
is religiously based. Just as serious in Nigeria is the armed insurgency in the delta
region of Nigeria, where the bulk of the oil industry—and American investment—
is concentrated. Violent acts against the oil industry pose a serious threat to Amer-
ican interests and to the still fledgling democratic government of Nigeria.

Nigeria is a classic case, however, where our diplomatic and economic resources
are poorly deployed. The U.S. does not even have a presence in the Muslim-domi-
nated north of the country—no eyes and ears, no daily program of public diplomacy,
no capacity for measuring the trends of Islamic debate and their implications for
the U.S. The U.S. similarly has no presence in the oil rich, but deeply troubled delta
region. There are few senior officers in the political and economic sections of the
Embassy. It is hard to understand, therefore, how we can anticipate and respond
to the potential threats there.

Moreover, our response in Nigeria has to be more robust than it has been to date.
President Obasanjo, now in his second term, is pushing forward a more aggressive
reform program than in his first term. He is seeking to make the oil sector more
transparent, to privatize the refineries, and to attack corruption. There are efforts,
long overdue, to revitalize the agricultural sector. The United States must be pre-
pared to respond with further support and incentives. There is understandable re-
sistance to providing debt relief to Nigeria until some of these reforms are more
firmly in place. But now is the time to begin to lay out the parameters of what debt
relief would look like and to make clear that the prospects are real as the reforms
move forward. Nigeria also needs much more technical assistance to take advantage
of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. Except for oil Nigeria has hardly begun
to exploit this potential.

Congress must moreover resolve the impasse over providing security assistance to
Nigeria. There are serious human rights issues with Nigeria’s military. But poor po-
lice capacity and a military without further training do not serve Nigeria’s or our
interests. The current spate of political killings, in the context of local elections, only
underline the seriousness of the security situation. If the Government does not
soon get a handle on law and order, the country could descend into a generalized
violence that could destabilize the entire nation. The lack of law and order was one
of the reasons people in the north took so enthusiastically to the imposition of
shari’a.

THE NEW FRONTIER: THE SAHEL

Nowhere has interest and action on terrorism moves so rapidly in Africa recently
than in the areas bordering the Sahara desert. A once small and almost
unremarkable program, the Pan Sahel Initiative, has been energized by the U.S.
European Command (EUCOM) in conjunction with the states on both sides of the
desert: Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad in the south; Morocco, Algeria and Tuni-
sia in the north. With improved communication and logistical equipment, and as-
sisted by U.S. satellites and advisory troops, these countries have been engaging in
military action against the GSPC, chasing it across borders and inflicting significant
losses on its cadres. In an area where U.S. security presence has traditionally been
limited, and influence marginal, the U.S. has now become a significant player. In
the process, EUCOM spanned the bureaucratic divide that exists in the State De-
partment between North and sub-Saharan Africa to develop a cohesive and truly re-
gional approach.

This is a welcome initiative. As the President of Mali said in a speech in Wash-
ington last year, it would otherwise be impossible to know what was transpiring in
this vast, sparsely populated area. Not only could it be a place of refuge but poten-
tially the site of new training sites for terrorists forced out of Afghanistan and else-
where.
But we also must be concerned with the fragility of democracy in states like Mali and the limitations on democracy in countries like Mauritania. Mali’s democracy is dependent upon the reconciliation that was achieved in the 1980s between the majority people of the south and the Tuaregs of the north, ending decades of friction and occasional insurgency. Mali is understandably concerned that nothing in the new counter terrorism efforts undermine that unity. Mauritania is a country where the line between the government’s legitimate opponents on the one hand and terrorists and coup plotters on the other is a thin one. The U.S. has to be especially careful that we do not become partners in a political process that drives people into the arms of Islamic extremists. Chad is not very different, with historic friction between north and south and between various tribal groupings. Let us tread here with care and discretion.

THE NEED FOR BALANCE

The one U.S. government agency that has taken the terrorist threat in Africa to heart has been the Defense Department, in particular the U.S. commanders in NATO, EUCOM, and the CJTF. NATO Commander General James Jones has described West Africa as “where the action is.” EUCOM Deputy Commander Charles Wald has traveled across the continent several times and was instrumental in fashioning the Pan Sahel Initiative into an active action program. DOD has undertaken HIV/AIDS awareness and control programs with militaries throughout the continent. With additional resources DOD is prepared to assist the oil producing countries of the West Coast in establishing offshore security capability, guarding against attacks on the drilling installations springing up all along the coast.

Welcome as this interest is, it is dangerous if not matched by an equivalent level of interest and capability in State and USAID in addressing the political and economic factors that make Africa worrisome. A response overly balanced to the military side will push us too close to the line of oppressive regimes, too insensitive to the political dynamics of an anti-terrorism strategy, too limited in our response to the problems of poverty that underlie every African security problem. Our military colleagues would in fact agree.

I have already noted the shortfalls in this regard in Nigeria. The same is true, however all across Africa, whether in senior personnel, language proficiency, presence in strategic locations, or dynamic public diplomacy. The problem is scheduled to get worse rather than better. As the U.S. prepares to staff a new Embassy in Baghdad, personnel slots are being taken from all over the world, including Africa—including Nigeria! We are in danger of robbing Peter to pay Paul.

The level of interest in Africa must in fact go higher than State and USAID. It must go to the White House and the National Security Council, where there must be recognition that Africa is of strategic interest to the United States, not just humanitarian as has so often been the case up to now.

There was a telling moment in this regard during last year’s crisis over Liberia. There was a telling moment in this regard during last year’s crisis over Liberia. The UK had done so in neighboring Sierra Leone, France in Cote d’Ivoire. The President sent 3,000 Marines offshore of Liberia, but after a few days and after only a few troops had gone on shore for a short while, the troop ship sailed away. The President said that our primary interest had been that food and medicine could be provided, and once that was done our job was largely done. However one judges the desirability of providing American troops in that situation, the conclusion that our primary interest in a failing state, where once al Qaeda had reaped fortunes in diamond trading, was humanitarian was unfortunate. Our interest in Africa must be seen as strategic. Once that fundamental recognition takes place, the resources that will be needed can be judged accordingly. And only then will we meet the totality of the terrorist threat on the continent.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you both for your testimony, very provocative and insightful.

As we sit through these hearings and listen to the problems that we face and listen to testimony from people to describe the kinds of problems we face, especially in Africa, but other places in the world, when we seem to provide support for governments that are repressive, and we do so on the basis of the fact that we are getting some information from them, that somehow or other they are friendly enough, anyway, so that we will work to keep them in
power, that, in doing that, we have been told by many witnesses, we create problems for ourselves in the long run.

Do you believe that there are criteria well enough established for us to determine when a government actually is cooperating and what that word really means, or is it a totally subjective thing on your part how we analyze it and say there is enough there that we will overlook some of the problems that we know are inherent in the government and they way they treat their own people and also maybe some of the things they are doing against our interests? I feel that we are often whipped there, and I am interested in your opinion, Ambassador Lyman, especially, as to whether or not we have that criteria, in your own mind, and whether it exists.

Mr. Lyman. It is an important question, Mr. Chairman. The good thing is that there is a definite movement in Africa toward more democratic regimes. Most governments in Africa are now elected. The Africa Union itself has said it will not recognize any government that comes to power through a military coup. So we have a democratic trend, and we need to keep encouraging it.

I will give you an example. I was privileged to hear Chairman Royce the other day, at a meeting on energy in Africa, point out that as important as it is to have the cooperation we are having with Chad in the Pan-Sahel Initiative, it is equally important that we keep a close eye on how the proceeds from the oil are going to be used in Chad to benefit the people of that country. It is that balance, I think, that we have to maintain throughout.

I think the criteria are clear enough. I think the criteria of moving toward more democratic regimes, respecting human rights, which are now on the African agenda, are there, and to recognize that to undermine that would be to work against our objectives. So I think we have the criteria; the question is, do we have the people on the ground and the information on which to make the judgments?

Mr. Tancredo. Mr. Farah, the State Department consistently avers that al-Qaeda does not have a presence in West Africa, and you consistently suggest that they do. To what do you attribute this kind of division of perception?

Mr. Farah. I think that there is a changing tide in this. The FBI has recently had people on the ground in West Africa that have found much of what I have found. The work of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, which has done a lot of work in trying to get attention paid to the al-Qaeda connections and Hezbollah connections that they have repeatedly stumbled across as they have done their investigations into the human rights violations; they have run up against stone walls, not only in the intelligence community but also at the State Department.

I do not have a good explanation for why that is. I did not particularly like it, but I think if you want to ignore The Washington Post reporter, that is fine. You have prosecutors and investigators with 30 years of DoD experience each who will put their reputations on the line to say this for no particular reason except that they came across it; I find ignoring that of a little more concern. And I think, as I say, the Treasury Department—is now acknowledging the problem with diamonds in West Africa being laundered.
The FBI has now investigated it much more fully and come to the same conclusion.

So I think that, over time, the veracity of that has been borne out, but on a policy level, I do not know why people—their knee-jerk reaction is it could not be happening, I think, largely because they did not know it was happening.

My contention, in my discussions with them, is that no one is alleging they were stupid or incompetent; they simply had no one on the ground there to do it. I found this by being on the ground in the diamond fields of West Africa. They did not have the capacity to do it. They just simply did not have the people there to do it. If they did, they may well have found the same thing, but that is why one of my recommendations is getting people on the ground there. People knew something was horribly wrong with the diamonds in Sierra Leone in the summer of 2001. Something was badly a skelter, and nobody could figure out why.

Mr. TANCREDO. What about Hizballah in Khartoum? Any idea about that?

Mr. FARAH. I do not. I was not dealt with Sudan, and I do not know the answer.

Mr. TANCREDO. Who is Ibrahim Bah, and what is his relationship to al-Qaeda and Hizballah?

Mr. FARAH. Ibrahim Bah is a Senegalese soldier of fortune who received religious training in Egypt, went to work with Mohamar Qaddafi in Libya, traveled to Afghanistan in the early 1980s, 1982 to 1985, I believe. He was with the mujahadeen in Afghanistan. He returned to Libya briefly, went and fought with Hizballah in Lebanon, and returned to Libya again just as Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh and that group were being turned in Mohamar Qaddafi’s camps.

He trained them, and he returned to Liberia with Charles Taylor’s forces, was given the rank of general in the RUF, and he led one of the first incursions of the RUF into Sierra Leone from Liberia. He then became essentially the gatekeeper for diamond deals for Charles Taylor’s regime and for the RUF.

In my dealings with the RUF, they thought that he was God, practically. He was someone who had been in the outside world, who had told them these marvelous tales of Afghanistan and Lebanon, and was viewed as something other worldly to them. He was sought out, I believe, by al-Qaeda because they knew him. Rohan Gunaratna, who is one of the leading experts in the world on al-Qaeda, a Sri Lankan who wrote the book, Inside Al Qaeda, has found records of Bah in Afghanistan, despite the denial of some American institutions to the veracity of that claim. He has talked to numerous people who identified Bah as an al-Qaeda businessman. So that is, in a nutshell, what I know of Ibrahim Bah.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you. Thank you very much for your testimony, Mr. Farah.

Mr. Payne?

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Farah, your articles in The Washington Post detailing al-Qaeda’s and Hizballah’s presence in West Africa; what was the response, and did you get any official response from the United States Government?
Mr. FARAH. The response I got consistently was that they had no information. The CIA then began circulating to Members of Congress who inquired that I had based my report on a single source who they had found not to be credible.

I have explained to them, I would not risk 19 years of my reputation on writing a story on a single source on something like that. I had gone to great lengths to explain to different agencies when they asked me how I got the story, which I normally would not have done as a journalist, but I felt it was important in that case to outline the extraordinary circumstances in which that developed and the verification that I had gotten for the initial story.

As I say, there is now a bit of a change in the attitude. I am finding that the Treasury Department and FBI, particularly, are much more open in finding that, in fact, that did happen and verifying it, or at least that it is credible that it happened. As far as I know, the CIA still maintains it did not happen.

Mr. PAYNE. What about the RUF, al-Qaeda diamonds, weapons in Sierra Leone and Liberia? There seemed to be a lack of attention drawn to that. Do you think it is because assets have been taken out of Africa? I was aware of a cutdown in intelligence in Africa. It was almost cut in half or maybe a third of what it was in the past 6 to 8 years. Do you have any knowledge of the reduction in that?

Mr. FARAH. I know the reduction was massive. I know that, at least in the early part of 2000–2001, they had station chiefs running two or three countries instead of a person in each country. They had an extremely limited staff. This was the CIA. I knew some of the station chiefs at the time. The DIA had, I think, a little more extensive presence and were working with the training of different troops, so they had different ways of getting different types of information. But there is no question that the intelligence capability was reduced. They could barely meet the minimum reporting requirements and had no capability, even if they wanted to, to go beyond that.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Lyman, you mentioned that there are staffing deficiencies, both in terms of experience and skills, in African Embassies, and that hampers your ability to fight terrorism. Could you expand on that a bit? I certainly know the outstanding work you did in Nigeria during tough transition times.

I know, in South Africa, during the time of transition from a white Apartheid government to a nonracial government, the outstanding job you did in getting us out of the country when Chris Hani was murdered that day, and you rushed me to the airport, and also the time when the Ankarta came down and started firing at the bus we were on at another time. So I do not know whether it was when I came into your country, I created a problem or whether problems—but I am glad you got me out each time.

What is your assessment, if you would?

Mr. LYMAN. Thank you, Congressman. I think it was just bad timing.

Let me make a comparison because I think it is relevant. During that period in South Africa when I was Ambassador there, from 1992 to 1995, as you say, a very important time in the transition,
we had consulates in three parts of the country. We had Johannesburg. We had Durban in the very troubled, Kwazulu-Natal province. We had a consulate in Capetown. I had a full political section. I had Afrikaans speakers in my political section. I had a Xhosa speaker in the political section. I had a labor officer dedicated full time to the labor movement that was so heavily politically involved. We had people all over the country.

If we were successful in South Africa, it was because we had information coming into us. We were interacting with all parts of the society and the political spectrum. I think we were able, for that reason, to do what I think was a credible job in helping and facilitating that transition.

Now, Nigeria is a country more than three times larger in population, with a very different mix, and with very different challenges, and there are no consulates outside of Lagos. We have an Embassy in the capital in Abuja and we have a consulate in Lagos. We have no one in the delta region, where all of the oil and the trouble is; no one in the North, no Hausa speakers on the Embassy staff; no permanent public diplomacy outreach with the Muslim population of the North. You know, my friends who have become Ambassadors to Nigeria, I can only wish them good luck because I think operating successfully in that atmosphere is going to be extremely difficult.

Now we are putting together a very large and important Embassy in Baghdad. I can tell you, positions are being taken from the Africa bureau, including Nigeria, to help staff the Embassy in Baghdad. Well, it is robbing Peter to pay Paul. I think that we cannot address the range of issues that we are talking about today with such a thin staff on the ground. No matter how good they are, they have to have more capability.

Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. I think my time has expired. Thank you, Ambassador.

Mr. Royce [presiding]. Mr. Meeks?

Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had an opening statement. May I ask unanimous consent to submit it for the record?

Mr. Royce. Without objection.

Mr. Meeks. Thank you.

Mr. Ambassador, unfortunately, I had to run out, and you are part of the Administration, but you are not part of the Administration, so to speak, but let me ask you this question. It is clear that our travel advisories are having a negative impact on Kenya and Kenya’s economy and that poverty can play a huge role in the number of people fostering terrorism. My question to you is, in your estimation, what would Kenya need to do to have the advisory lifted?

Mr. Lyman. Congressman, this is a very difficult area because you have to have good and honest advisories to protect Americans going abroad. But in this case we have to look with the Kenyan government at what areas can be improved, particularly the areas where the tourist traffic is going to go and to see whether one can put into place enough protection and assurances in that area that we can modify the advisory.

Sometimes we will have an advisory that says, “Look, certain parts of the country are really not safe, but other parts of the country are okay.” I think if tourism is as vital to Kenya as it is, and
they cannot assure security generally, perhaps we could work with them in ways in which the tourist trade, we can say, is reasonably safe. That is a measure that could help them a great deal.

The specific steps they would have to take, I am afraid I am not close enough to the specifics to know. But maybe we could work with them in that direction because, as you have pointed out and as Congressman Payne pointed out, they are paying a tremendous price in this situation in terms of earnings, and tourism is one of the few labor-intensive industries, employment-creating industries, that developing countries like Kenya have.

Mr. MEEKS. Given the price that they are paying, they have tried, and they have put in place, various measures for anti-terrorism, et cetera. Their economy is based on tourism. It is down. My question then becomes—they are doing everything they can to be as good allies as they possibly can—how can we then justify, for example, them just getting a million dollars to fight terrorism so that we can make sure that things are safe compared to, say, Pakistan, who is getting $4 million, and then it is even projected in the future they will get $4 million, but Pakistan will get eight, yet they are doing everything they possibly can. It almost puts them in a chicken-and-egg-type situation.

Mr. LYMAN. I do believe we are going to have to commit more resources to countries of Africa, and particularly in those situations of Eastern Africa and the Horn, in the counterterrorism security area. As I mentioned, my understanding is that the resources available for that purpose declined in 2004, and I hope that they can be restored in 2005 to do exactly the things you are mentioning.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Farah, to what extent, in your view, are militant organizations, foreign or domestic, active in Kenya, and what do you believe their influence may be to the Kenyan Muslim community, in particular, and what are the likely consequences, if any, for Kenya's political stability down the road?

Mr. FARAH. Congressman, those are all great questions. Unfortunately, I dealt in West Africa and did very little in East Africa, and I would be, I think, out of my league to try to answer those questions intelligently.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Ambassador, can you answer that?

Mr. LYMAN. I am sorry. Could you repeat that?

Mr. MEEKS. Yes. To what extent, in your view, are militant Islamic organizations present in Kenya, be they domestic or foreign, and what kind of influence are they having to the Muslim community within Kenya, and what will be the long-term effects that these organizations will have to the political stability of Kenya?

Mr. LYMAN. Well, I think what has happened is terrorist elements have found a niche within the Islamic community up and down the east coast of Africa, capitalizing on some historic grievances and feelings of marginalization. It is not the majority, but you do not need majority support to find enough of a niche and a support base to create the kinds of terrorist cells, and then they can be fed from outside by people moving in and out through Somalia, et cetera.

So I think we have to be extremely careful that we do not see the entire Islamic community in that region as extremist or sup-
porting terrorism. But clearly there is a home within that community that terrorists have exploited. Terrorists need that kind of a home in order to be able to plan and execute the kind of bombings that we saw in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and then the attack on the Israeli hotel, and that is unfortunate. That is why the Kenyan government, in fashioning its antiterrorist legislation, had to be very careful to get at the terrorists, but not to inflame the entire Islamic community in those countries, and it is something to which we all have to pay close attention.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ms. Lee?

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like to ask for unanimous consent to insert my opening statement into the record.

Mr. ROYCE. Without objection.

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much.

Good to see you again, Ambassador Lyman.

Let me ask you a question with regard to your assessment that our involvement in Africa should be, in addition to humanitarian, strategic. In many ways, that makes sense, but I guess, on the other hand, strategic, in terms of whose interests? Only the United States interests in terms of the continent and the interests of the country? Whose strategic interests should our strategy focus on?

Mr. LYMAN. Let me give you an example of what I mean. We went through a very difficult set of decisions last year, you will recall, over Liberia, whether the United States should put troops on the ground to help stabilize that situation when the rebels were approaching the capital. In the end, the Administration chose to station troops off-shore and a few on-shore for a while who eventually pulled back. What the President said was our primary interest was getting food and medicine into the country. That has been accomplished; the troops can sail away.

Now, in light of Mr. Farah’s testimony, that is not our only interest. It is an important interest, of course, but our interest in the failed state, Liberia, is much greater than that. It is to recognize that failed states are exploited, and, first of all, the people suffer. What al-Qaeda did in West Africa is hook up with criminal and political elements who, for their own reasons unrelated to al-Qaeda, were destroying those countries. Now, the people suffered the most. Sierra Leone, as you know very well, Congresswoman, I know, what happened in Sierra Leone was brutal and Liberia. So the humanitarian, the political, and the strategic come together.

We have a stake in helping those countries establish sound governments and economic achievement. It is in their benefit. But if you only say our interest is humanitarian, you can say the medicine is there, and we can sail away. What I am saying is that our interests have to be much broader and deeper, and I think that is consistent with the needs of the Africans.

Ms. LEE. Let me give you an example. Based on this, how does one work with an African country to determine what the strategic interests should be?

Mr. LYMAN. Well, let me give you a good example. I mentioned that Chairman Royce, the other day, was speaking to a session on oil in Africa. Now, oil and gas are strategically important to the United States, and the growing importance of West Africa in that regard is in our interest. But it is also in our interest, in a broad
sense, and very much in the Africans' interest, how those resources are used and where we can work with governments on transparency so that everybody knows what is being paid and where that money is going, or, in the case of Chad, to support the special arrangements for overseeing the proceeds of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline. That is an interest that serves us and serves the African people very well. It serves us in the sense that if that money continued to be used as badly as oil money has often been used in the past, not only does it create a bad image for the U.S. in terms of our simply taking out the oil while the people are suffering, but it also creates the kind of instability that works against us as well.

Let me give you another example. Nigeria is important for a lot of reasons. Oil is one. Its role in Africa is another. It is a close ally in many ways. They are going through a very important economic-reform program right now, and I think it is more promising than we have seen for a long time. They have a tremendous debt problem. There are a lot of reasons for not giving debt relief to Nigeria right away. I mean, nine or 10 billion dollars went out the back door a few years ago. People said, you know, why should I give debt relief?

But we have not begun to say enough to the Nigerians, that as they move down this path of transparency, which they are really committed to, that we are prepared to work on their debt. Their debt now takes a third of their revenue every year, and by offering that promise, by saying we are ready to work with you on that, already we are giving encouragement to the reformers, who have a political problem at home with the debt.

So these are ways in which strategic interests and their interests can be brought together in ways that I hope are win-win situations.

Ms. Lee. Thank you very much for that answer.

Let me ask you now with regard to the Clinton Administration, when the Administration retaliated by bombing facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan. Do you agree with the clinics, and I have not followed this much for a few years, but critics of the Clinton Administration that they hit the wrong target, specifically in Sudan?

Mr. Lyman. Well, I know there is a lot of controversy over the adequacy of the intelligence on that, and I am not in a position to judge that intelligence. I do know that because of the controversy over the intelligence, there was more resentment, if you will, about our bombing of Sudan. I happened to be, just after that, leading a United States observer delegation to the nonaligned movement meeting, and what people told me in the corridors was if you had just hit the Taliban in Afghanistan, we would have all cheered, but the fact that you hit Sudan, and it was questionable why you did it, creates a problem for us.

So I think it is again, and we have seen this in larger contexts, when we do something like that, we have to have convincing information, and in that case, many people were not convinced.

Mr. Royce. Thank you very much, Congresswoman.

Mr. Lyman, in your testimony, you mentioned that Islam in sub-Saharan Africa has traditionally been very tolerant, and one of the examples you have given is the election, by an overwhelmingly Muslim Senegal originally, of their first President, Leopold Sedar
Senghor, who is a Christian and took office there, obviously, with a vast preponderance of Muslim votes. The question that I wanted to ask you is if Wahabism, with its Gulf state financing, has started to change the character of some of Islam in that part of the world, the charity financing that we see coming out of the Gulf states. Would you like to comment on that?

Mr. Lyman. I think the battleground is more in Nigeria and East in Sudan, which you have talked about before. Senegal has a very, very strong——

Mr. Royce. Excuse me. I may have been misunderstood because I was giving Senegal as an example from your report, but it is, in fact, Nigeria, where, when Don and I have been in Nigeria, I have had a Nigerian governor and others who are Muslim who have told us, and I will give you the direct quote:

“There is a new mosque across the street from my old mosque. It is 10 times the size with 100 times the budget, and the madrassa is teaching a very different education than the one I received, and some of the young men are wearing Osama bin Laden t-shirts.”

This is what we are hearing on our trips to Nigeria.

Mr. Lyman. I think Nigeria, this battle is going on, this debate is going on, and there is money coming in. It has been coming in actually for a long time, but in the conditions I described in Nigeria, it has become more intense and more worrisome.

Mr. Royce. And why is it so susceptible, in particular?

Mr. Lyman. Well, several reasons. One, I have described the declining economic situation and the decline in law and order in Nigeria, et cetera, but also in the North they have perceived to have lost political power in the last few years. Traditionally, northern Nigeria controlled the military and the government.

In the last few years, you have a born-again-Christian President from the South. He stripped away, for different reasons, many of the senior military who he thought were too much involved in politics. The North perceives itself of having lost its traditional position. Adding to all of the other aspects that I have mentioned, this kind of intense religious competition, if you will, can become a very serious source of concern.

Mr. Royce. Ambassador, there is another question I wanted to ask you and Mr. Farah, and that goes to the question of whether West Africa is being used principally to launder money and hide money or whether it is becoming a rather significant recruiting ground for al-Qaeda, and you can probably tell us better than anyone, Mr. Farah. What is your assessment?

Mr. Farah. As far as I was able to determine while I was there, I do not think al-Qaeda is doing a lot of active recruiting. Their presence in Liberia and to the RUF was specifically through the gentleman I was asked about before, Ibrahim Bah. I think without Bah, that connection may not have been made simply because al-Qaeda was not going to wander into a place and start shopping around for diamonds without knowing someone there that they could trust.

Hizballah, I think, is a different situation. Hizballah, I know, extensively recruits in West Africa, and I know that people send their
children back to get military training. They come back and forth, and that is because of the huge diaspora, almost a quarter of a million just in the tiny west coast there, and that is a much more significant thing right now.

Mr. ROYCE. But that is a little bit of a different issue because, given Hizballah’s religious differences with Shia Islam as opposed to the Wahabi, Sunni version. Is there reason to be concerned about how close their ties are becoming, or are those really two organizations that are not destined to work in cooperation?

Mr. FARAH. Well, I think they are two different organizations and two different structures, but I think if you look, going back to the time of bin Laden in the Sudan, clearly, when Mughniyah, the Hizballah military leader, came over to train them in explosives, there has clearly been a relationship between Hizballah and al-Qaeda that crosses, at least, into the military term. Now, the middle men handling the diamonds going to al-Qaeda were Shiites, and they are closely tied to Hizballah. I think, again, it was much more of a personal relationship, but I think those personal relationships often override their religious differences.

Mr. ROYCE. I appreciate that. I have got time for one more question, and I wanted to ask you—a number of us on this Committee have been involved in the effort to try to track and set up a system on blood diamonds in order to make it more difficult for al-Qaeda to traffick in this particular methodology for moving resources, and I was going to ask you if you thought that the steps that have been taken have helped make it more difficult for them to traffick in blood diamonds.

Mr. FARAH. The Kimberley process primarily?

Mr. ROYCE. The whole Kimberley process.

Mr. FARAH. I think it has added another hurdle to their ability to do things. I think it has made it slightly more than marginally more difficult for them. As you know, if you can get a certification, virtually any country can still send your diamonds, so, as you have probably read elsewhere, you see suddenly the Gambia exporting huge amounts of diamonds, although there are no diamonds in the Gambia. The Central African Republic spikes every time the Democratic Republic of Congo is tamped down a little bit and gets rapped for the diamonds. As long as you can get your diamonds to someplace they can certify them, they can still get into the system.

Is it better than nothing? Certainly. Is it the ultimate solution? No, because it is a business that is driven by large amounts of money and where the profit margins can be significant, especially the early markups from the diamond fields. I am not sure that there are regulatory ways to really make sure that that cannot happen.

Mr. ROYCE. As an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury explained to me the other night on this, he said:

“We have taken a situation where you put a million dollars in diamonds on this end, and it comes out $200,000 on the other end for the terrorist network by the time it gets into Afghanistan or Pakistan or wherever. We have converted that into a situation where now a million dollars on this end, you only get $20,000 on the receiving end.”
In other words, we have made it more and more expensive and more and more difficult for the resources to end up. And he said, you know, for these terrorist operations, maybe it is a half million that it costs to carry out a terrorist operation, and that is one without WMD, but he said, if we begin to talk about the costs of WMD, that is a hugely expensive operation. So what we are actually doing here, besides freezing the accounts, besides putting pressure on the charities not to spend the money, and working with the Gulf states to get them to ratchet that down, but there is one last element of this, and this is this trafficking in blood diamonds and other resources.

If we can choke that off, then it becomes ever more difficult to reach critical mass in terms of having the funding to carry out the truly grand schemes, and that is sort of the end game for us, or should be: Finding ways in Africa and around the world to engage with governments there and make it ever more difficult for the resources to be used because you cannot conduct the recruitment, you cannot sustain the operation, you cannot finance the operation without having these resources.

Mr. Farah, is that sort of your view of our tactical program?

Mr. Farah. I think that the concept is right. I am not convinced myself that we have managed to reduce it from a million going in to $20,000 coming out on the other side, but clearly there has been an impact.

As you look in retrospect now, International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), one of the main charities, was operating in Sierra Leone and the diamond areas throughout the time. The Bank of Credit and Commerce had some of its largest offices in Sierra Leone. We just were not aware of what was going on. We were not paying attention to what was going on there.

I think it helps definitely to raise the cost, but it is information that you cannot get unless you have people out there on the ground gathering information. And I think that the U.S. Ambassador in Sierra Leone actually wrote a cable to the State Department in the summer of 2001 saying, Something is really screwed up on the diamond trade here. Diamond dealers are telling me we cannot buy diamonds. Bad Lebanese, they call them, are buying diamonds. They send people in from Liberia with $500,000 at a time. They buy up the entire thing, and they are paying a premium. We cannot buy diamonds.

Nobody knew what that meant at the time, and what little reporting was done was not paid attention to, which is not surprising, coming out of West Africa at the time. But that would have been detectable as an anomaly that was significant had we been paying attention and had more people out there to be able to deal with the situation.

So I think that that, to me, is the big element missing in working toward a solution, is dedicating the resources to people, not monitoring telephones and watching computer traffic, but people out in the bush gathering information that, when you piece it together, is important.

Mr. Royce. Mr. Farah, thank you for that assessment. I think you are right, and I thank Ambassador Lyman for the same point, and we also want to express our appreciation for both of you gen-
tlemen coming here to testify before us today, and this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Thank you Mr. Chairman for putting this hearing together. The hearing could not have been more timely. The Bush administration has heeded the call to investigate the horrendous attacks of 9/11. The investigations of the 9/11 commission, I believe, will afford us the opportunity to learn lessons that will help us avert such horrible acts from occurring again on our soil. It will also help us in the global war against terror.

Evidence provided by Former Treasury Secretary O’Neil and the Counterterrorism czar Dick Clarke to date have been extremely revealing. That’s why it is refreshing to learn that the National Security Adviser Dr. Condoleezza Rice will testify before the commission in public and under oath. I hope she provides in-depth insight and more clarification to aid the commission’s work.

On the other hand, our efforts at fighting terrorism will come to naught without the support of our allies around the globe including our friends in Africa. One such friend is Kenya. For me personally, I have followed with keen interest the loyalty of Kenya to the cause of the United States. Kenya has stood by and with us to fight the global menace of terrorism. Kenya has been the leader in regional conflict resolution efforts in Somalia and the Sudan. Kenya’s support has been invaluable on many fronts to the extent of losing many of her sons and daughters in the 1998 bombing of our embassy in Nairobi and the 2002 Paradise Hotel bombing in Mombasa.

And sadly because of Kenya’s location, Kenya continues to be a target, in part, because of our presence there. Kenya has done much to thwart the efforts of terrorists. The new government has passed an Anti-terrorism bill, formed an anti terrorist police unit, and created a Task-Force on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism. Kenya has repeatedly called for assistance in helping to develop a viable government in Somalia.

Even so, more is needed to strengthen security, immigration, and port services that allow for terrorists to enter and operate within Kenya. And because ours and other travel bans have weakened Kenya’s tourist industry and overall economy, Kenya cannot do this alone, even with all of its good will.

Much has been made about our $100 million contribution to fighting terror in the region. For Kenya this means a little over $1 million, compared to a $4.2 million contribution for Pakistan. And this trend persists as we look ahead. While requests for 2005 for Kenya are at $4 million, for Pakistan they are at $8 million.

It seems to me that we are not really serious about fighting terrorism in Africa much less Kenya. Kenyans share our suffering. They too have been struck by Al-Qaeda and the potential for terror to strike again in Kenya remains a real threat. Our largest embassy in Africa is there. Yet, our aid to Kenya is simply not enough. Families of loved ones who did not survive the 1998 bombings are still awaiting compensation. We need to do more to assist the Kenyan families of survivors.

We need to move our cooperation with Kenya from the level of words to deeds if we want to see results. Now is the time to do this as Kenya’s decide their Constitution and how their democracy will move forward. I know that a strong relationshipship with a democracy like ours can only strengthen Kenya’s resolve to move in this direction. Kenya deserves America’s support and indeed the support of the international community to make it a model worthy of emulation in the entire region.

APPENDIX

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GREGORY W. MECKS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

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Chairman Royce, Ranking member Payne, thank you for convening this hearing on Terrorism in Africa.

It is very important that we approach the issue of terrorism with a comprehensive and thoughtful strategy that also addresses its root causes. We need a strategy that looks beyond building military bases and air strips, and addresses poverty reduction, development, aid and trade.

In the written testimony of our witnesses, it is implied that many of Africa’s vast and remote areas are governed by weak and insecure governments that are potential breeding grounds for terror groups.

I argue that if Africa has vast and under-developed land, weak governments and security services, it should be our charge as the leaders of the free world to invest in the people, their land, and their governments. Desperate people do desperate things.

This hearing is necessary and welcome. As a proponent of peace and development as the great weapon against terror, I am particularly interested in hearing from Africans on this issue.

In supporting a global war against terror, African governments and particularly victims of terror acts should be compensated fully as partners in the US war against terror as the ranking member mentioned in his opening statement.

Never again should we have victims who are not humanely treated and compensated as we did in 1998’s bombings of the Kenyan and Tanzanian embassy bombings.

Those victims still deserve compensation.

In closing it is my hope that the United States looks not only at building bases, but moreover we should look at building bridges.

Bridges for development, growth, and global respect and mutual trust.

Thank you for this hearing and I look forward to your testimony and the dialogue.