U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY UPDATE

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U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY UPDATE

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2005,

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
AND NONPROLIFERATION,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. ROYCE. The Subcommittee will come to order. Today, the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation is focusing on a U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy Update.

Last month, the Subcommittee heard testimony on the evolving nature of the terrorist threat facing us and how to update the National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Some witnesses characterized al-Qaeda as a movement or an ideology, rather than a formal organization. There was a discussion of preventing terrorists' access to WMD; the importance also of more precisely defining the terrorist threat. We talked about the virtual Caliphate on the Internet and about the imperative of stepping up the struggle for goodwill throughout the Muslim world.

Since that hearing, on October 6, President Bush delivered a major address in which he discussed in detail the ideology behind terrorist acts and described the enemy as he has never described him before. He labeled the enemy with several similar terms, including “Islamic radicalism.” President Bush went on to describe Islamic radicalism as more like, in his words, “a loose network with many branches than an army under a single command, yet these operatives, fighting on scattered battlefields, share a similar ideology and vision for our world.”

I welcome the President's move from the generic “War on Terrorism” to the more specific “Islamic Radicalism,” and I commend the 9–11 Commission's use of “Islamist terrorism” to define the threat, which ranges from Africa to Southeast Asia, from the Middle East to the Caucasus. We have been throughout this region, and this is the key concern put forward by parliamentarians and by heads of state throughout this region.

Language choices impact U.S. policy, but they also impact how the American people perceive the threat facing our Nation. Also of significance since the Subcommittee’s last hearing, is the release of a letter from al-Qaeda's number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, to the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and although we should not rely too heavily on a single source of intelligence, the letter provides in-
sights into al-Qaeda’s strategic goals for the Middle East, as well as the state of al-Qaeda itself. Zawahiri frequently mentions being isolated. He mentions asking for information. He speaks for not knowing what appeared on Al-Jazeera. Indicating further difficulty for al-Qaeda’s leadership, Zawahiri mentions funding problems that they are having.

We are making progress in strangling the al-Qaeda organization, yet its philosophy, unfortunately, continues to breathe freely. I am afraid we have been losing the battle for ideas. Anti-Americanism is rampant. We do, however, know of one area in which we have been able to bolster our image. The humanitarian response to the tsunami in Southeast Asia helped to improve attitudes toward us, toward the United States, throughout that region.

To that end, the tragic earthquake that recently struck South Asia is, frankly, an opportunity in a region critical to our struggle against Islamist terrorism. The U.S. has been a leader in the earthquake relief effort, with an initial $50 million pledge and, of course, critical logistical support. Some with radical agendas are active, too, competing with us for goodwill. Given the long-term struggle we are in, we should make the most of this situation. We can help people, as we should, and change attitudes, but in the long run, we will save lives, too. We will save American lives.

The President’s speech on terrorism made comparisons to the Cold War. That analogy is apt in several ways. As policymakers, we need to be preparing the American people, in my opinion, for a long struggle, yet I sense that the Nation’s concentration is drifting, largely because this is an unconventional war. Indeed, a recurrent theme in radical propaganda is that the West has a short attention span. In Afghanistan, where we see worrying signs, the Taliban likes to say, “The Americans have the watches, but we have got the time.”

This struggle will require a sustained commitment by our country, all elements of national power, and a good measure of creativity. We must fight complacency, for two threats are growing at a worrisome pace: Jihadist ideology seems to be taking hold in many quarters of the globe while WMD knowledge and materials are proliferating. The link of these two are of paramount concern to this Subcommittee. We look forward to hearing from the Administration about this critical challenge, and I will turn to the Ranking Member for any opening comments he may have. Mr. Sherman?

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these hearings. I regret, I was a few minutes late due to a markup in the Financial Services Committee. I want to thank the Ambassador for taking on a very important role. I regret that it took you so long to be appointed and confirmed, but you are there, and I want to thank you for drawing the connection between terrorism on the one hand, and nuclear proliferation on the other.

When I look at this Administration, I see an Administration that believes that stopping terrorism and proliferation is the most important goal except for all of the others, because putting aside what is going on in Iraq, it seems that every time our desire to stop terrorism, put pressure on terrorism, stop nuclear proliferation con-
licts with any other goal, terrorism and nuclear proliferation is pushed off to the side.

A few examples: Our policy toward China. China is investing $70 billion in Iran, and I am sure we have told them we would prefer they don’t. We are willing to invest the money in a postage stamp, but we have a goal of free trade with China. They have access to our markets, a $150 billion trade surplus with us. Have we ever said that our interest in preventing China from investing in Iran and Iranian oil fields, in violation of the objectives of ILSA, et cetera, have we ever said that is more important than cheap tennis shoes? No. Our desire for cheap consumer goods comes first; our desire to put pressure on Iran, second.

When it comes to North Korea, a big, ballyhooed success. Actually, North Korea today is working, unimpared, toward building its eighth, ninth, tenth, or eleventh nuclear bomb. Have we ever said that Chinese subsidies to North Korea have to be turned off for a day or two if they are going to have access to our markets? Of course not, because the goal of protecting Americans comes second to the goal of profits for those who sell consumer goods.

When it comes to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, we passed it here in Congress. What did we do? Japan announces over $2 billion of investment in Iranian oil fields, and the official position of the Administration is, we have no belief that it is happening or no notice that it is happening because our subscription to the Wall Street Journal ran out, because this was published in all of the major financial papers. So our policy toward enforcing the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act is, we absolutely refuse to do it, even if in clear violation of statute, even if a felony is committed in the White House. That is okay because our relationship with Japan and our access to cheap electronic goods and our desire to have free trade, our desire to have American oil companies make profits in Iran comes first. Our interest in stopping terrorism comes second; this at a time when a leading German magazine reports that 25 relatively high members of al-Qaeda are walking the streets in Iran, not under house arrest, but free to plot the next 9/11.

When it comes to our dealings with Russia, we seem to have put stopping the Iranian nuclear program at the bottom of the list. We are going to continue to do business with their space agency because meeting our obligations to the international space program comes first. Stopping a nuclear bomb from being smuggled into the United States from Iran: Secondary in this Administration.

But then sometimes we punish Russia for just being Russia, not in an effort to get them to change nuclear proliferation policy, but just in an effort to carry out our vestigial desire, it seems to me, left over from the Cold War, desire to surround Russia, and so we are financing a pipeline to go around Russia and around Armenia to bring Caspian oil out through Turkey. Why not through Russia? Because of a desire expressed in many different ways in this Administration to deprive Russia of influence in the states of the former Soviet Union. So our goal with Russia seems to be space first, diminishing their influence in their former affiliated states second. And it is hard to see where our policy is toward stopping their cooperation with the Iranian nuclear program since we have not been willing to sacrifice any other goal.
Now, when I say not sacrifice any other goal, our diplomats are willing to pound the table. They work hard. They will work until 3 o’clock in the morning to write strongly-worded statements. I don’t fault them for lack of hard work, dedication, and intestinal fortitude; it is just other than willing to give up the sleep of our diplomats, we are not willing to concede any other issue.

When it comes to our relationship with Egypt, we want a smooth relationship with Egypt. We give them a couple of billion. They go in, and they fight us at the IAEA conference on the issue of whether full fuel cycle is available to formerly nonnuclear states. We don’t even mention it. Why? Because a smooth relationship with Egypt comes first, and stopping nuclear proliferation is a matter as to which we are unwilling to sacrifice any other important issue, even maintaining a smooth relationship with a country that we are giving billions of dollars of aid.

So I look forward in your testimony, Ambassador, to you telling me which corporate profits we are willing to sacrifice in order to achieve our terrorism and nuclear nonproliferation goals, which major goals we are willing to subordinate to the goal of keeping Americans safe from terrorism and especially nuclear terrorism. I compliment you for your effort. You are part of a government that is willing to have you work until 3 o’clock in the morning on your objectives but isn’t willing to sacrifice cheap tennis shoes. I yield back.
summarize your printed report, if you would, Ambassador Crumpton, if you can do that in 5 minutes, and then we will go to our questions. Thank you, sir.

Let me point out that there is a button right there. There you go. Thank you.


Mr. CRUMPTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Sherman and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thanks for the opportunity to testify today. I will summarize my formal written statement and ask that you include my full testimony in the record.

We face a rapidly evolving, global battlefield and a transformative enemy that embraces terrorism in new ways and thus poses unique challenges. For some, terrorism serves to define their political agenda and to provide them identity. For example, al-Qaeda without terrorism is nothing. Hezbollah uses terrorism to achieve political goals such as boosting their power and prestige to win seats in Lebanon’s Parliament. Iran and Syria export terrorism to serve their narrow, selfish national interests. The FARC in Colombia, in concert with narco-traffickers, terrorizes for political and economic gain.

So terrorism not only has various adherents and forms; it may serve various ends. We must understand these differences to formulate and implement more effective and enduring strategies.

To further complicate this challenge, note the shifting terrain upon which this war is waged. Our foes exploit the explosive growth of media and the Internet, as well as the ease of travel and communication around the world. With the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge, terrorists acquire new tactics and new weapons, such as multiple-shaped charges detonated along our convoy routes in Iraq; suicide bombers trigger explosive-laden backpacks in soft target sites in London and Bali, enemy operatives seek to develop expertise in biological and chemical weapons, as revealed in anthrax labs and training manuals seized in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002.

The enemy is also learning to deploy in smaller numbers, in teams or individuals or even remotely, with increased lethality. From an operational perspective, these enemy forces are developing into microtargets with macro impact. The enemy learns and adapts and takes advantage of our modern, progressive, global society. We must learn and adapt also.

In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks 4 years ago, we and our allies have waged an unremitting war against al-Qaeda, its associates, and its supporters. As the President noted in his October 6th speech, in the last 4 years, we have stopped 10 major al-Qaeda attacks, 3 aimed at our Homeland. While we and our international partners have made great strides, we must do more.

In the case of al-Qaeda and affiliates, we confront a loose confederation of extremist networks. According to Australian strategist David Kulcullen, this confederation has many of the characteristics
of a globalized insurgency. Its aim is to overthrow the existing international system and replace it with a radical, totalitarian, pan-Islamic “Caliphate.” Its methods include intelligence collection, analysis, counterintelligence, deception, denial, propaganda, subversion, terrorism, insurgency, and in places like Iraq, open warfare.

So while we speak of “terrorists,” we must focus not only on “terrorism” but, rather, all of the methods our enemy employs. We must also focus on their strategy and attack that as well.

Al-Qaeda gains strategic strength from making local conflicts their own, from aggregating these conflicts, from deploying operatives on a global scale. We must, therefore, cut the links, material and ideological, from al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and prevent al-Qaeda from recruiting more allies. We must cut these links and isolate the enemy. Toward that end, we must cut these ties while we simultaneously attack three strategic objectives: Enemy leadership, enemy safe havens, and the conditions the enemy exploits to advance their cause.

We must engage these strategic targets with all of the instruments of state craft, to include diplomacy, military power, the rule of law, economic power, and intelligence covert action. We must orchestrate these instruments in harmony, for each particular environment, for each specific target. This requires intensive intelligence collection and analysis followed by sharp and quick action. More than ever, the intelligence sensor must be linked to the policy conductor at all levels. This is yet another challenge. We must simultaneously work at four levels: Global, regional, national, and local.

I mentioned Iraq. This is another example where al-Qaeda seeks to claim a local conflict as their own. Al-Qaeda and its allied foreign fighters seek to hijack, transform, and direct local Sunni Baathist insurgents in Iraq. They not only want to defeat the United States and our allies, but also the notion of democracy in the Middle East.

How we define the various enemy forces, cut their links, and isolate them, in partnership with our local allied forces, will be the key to breaking the insurgency. Success in Iraq and all CT conflicts depends upon the success of our partnerships. The State Department, with the cooperation and support of other Federal agencies, works to build the political will and practical capacity of other governments and non-state actors, such as international organizations, to combat terrorism.

As we seek to defend our Homeland and to attack the terrorist enemy, we must also find a way to counter the appeal of violent ideologies, and we are working to develop a comprehensive strategy. As the President noted in his October 6th speech, the most vital work will be done within the Islamic world itself. So we must listen to Muslim reformers, to Muslim allies, and support their efforts to bring forth Islamic democracy as in Iraq.

Finally, we must provide a more effective policy context at all levels to enable these operators and implementers to orchestrate the instruments of statecraft. We must engage the enemy, especially its leadership, with unrelenting vigor. We must deny the enemy safe haven. We must address the broader conditions that
terrorists exploit, providing viable, attractive alternatives to the disaffected. Toward that end, we must continue to build international partnerships.

All of this will take time. All of this will require the kind of sustained, determined, focused effort that will last as long as required. We must steel ourselves for a long, hard, and complex war. But we have done this before, and we have won. We will do so again. The American people expect no less.

Thank you. I welcome your questions and your comments.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crumpton follows:]


Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Sherman, Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee: thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I will summarize my formal written statement and ask that you include my full testimony in the record.

Since 1776 the United States has often waged war against tyranny and terror. Sadly, throughout the last couple of centuries terror has been an enduring tactic employed by our enemies. In this modern era we face a rapidly evolving global battlefield and a transformative enemy that embraces terrorism in new ways, and thus poses unique challenges. Certainly, globalization, modernization, and the development of democracy and free markets afford us many wonderful opportunities for peace and prosperity. Yet, this globalization dynamic imposes political and cultural stress, and reactionary forces exploit this stress and employ terrorism as a means and, sometimes, as an end. For some, terrorism serves to define their political agenda and to provide them identity. Al-Qaida, without terrorism, is nothing. Hizballah uses terrorism to achieve political goals, such as boosting their power and prestige to win seats in Lebanon’s parliament. Iran and Syria export terrorism to serve their narrow, selfish national interests. The FARC in Colombia, in concert with narco-traffickers, terrorizes for political and economic gain. So, terrorism not only has various adherents and forms, it may serve various ends. We must understand these differences, to formulate and implement more effective and enduring strategies.

To further complicate this challenge, note the shifting terrain upon which this war is waged. Our foes exploit the explosive growth of media and the internet, as well as the ease of travel and communication around the world. These advancements have made possible the rapid movement of operatives, expertise, money, and explosives. Terrorists no longer depend on personal contact to plan, organize and conduct their attacks: they use the media and the internet to advance key messages, rally support, share experiences, recruit, train, and spread fear.

With the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge, terrorists acquire new tactics and new weapons, such as multiple shaped charges detonated along our convoy routes in Iraq. Suicide bombers trigger explosive-laden backpacks in soft target sites, in London and Bali. Enemy operatives seek to develop expertise in biological and chemical weapons, as revealed in anthrax labs and training manuals seized in Afghanistan in 2001–2002.

The enemy is also learning to deploy in smaller numbers, in teams or individuals or even remotely—with increased lethality. From an operational perspective, these enemy forces are developing into micro targets with macro impact. This trend is challenging our notion of warfare, operationally, legally, politically, and even philosophically.

The enemy learns and adapts, and takes advantage of our modern, progressive, and global society. We must learn and adapt, also.

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks four years ago, we and our allies have waged an unremitting war against al-Qaida, its associates and its supporters. We have been on the offensive, and taken the fight to the enemy in a campaign of direct and continuous action that has degraded the ranks of al-Qaida’s leaders and operatives; constricted the space that terrorists operate in and transit through; and choked the enemy’s lifeblood by cutting off key funding channels and sources. These offensive measures continue to bolster the security of the United States and its citizens and interests abroad. As the President noted in his 6 October speech, in the last four years, we have stopped ten major al-Qaida attacks, three aimed at our homeland.

While we and our international partners have made great strides, we must do more.
In the case of al-Qaida and affiliates, we confront a loose confederation of extremist networks targeting the United States, its allies and interests, and the broader international system. According to Australian strategist David Kilcullen, this confederation has many of the characteristics of a globalized insurgency. Its aim is to overthrow the existing international system and replace it with a radical, totalitarian pan-Islamic “Caliphate.” Its methods include intelligence collection, analysis, counterintelligence, deception, denial, propaganda, subversion, terrorism, insurgency and open warfare. So, while we speak of “terrorists” we must focus not only on “terrorism,” but rather on all the methods they employ. We must also focus on their strategy, and attack that as well.

Al-Qaida gains strategic strength from making local conflicts their own, from aggregating these conflicts, from deploying operatives on a global scale. We must, therefore, cut the links, material and ideological, from al-Qaida and its affiliates and prevent al-Qaida from recruiting more allies. We must cut these links and isolate the enemy. These links include ideology, finances, intelligence, communication, cultural affiliation, training, and other support infrastructure. Toward that end, we must cut these ties while we simultaneously attack three strategic objectives:

- **Enemy leadership;**
- **Enemy safe havens, which include**
  - geographic space, such as state sponsors of terrorism, failing states, ungoverned areas where terrorists can train and organize;
  - cyberspace, which provides internet-based means for communication, planning, resource transfer and intelligence collection; and
  - ideological space, which includes belief systems and cultural norms that enhance the enemy’s freedom of action;
- **The conditions the enemy exploits to advance their cause—local groups, grievances, communal conflicts and societal structures that may provide fertile soil in which extremism flourishes.**

As the President stressed in the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, we must engage these strategic targets with all instruments of statecraft, to include diplomacy, military power, the rule of law, economic power, and intelligence/covert action. We must orchestrate these instruments, in harmony for each particular environment, for each specific target. This requires intensive intelligence collection and analysis, followed by sharp and quick action. More than ever, the intelligence sensor must be linked to policy conductor, at all levels.

This is yet another challenge in this global war, the challenge of multiple level operations. We must simultaneously work at four levels: global, regional, national, and local. This is where we can break the links that al-Qaida seeks to forge. Breaking these links helps eradicate or diminish enemy safe haven, usually in border areas which confounds operations based exclusively on national level operations. This is also how to attend to the local conditions that the terrorist seek to exploit; deny them disenfranchised and angry young men as recruits, and deny them the operatives for terrorist attacks.

This is not just an academic outline, but a viable operational method that has worked. In Afghanistan in 2001–2002, the United States placed an emphasis on local, national, regional, and global conditions, on fracturing enemy forces, on employing all instruments of statecraft, and on providing hope and opportunity for the dispossessed. In Southeast Asia, from where I have just returned, the rapid US response to the tsunami in Sumatra helped accelerate a peace accord in Aceh. The strong regional leadership of the Malaysian government may forge a peace accord between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, perhaps helping to deny safe haven in Mindanao for JI operatives that threaten Indonesia and the region. And, in southern Thailand, a local conflict must be addressed, before al-Qaida and affiliates can exploit to their own ends.

There is another example where al-Qaida seeks to claim a local conflict as their own: Iraq. Al-Qaida and its allied foreign fighters seek to hijack, transform, and direct local, Sunni, Baathist insurgents in Iraq. They view Iraq as a training ground and indoctrination center for Islamic extremists from around the world. They not only want to defeat the US and our Iraqi allies, but also the notion of democracy in the Middle East. The enemy is recruiting, especially from countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Networks endeavoring to funnel would-be combatants to Iraq have been disrupted in several European countries. In the near future, some of these battle-hardened fighters from Iraq could return to their home countries or our own, exacerbating domestic conflicts or providing new skills and experience to existing extremist networks in the communities to which they return. Iraq, therefore,
presents local, national, regional, and global consequences and opportunities, for the enemy and for us.

How we define the various enemy forces, cut their links, and isolate them, in partnership with our local allied forces, will be the key to breaking the insurgency. In addition, as Secretary Rice said when she testified before your counterparts in the Senate (October 19), we and the Iraqi government will succeed when we:

- Keep Iraq from becoming a safe haven from which Islamic extremists can terrorize the region or the world.
- Demonstrate positive potential for democratic change and free expression in the Arab and Muslim world, even under the most difficult conditions.
- Turn the corner financially and economically, so there is a sense of hope and a visible path toward self-reliance.

Success in Iraq and all counterterrorism conflicts depends upon the success of our partnerships. The State Department, with the cooperation and support of other Federal agencies, works to build the political will and practical capacity of other governments and non-state actors, such as international organizations, to combat terrorism. We have intensified old relationships and built new ones with foreign militaries, intelligence services, law enforcement authorities, foreign ministries, and banking officials to advance our common counterterrorism goals. We are working with foreign civic groups, provincial officials, tribal authorities, business leaders, educators, and a growing array of private sector partners who have vested interests in political stability, liberal institutions such as free markets, and democracy.

We have sought to focus the resources and abilities of a wide variety of multilateral organizations to build a seamless global counterterrorism web. Immediately after 9/11 we pressed the UN to set new, higher international standards for combating terrorism. We have worked to encourage all countries to ratify and implement the existing international conventions and protocols on counterterrorism. President Bush signed the UN Nuclear Terrorism Convention on September 14, the first day it was open for signature. We are working closely with our allies to secure final agreement on a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism which will close additional gaps in international law. We are coordinating with allies who have the ability to provide assistance—such as the EU and the G-8—to build will and capacity to combat terrorism around the globe.

We ask, encourage, and when necessary pressure other governments to counter existing threats within their borders or to prevent a terrorist problem from taking hold. If these foreign governments do not have the means, we coordinate the resources of the State Department, the Intelligence Community, DOD, the Justice Department, the FBI, Treasury, Homeland Security, and other agencies to provide the tools and training required. Because of the US government’s collective efforts, our foreign partners have successfully identified and interdicted terrorist groups, passed legislation to criminalize terrorism and terrorist finance that meets international standards, and improved their ability to enforce those laws and prosecute those who violate them. And, our partners are teaching us about the nature of the enemy, about the conditions they exploit, and about the benefits of such partnerships.

As we seek to defend our homeland and to attack the terrorist enemy, we must also find a way to counter the appeal of violent ideologies. Similar to the Cold War, we must understand the social and political conditions that terrorists exploit, and address these conditions while we simultaneously engage the enemy directly. We and our allies must convince these exploited populations that alternatives of prosperity, freedom, and hope are possible. Ultimately, we will beat al-Qaida’s hateful intentions and twisted ideology by deploying our most powerful weapon: the ideals and values upon which this great country was founded. These ideals and values, however, should not be imposed, but rather we must create the political space for others to establish their own brand of liberal institutions and democracies, to suit their needs.

We are working to develop a comprehensive strategy to de-legitimize terrorism and to encourage efforts by the majority of Muslims who reject violent extremism. As the President noted in his 6 October speech, “the most vital work will be done within the Islamic world, itself.” In his excellent book “No god but God,” Reza Aslan notes that it will take many years to defeat those “who have replaced Muhammad’s original version of tolerance and unity with their own ideals of hatred and discord.” But, he adds, that “the cleansing is inevitable, and the tide of reform cannot be stopped. The Islamic Reformation is already here.” So we must listen to Muslim reformers and support their efforts to bring forth Islamic democracy, as in Iraq.
We are not only broadening our partnerships in the Islamic world, but refining our public diplomacy, becoming more effective in countering extremist propaganda, and advancing our broader strategy in concrete ways. Specifically,

- The President has launched a new effort to promote freedom and democracy. In a September 19 address to the United States Institute of Peace, the President's Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Frances Townsend underscored the President's freedom agenda and its importance in our counterterrorism strategy.
- The US will further encourage economic prosperity based on free market and free trade principles.
- The US will support international educational reform that demands intellectual integrity and tolerance, and prepares young people to compete in an international economy, as an alternative to systems that promote ignorance, fear, and paranoia.
- The US will advocate women's rights. One half of the world's population needs not only a voice, but a leadership role in all countries.
- The US will work bilaterally and multilaterally to address local and regional conflicts that global terrorists seek to exploit.

So, we must provide a more effective policy context, at all levels, to enable those operators and implementers to orchestrate the instruments of statecraft. We must engage the enemy, especially its leadership, with unrelenting vigor. We must deny the enemy safe haven. We must address the broader conditions that terrorists exploit, providing viable, attractive alternatives to the disaffected. Toward that end, we must continue to build international partnerships. All of this will take time; all of this will require the kind of sustained, determined, focused effort that will last as long as required. We must steel ourselves for a long, hard, and complex war. But we've done this before, and we have won. We will do so again. The American people expect no less.

Thank you. I welcome your questions or comments.

Mr. Royce. Thank you very much, Ambassador Crumpton. Let me start with something noted by the 9–11 Commission. They said: "It is, therefore, crucial to find a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing the exercise of imagination."

Speaking of imagination, you were warning about Afghanistan before 9/11—so was I, and yet for a variety of reasons, you weren't heard on that subject. Are we hearing disparate voices today, and are we moving forward with that bureaucratizing of imagination and unfashionable views? I wanted to ask you that, and I wanted to ask you, in your opinion, what threats are we not paying sufficient attention to, like we weren't with respect to what was underway in Afghanistan at the time with the militancy of al-Qaeda and the Taliban?

Mr. Crumpton. Yes, sir. I think there is a need for greater investment in intellectual capital in the CT policy arena. I think that we need to work more closely with the private sector, with universities, with think tanks, and not only here in the U.S. but around the world. I think one example of that is Global Trends 2020. It was a publication issued by the National Intelligence Council where they reached out to the global private sector. I think this is what will help us sustain a more focused effort, a more creative effort, as you mentioned.

I also think that as we continue to assign different officers from different parts of the Executive into CT bureaucracies, this cross-fertilization breeds creativity. I had the great honor to serve in the FBI for a year, from 1998 to 1999, and I learned a lot there. The Department of State reaches out to other agencies, and we also detail our people to them. This is the type of creativity that I think
is what you are talking about and will lead to greater depth and flexibility in our strategy.

Mr. ROYCE. Building on that, Ambassador, what areas do you think we should be looking at in this Subcommittee?

Mr. CRUMPTON. I think that WMD, as Mr. Sherman noted, is going to be an increasing challenge, specifically, bioterrorism. Nuclear, as horrible as the prospects may be, for the most part, we are able to know where highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is located, we are able to work through current infrastructure and work with allied governments and work through a variety of mechanisms, but, frankly, what concerns me as much, in fact, is the bio threat. A lot of that is rooted in the nature of the threat. Laboratories can be established in very small areas. It is a more difficult intelligence target, and in terms of working across various governments, it also brings us new challenges.

Mr. ROYCE. You have seen some considerable evidence on this front in terms of these attempts, and that is something you feel we should be looking at. Let me ask you, are you satisfied with the efforts on the part of the international community, on the part of the United States at this point? Or does more need to be done to monitor and to increase human intelligence with respect to bioterrorism?

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. I think more needs to be done across the board.

Mr. ROYCE. Much has been made about the porous entryways into the United States. Coming from a border State, I know just how porous those borders are, and I have often said that border security must be a pillar of our national security policy. I think that is amplified by our CIA director, who is also concerned about a device coming across that border.

From a counterterrorism approach, what more can be done on that front, and how close is your interaction with other government agencies on this specific issue of the potential of WMD moving across that border?

Mr. CRUMPTON. I think that borders are difficult, if not impossible, to seal, especially in the type of globalized environment in which we live and on which we depend. I think we can continue to work toward greater defensive measures, including the use of technology, but I also think that, perhaps even more importantly, intelligence must be used where we can deploy our finite resources, intelligence that tells us where the greatest threats are and which border points they are trying to use.

Regarding our interaction with other government agencies, it is close and growing closer. As an example, in my office, we have just welcomed a detailee from TSA, and we hope to have more. Also, we work closely in our agency with the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and others.

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you one last question. Yesterday, Iran's President declared that “Israel must be wiped off the map,” to use his words yesterday, and this came as Islamic Jihad, which is a group allied to Iran, killed at least five Israelis with a suicide bombing in Hadera. In your opinion, is a new terror offense against Israel underway?
Mr. CRUMPTON. I think it is a continuation of a terrorist offensive against Israel that has been going on for years. I think that the comment by the Iranian leadership is not surprising. It is something that they have maintained, and it just underscores why we believe that Iran is the number-one state sponsor of terrorism in the world today and why they pose such a threat.

Mr. ROYCE. Well, with the election of this new head of state and with his choice of words, it does seem to me to ratchet up the rhetoric over what we have heard in the past.

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. The rhetoric may have increased, but from what we have seen, both their intentions and their capabilities and their actions continue to pose a threat and have been for years since they killed our Marines in Beirut in 1983.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador Crumpton. We will go to Mr. Sherman now for his questions.

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Ambassador, the question I kind of previewed in my opening statement is, can you identify when the Administration has sacrificed an important public policy goal in order to achieve some more important antiterrorist or antiproliferation goal? Have you lost every bureaucratic fight in the State Department or in the Administration? When I say “you,” I don’t mean you personally so much as those who believe that stopping proliferation and terrorism should be our highest goal.

Mr. CRUMPTON. Well, Mr. Sherman, I believe that the Administration has placed CT and CP at the top of their agenda, and I think that has been demonstrated by the resources allocated to these efforts. I can certainly speak to counterterrorism in terms of the reform, both legislative and within the——

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Ambassador, with all due respect, I know we have put in the hard work, I know we have put in the resources, but, for example, we have to decide whether we want our oil companies to do business with Iran through their foreign subsidiaries. Were you even involved in any discussions as to whether our antiterrorism efforts would be more important than the profits that these oil companies and oil service companies can make by doing business with Iran and their foreign subsidiaries? Have you been involved in discussions like that?

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. I have been involved in discussions about Iran policy with the White House——

Mr. SHERMAN. But as far as our companies making profits, have you been in a meeting where you could have said, “To hell with whether this or that company is making a profit; they are just going to have to stop doing business in Iraq.”?

Mr. CRUMPTON. I have not been in a meeting where we have discussed multinational profits in Iran.

Mr. SHERMAN. Which basically means that in making the decision—in effect, by not making it, the voice of counterterrorism is not even heard on the decision, or perhaps the nondecision, to act, or in this case, clearly, not act, against American oil companies doing business in Iran.

What about the decision to ignore Japanese investment in Iranian oil fields? Were you given the opportunity to present the case
that we should raise that to the highest level and impose sanctions?

Mr. CRUMPTON. Mr. Sherman, we are evaluating CT and CP policy every day. We look at all of the aspects of national power, and we look to multinational partners, both in the public and the private sector——

Mr. SHERMAN. So far, you haven't been able to do that.

Mr. CRUMPTON [continuing]. That will help us when we look at issues like Iran, state sponsors like Iran.

Mr. SHERMAN. So far, although you have evaluated what we should do, you have never been given the opportunity in the highest councils to say, “Stop ignoring Japanese investment in Iranian oil fields.” Is there any time when you have advocated doing something specific and immediate that would adversely affect the profits of any corporation?

Mr. CRUMPTON. Sir, I have advocated, for many years, CT operations, CT policies, irrespective to the profit motive of any corporation, American or otherwise. As far as I know, sir, I have never been in any discussion where we have considered the profit of an American company in our policy deliberations because the CT effort is paramount. It far outweighs corporate interests. For you to imply that corporate profits somehow outweigh the lives of Americans, I reject that, and, frankly, I find it insulting.

Mr. SHERMAN. It is just coincidence, and I am sure you personally are not concerned with these profits. I just don't think they give you any power at all to do anything that would even allow you to advocate any action that would adversely affect the profits of any corporation, domestic or foreign, which is why I asked you: Have you ever advocated a specific policy which would adversely affect—I know you are going to tell me that you have never tried to protect the profits of these foreign corporations or these domestic corporations or these international corporations—but have you ever advocated a policy that would adversely affect the profits of any corporation? Any example you can give us.

Mr. CRUMPTON. Our policies are made to protect American lives and American interests irrespective of the profits of any corporation, American or otherwise.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Ambassador, you are simply repeating yourself, and I am given a limited amount of time by this Subcommittee. What you are saying is, you cannot name an instance but that you believe that your effective advocacy of CT policy has never conflicted with an identified corporate interest.

On the other hand, I identified such things as putting pressure on China and threatening their access to United States markets and a whole list of others in my opening statement where we could have taken action adverse to the interest of corporate profits that could have, and you can argue both ways—I am not saying that the ideas I threw out were trouble free, but even in my opening statement I identify several CT policies that would have adversely affected corporate profits.

And you do this full time, and while you are not a protector of corporate profits, it just so happens none of the policies that this Administration has even considered would adversely affect the corporate profits of any corporation. And maybe that is just a coinci-
dence because maybe there is never a possible counterterrorism or counterproliferation policy that adversely affects corporate profits, or maybe it is just that this Administration has put all of those possible policies off the table.

Mr. CRUMPTON. Mr. Sherman, I disagree. We have sanctions on Libya, on Sudan, on Iran that deny United States corporations economic opportunity, and there are other examples also.

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, those have been imposed by Congress, and I yield back.

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I think this Administration has put comprehensive sanctions on Sudan. The consequence, by the way, of those policies, of course, is that the major player in Sudan today is the government-owned oil company in China who is the major beneficiary. Now, myself and Mr. Tancredo and others have helped and assisted with driving that policy and have backed the Administration on this, but I think it does indicate some of the complexities with the fact that there certainly is no United States presence of any corporation in Sudan. We have got sanctions certainly that the Administration has enforced across the board.

I think it is interesting that a consequence of this is now that most Sudanese oil goes to China. Perhaps it explains some of the deeper consequences, the unforeseen consequences, of that particular approach, and I just wanted to point that out.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to oversimplify policy. Sanctions are never trouble free, and no absolutist statement that I might make for rhetorical flourish would fail to have an exception, and, in fact, we have not allowed our oil companies to do business in Sudan; on the other hand, we have not even mentioned the possibility of interrupting Chinese exports to the United States if China doesn't cooperate with us on the issue of Sudan.

Mr. ROYCE. And I grant you, we haven't sanctioned Japan. We haven't closed off trade with Japan, as you have raised that point, but as I mentioned, there are some side effects to such policies as to——

Mr. SHERMAN. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act would apply to only one Japanese company, not to the entire country.

Mr. ROYCE. Let me go to Mr. Tancredo.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Crumpton, there is a book, if you have not had the opportunity to review, I would suggest that you do so. I found it really quite compelling. It is called Infiltration, by a gentleman by the name of Paul Sperry, and among the things that he brings out is the significant threat posed by the proliferation of Wahhabi-connected mosques in the United States, all funded by the Saudis. Many of them not too far from where we sit, by the way, identified as perhaps some of the most radical, are being led by people who are the most radical members of the Wahhabi sect, and certainly the kind of religious perspective that they hold presents, I think, to many people a significant concern.

Not only is it a concern about what is being said in these mosques and what is being said in the schools that are supported all around the world by Saudis, but the effect of that. Where do we go from there? Are these people who come out of these mosques
and out of these schools already primed and ready to go in terms of enlistment into radical organizations?

And the question, of course, becomes one of, what can we do about this? What are our options? If we know that there is a concerted effort, because certainly there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that there is a concerted effort on the part of the Saudis, to—I will use the title of the book—to infiltrate Wahhabism and radical Islamic ideology into the United States, thereby helping to recruit terrorists here. And based on the fact that these mosques would certainly, if ever challenged about this, would certainly raise the issue of religious freedom, freedom of expression, and freedom of association, what is it we can do about what I consider to be a very, very serious and insidious sort of phenomenon that has all the earmarks, it seems to me, of infiltration?

Mr. CRUMPTON. I was in Saudi Arabia last month, meeting with our Saudi partners. We had wide-ranging discussions, including the question of ideology and including the question of Saudi money. They have made some progress. They have established a financial intelligence unit to track funding. I have asked them also about the ability to track the money from the charitable organizations. They need to do more in that regard. I expressed my disappointment that they have not yet established a commission to overlook these charitable organizations and determine where this funding is going.

You raised a good question about whether this is religion. Is it freedom of religion, or is it something else? Is it perhaps a competing political ideology? This is something that we have discussed with the Saudis, and we need to engage them further.

I think the Saudis have realized, since May 2003, that they have a problem, certainly inside their borders, and they have taken action inside their borders. In fact, when I was there, some of their security forces were engaged in a fire fight, and some of their men lost their lives.

The question that you ask is beyond the Saudi borders. Specifically, here in the United States, what are the Saudis doing about this? They know that we have concerns. I have raised it with them, and we will continue to engage with them and work with them to make sure that this radical ideology does not take hold and does not spread.

I am encouraged by the Riyadh declaration earlier this year when the Saudi Government made some public comments about the need for moderation, about the need to have a more pluralistic view. They have taken some small steps toward reform within their government, within their borders, and I hope that will also follow in terms of their reform of their efforts beyond their borders.

Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Ambassador, I must tell you that although I do not share the Ranking Member’s enormous concern about what he paints as sort of a corporate headquarters inside the State Department, I must also tell you that with regard to Saudi Arabia, it does seem to me that we have a reluctance to do anything beyond, as you have said and others in front of us at this Committee have said, and that is raise objections.

We have talked with them. We have told them about our concerns, but this, it seems to me, has not had even the slightest effect
on what they are doing in terms of their support of these Wahhabi mosques and of madrassahs around the world, and specifically in the United States. Again, it just appears this way, and I am looking for any correction you may want to give me in terms of the way we are viewing it, but it appears that the more pressure that is put on them by Islamic radicals inside their own kingdom, the more they simply respond by saying, “Look, we are going to crack down on you here, and we are going to give you an open checkbook essentially. Go away and do this somewhere else, and we will allow you to do that. We will fund it as long as you sort of leave us alone, leave the ruling family intact, and stop this sort of insurgency—a little, tiny insurgency, maybe you could call it—inside Saudi Arabia.”

It is certainly not just here, but it is in Washington, DC. It is certainly in the areas around Detroit, an area where there are huge concentrations of Muslims in a Muslim community, and there are these enormous advantages that they have because they have both the money, and they use our laws and the freedoms of the United States to advance their very nefarious purposes. And it just seems to me that we have to have some strategy to deal with that, even if it is not politically correct. It is a very dangerous situation we face here. Again, get the book. It is very unsettling, I will tell you. I would just love to know that we have some counterintelligence operation that is designed to deal specifically with that particular problem: The Saudis’ funding of mosques, the funding of these schools in the United States.

Mr. CRUMPTON. Sir, the Saudis have taken some steps. As I noted, they have started a financial intelligence unit. They are sharing information with us. They have reduced some support. They are looking at changing the curriculum and their books. They have changed some of the curriculum, but they still have a long way to go, and we have expressed that to them. We will be following up with a meeting in the first week of December with our Saudi counterparts to continue this discussion and to move forward on our strategy with them.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Cardoza of California.

Mr. CARDOZA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the hearing, and welcome, Mr. Ambassador. At the beginning, I want to also say, Mr. Chairman, that I want to thank you for your amendment yesterday on the Floor. It was one that the country needed. I wish we had gotten more votes.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Cardoza.

Mr. CARDOZA. The Chairman issued a memorandum to the Members of the Committee, and on page 10 it has a table that outlines—have you seen this, Mr. Crumpton?—it outlines the number of foreign fighters that we have captured in Iraq since April 2005, and it lists the number as 312, and then it goes on to list the different countries that these foreign fighters have allegedly emanated from.

The Administration, in the past, has said numerous times that the foreign fighter situation was driving the insurgency in Iraq. Is that your feeling at this time?

Mr. CRUMPTON. I think there are many reasons for the insurgency in Iraq. I don’t think we can say it is simply the foreign
fighter. They are a minority there. I think General Abizaid has talked about that. As I noted in my opening statement——

Mr. CARDOZA. I am sorry I missed that. I apologize.

Mr. CRUMPTON. The foreign fighters seek to hijack the insurgency, to claim it as their own, and to exploit the insurgency and exploit those conditions in Iraq for their own unique political ends. We are encouraged by the recent democratic institutions that are forming in Iraq, by the turnout for the referendum. We are very positive about where Iraq is going to go, although we know it is going to take a long time. There have been many bumps in the road.

What is critical is that these nascent, liberal institutions gain traction and that we keep them afloat, and we keep them moving in the right direction because that is the last thing that foreign fighters and al-Qaeda want. They fear democracy. They fear success in Iraq. As noted earlier, I think the letter to Zarqawi underscores their fear of our success in Iraq.

Mr. CARDOZA. I would agree with you on several points. I am not sure I agree with you on the ultimate outcome yet because I think that is still in the balance, and I think we have to be vigilant to make sure it goes in the right direction. That is why I am asking the questions today.

Have you had an opportunity, sir, to review any of the work and the literature by Ken Pollock of the Brookings Institute, any of the editorials he has written for the *New York Times*?

Mr. CRUMPTON. I have read some of his articles and columns but, frankly, not recently.

Mr. CARDOZA. Okay. Well, he talks about a counterinsurgency strategy that he believes, in my conversations with him, that the British did very well as they finally learned to overcome the terrorism in northern Ireland. He talks about it as being an “ink spot strategy” where you develop a concentration of security and let that security spread and show people the path. In fact, I subscribe to the fact that we should be doing more of that in Iraq and that the Administration’s strategy has been one of more general political strategy and not securing economic stability. There are less hours of electricity produced in the country now than there was under Saddam. We have all heard the statistics.

I will not belabor that, but I would suggest that the Administration take a look at some of these strategies of concentration in different parts of the country that are more stable, showing the path to the Iraqi people that they have a better future through stability than through terrorism. I believe it is not necessarily driven by foreign fighters. I do agree with your assessment that they take advantage of the situation.

I also wanted to mention that I agree with Mr. Tancredo. I think his two points on the Saudis and the Wahhabi problem are of grave danger to this country and are in direct confrontation with the goals that you have talked about as far as the counterterrorism strategy.

I have one final question that I am concerned about. In my community, several months ago, when I first came to Congress about 2½ years ago, my local sheriff mentioned to me that drug money had been funneled back. There was a bust where $5 million of drug
money had been—I think Hezbollah was the terrorist organization that he thought the drug money went back to, the sale of the drugs, the smuggling. And I am very concerned about this link with drug cartels to terrorism, and wonder if you are seeing any of that in any other areas of the country, if you are seeing a growing link between drug lords and narcotics trafficking and terrorism, terrorist organizations.

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. If I may first comment on your point about Saudi Arabia and then address your question. There is an excellent book called No God But God, and the thesis is that there is an ongoing Islamic reformation, really revolution. There is great debate, great conflict, within the Muslim world right now, and Saudi Arabia is a part of this. We need to find ways to encourage those moderate voices that believe in an Islamic democracy as we are trying to see established in Iraq.

This is a complex issue. It is going to take a long time, but in the end, I have no doubt that moderate Islam will prevail.

Your question about drug money and terrorism, the nexus; there is a nexus. If you look at opium production in Afghanistan, clearly some of the Taliban have profited from that. Colombia; and, again, I mentioned this in my opening statement, the alliance between the narco-traffickers and the FARC in Colombia, in particular, is another example. It is a problem, and I think it underscores how non-state actors, including narco-traffickers, are a threat to this Nation and our people.

Mr. CARDOZA. Mr. Chairman, if I could have just a moment more to ask a follow-up.

My concern about the link between drugs and terrorists is not just the fact that they are funding their organizations through this, but they also have the supply mechanisms to be able to smuggle into our country very dangerous materials that could be used in terrorist attacks domestically, and that is one of the reasons why I raised the question. And I would like to have any comments that you might be able to share with the Committee on that topic.

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. I share your concerns. It underscores the need for the intelligence that will point us to the right people, to the right places where they are trying to infiltrate. It is not only narcotics; it is human smuggling, another area of concern. We have a long way to go, sir, in determining all of those routes and all of those networks.

Mr. CARDOZA. Sir, we have been less than successful in the fight against drugs, and I am very concerned that it is just an open pathway into our Nation to smuggle very dangerous materials into this country.

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROYCE. We will go to Mr. McCaul of Texas.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have three questions, and I will try to get through those as quickly as possible.

I am reading a book called Ghost Wars that won the Pulitzer Prize. You have probably read it yourself. It is very insightful about the CIA's involvement in Afghanistan. The year 1979 was a pivotal year. You had the shah in Iran overthrown, the Islamic revolution, and then you also had the Sunni Arabs forming the mujahadeen in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets.
Just in reference to the Ranking Member’s comment, the Clinton Administration advocated the interests of Unocal and Afghanistan when the Taliban was coming to power. But I want to focus on three areas.

One is human intelligence. What you get in reading the book is that we shifted away from human intelligence in the nineties and started to rely more on the electronic. Where are we today? What is the state of our human intelligence capabilities?

Number two: With Iran raising its head again and its alliance in our own hemisphere with people like President Chavez in Venezuela, who has also aligned himself with Fidel Castro, it seems to me it is bringing the threat of Islamic terrorism into our own hemisphere. Can you comment, if you can in an open hearing, on the current threat in our own hemisphere from Latin America penetrating our own porous borders and causing us harm?

And then, finally, I had a trip with the Homeland Security Committee. We visited with King Abdullah in Jordan, and I had a glimmer of hope in terms of changing the ideology in terms of he said he had met with the council of the top 12 Imams in the region and was attempting to get them to issue fatwas, or religious edicts, condemning this extreme interpretation of jihad and the Islamic faith. That gave me just a glimmer of hope that perhaps by changing within their own religion with these fatwas, which are laws, that we have some hope of, as you predicted, the moderate Muslim world prevailing.

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. Thank you. Your first question: What is the state of human intelligence? I agree with your assessment of human intelligence in 1990. At one point, I think the CIA only brought in about a dozen people for a training class in the year. The funding was cut. Resources were down to the bare bones. That takes a long time to rebuild.

Importantly, there is great interest in service within the intelligence community. I think, last year, perhaps the year before, more than 130,000 Americans applied for employment with the CIA. The CIA has gone to great extremes, thanks to the generosity of Congress, to bring in more people, and I, unfortunately, will not be able to go into detail in this particular forum, but I am encouraged by their recruitment efforts and by their training. I am also encouraged by the performance of those officers overseas in such harsh places as Afghanistan and Iraq.

I might also note that the human intelligence partnership with our military special operations forces is closer than ever, and I think that it is going to continue to be a requirement for us to succeed in this war. Sir, I would be glad to speak with you in a private session, if you wish, about the state of human intelligence.

Mr. McCaul. Thank you.

Mr. CRUMPTON. Your second question about Islamic terrorism in our own hemisphere; this goes back to some of the earlier questions about the nexus between terrorism and organized crime, whether it be narcotics trafficking or human smuggling. It is a concern.

When you look at the Caribbean, when you look at some of the Islamic movements in the Caribbean as a concern, when you look at the number of special-interest aliens, many from the Middle East, that cross from Mexico into your home state; those are large
numbers. When you look at the presence of Hezbollah fund-raising organizations in various parts of Latin America, there has, for many years, been a problem in the tri-border area. It is a real issue. It is a real concern.

We are working diligently with our partners there in South America and Central America and also with the Organization of American States. There is a focus on counterterrorism. We are working very closely with the Department of Homeland Security in working the borders.

I should emphasize this. The Department of Homeland Security, relatively new, is taking great strides in the right direction. Now, I believe there are more than 1,600 of their officers assigned overseas in various Embassies, and that number will grow, and as they are integrated into some of our foreign operations, I think it will make us stronger back here in the Homeland.

So I share your concerns about the problem here in the hemisphere. We are acutely aware of it, and we are working through both bilateral and multilateral fora to address these concerns.

Mr. McCaul. If I could make just a quick comment. I think one of the biggest threats to our national security are the OTMs, the Mexicans coming across. I worked with Border Patrol in my prior career, and they don’t have anyplace to put them. They don’t have any detention space down there, and they are given a notice to appear, and they don’t show up. I think that is something that we are going to address in short order in the Congress.

Mr. Crumpton. Yes, sir. Thank you. In your third question, you referred to King Abdullah in Jordan and his efforts to rally moderate Muslims. He is a leader in the region. I am also encouraged by the efforts of the Malaysian Government. I just returned from Southeast Asia Tuesday night and had fruitful discussions with the leaders in Malaysia and Indonesia and some of their efforts. Pakistan; President Musharraf has taken some bold steps trying to reform the madrassas in his country, trying to work with moderate clergy. The Riyadh declaration earlier this year; I mentioned what the Saudis are trying to do.

I believe that there is a growing consensus, a growing alliance, among these various Muslim states that they have to get into the fight. I think they understand that more than ever.

Mr. McCaul. I appreciate your testimony here today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Crumpton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Royce. Mr. Weller of Illinois?

Mr. Weller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Ambassador, thank you for your time before the Subcommittee today. I want to continue a portion of the line of questioning which my friend from Texas opened up, Mr. McCaul. All too often, I feel, as we discuss terrorism around the world, we often ignore—certainly our friends in the media ignore and many others ignore—our own neighborhood, Latin America and the Caribbean. So I appreciate the comments you have already begun.

I have had the opportunity to visit the tri-border region, Ciudad del Este, and I have personally had a chance to assess that area in the last few years. I spent time in Colombia trying to get a han-
dle on what the FARC and other narco-trafficking terrorist groups are up to.

Can you share with us what type of evidence you see out there, if there is any, where Middle East terrorist groups have linked up with the identified terrorist groups here in our own hemisphere, the FARC, for example, or others? We know the IRA has played a role with the FARC. What about the Middle East terrorist groups?

Mr. CRUMPTON. No, sir. I cannot recall any intelligence pointing to that kind of link. I think you do have a common overlap, though, in the criminal infrastructure. I think FARC and other extremist groups here in our hemisphere work among the same criminal elements that Hezbollah and others do. I see that three-way link as pretty common. Whether it is money laundering or document fraud or human smuggling, they use similar methods.

Mr. WELLER. The narco-trafficking is clearly identified as a source of financing for terrorism but also violations of IPR, trafficking in pirated goods and products, entertainment, software, CDs are also a source of funding. When I was in Ciudad del Este, the local prosecutor showed us a warehouse full of several million dollars' worth of pirated CDs and software that they had seized.

Hamas and Hezbollah have been identified as using the tri-border region as a source of funding. Where else in Latin America do you see Hamas and Hezbollah operating in a way to gain additional funding for their terrorist activities?

Mr. CRUMPTON. There are parts of the Caribbean where we have certainly seen some tribal. There are parts of Central America where we have seen some operatives, where we have seen financial transactions. In the Caribbean, in the southern part of the Caribbean next to Venezuela and Colombia, we have seen some activity there.

I should note that when you talk about Hezbollah, they really are a global terrorist network, and although they have been relatively quite outside the Levant, they remain a formidable force, in large part because of their sponsorship by Iran, the training they have received, the experience they have gained from the engagement against the Israeli forces. In some ways, you could argue that Hezbollah may be more of a threat than al-Qaeda, given their network, given their expertise, given their state sponsorship. So you are right to be concerned.

Mr. WELLER. The current President of Venezuela has made positive statements about Iran's desire to obtain nuclear technology and has been visibly seen cozying up to the current Iranian leadership. Do you see an expanded Iranian presence in Latin America and the Caribbean? Have you seen any increased activity through their diplomatic efforts or any other outreach?

Mr. CRUMPTON. No, sir, but I will be glad to check and get back to you on that.

Mr. WELLER. I would appreciate that.

Just generally, how do you assess the cooperation of our friends in Latin America and the Caribbean, the cooperation of the governments of our friends throughout the hemisphere, when it comes to identifying those who are raising money through illegal activities: Narco-trafficking, piracy, and other sources of fund-raising? How do
Mr. CRUMPTON. If you exclude Cuba and Venezuela, I would say cooperation ranges from good to outstanding. That, of course, can vary from country to country, and even within a particular country it can vary, beginning with law enforcement or with intelligence or with immigration. It would be hard for me to capture all of that in great detail in this timespan, but I can say that, given what I have seen just in the last couple of months in terms of not only information sharing but in the need to coordinate counterterrorism policy, it is going in the right direction.

I think these governments fully realize the threat that they are under, and I think, when you talk about weapons of mass destruction and our efforts to educate them and raise their awareness, they are receptive to that. But, honestly, sir, we have a long way to go, and most of it in Latin America is not about political will; rather, it is about capacity or lack thereof. Part of our effort is to help, whether it is with the interdiction program, the terrorist interdiction program, which we fund, or other areas of support. We are working with them closely.

Mr. WELLER. Trinidad recently had a series of bombings, and there was a radical Muslim leader who was arrested and since then released. Do you see any ties between this particular group in Trinidad and any of the international terrorist organizations from the Middle East?

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. I recall there is a link, and I will be glad to get some specifics for that, if you want.

Mr. WELLER. Okay. I would appreciate a briefing on that.

Mr. CRUMPTON. Certainly.

Mr. WELLER. In closing, Mexico is one of our most important friends and allies anywhere in the world. Of course, we share a common border, and there is much frustration regarding the smuggling of human cargo across the Mexican and United States border. At the same time, Mexico has a southern border with Guatemala and Belize. How do you assess Mexico’s efforts to make their own borders more secure, preventing criminal activity from crossing from their side into ours, as well as criminal activity crossing from the south, north into their territory?

Mr. CRUMPTON. I think the Mexican Government has the political will, but they are straining under a lack of capacity. This is aggravated, of course, by the narco-trafficking, especially along the Mexican-Texas border, and that is exactly the kind of area that terrorist will seek to exploit, so they have a long way to go, sir.

Mr. WELLER. But the Guatemala-Belize border for Mexico; how do you see their efforts there?

Mr. CRUMPTON. Again, I see some political will, but there is a question of capacity.

Mr. WELLER. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. And do you see political will on the southern border as well or an absence of political will there, Ambassador Crumpton?

Mr. CRUMPTON. Referring to——

Mr. ROYCE. On our side of the border.

Mr. CRUMPTON. On our side of the border?
Mr. Royce. If I might make a suggestion, maybe we could go to a second round, and we will all keep it to 3 minutes each. But, yes, let us just address the issue of lack of political will on the part of Mexico and maybe also the lack of political will on the part of the United States. I will tell you why I think that is a serious concern.

Going back to your comment that on a recent trip to Southeast Asia, you said you had concerns, that you were frightened about the terrorist efforts to acquire WMD. I know a number of Border Patrol officers that are also frightened, and I don't know anyone quite as frustrated as they are in dealing with a situation in which they feel things have been programmed to fail, and let me give you an example.

Seventy percent of those from countries of concern, 70 percent of OTMs overall, when they are apprehended, there isn’t detention space. We have a few thousand men and women on the Border Patrol. We have 700,000 people in law enforcement in this country, and yet we don’t use that State and local law enforcement in order to try to back up those several thousand.

It just seems to me, if homeland security really was a priority, these issues would be addressed. So I would ask you about that.

I also wanted to ask you, on another front, the earthquake in South Asia. Robert Kaplan, a military writer, said hunting down al-Qaeda in its lair will be impossible without the goodwill of the local population. That attitude can be generated by relief work of the kind taking place in Kashmir. It is the classic counterinsurgency model: Winning without firing a shot.

You mentioned the tsunami in your testimony but not the earthquake. I thought I would ask you about your thoughts there. Democracy can be a decades-old or maybe centuries-old project, but humanitarian relief is immediate and can have a very real impact on hearts and minds.

Lastly, according to a report published, as you mentioned, in the New York Times, 312 foreign nationals have been captured in Iraq since April of this year. That includes 41 from Sudan. Sudan is a country of significant congressional interest, given its complicity in the ongoing genocide in Darfur and its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism in the past. The State Department contends that Sudan is taking the right steps when it comes to terrorism, but then we see this significant influx of fighters into Iraq, 41 of whom have been detained since April. So how does Sudan fit into the transnational terrorism picture? Those would be my closing questions. Thank you, Ambassador.

Mr. Crumpton. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. The first question, regarding our southern border, Secretary Rice and Secretary Chertoff have launched a joint initiative to look at foreign counterterrorism and homeland counterterrorism policies and how we can pull these together.

I take your points—regarding the challenges faced by our Border Patrols. I will go back to an earlier comment I made. We need to increase our defensive efforts, but we also need to increase our intelligence so we know where to put the finite resources we have.

The second question——

Mr. Royce. Well, if you want a force multiplier, I suggested just now one way to get one. We have in excess of 700,000 State and
local law enforcement personnel in this country. In terms of utilizing bed space for OTMs, it would seem to me, if there really was the will, with all of the military bases and everything else we have at our disposal, we would be in some position other than releasing 70 percent of those apprehended. So I think if we are going to be serious about this, we ought to drive home the point that, to date, we haven't established any kind of policy that is really going to address the issue of border security.

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. I will take that on, and I will be glad to raise it with my partners in DHS.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. I will let you continue, Ambassador.

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. The second question, regarding goodwill of population to have an enduring, effective counterterrorism policy; I wholeheartedly agree. Robert Kaplan wrote an excellent article about what the U.S. military, working with our Embassy in Manila, has been able to do in Basilan down in Mindanao. It was about building roads and building wells and building economic capacity, in addition to securing that area from Abu Sayef. If there is a model in Southeast Asia, it is probably Basilan.

It is the same kind of thing that Mr. Kaplan was talking about, I think, in Kashmir. It is the same thing that we used in Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban. It is about listening to local partners and about building not only goodwill but trust. It is about finding common ground and offering locals an opportunity to not only secure their economic well-being but to enhance their pride, their honor, their prestige, and I think where you see effective counterterrorism/counterinsurgency policies, that is what is done.

Your third question about Sudan: Sudan has made great strides since 2000, since Frank Taylor went there and laid out a roadmap for their counterterrorism objectives. Sadly, Darfur is an ugly blot, and I spoke with the Sudanese foreign minister about this in New York just a few weeks ago. Until that is resolved, there is really no way that we can take them off the current list. There are efforts underway. With our help, through the offices of the African Union, there are meetings in Nigeria with the rebel factions with the Sudanese Government, but we don't know where that is going to go. We don't know how long that is going to take.

So despite what I must note are some noteworthy efforts on the part of Sudan in terms of what they have done in terms of securing a peace accord with the rebels in the south and establishing a government of national unity, in terms of sharing information with us on terrorism, in terms of closing down some of the offices there, until Darfur is settled, I don't see any movement on our part.

Mr. ROYCE. I concur on that point. Thank you. I am going to go to Mr. Sherman.

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. First, I want to pick up where I was before, but then I want to go to a completely different area. You did correctly point out that our companies are restricted, to some extent, making money in Sudan and Iran due to sanctions we applied before September 11th. I was simply voicing the hope that after 9/11, we would have changed our trade and investment policies so as to achieve counterterrorism objectives, that we would have begun enforcing the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act against Iran as
as Libya, that we would have changed our trade and investment policies toward Iran, toward China, toward Russia, toward certain Japanese oil companies. And, in fact, since 9/11, we have not changed, and apparently not seriously discussed inside the Administration changing, our trade and investment policies toward achieving counterterrorism objectives. The one change we did make was we weakened the Iran Nonproliferation Act in Congress on the Floor last night. Of course, we weakened it far less than the Administration had urged us to.

So I would hope that your office would become a voice within the Administration to try to explore all of the ways we can use our trade and investment policy more aggressively than we did before September 11th to try to achieve counterterrorism objectives.

Now, shifting completely, there are a number of organizations that are on the terrorist list that once deserved to be on it that would like to get off of it. The best example I know of an organization that was listed as a terrorist organization and then removed was the Irish Republican Army, and it does not make one a terrorist just to be an insurgent. George Washington was a violent insurgent. But a terrorist is one who targets noncombatants.

Are there any defined standards by which we look at an organization and say, “Yes, you were a terrorist organization in 1990; yes, you were a terrorist organization in 1995, but you have changed your tactics, you have announced that you have changed them, you have actually changed them, you have adopted a bargaining position that is at least within the realm of reasonableness.”? What steps should the MEK or the Tamil Tigers take, and is there any chance that we will actually have a statement out of the State Department defining what the standards are? What standards would be applied to the Tamil Tigers, the MEK, or others who wish to clean up their act?

Mr. CRUMPTON. Well, I think, as you outlined, when any organization targets innocent civilians with political violence, they are defined as a terrorist organization. Until that is not only renounced but demonstrated over time, until they participate in the legitimate political dialogue, I don’t think they can be taken off that list, sir.

Mr. SHERMAN. How long a period should there be between when an organization renounces terrorism and ceases terrorism before they would get off the terrorist list, and would actions of insurgency, military actions against military targets, prevent it from being removed from such a list?

Mr. CRUMPTON. Well, the time line also depends on who they target. MEK is an example. They killed Americans during the seventies. They participated in the takeover of the Embassy in Tehran. So it also depends on who they targeted and what these individuals responsible for these crimes are doing within that organization.

Mr. SHERMAN. So we would be tougher on an organization that killed 100 Americans in a terrorist attack than one that killed 100 Sri Lankans in a terrorist act.

Mr. CRUMPTON. It is a question of U.S. law and international law, both. It also depends on the geopolitical environment. It depends on progress toward their participation in legitimate government. There is a variety of factors, sir.
Mr. SHERMAN. Let me use this opportunity to urge your office to coordinate with others in the Administration to try to issue some sort of standards so that groups that wish to clean up know what the standards are that they would be held to and have an incentive to clean up their act, and it may very well be that there are certain acts of terrorism so heinous and so directed at our own citizens that a group would never get off the list. So I guess, among the standards are whether the organization has a reasonable bargaining position to resolve the conflict that it is in, whether it has renounced terrorism in word and deed and for how long, and, finally, you introduced an idea which I hadn’t thought of which is, no matter how long ago it was—well, how long ago and how heinous were the acts of terrorism that they are now trying to live down?

So, hopefully, we would let people know what we would like to see and what the rewards might be, and I yield back.

Mr. CRUMPTON. Mr. Sherman, I don’t believe we could issue a particular set of standards that would be comprehensive. I do, however, believe that we can and have issued roadmaps for specific organizations, just like we have for countries. Sudan is an example.

Mr. ROYCE. We are going to go to Mr. Tancredo of Colorado.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, sir.

Let me follow on that issue of the MEK especially because, you know, it is not just the fact that they have, I think, renounced any sort of violence against the United States, which has certainly been an observable thing, that is to say, there has been nothing for those 30-some years since the allegation that they were involved in the attack that killed at least one American serviceman in Iran; not only that, but, of course, it seems to me, if you are being somewhat subjective about this—which you are saying that you are, because you are not going to put it into any sort of objective set of criteria for us to determine whether they should come off—well, then wouldn’t the subjectivity of this allow you to look at the fact that they have been most helpful in giving us information that we have used against the regime in Iran?

They have been enormously helpful not only in that regard, but as I understand it, now we actually provide them security. The group in Kabashraf in Iraq, we actually provide security for them now. They are not being held there against their will; they are actually being given a status that is quite peculiar, in that if they are still on the terrorist watch list, but we are protecting them, it leaves a lot of interesting questions for us that I think should be taken into consideration when we are dealing with this issue in the subjective way that you have described.

But the real issue that I want to get into is your comments about Mexico showing some degree of support for our efforts. There does seem to be a desire to help us. How would you interpret Mr. Jorge Castaneda’s remarks to the Senate last month, the past foreign minister and potential Presidential candidate in Mexico, when he told us in no uncertain terms when we asked him whether we could expect any help from Mexico in our war on terror, essentially, and he said, “You can expect nothing from us unless you satisfy a certain set of requirements, and that is, one, open your borders. Allow the people who are Mexican nationals in your country the op-
portunity to stay there, even though they came there illegally, and not only that, but give us a lot of foreign aid, and if you do those things," he said, and only those things—I think he said “the whole enchilada”—I think that is the phrase he actually used—they want all of that before they would ever help us in securing our borders or, especially looking at the transit through their country from other areas. Very, very concerned about that and very hard for me to understand that that can be interpreted as being some supportive position taken by their government.

And, lastly, the State Department and, I think, Homeland Security have suggested that there is no reason—I think the actual wording they used there—there is no evidence that any terrorists have come across the southern border into the United States or come across either border, northern or southern, illegally and are now in the United States.

I have talked to FBI agents who have arrested people who are in this country and who came across the southern border and were arrested for terrorist-related activities. The idea that we may not have interdicted them at the border, well, I guess that is encouraging to somebody. And also I have talked to people within the law enforcement establishment that suggest that there has been contact between al-Qaeda and MS–13 for the purpose of helping to transport people into this country. How do you square all of these things, more on the last couple of things even than the MEK, especially Jorge Castaneda’s statement?

Mr. CRUMPTON. That is an excellent example of a challenge that we have to surmount. This notion that countries, that organizations, must work with us because it is an obligation, because it is an issue to be managed with the United States, in fact, the partnership we offer is not one of obligation; it is a partnership of opportunity for other countries because this is not just about U.S. interests; it is about the interests of civilized nations. It is about morality. It is about economic interdependence. If there is another attack here in the Homeland like 9/11, the economic impact will not only be felt here but certainly in Mexico, as it was after 9/11.

I believe that our neighbors and our partners around the world must understand this. This is not about U.S. interests only; it is about the interests of global, civilized society, about global economic prosperity, about the growth of liberal institutions. Now, that goes back to issues of public diplomacy, it goes back to issues of education, and it goes back to, I think, building greater networks of trust, greater networks of communication, because it is not just about us. It is truly about our global community, and I hope that in our discussions with our partners, that we will be able to underscore that with Mexico and with other countries.

Mr. TANCREDO. Do you have any idea, if you will indulge me just for one moment, Mr. Chairman, do you have any idea how many people have been arrested in the United States for either being terrorists, terrorist watch list, involved with some sort of terrorist activity who have, in fact, come into this country illegally, either across the borders or into the United States on visas and overstayed?

Mr. CRUMPTON. No, sir. I don’t have a specific number, but I will be glad to get one and get back to you.
Mr. TANCREDO. I would certainly appreciate that.
Mr. CRUMPTON. Sure.
Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Tancredo.

Just in closing on MEK, this was a group that was outlawed in the United States back in the late seventies because of their attacks—actually their killing of Americans during the Iranian revolution and, you know, their involvement with Saddam Hussein's genocidal campaigns against the Kurds. They have participated in attacks on civilians and also political assassinations of the Iranian diaspora or the Iranian ex-pats who don't share their political views. So I think a lot will be decided by whether or not they discontinue those types of practices, including political assassinations.

I want to thank Ambassador Crumpton for his testimony. I think this was an excellent introduction of you to us, and we look forward to working with you, and I can think of no more important issue than terrorism and WMD, your areas of expertise. We wish you the best. As you know, this Committee has a great interest in what has been a problematic annual report, and so myself and my colleagues will probably have a few questions for the record we hope you could answer, and, again, I thank you and wish you the best, Ambassador Crumpton.

Mr. CRUMPTON. Mr. Chairman, thanks for the opportunity.
Mr. ROYCE. We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD


Question:
The State Department’s last two annual reports to Congress on terrorism have been problematic. First the numbers were inaccurate and then the statistics reporting attacks were omitted. How do you propose to improve the way the report is produced?

Response:
As you know, the reporting statute was amended in December 2004 to include certain new requirements. Some of these requirements (e.g., the requirement that we report, to the extent practicable, statistical information concerning the number of individuals that have been killed, injured or kidnapped by terrorist groups during the course of the year) relate to information that the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) compiles in accordance with its statutory mandate to be the primary organization for analyzing and integrating intelligence that the USG possesses or acquires on international terrorism and counterterrorism. We have been working with NCTC to ensure that all statutorily required statistical information is appropriately prepared and presented in the 2005 report. Both we and NCTC are committed to producing a report that satisfies the needs of the Congress and the requirements of the statute.

Our efforts to produce the 2005 report are already underway, and we look forward to continued consultation with Congress as we move forward in this process.

Question:
What is your opinion of House passed legislation (H.R. 2601, Section 1102) that would require a single Patterns report? The proposal requires more specific assessments in the country-by-country section, to include negative reports on country cooperation, which may be classified, if necessary.

Response:
We believe that the existing reporting requirements (including new requirements introduced in December 2004, which will become effective for the first time this year) create the framework for the kind of useful, authoritative reporting that Congress seeks, and that further amendments are not required.

With regard to our opinion on legislation that would require a single Patterns report, we note that the reporting statute (22 USC § 2656f) already requires a single report. We are preparing to meet this requirement by, among other things, arranging for the National Counterterrorism Center to provide for inclusion in the report certain information (e.g., statistical information that is required under the December 2004 amendments) that by statute falls within their purview.

As to the proposed changes to the country assessment requirements, we believe that the reporting statute already creates an appropriate framework for us to provide all relevant information to Congress, including pertinent information about foreign governments’ cooperation (or failure to cooperate) with our counterterrorism activities. To the extent that this information may be classified, we note that the current statute already permits us to include classified information in a classified annex to the report.
RESPONSE FROM THE HONORABLE HENRY A. CRUMPTON, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Question:
Many of the countries we are providing antiterrorism assistance to have recent histories of human right abuses perpetrated by their government’s agents—both military and police. As we speak, one of the more egregious cases—Morocco, for instance—has their military and police forces illegally occupying Western Sahara and undermining the stability of the region.

In light of this, can you explain your role in our counter-terrorism initiatives? What assurances can you demonstrate that we are proceeding in a way that does not undermine human rights concerns and standards?

Answer:
All units of foreign security forces identified to receive Anti-terrorism Assistance Training (ATA)—in Morocco and worldwide—are thoroughly vetted for human rights abuses both by the U.S. Embassy and the Department of State before any training can occur. If credible evidence that the unit in question is associated with human rights abuses, no ATA training or assistance will be provided.

In addition, National Agency Checks (NAC) and local record checks are conducted on every ATA participant. The RSO must verify via cable to the Department that all candidates for training received favorable records checks. Verification must accompany the list of participants transmitted to the Department. The RSO and post must ensure that records checks are comprehensive and encompass a prudent period of time. Post is advised that individuals who have violated the human rights of others, been associated with persons indicted for war crimes, and/or engaged in corrupt or criminal practices, are ineligible to receive ATA training.

The NAC checks are normally conducted by the Embassy LEGATT (FBI) at a nearby post or directly with Washington. Also post Consular Sections will also do their checks before a visa is issued to the participants.

Morocco has been the victim of terrorism, and is an important partner in our efforts to combat terrorism in North Africa. ATA training is a critical element in enhancing Morocco’s practical capacity to fight terrorism, and all Moroccan participants in ATA training are carefully selected and vetted.