SUDAN: CONSOLIDATING PEACE WHILE CONFRONTING GENOCIDE

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SUDAN: CONSOLIDATING PEACE WHILE CONFRONTING GENOCIDE

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:38 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. The challenges we face today in Sudan are perhaps among the most difficult of our time. On the one hand, the peaceful resolution of a decades-long civil war between the North and South is critical, an opening that could provide untold opportunities for peace, economic development and democratic aspirations.

On the other hand, a genocidal conflict rages in the Darfur region of western Sudan, a conflict which claims up to 10,000 lives per month.

Finally, the odious regime responsible for atrocities in both of those wars has offered the United States valuable support in the global war on terrorism. It is all too easy to see one of these developments as more important than the other, but I believe that would be a mistake. Let us learn the lessons of our past failures in Sudan.

The war between the North and South claimed the lives of over 2 million Sudanese and was punctuated by incredible brutality, including indiscriminate attacks against civilians, forcible conscription, enslavement, mass murder, arson and rape. The United States poured hundreds of millions of dollars into humanitarian relief for Sudan but never bothered to engage in a high-level effort to resolve the conflict until President Bush appointed Senator John Danforth as a special envoy in 2001.

In the 1990s, when the war between the Government in Khartoum and rebels in the South was at its peak, the Sudanese Government sought a diplomatic rapprochement with the United States. Khartoum, we were told, was willing to turn over a very well-known terrorist to U.S. law enforcement. But because of the war between North and South, and because of concerns about Khartoum's atrocious conduct in the war, the offer was refused.

Later, President Clinton described his failure to accept that offer as the biggest mistake of his Presidency. The terrorist was Osama bin Laden.

In Darfur today, the Sudanese Government is employing many of the same tactics it used in the South. No one knows the precise
number of those who have perished as a result of the genocide, but numerous observers place the figure at roughly 300,000. Over 2 million Darfurians have been forced from their homes. Entire villages have been razed. There are widespread reports of arbitrary killing, abduction, looting, torture and rape.

Now, just as in the 1990s, reports of a visit to the United States by the Sudanese intelligence chief, who allegedly has shared valuable information relating to the war on terrorism, have sparked outrage among those who rightly are concerned by genocide in Darfur.

In this context, there are three temptations that must be resisted today. The first is to focus solely on the crisis in Darfur at the expense of solidifying the historic North-South Peace Accord. The second, is to allow the end of the conflict between North and South to blind us to the grave human tragedy unfolding in Darfur. The third, is to allow the Government of Sudan’s reported cooperation in the war on terrorism to outweigh all of the above.

There will be no easy answers, but we must hold these three equally vexing challenges in our heads and be sure that we do not sacrifice one challenge to meet the others. The consequences of shortsightedness, as we saw on September 11, 2001, and continue to see today in Darfur, are horrifying. Before turning to the esteemed Ranking Democratic Member, allow me to note that the Committee will entertain 1-minute remarks by any Member who feels compelled to make them.

I do, however, encourage restraint. We have a great deal to cover today, and we want to make sure that we allow enough time for questions.

With that, I turn to my friend, the distinguished Ranking Democratic Member Tom Lantos, for his opening remarks.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank you for holding this most important hearing on the horrendous situation in Sudan.

Before dealing with Sudan, I would like to ask Deputy Secretary Zoellick to carry to Secretary Rice our strong admiration for the powerful, historic and courageous speech she made in Cairo and in Saudi Arabia on the importance of opening up non-democratic regimes. This is the first time in history that an American Secretary of State in Cairo and in Riyadh made speeches calling on democratization by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and I strongly applaud her efforts.

Mr. Chairman, with this forum and others, our Committee continues to press diligently for more action to stop the human rights abuses in the Darfur region of Sudan, even as the international community chooses to maintain its focus on securing the peace.

After 20 years of civil war, South Sudan has been liberated. But it now faces the daunting task of achieving stability and prosperity. While South Sudan now has the good fortune to look toward the future, Darfur still is in the midst of a genocide that harkens back to the worst moments in human history. As the only survivor of the Holocaust ever elected to Congress, I feel particular kinship to the people of Darfur.

Mr. Chairman, as you know well, my commitment to promoting human rights stems from my own early experiences with oppres-
sion and genocide. But we need not look back as far as World War II to find an example of a situation in which more timely intervention could have prevented a tragedy.

This week, my wife and I have the privilege of meeting in my office a genuine hero, Paul Rusesabagina. His courageous action during the senseless ethnic violence of Rwanda during the 1990s saved over 1,000 lives and has been commemorated in the remarkable film, *Hotel Rwanda*. Mr. Chairman, the world could use more heroes, but the situation that gave rise to this one must not be allowed to play out on the African Continent again.

While there is no doubt that one has to deal with the devil at times to bring peace, we should not let Khartoum cover a multitude of sins just because it reluctantly and belatedly reached an accord with South Sudan.

International pressure, led by the United States, has reduced the large-scale violence against the people of Darfur over the past few months, primarily in the areas where the African Union monitors have been present.

Yet, Mr. Chairman, in areas where there are no monitors, genocide by attrition continues. Protection of civilians in the Darfur region has been pitifully poor. For some months now, I have been calling for the United Nations to implement a clear, immediate, civilian protection strategy to safeguard the people of Darfur from genocide.

African Union troops responsible for monitoring the cease-fire in Darfur were given neither the mandate nor the capacity to enforce it. Even more sickening, the African Union deployment required the consent of the sponsors of genocide sitting in Khartoum. The African Union now plans to increase its ranks in Darfur to 7,731 troops by September. But this is still woefully insufficient to monitor Darfur, a territory the size of France.

In my judgment, no fewer than 15,000 troops are needed to protect civilians against Khartoum and its Arab militias.

Mr. Chairman, even increasing the troop strength in Darfur is not enough. The African Union needs to add teeth to its mandate of the forces in Darfur so that soldiers can take any measure necessary to protect citizens from attack. The African Union finally has agreed to augment its deployment with logistical communications and other support from NATO and the European Union.

But even if that happens—and it will take some time before that happens—I strongly urge NATO and the European Union to step into the breach and to implement a robust protection mission until the AU troops can fully deploy. With the defeat of the European Constitution by both Holland and France, Europe is in disarray. I can't conceive of a more effective and meaningful and lifesaving move by the European Union than to take military action in Darfur to save lives. If the European Union does that, if the European Union provides NATO with the necessary forces and commitment, we will rapidly forget the collapse of the Constitution.

Mr. Chairman, the genocide in Darfur is not just an African crisis. It is a crisis of all humanitarians, and as such, it obligates all of us to act with great urgency. I want to commend Secretary Zoellick for his outstanding work in Africa, and I look forward to
his testimony for what the United States is prepared to do to stop the slaughter in Darfur.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

We will now entertain 1-minute statements for those who wish to make them.

First, Mr. Leach of Iowa.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Two years ago the Government of Sudan, responding to the formation of two rebel movements in the Western Darfur region, initiated a terror campaign, as we all know, against the residents, through direct attacks on rebels and civilians and through a militia, known as the Janjaweed. State-sponsored violence has displaced more than 2 million residents of the region and killed between 180,000 and 400,000 persons in Darfur.

This, on top of the genocide that has happened in the South, where 2 million people have been killed and 4 million displaced. The United Nations referred to the killing and displacement of people as ethnic cleansing. I am happy to say that our President, President Bush, Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice and other members of our government have called it for what it is, a genocide.

Today, an estimated 10,000 residents in Darfur continue to die each month. Most of these deaths, as we know, are due to illness or starvation as a result of attacks on humanitarian supply shipments by Darfur rebels. Mr. Chairman, the African Union mission in Sudan has asked for and has been given primacy in preventing further killings of civilians in safeguarding humanitarian supplies in Darfur.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. This is a good sign, and hopefully, they will be successful.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Lantos, for calling this very important meeting. I believe that this is a very timely hearing, because I would like to know what the United States policy toward Sudan is. Up to now, it seems very unclear. There is one government that stands out in today's world as the most heinous, the most abusive, the most unconscionable evil regime; that is the former National Islamic Front (NIF) Government, now called the National Congress Party.

This regime, which came to power through a bloody coup in 1989, has not ceased to stretch the limits of the mind of the ability to comprehend a brutality that one human can inflict upon another human, nor has it ceased to challenge the international community's threshold for witnessing human suffering.

Not only did the NIF Government harbor Osama bin Laden—the Bush Administration's primary foe in the war on terror, who masterminded the tragic events of September 11th and the bombing of the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam Embassies and the assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak—the same gen-
tleman who was invited to the United States, Mr. Gosh, was the one in charge of all those activities. They tell me that leopards don’t change spots.

It turns out the people of the Nuba Mountains, where they had a well orchestrated campaign to kill, they then went after the South with the new oil money and viewed the bombardment with the Antonovs——

Chairman Hyde. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Payne. This government is wrong, and I look forward to your testimony.

Chairman Hyde. Mr. Royce.

Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Deputy Secretary, I welcome the chance to work with you. You showed great commitment to Africa as the U.S. Trade Representative. Now you have thrown yourself into the Sudan crisis. Moving ahead will require the energetic commitment you gave to the United States-Africa trade agenda. The last Congress came to the conclusion that the Sudanese Government was responsible for genocidal killing in Darfur. The Administration seconded that finding, and President Bush signed legislation affirming it.

In January, I travelled to Darfur, a trip that reconfirmed the genocide finding for me. We were in Tine, a town formerly of 20,000, where there are 200 survivors.

If we believe the genocide is occurring in Darfur, and I know that other factors are in play, including land disputes, but if these don’t void the genocidal factors, then we should act with great urgency. You have gone to the Sudan, and the United States has done far more than many other countries, many of which don’t wish to believe that genocide is occurring. But I can’t help but sense that greater urgency is needed.

Chairman Hyde. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hyde. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. Delahunt. I just want to associate myself with the remarks of the Ranking Member, Mr. Lantos. I think he really got this right. There is no time. There ought to be a sense of urgency, and I would even extend this to the involvement of the United States in any action that would be undertaken by the EU, by NATO. Obviously, we are a member of NATO. But genocide, this is the ultimate act of terrorism.

If there is a war on terror that needs immediate intervention, it is happening in Darfur.

Chairman Hyde. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am just—thank you very much for coming today, and I would be very interested in the testimony. I would hope that as we move forward and look at what is going on in Sudan and try to find long-term solutions to the challenges we face, I hope that we also take, not just a long-term approach to Sudan, but a regional view of what it is going to take to have peace in that area. As you know, first we had the Sudanese civil war. Then you have this Darfur genocide.

From what I understand, the situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia this moment is about to explode unless we pay more attention
to it. If that happens, it is going to engulf that whole area. All the good work we have done for Sudan and even what we do to help in Darfur, is going to be for naught.

So I would admonish the Administration to start paying some attention. We can do something to stop a conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. We should be doing it. It will have incredible implications on your ability to do your job in Sudan and these other challenges we face.

Chairman Hyde. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hyde. Ms. Lee of California.

Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, want to welcome you, Deputy Secretary, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing.

I want to also follow up with Mr. Payne’s comment and questions with regard to United States policy toward the Sudan. I believe it was in April the United States Government hosted, or at least invited and had discussions with the top intelligence chief of the Sudan, and now we are in a hearing, and you may clarify this later, that a high-level delegation may be visiting the United States.

Also, I am hearing that there are discussions with regard to the lifting of sanctions against this regime. So I wanted to—and during the questioning, I want to clarify from you what is taking place.

I had the privilege to visit the Sudan with Chairman Royce, and what I saw was unbelievable. Genocide is occurring. There should be no discussion with regard to the lifting of sanctions. And yes, we have to deal with the war on terror, but we have got to figure out a way to address the war on terror with Sudan if, in fact, that is the case, but using that as leverage to get that country to end the genocide against the thousands and thousands of people.

Chairman Hyde. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

Ms. Lee. And so I look forward to a response.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hyde. Mr. Tancredo.

Mr. Tancredo. Mr. Chairman, there is certainly no greater problem, more of a conundrum, in the world that we confront in Sudan. It is extremely important. I hope that we will take this into consideration during all of our deliberations and during every time we have an opportunity to address a member of the Administration, that we never made a single ounce of progress, ever, in the entire time that we have been working in this area, without confronting, without making it impossible for Khartoum to do anything else. They only did what they did when we took away all other options. It wasn’t because they wanted peace. It was because they had no other option at that time, and they look forward to the, I think, time when we aren’t looking as carefully at this.

The complexity of those challenges require high-level commitment on the part of the United States over a long period of time. Appointing a special envoy to Sudan would commit that attention without elevating our diplomatic presence there, and I would like to hear where the Administration is in the process of evaluating this proposal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you.
Mr. Blumenauer.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Secretary. I have enjoyed, in the past, interacting with you given sort of the focus that you have in trying to solve difficult problems and intellectual challenges. I think none probably that confront you is any more onerous than what you are going to be talking through today.

I would hope—I have already extended my apologies for jumping across to a hearing. I will be back. But I would like to explore with you ways that you think that Congress could have a more focused presence in this troubled area. A number of my colleagues have been there. I have entertained this notion that we might be able to have a sustained series of efforts so that every Member of Congress who wishes over the course of the next year and a half, could actually spend some time on the ground, and that could be done on an ongoing basis. So that, if there were a series of visits—and hopefully, in some cases, repeat visits—that it might give some additional attention, some leverage, and we would be willing to work in a cooperative fashion. I would like to explore that a little bit further with you.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Paul of Texas.

Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In 2003, the Government of Sudan and its outlaws began a campaign to slaughter their own people in Darfur. In less than a year's time, the Sudan's Government forces and their militia, the Janjaweed, have killed thousands of civilians, forced over 100,000 civilians to flee to neighboring Chad, and displaced more than 1 million people.

The U.S. Administration and Congress have both called this evil campaign genocide. However, the time for name-calling is over. A decade ago, nearly 1 million innocent people were slaughtered in Rwanda, and the world hid their faces and failed to act. This cannot be repeated in Sudan. The United States, the United Nations, the European Union, and the African Union must do more to ensure that genocide stops.

Every day that there is failure to act, more victims are doomed to die. Reminds me of a statement that my grandfather used to make: “When all is said and done, more was said than done.” I would like to see the United States policy on what the exact plan is.

Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Boozman. He is not here.

Ms. Berkley.

Ms. BERKLEY. I will yield back my 1 minute.

Chairman HYDE. The Chair appreciates Ms. Berkley.

Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Schiff.

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, we are all acutely aware of the fact that, down the road, we are going to be asked, what did we do in Congress, what did we do in the Administration to stop the genocide going on in
Darfur? I don’t think any of us are yet comfortable with the answer that we can give. We all want to do more.

We don’t think we are doing enough. Nothing that has been asked of the Congress has been refused. Nothing that the Administration asks of Congress to help stop the genocide in Darfur will be refused. Indeed, we are struggling to determine what we can do proactively to halt the slaughter. This is a litmus test, not only for the Congress and Administration but for the United Nations, too, as Mark Brown testified a month or so ago.

I agree with Mr. Lantos. I think we need to do everything possible to beef up the African Union troops to at least 15,000, and I would appreciate hearing your testimony, not what we are doing, but what more we can be doing to make that happen. I appreciate your being here and look forward to hearing what you have to say.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Fortenberry.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No comments at this time.

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so much.

I wish I could take representative Shelley Berkley’s 1 minute. But I had the good fortune to travel with the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa over to the Sudan. As we know, since the beginning of the genocide and before many tens of thousands of innocent civilians have been killed, one in every three Darfurians has been displaced, and 200,000 people have been forced into refugee camps.

We went in with Don Cheadle, the actor who played the role of the hotel manager, Paul Rusesabagina, and they stayed overnight there. While they walked among the people, they told us very clearly, people who look like us—and I remember one tall, young man, circling his face—had been killed. The children drew pictures of bloody sheets with planes of the insignia of the government flying over.

So I welcome Deputy Secretary Zoellick and hope that you can inform us how our Government is responding to this genocide.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Crowley.

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to associate myself with the remarks of our Ranking Member. It is good to see my friend again, Ambassador Zoellick, once again in a different capacity. This, unfortunately, though reminds me of an event I attended a couple of months ago, in February of this year, commemorating the 60th anniversary of the ending of the Nazi death camps and I continually heard over and over again: Never again, never again, never again.

But there apparently seems to be no end to the “never-agains,” because we continue to have this problem throughout the world. I, too, am interested in hearing what the plan of our Government is to cease the genocide in Darfur and what plan we have to bring
assistance in getting that assistance to the people who need it, to the displaced people of Darfur, as well.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the rest of my time. I haven’t used it all, I don’t believe.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Crowley.

Thank you, Mr. Chandler.

Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MECKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good to see you again, Mr. Deputy Secretary. I, too, came to hear your testimony today. It seems to me, you know, particularly the President of the United States, Secretary of State Powell, this Congress with its loudest voice, has indicated that genocide is taking place. I know there was a letter that was sent to you. I guess, from that reply, maybe you don’t think so. I would like to know why.

There has been some different issues with reference to you. It has been reported that up to 400,000 individuals have been killed. I think that you came out with a number that was something like 60,000 to 160,000—I don’t know the discrepancies or how you came to that number. So I would be interested in hearing how that is.

The fact of the matter is that there is, in my opinion, genocide has taken place, and we are not doing what we need to do to stop the killings. I would like to know what the Administration’s plan is.

I know that the AU—and I hear that the AU is intending to come in—but that is not going to happen until 2006. What message are we leaving the people if in fact we do nothing until 2006 to secure them? How can we stop a genocide unless—and people who die—unless there is some security there?

I look forward to hearing what the Administration’s policies are so we can make sure that we don’t have this continue on our watch.

Chairman HYDE. We are very fortunate to have the Deputy Secretary of State, Robert B. Zoellick, with us today. Prior to his current appointment, Mr. Zoellick served as the 13th U.S. Trade Representative and as Undersecretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs.

From 1985 to 1988, Mr. Zoellick served at the Department of Treasury as Counselor to Secretary James Baker, Executive Secretary of the Department and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions Policy.

Mr. Zoellick has also served as Executive Vice President at Fannie Mae, Professor of National Security at the Naval Academy, research scholar at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, and Senior International Advisor to Goldman Sachs.

Mr. Zoellick, I am pleased that you are serving as the Secretary’s point man on Sudan. You are a seasoned veteran who undoubtedly is up to the task. I do, however, seek your assurances that the Administration’s interest in Sudan does not end with you. The overlapping and complex crises in Sudan not only deserve but absolutely require serious and sustained attention by both the Secretary of State and the President.

I should note that I have been working with the gentleman from New Jersey, Don Payne, and other Members of this Committee to
develop bipartisan legislation which keeps pressure on the regime in Khartoum to end the crisis in Darfur and encourages the expansion of the African Union mission in Darfur so that it achieves the size, capacity, and mandate necessary to provide civilian protection and offers the President maximum flexibility to support the deployment and reinforcement of such an expanded mission.

I look forward to working with you to see that these critically important objectives are realized.

Mr. Zoellick, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT B. ZOELLICK, DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Zoellick. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos, Members of the Committee.

Mr. Lantos, I will be pleased to relay your compliments to the Secretary when she gets back later this week.

As all the statements suggested, I know there is extremely strong interest in this Committee, as there is across the United States, in the problems of Sudan and Darfur.

Mr. Chairman, just to underscore one of the points you made in the opening comment, I have discussed this with the President, as well as the Secretary of State at length. Both of them are extremely interested in the issue. It is one of the reasons that they asked me to focus on Darfur and the issues of Sudan. I will discuss some of this in the PowerPoint testimony. I tried to present this in this format because sometimes I think it is a little bit more user-friendly. But I will try to move through it quickly so we have plenty of chances to get through questions.

The second slide is just a map. It is a good reference point.

But, on page 3, you see, I have tried to identify the goals of United States policy, because I think it is very important, amidst all the challenges, that one has a clear sense of what one is trying to achieve, and that is a unified and peaceful Sudan that contributes to regional development and cooperates on counterterrorism; a participatory and inclusive democratic government in a Federal system that respects human rights, shares resources for the benefit of all Sudanese, and a key aspect of that are free, fair and democratic elections at the local, regional and national levels within 4 years.

To make this happen, we have to have an end to violence in Darfur, reconciliation among tribal and other groups, the voluntary return of people to their homes and, of course, accountability for the perpetrators.

In the meantime, I will come back to some of the particulars on this, we have to make sure we provide the humanitarian care and security for the internally displaced people and other civilians in Darfur, as well as the refugees in Chad, and try to improve conditions in South Sudan.

I want to focus on economic development and effective integration of all areas of Sudan and to the global economy; thereby ending one of the problems for Sudan, which has been a recurring cycle of famine and suffering leading to cross-border violence, as well as some of the points that Mr. Rohrabacher is referencing, and the refugee flows.
In the process, we want to try to strengthen the African Union’s capacity to provide basic security, ensure humanitarian access, mediate political conflicts, trying to demonstrate a success in Darfur and all of Sudan, and, in the process, also demonstrate strong United States support for Africa’s peaceful development and democracy.

The next slide, page 4, tries to give a quick sense of background and context. Because, as I know many of you that have visited and talked to others and me about this, is that there are a number of complex strands here coming together, and I just thought it would be useful to try to highlight some of them. Most important is that Sudan as a country has been marked by ethno-religious exclusivism since the Khartoum traders and mercenaries first carved out this region in the conquest of the Nile Valley in the 19th century.

So, historically, you have a country that has been dominated by a very small clique of traders, soldiers, and administrators. They tend to be drawn from a limited set of tribes, frankly three Arab tribes north of Khartoum. Because of this, the country at large has had a large Arab cultural-religious orientation. The ties are traditionally to Cairo, to Damascus in the past years, to Saudi Arabia, and not to the rest of Africa.

So what that has produced is Khartoum fundamentally operates as an Arab metropolis that is surrounded by impoverished sub-Saharan expanses.

So in the South, you have traditional African tribal structures, animist and Christian communities.

In the West, in Darfur, you have had a fascinating historical mixing over the centuries of African and Arab-Muslim tribes. Some have come from the West over a long migration, some of them economic, some of them religious. You have ancient Saharan peoples and Arab tribes from the North.

Economically, this has led to a mixture. You have nomads and also farmers, and this creates a very complex network where livelihood has been based on desert-edge villages, very dependent on rain and “boom-and-bust” agriculture and grasses. As I will talk about, this has been one of the precipitators of the problem in the region. If we are really going to address this problem over time, understanding some of the economic and ethnic connections will be important to address.

In the North, you have a mixture of Arab tribes, and they predominate in the urban areas.

And in the East, you have this general egalitarian pastoral Beja that have ancestral ties to Egypt and the Nubians.

Now, in the past, and this basically references up to 1989, the history of the system is a very weak center, Khartoum, that has tended to co-opt regional constituencies to create a power base, which is based on this Arab sort of center with the tribes from north of the Nile.

Just to give you an example, since we focused on Darfur; Darfur was the Independent Fur Sultanate, so Dar was the land of the Fur dating back to the 17th century. This was overthrown by the British at the start of the 20th century, in 1916. The way that the British then ruled the country was through a series of imperial na-
tive administrations that awarded homelands with paramount chiefs. This displaced the older, more fluid social order.

Now a key point for today is some of the nomadic groups didn’t get lands in this process. As I noted, this set a long fuse for the future when some of those groups ran out of area for their grasses. The rule depended on the effectiveness of local leadership in government. This was and remains a very important aspect for tribal conferences to try to help settle disputes.

Sudan achieved its independence in 1956. As some of you alluded to, this is the largest country in the continent. It borders nine other countries. So what happens in Sudan affects a lot of others, it has an estimated 40 million people.

Now the roots of the conflict date back to this point that I mentioned about a strong resentment from the periphery of the Muslim-Arab domination at the center. So the strife really starts with independence in 1956, when the Southern groups start to struggle for their potential independence. There is a peace agreement in 1972, and that failed because it was not fully implemented, a caution for all of us today related to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement we signed earlier this year.

The Government of Sudan (GOS) imposed Shari’a Law in 1983. This re-triggered the Southern civil war now under the leadership of Dr. John Garang, a Southerner who had been part of the Sudanese military, integrated as part of the 1972 peace implementation.

As many of you who know him, he was educated in the United States, went to Iowa State, as I recall, also had military training there. An important point, this battle in the South was the first use by the Government of Sudan of government-mobilized militias as a counterinsurgency strategy, interestingly and, in some cases, a tragic irony, drawing on some of the cattle herding areas of Darfur.

It is a basic strategy of brutality, starvation, and robbery. Of course these tactics, these counterinsurgency tactics, have been turned against Darfur 20 years later. So in the North-South struggle, as I think Mr. Lantos and the Chairman mentioned, you had some 2.5 million people die over the course of this 21-year struggle.

So, meanwhile, in Darfur, in the mid-1980s, this trouble really starts with the drought and famine in 1984. This led to the breakdown of this fragile social structure that I mentioned, including the migratory patterns between the settled agriculturalists and the herders.

An important part, as many of you may recall, Libya, which was trying to go after Chad in 1987, uses the region as sort of a backdoor for movement. It formed something called the Arab Legion. This is very important, because the description I gave you of this region suggests you had a mixing of Arabs and Africans over centuries in this region. The sharp borders between Arabs and Africans had not really been drawn until you start this racial ideology of Arabism that comes out of the Chad movement. Frankly, this is connected to some of the definitions of genocide, at least the United States view of them.

In 1989, General Bashir overthrows the government, establishes this Revolutionary Command Council for the National Salvation. The National Islamic Front that is run by Dr. Turabi takes over as the leading party. You also have economic effort, a terrible
hyperinflation during this period, that wipes out the traditional middle class. Turabi prosecutes a vicious war in the South. Meanwhile, he is also trying to use an Islamic embrace on Darfur, but without any real effects on development.

Just again, to give you a sense of the interconnecting conflicts here: In 1972, there is a declaration of Jihad in Kordofan against a group that is associated with the SPLA. That is the Southern group in the Nuba Mountains. This tries to create an Islamic state by force, but it fails.

In 1998 the army, the militia, uses starvation efforts in the oil-field zones of Upper Nile Province in Southern Sudan. This is against Southern Sudan and a little further north. But, again, the focus now—and this is understanding the regime—is on money and power. This is not an Islamic purpose.

In the 1990s, as a number of you mentioned, Turabi hosts Osama bin Laden. The United States attacks Sudan in August 1998 at a suspected weapons of mass destruction facility. In 1999, partly precipitated by this, you have a split within the Islamic movement in Khartoum, and President Bashir arrests Turabi.

September 11, 2001, the Government of Sudan starts to accelerate its reorientation toward the United States. This goes back to, I think, to Mr. Tancredo's and some of the other points. This clearly is a recognition of reality. It is not a change of heart. Bashir is fearful of Sudan's association with terrorists. The Government of Sudan cannot defeat Garang and the SPLM militarily. So, in a sense, you have politics driven by exhaustion. They are worn down by decades of war, failure of the ambitious, ideological projects.

These are the conditions that led to the negotiation of the North-South Accord that was signed in January 2005. This accord creates the possibility of a new pattern of power-sharing among geographically-defined constituencies and some prospects for development, in part through energy resources. The government, of course, is looking toward greater international acceptance.

But outside Khartoum, you have got a potential conflict. You have got an impulse, on the one hand, for equality and another one for emancipation. These pull in opposite directions, because the peripheries have to decide: Should they try to get the strongest possible representation at the center to overcome the history of Sudan, or should they try to break away?

Khartoum's old habits also haven't changed, a caution that many of you have made properly. They are fearing separation, but they also have the tension of negotiated power-sharing. So, in 2002, some Darfurians were complaining of Arab militia harassment. The problem festered. What launched the genocide was an early attack on a police station by some rebel groups in 2003.

So even as Khartoum is negotiating with the South, starting in 2002, it turns to the old habits. It unleashes the Army as well as a brutal militia counterinsurgency in Darfur.

Again, at least I think there is some thought that what was also going on in Khartoum is that some were feeling that maybe others in Khartoum were maybe giving away too much in the North-South negotiation. So you have the extraordinary tragedy, the large-scale loss of life, widespread raids and destruction of villages. Over 2 million people forced from their homelands, violence carried out by
government forces, the Arab militia, Janjaweed, and the rebel groups, the SLA and JEM, which I will come back to, which have their own internal conflicts.

Some of the Darfur rebels, the SLA, have ties with some of the rebels, particularly John Garang's SPLM. These are the larger groups, the SPLA—the JEM group, just to add to the complexity, actually have ties with Turabi, the person who was pushed out. The United States made a finding of genocide again in Darfur in 2004. This is a point I will be happy to come back to.

The UN did not find genocide. They found crimes against humanity in 2005. Many people will recall—Mr. Lantos made this point—the Nuremberg Trials were crimes against humanity. The United States' position is that it is genocide.

But one point is that, at least in terms of dealing with this internationally, my own view is, while we are not changing our position on genocide, crimes against humanity are bad enough for most people to work on. So rather than get too caught up in the labels, what we should try to do is focus on the problems here. It is not changing anything about it. Frankly, I don't think it is best for us to get diverted in the fight with the UN whether it is crimes against humanity or genocide. We have our view. Frankly, it goes back to some legal questions in international law about whether or not there are some ethnic issues. Frankly, I believe our position is right, but the key thing is we have got to focus on solving the problem.

Again, as some people mentioned—Mr. Rohrabacher—when we look at Sudan as a whole, we focus on the South, we focus on Darfur. There are other potential problems out there, in the Eastern and Northern provinces, and we have to be careful as we proceed and try to prevent a flare-up of violence elsewhere.

Indeed, some of you may have seen, there was a report in the Financial Times this morning about eastern Sudan, where the Beja people that I referenced took 20 Sudanese soldiers captive. This is, I expect, one of their moves to try to sort of influence the overall process.

But as we have seen, starting with the attack on the police station in Darfur in 2002/2003, a little spark with a lot of wood could lead to big flare-ups.

As a number of you also mentioned, there is a very strong African interest as a whole. You have got the largest country in Africa. It has got nine neighbors. They are Arabic. They are African. Frankly, it is not only the worry about the spillover, but it is the worry that all of Africa is basically divided on old colonial lines and the worry about the break-up of states. Also, the African Union is in a process of trying to strengthen its ability to try to deal with African problems.

So a quick run through.

Now, turning to page 10, the North-South Accord, just to get to the baseline. This agreement was begun in negotiations in 2002, signed in January 2005. This is the one that Senator Danforth played an important leadership role in. It is a fair political arrangement, based on this changed concept of power and wealth starting to lead to national elections in 4 years. It has got very, very detailed implementation requirements. I emphasize that be-
cause we have an agreement; it is starting, but there is a tremendous amount to do in order to make this work.

I highlighted some of the key ones: Commitments to develop an interim Constitution, which is going on right now; a bicameral national legislature; process for competitive elections; a new institution of the Presidency that would draw the Southerners in with the Khartoum Government; allocation of ministerial posts in this new Government of National Unity; oil revenue sharing; joint integrated military units; human rights provisions.

We are now in what is called the Pre-Interim Period. This is supposed to be completed by July 9th, at which time the North and the South are supposed to create a Government of National Unity. Dr. Garang actually becomes the first Vice President in this new government.

One of the things we have been pressing for is to move that process forward, and then that triggers a 6-Year Interim Period. Part of the South’s ongoing leverage is they have the ability to opt out of this process at the end of the 6-Year Interim Period.

Now, the next page, 11—and a number of you referenced this—CPA and Darfur. And as the Chairman put it, you could add the terrorism element here. It is the challenge of trying to reinforce upward spirals or arresting downward spirals. So the CPA creates a political and, indeed, fundamental constitutional framework for trying to share authority and wealth, which does create the possibility of ending the conflicts, not only in the South but in Darfur and the potential ones in the East and other regions.

Garang and his group, the SPLM’s involvement with the new Government of National Unity, should help resolve Darfur. Garang has made the point that the government shouldn’t spend $1—he used the local currency—in terms of the fighting in Darfur.

Also, an important signal, the backing by the U.S., substantially with the Congress, has helped, including financial resources and countries around the world for the North-South Accord. This creates a positive incentive for others to try to come to terms within this potential political framework. So the potential upward spiral is the CPA implementation, a new Sudanese Government approach, an expanded African Union mission on the ground, focusing also on reconciliation in Darfur and other areas, within this political framework.

But there is the potential downward spiral, and a point that I and others have emphasized, which is that if we have an ongoing tragedy in Darfur, this will preclude United States support for the new government and the CPA implementation. So what could be coming together could drag the process down.

On page 12, I just tried to identify some of Darfur’s key needs. The first is to try to supply food and basic necessities for the people forced off the land, an estimated 2 million. Also, and beyond food, we obviously have to improve the security inside and outside the camps. You have all read, we have all encountered, the terrible stories of people not being able to leave the camps, but there is also a problem in terms of needing to get the African Union police in the camps to try to protect them.

But, frankly, those two parts aren’t enough. That just stabilizes the situation at best. One also has to push for a political reconcili-
ation among the government, the rebel groups, and various tribes. This is one reason I referenced some of the historical aspects. We are also going to have to give people a chance to return to their homes, that is, we are going to need to address some of the long-term economic and social issues.

This has been complicated by the drought that has exacerbated human needs in the displaced populations. The good news for now is that the food is flowing, and I want to compliment the people with USAID and the contractors that have worked with them. They have done a fantastic job with the NGOs. I know you have had a chance to visit. I have visited the camps.

Here is a striking fact: 86 percent of the food delivered to Darfur is from the United States of America. We had the Europeans in town, and one of the points that the President and I have emphasized is that they need to upgrade their support for this. Because, frankly, in the South, we are supplying 90 percent of the food.

We have also focused on the need for the Government of Sudan and the rebels to halt the harassment of the NGOs. A key component which many of you referred to is the need to expand the AU mission. We have just gotten the AU security forces to up to about 2,700. Over the course of this year, we have urged them, they have agreed, to expand to 7,700.

There is some discussion among the African Union about possibly going up to a higher number. They have referred to 12,000. But, frankly, each of these takes work. Frankly, one of the reasons I was in Rwanda before I was in Darfur and Khartoum the last time is that Rwanda has good troops. They have been willing to put the troops in there. We, through U.S. forces and NATO, had to supply the transport, the logistical planning support. We tended to be linked up with the Rwandans in doing that. The deployment for these forces is supposed to begin in the start of July. We are pressing to try to get it done in the July-September time frame.

I made a reference to police. As many of you know who have been there, you have military forces. You also have police contingents coming from a number of African countries. These are very important because there are some 200 overall camps, but 90 major camps. We have to get police in those camps to try to protect people.

A modest point, but it gives some sense of how we are trying to focus on diplomacy, we pressed the Government of Sudan to support the African Union’s role and NATO’s role, which they did. This is sovereign territory. If you are going into a sovereign territory without somebody’s approval, you are declaring war. So it is important to get somebody to come in and agree to this, and it is an important step that they agreed.

In part, as some of you have made the point, it is the recognition of, frankly, the failure of their policy. Their belief that their future power, holding of power is not a change of stripes, as the Congressman mentioned. It is clearly their own calculation of what is in their self-interest, which is why one wants to keep the pressure on.

The United States support, as I mentioned, has been airlift for Rwandans, as I mentioned. Some of you mentioned the work I have done in Africa before, if you are going to ask people to do things,
it is nice to go there to thank them and the Rwandans have some of the best forces.

Going back to Mr. Lantos’ point, I also wanted to make a point, because I visited the genocide memorial there, which is a very impressive museum and reminder for all.

With the Congress’ help we were able to allocate some $50 million quickly, because these troops have to have facilities and a place to stay. So, frankly, we started to move that money already to start to get the construction for these quarters; and an important component since I talked to both the AU and the NATO forces is a complicated area, the planning and logistics operation, that, frankly, NATO is best positioned to perform.

Now the Government of Sudan military has pulled back, but you still have the Janjaweed militias operating. According to the UN Secretary-General’s report—and this conforms with one I have seen—there appears to be less violence, but there is increased banditry.

You should know the U.S. headed off some particular individual conflicts. In other words, with our contacts, we could see forces massing, whether they were Janjaweed militia or others. I called Vice President Taha in Khartoum. We contacted the African Union forces and made the point that additional slaughter would just make this harder for everybody to try to move ahead.

So, in addition to trying to deal with it at the macro level, I can assure you we are dealing at some pretty micro-village level here to try to stop conflict.

An important point that I alluded to is that the rebel groups are still active. The SLA is the bigger one. They are fighting each other right now. In fact, part of the violence you see in Darfur is, as we push the peace reconciliation, the rebels are, not surprisingly, trying to strengthen their own position relative to one another. So some of the conflict you have had, has been rebel on rebel. Also, frankly, the rebels probably associate with some of the bandits trying to get food from some of the convoys.

An important point here is then how do we try to create a process for peace or reconciliation? Here, again, the African Union has been in the lead in peace talks in Abuja, in Nigeria. It is important for the African Union to play a leadership role, but they need our support.

The key mediator is the former Prime Minister of Tanzania Salim, who I spoke to in the past week to try to coordinate with, pledge our support; and in doing so we are obviously trying to work with some other European countries, other African countries. This process just restarted again on June 10; and it is fitful, is the best way to say it.

Frankly, this is also where the North-South struggle fits in with Darfur. Dr. Garang has some influence over the SLA. So when Dr. Garang was here I emphasized, I hope you emphasized, that we need his help in terms of solving the Darfur problem.

In March, we were able to get the three UN resolutions on economic sanctions, on accountability, also one that I will mention in terms of starting the UN forces in the North and South. The goal here for Darfur is to try to create a secure environment for the political and tribal reconciliation so people can return home, and I
emphasize “voluntarily.” Because sometimes there are movements made but not voluntarily. So food, security, but a peaceful accord will extend.

The followup is disarming the militias, and then recognizing this problem is not going to stop with that. You still have problems with restarting life, getting people back to villages and dealing with some of these long-term issues of land and grazing rights and water and some of the tribal tensions that exist through that.

Now the follow-through on the CPA, the North-South Accord, I attended a conference in Oslo to try to emphasize the importance of it and the commitment for donors to support the North-South Accord. There were some $4.5 billion in pledges. I have outlined here some of the U.S. funding, and the U.S. is by far the most generous player. Obviously, that depends on the support that we get from the U.S. Congress.

The third UN resolution, 1590, authorized the 10,700 observer force for Southern Sudan. In addition, there are some civilian forces. So, again, I know most of you followed this closely. This is a UN peacekeeping force in the South that is different than the AU force in the West. This deployment started in May. We are aiming for completion by December 2005. I got a report this week of some slowdown because this is the rainy season.

One other item I want to draw to your attention—some of you may have encountered this group. There is a fantastic small group of a civilian protection monitoring team, led by some retired U.S. military officers that operate out of the South. It uses planes to try to investigate incidents. They have a lot of credibility. They were scheduled to come out in June. But because the UN forces were a little longer in coming on—and I saw them when I was in the South in Rumbek—we were able to extend that, agreeing with the UN and finding some money to do that.

It is a good example, frankly, of how—as I am sure many of you know—whether it is NGOs, former military officers, small numbers of people make a huge difference. And these are very dedicated people.

The food shortage problem, however, is now greater in the South than it is in Darfur; and this is a point I want to emphasize. Because if we want to make the North-South Accord work, and if John Garang wants to stress how this is a new day, it is going to be hard to do so if people come back and they don’t have food.

Again, we are in a position where the United States has provided 90 percent of the food deliveries. Again, when I was in Rwanda, I talked about this with Commissioner Michel, one of the European Union commissioners; and the President and I raised this this week again with the European Commission and the European—Luxembourg, the European Chair.

Another point that I want to mention, because I know some of you had an interest, there is another strife that has been in the South, which is the Lord’s Resistance Army, this terrible situation where they draw children in and force them to fight. This was part of this whole counterinsurgency strategy in that this was part of the government, Khartoum’s, efforts against Uganda. Over the past couple of years, as the government has taken a new approach, they
have now let the Ugandans cross into Sudanese territory to fight these guys.

I talked to President Museveni when I was in Rwanda, the President of Uganda. They are making some headway, but the SPLM, John Garang's group, has recommended a three-part effort—SPLM, Ugandan and Government of Khartoum—to try to further squeeze the Lord's Resistance Army. And that is something I pressed for in Khartoum on my last trip.

I also mentioned to make this work that we have to have set up the Government of Southern Sudan, and if any of you have been to Rumbek or the South, you know there is a lot of work to do here. We sent an interagency assessment team. There has also been a security team we did with a number of other countries. We started about $20 million for programs to assist in the formation of this government. We have some additional money in the 2006 request.

I can't emphasize enough the importance of showing progress in the South, pushing both the Government of Sudan and the Southern forces on the implementation in an inclusive fashion. So, yes, we have the South and Khartoum in agreement. But, as I mentioned, you have other groups—fortunately, some of the Northern tribes just reached an agreement to be included. But the strife I read about, the report of today from the East, this is probably a signal of other groups that are not included. So we have to press both parties to try to make this as inclusive as possible.

We are pressing very hard to keep this on track, including the formation of the Government of National Unity by July 9; and then we are going to have to work through a very challenging transition where, again, we have some aid support as we try to transform the nature of this government. That we hope will create the conditions for a safe and voluntary return of displaced Sudanese.

So keep in mind there is about 2 million Sudanese from the South that are located around Khartoum in IDP camps. Then all this has to be backed by new policies at the national, local and provincial level, security and community level, conflict resolution, economic development, health and education. I mentioned this partly going back to the history, because local government has been the key to Sudanese success when it has occurred. So in this structure one also has, with our aid and our political efforts, to try to maintain and build local capabilities within a Federal structure that is being created under the CPA.

So, in summary, we have to work with Sudan on multiple transitions: From war to peace; centralization to genuine federalism and devolution of power; emergency needs from food to a development strategy; and military rule to democracy.

As I mentioned, you have upward and downward spiral potentials here. And a sensitive point, but one I will identify for you, is that for all work done on the North-South Accord, and when I have gone I have tried to emphasize this to the parties, that our ability to help on the North-South Accord depends critically on a solution to Darfur. Some people are sensitive to this. They don't want to give up the North-South Accord for Darfur, at least that is my view. And the sense that I picked up from many of you is that you have to solve both together and you have to solve all the country's problems together.
In the course of this, there is obviously a complex amount of multilateral diplomacy, starting with our African partners. Obviously, the UN Special Representative Jan Pronk is a good person there. I have had a chance to work with him on a number of issues. Arab states, Britain, and Canada have put in forces.

I talked to my friend, Pierre Pettigrew, Canadian Foreign Minister, formerly the trade minister, because they want to make a special effort, and they are being coordinated in this.

Norwegians have done an important job, the Dutch, and, of course, NATO and the EU.

As I mentioned, I have been to Sudan twice, to Khartoum, Darfur twice, different parts, Rumbek. I may return for this July 9th creation of the Government of National Unity. It is part of how one tries to use the diplomatic aspects to kind of press people across the line.

But we obviously are going to need congressional support and resources. So I had a chance to talk to Mr. Blumenauer a little bit before, and would be pleased to work with the Committee and others about visits to help reinforce the message to all parties because we know this is not going to be a smooth or clear-cut path.

I have raced through this, but you can see there is a tremendous amount of complexity here. Even the North-South Accord, if you look through all its implementation provisions, it is an enormous achievement. But it has to be implemented, and that is where we have a lot of work to do together.

Just to show what you have also got here, I added a couple of sort of maps to give you a little feel. The map on page 17 is the expansion of the AU forces. So the current camps are in red. The blue ones are the expansion that you will have. So this is a sort of a picture of the Darfur area.

On page 18, you have a small sort of map for Southern Sudan, the peacekeeping forces. So here you see you don’t just have African countries, because this is a UN peacekeeping mission divided into six sectors.

On page 19, I just tried to give you a little summary of the United States assistance to Sudan. We include Chad because we have some 200,000 refugees in Chad on this, divided into the Darfur/Chad and the other Sudan. I note on the bottom there that this does not count the UN peacekeeping for Sudan, which goes to supply the funds for the North-South Accord. With that you had over $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2005, estimated over $800 million in fiscal year 2006. You will see that it is an estimate.

One of the reasons why I couldn’t just put our budget request in here is that big parts of this is food aid; and the way that food aid is requested, as many of you know, it is a general account and then we have to sort of try to allocate it. But this tries to give you some sense of that.

On page 20—I won’t go into all the details for this but, knowing the interest, I thought you might want to have it. I tried to divide it so you can see how the aid is broken down: First for Darfur and Chad with the humanitarian side, fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2006. Then, you see the next chart is the nonhumanitarian aid for Darfur and Chad. Then the following one takes Sudan, non-Darfur,
gives you a sense of humanitarian numbers; and the last one gives
you a sense of nonhumanitarian aid.
So this is heavily the reconstruction. So this last chart gives you
a better sense of some of the efforts to build the implementation
of the North-South Accord.
So, Mr. Chairman, I apologize for going on a little bit, but I know
the interest and would be happy to take any of the questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Zoellick follows:]
Sudan Policy

Committee on International Relations
U. S. House of Representatives

Robert B. Zoellick
Deputy Secretary of State

June 22, 2005
Goals of U.S. Policy

- Unified, peaceful Sudan that contributes to regional development and cooperates on counter-terrorism.
- Participatory and inclusive democratic government in federal system that respects human rights, and shares resources for the benefit of all Sudanese.
  - Successful, free, fair, and democratic elections at the local, regional, and national level within four years.
- An end to violence in Darfur, reconciliation among tribal and other groups, the voluntary return of people to their homes, and accountability for the perpetrators.
  - In the meantime, humanitarian care and security for IDPs and other civilians in Darfur and Chad, and security of operations for NGOs and international donors.
- Full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Accords (CPA) between North and South, improving conditions in southern Sudan.
- Economic development and effective integration of all areas of Sudan into the global economy.
  - Ending the recurring cycle of famine and suffering, cross-border violence, and refugee flows.
- Strengthened African Union capacity to provide basic security, ensure humanitarian access, and mediate political conflicts, drawing on success in Darfur and all of Sudan.
- Demonstration of strong U.S. support for Africa’s peaceful development and democracy.

Background and Context

- Sudan has been marked by ethno-religious exclusivism since Khartoum traders and mercenaries carved out a state through conquest in the Nile Valley in the 19th Century.
- Historically dominated by a small clique of traders, soldiers, and administrators.
  - Drawn from tribes along the Nile north of Khartoum.
  - Arab cultural and religious orientation; links to Cairo, Damascus, Saudi Arabia.
- Khartoum has been an Arab metropolis surrounded by impoverished sub-Saharan expanses.
  - In the South, a traditional African tribal structure (animist and Christian communities).
  - In the West, in Darfur, a mixing of African-Arab Muslim tribes which have come over centuries in waves: West Africans on long migrations (and trade routes); ancient Saharan peoples; and Arab tribes from the North.
  - Mixture of nomads and farmers, complex networks connected to desert-edged villages, very dependent on rain-fed (boom and bust) agriculture and grasses.
In the North, a mixture of Arab tribes (comprised of Nubians – a significant minority group) predominate in the urban areas.
- In the East, generally egalitarian, pastoral Beja with ancestral ties to Egypt and Nubians.

In the past (until 1989), a weak center in Khartoum co-opted regional constituencies to create a power base.
- Independent Fur Sultanate (of 17th century) of Darfur overthrown by the British in 1916.
- Imperial “native administration” awarded homelands with paramount chiefs, displacing older, more fluid social order. (Some nomadic groups didn’t get lands, lighting a long fuse for the future.)
- Rule depended on effectiveness of local leadership and government.
- Tribal conferences as a means to settle disputes.

Sudan achieved independence from Great Britain in 1956.
- Largest country on the continent.
- Borders nine other countries.
- Estimated 40 million people in 2005.

Roots of conflict
- Strong resentment from the periphery of Muslim Arab domination at the center – southern groups commence struggle coincident with independence in 1956.
- Peace agreement in 1972 failed because it was not fully implemented; GOS imposed Shar’a Law in 1983; southern civil war resumes under the leadership of Dr. John Garang, a southerner who had been integrated into the GOS military during the 1972 peace implementation.
- First use of government-mobilized militias in the South as a counterinsurgency strategy in mid-1980s, drawing on cattle-herding Arabs of Darfur (reliance on brutality, starvation, and robbery).
- An estimated two and one-half million die in conflict that stretches across 21 years.

Darfur in conflict in the mid-1980s
- Drought and famine of 1984-85 - breakdown and migration.
- In 1987, Libya used the region as a “backdoor” into Chad.
- “Arab Legion” and a new racial ideology (“Arabism”).
• In 1989, General Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir overthrew the
government and established the Revolutionary Command Council for
National Salvation to rule Sudan. The National Islamic Front, led by
Dr. Hassan al Turabi, took over as the leading party.
• Hyperinflation of 1978-95 wipes out Sudan’s traditional middle-class.
• Turabi prosecutes a vicious war in the south; reaches out with Islamic
embrace in Darfur, but without real effect on development.
• In 1992, declaration of Jihad in Kordofan against SPLA-led Nuba
Mountains rebellion; failed effort to create Islamic state through force.
• In 1998, army, militias, and starv.ation used in oilfield zones of Upper
Nile province in southern Sudan; battle over money and power, not
Islam.
• During 1990s, Turabi hosts Osama bin Laden.
• U.S. attack on a suspect WMD production facility possibly linked to
• In 1999, split within Islamic movement in Khartoum: President Bashir
arrests Turabi.

• After September 11, 2001, the GOS accelerates reorientation toward
the U.S.
  – Bashir fearful of Sudan’s association with terrorists.
  – GOS cannot defeat Garang and the SPLM militarily.
• Politics driven by exhaustion - worn down by decades of war, failure
of ambitious ideological projects - led to North-South Accord
(Comprehensive Peace Agreement-CPA) signed in January 2005.
  – New pattern of power-sharing among geographically-defined
    constituencies.
  – Prospects for development (in part through energy) with greater
    international acceptance.
• Outside Khartoum, the impulse for equality and emancipation pulls in
opposite directions: Should the peripheries win strongest possible
representation at the center to obtain fair share of power and resources,
or should they break away?
• Khartoum’s old habits - and fears of separation – are also in tension with the negotiated power-sharing.
  - In 2002, some Darfurians complained of Arab militia harassment; the problem festered and the rebels attacked a police station in 2003.
  - Even as Khartoum negotiated with the SPLM in the south (starting 2002), it unleashed the army and a brutal militia counterinsurgency in Darfur in 2003.
  - Some in Khartoum believe CPA negotiation gives away too much.
  - Large loss of life, widespread rape and destruction of villages, over two million forced from their homelands. Violence carried out by government forces, Arab militias (Jinjaweed), SLA, and JEM.
  - Some Darfur rebels (SLA) have ties with SPLM.
  - U.S. finds genocide has occurred in Darfur (September 9, 2004); UN rules “crimes against humanity” (January 2005).
• Dangers elsewhere in Sudan: Eastern and Northern provinces as well as Kordofan.
  - Need to try to prevent flare ups of violence.
• Strong African interest to: avoid destabilization of 9 neighbors; prevent possible breakups of states; demonstrate the African Union’s ability to deal with African problems.

The Naivasha (North-South) Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

• Begun in 2002, signed in January 2005.
  - U.S. mediation vital, led by Senator Danforth.
• A fair political arrangement founded on power and wealth sharing, leading to national elections within 4 years.
  - Very detailed implementation requirements.
  - Commitments to develop Interim Constitution, bicameral national legislature, process for competitive elections, new Institution of Presidency, allocation of ministerial posts, oil-revenue sharing, joint-integrated units, human rights provisions.
  - Pre-Interim period scheduled to be completed by July 9, initiating new Government of National Unity for 6-Year Interim Period.
  - South can “opt-out” through referendum at end of 6-Year Interim Period.
The CPA and Darfur:
Reinforcing Upward, Arresting Downward Spirals

- The CPA creates a political and constitutional framework for sharing authority and wealth within which to end the conflicts in Darfur and other regions.
- Garang and SPLM involvement in the new Government for National Unity should also help resolve Darfur.
- Backing by the U.S. and countries around the world creates a positive incentive to come to terms.
- So the “upward spiral” is CPA implementation, a new Sudanese government and approach, an expanded AU mission on the ground, and reconciliation in Darfur (and other areas) within this political framework.
- But ongoing tragedy in Darfur will preclude U.S. and other support for the new government and CPA implementation: the “downward spiral.”

Darfur’s Needs

- Supply food and basic necessities to camps for people forced off lands (some 2 million); improve security inside and outside camps; foster political reconciliation among the government, rebel groups, and various tribes; and redress long-term economic and social issues driving conflict.
- Drought exacerbating human needs, increasing displaced populations.
- Food flowing: AID has done a great job along with NGOs.
  - 86% of food delivered in Darfur thus far has been supplied by the U.S.
  - GOS and rebels must halt NGO harassment.
- The AU has agreed to expand its security forces from 2,700 to 7,700.
  - NATO/EU to provide transport, logistical, planning support.
  - Deployment aimed for July – September;
  - Expanding AU police operations to about 90 camps. Need to stress safety of women.
  - GOS supported AU/NATO role.
  - US: Airlift for Rwandans; visited Rwanda to discuss and thank; $50 million deployed promptly to build quarters; assistance with AU planning and logistics.
• GOS military pulled back, but Jinjweeed and militias still operate (appears to be less violence, but increased banditry according to the UNSYG report).
  – U.S. helped head off individual conflicts.
• Rebels (SLA/JEM) still active; fighting each other.
  – JEM connects with Turabi, the former Prime Minister.
• AU peace talks between GOS and rebels begun in Abuja.
  – Important for the AU to lead.
  – U.S. supporting through work with UN representative, partner countries for AU, Dr. Garang and SPLM, U.S. officials on the scene.
• UN resolutions on economic sanctions and accountability signal no impunity for crimes against humanity or genocide, by any party.
• Goal is to create secure environment and political, tribal reconciliation so people can voluntarily return home safely.
  – Disarm militias.
  – Still face huge challenge of restarting life, redressing issues of land, grazing rights, and water.
  – Tribal tensions due to land, drought, new settlements will remain – conflict among tribes over local resources.

CPA Follow-Through

• Oslo Donors Conference:
  – $4.5 billion pledges (for CPA implementation and humanitarian needs throughout Sudan); need delivery
• UNSC Resolution 1590 on March 24 authorized 10,715 observer force for southern Sudan.
  – Deployment started in May 2005; aim for completion by December 2005.
  – U.S. maintained Civilian Protection Monitoring Team; excellent monitoring work.
• Food shortages for returnees and displaced persons.
  – U.S. providing 90% of food delivered to non-Darfur Sudan.
  – Serious situation in Bahr Al Ghazal, North Kordofan, Nuba Mountains, and elsewhere.
• Press GOS to work with SPLM and Uganda on Lord’s Resistance Army (in far south).
• Working with Government of Southern Sudan to set up basic institutional capabilities:
  – Sent Interagency Assessment Team.
  – Total of $19.68 million in FY05 for programs to assist the formation of the GOSS.
  – Need to show progress in the south.
• Pushing both GOS and SPLM on CPA implementation in an inclusive fashion (to include other groups).
• Urging formation of Government of National Unity by July 9 goal.
  – Need to work with GONU through the challenging transition.
• Support safe and voluntary return of displaced Sudanese.
• Encourage GONU to improve international acceptability.
  – Especially Darfur, handling of IDPs and refugees.
• Encourage new policies at national, local, and provincial governance; promoting security and community-level conflict resolution; economic development; and health and education.
  – GOS needs to cease destruction of IDP camps near Khartoum.

In Summary

• Need to work with Sudan on multiple transitions:
  – War to peace.
  – Centralization to genuine federalism – devolution of power.
  – Emergency to development.
  – Military rule to democracy.
• Upward or Downward Spirals.
• Working closely with AU.
  – Multilateral diplomacy with particular African partners; the UN; Arab states; UK, Canada, Norway, Netherlands; NATO; EU; others
• Two visits to Khartoum, different parts of Darfur, Rumbek in southern Sudan.
  – May return for July 9 creation of Government of National Unity.
• Will need Congressional support and resources.
• Not a smooth, nor clear-cut path.
• Must concentrate on both achieving accords and implementing them – lots of detailed work.
AMIS Locations (Current and Planned) in Darfur as of June 20, 2005

Map of UNMIS Sector Allocations

- Force HQ & Troops
- Force Reserve
- Sector 1: BANGLADESH
- Sector 2: KENYA / CHINA
- Sector 3: INDIA
- Sector 4: EGYPT
- Sector 5: PAKISTAN
- Sector 6: ZAMBIA

LEGEND:
- Airport
- AMIS HQ
Funding FY 2004-FY 2006

U.S. Assistance to Sudan/Chad
(excluding Assessed Contributions)

In addition, U.S. contributions to UN Peacekeeping for Sudan: FY05=$132M, FY06=$250M.

Darfur/Chad: Humanitarian Aid
FY 04 - FY 06

FY 2005 Supplemental includes $240 million in PL 480 for Sudan and other parts of Africa. USAID is determining how much is to be allocated to Sudan. Some accounts in FY 2006 are estimates based upon allocations from Regional and Global accounts. Emergency resources are allocated against emergency priority needs. Final and disaster numbers could change depending on appropriation level and needs during FY 06.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I hope I will not embarrass my good friend, the Secretary, by saying this was probably the best presentation I have had in 25 years of sitting on this Committee, both orally and in terms of the prepared materials.

The State Department is now embarking on a new mission, which is called the Pedagogic Mission of the Department of State, which we sorely need. I want to commend you and congratulate you, Mr. Secretary. You raise so many issues that it will be difficult to focus on just a few in the limited time I have.

Let me hark back to the end of last week when Chairman Hyde and I had two competing proposals for UN reform. Those were competing proposals in terms of penalties. They were virtually identical in terms of describing the problem. Clearly, your presentation demonstrates the ultimate absurdity of having the Sudan perform a function under the UN Human Rights Commission while participating and perpetrating some of the most outrageous human rights violations in contemporary history. So our hearings and our legislation do tie together.

I have one specific area—two, really, two specific areas—I would like to explore with you. The first one is, I know I speak for every single Member of this Committee on both sides in saying that what we appreciated most about your presentation was its candor. Some time back, a high-ranking official gave us a cookie-pusher, soft and gentle, nonsubstantive presentation; and I cautioned him that if that goes on, the hearings will be empty. Let me assure, you, Mr. Secretary, the hearings where you will appear in the future will be
attended by every Member of this Committee because we appreciate candor.

I also want to call my colleagues' attention to the fact that—you have referred to it several times during a very complex and invaluable presentation—that the United States carries the bulk of the financial burden of aid; and, obviously, we carry and will carry the bulk of logistical support for the African Union troops. This is a reminder to all of my colleagues who emphasize that all we do is engage in military ventures. I am very proud of what we are doing in this area; and I think it is very important that we, in our own appraisal of our own foreign policy, have some balance and recognition of what the United States is doing globally.

My key question relates to a time line. It is self-evident that, given all of the deficiencies, the African Union forces in sufficient numbers will not be in place any time soon. Whether they will be there at the end of the year or middle of next year or whatever, they will be inadequate, inadequately prepared, inadequately supplied, equipped—you name it. Has the Administration considered the possibility of calling a NATO emergency session, to call on our NATO allies, particularly the ones who have no forces in the two main areas where we are currently committed, so that an interim major NATO force could be put in place to prevent what we correctly call genocide?

In point of fact, it was the House that designated what is going on in Darfur genocide the first time. The Senate followed suit, and then we had the UN calling it a gentler name. It seems to me that here we have a ready-made, more-than-capable and, to a very large extent, underutilized NATO contingent that could be supplemented by non-NATO advance-country forces, ranging, as you have indicated, from Canada to Sweden, to participate in an immediate major deployment to prevent continued large-scale loss of human lives.

The picture is not that complex. The details are complex. Your presentation was extremely valuable to all of us who follow the situation closely. I know I speak for all of my colleagues. We learned a great deal. But the underlying realities are very simple. Hundreds of thousands of people over a period of time—millions—have been killed. Tens of thousands are being killed now; and we have well-equipped, ready-to-go forces in many countries capable of deployment. What would be more helpful in dealing with the issue and dealing with our global public relations dilemma than the United States taking the lead in calling for a NATO emergency session to deal with this crisis?

Secretary?

Mr. ZOELLICK. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Lantos; and thank you for the kind words and the support you have given me and the Secretary over the years. I appreciate it.

First, the AU's roll is particularly important here, so I don't want to skip over this. It is particularly important in dealing with the problems of Darfur and Sudan but also important in terms of Africa in general. I wish it weren't so, but this may not be the last one of these. So one point I want to draw attention to is that many of you dealt with this under the old OAU form, and the OAU was created a couple of years ago.
The Africans are making a very strong effort to try to develop capabilities on the military side as well as the mediation side. And those are the core, the catalysts that we needed to work with in this process. I have had a chance—I know many of you had a chance—to visit the soldiers, the Nigerian general in command, the others that back them from Kenya, Rwanda, Senegal, others. So where at all possible, Mr. Lantos, we want to try to make it work for them.

And that goes, I guess, to the second point. You suggested it is going to take a long time. I hope not, and we will see over time. I believe it need not.

In other words, one of the reasons I was out there again and the Secretary stressed with a number of the AU political officials—and obviously this goes to member states, Rwanda, Nigeria and others—is that I believe we should start to get those forces in during July and starting in early July. Frankly, we are pressing to get them there during the July-August-September period, and that is one reason why, to show the critical need for support. As I alluded to, they can't go in unless we build the facility. So we work with a group called PAE to build the facilities for them to go.

So I do believe we can expand this mission. Whether we get exactly the 7,700, I can't say, but certainly double it and more quickly, and including the police forces.

Then the question is, how best do we support this? And that does come back to NATO.

Just to show some of the interconnections, on the first trip that I took on this post I visited some 13 NATO countries. I came back to the North Atlantic Council, and I started to get people to think about this possibility, about the fact that, given the problems in Sudan and Darfur, that we would want to try to get NATO backing. And those of you who dealt with NATO issues over the years know this is actually a pretty tremendous step to be able to get moving forward.

Of course, there was some tension with the European Union; and we emphasized, look, we will get help wherever we can. We are not trying to be just NATO and not European Union. We do believe that NATO tends to have more of the military planning and logistics capability in here. So the focus with NATO now has been the airlift logistics, but, importantly, the operation and planning capacity, including that of the U.S.

Now that does mean there are some people on the ground, with the Canadians, United States, British, French, rather small amounts related to support capacity.

One last aspect, one I think we need to think about with this—which sort of NATO forces. You know, we didn't have colonies in Africa, but the Europeans did. So I think one of the challenges here, as we have seen in problems like Somalia and elsewhere, is whether outside non-African forces—to the degree and on the first order, it may seem like they are expanding security, but that can degrade very quickly. So that is one more reason why—at least it is my view—that we ought to try to make the African Union process work: For their good, for Sudan's good and for—frankly, the long-term development of this African capability.
But we will have an ongoing conversation on this. If I am wrong and we don’t get the forces in, then we have to talk. I tell you honestly, Mr. Lantos, it would be a big challenge to get NATO to agree to put large-scale “boots on the ground” effort; and I think it could end up creating a different conflict in Africa. I am not sure how the Africans would react to this as well. That is why, as I tried to emphasize here, I think we have something moving, and at least my goal is to try to get it moving as quickly as possible to see if we can upgrade the amount of security forces and police.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to echo the comments. This is quite a tour de force, and I think you have a balance that is about right. I would just like to stress when we look at a perspective, which is awfully difficult, I know, in issues of this kind, there is a moral issue. Members of this Committee have defined it rather well. You have defined it exceptionally. There is a geopolitical issue that is real. There is a legal issue that isn’t inconsequential.

Here there have been several references to the distinction between genocide and a crime against humanity. I would just like to mention one aspect to this, and that is the United States House of Representatives formally declared this to be a genocide. The Senate did. The United States Administration did. The implications for law are that we are parties to the Genocide Convention, and that obligates every party to do whatever it can to bring this genocide to an end.

I only raise this from two perspectives. One is philosophical, literally obligates the United States to act unilaterally, although it is obviously far wiser to operate multilaterally; and so all of your observations about emphasizing the OAU are well taken. But, secondly, it implies that the Congress is behind you, if not ahead of you. And I stress this because you do not have to feel constrained when you make decisions that are for the good of humanity. Congress is with you. And I stress this as strongly as I can.

Secondly, and just as an offshoot, you noted as an aside that one of the leaders of the Southern part of Sudan, one of the great, impressive leaders of Africa, John Garang, is a graduate of a university in the United States that happens to be in my State. This, to me, is very symbolic of another set of issues, and that relates to how the United States Government deals with visas. By that I mean we have people around the world in important parts of government of various societies that have been educated in the United States. For our Government to take too constrained an approach at this time of accepting people at our academic institutions can be very counterproductive of the national security interest of the United States.

We also look at national security as an implied constraint. But this is an exceptional example of why it should imply the exact reverse, and I just ask that you take that perspective back to the Department.

Finally, I was going to ask the question, but you addressed it in the end of your statement. It relates to the regional dimension of this particular conflict, particularly as it relates to Uganda and
Khartoum supporting certain Ugandan movements that may be unsettling to the Southern part of Sudan. I think you have indicated you have addressed this in your diplomacy, and I want to congratulate you on that.

Finally, I would echo two thoughts—or one thought of Mr. Lantos and upgrade it. He indicated that this was a tutorial session, but it is also reflective of diplomacy that is active, and we appreciate your leadership.

Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

Chairman HYDE. Excuse me, Mr. Payne. I am informed that Mr. Zoellick must leave at 12:30. So I would appreciate any succinctness we can muster in asking questions.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be as succinct as I can. Let me thank you once again for calling this very important hearing.

I want to make a point or two. First of all, I think it is quite clear that a comprehensive peace agreement clearly states that we should continue to provide aid to South Sudan regardless of the situation in Darfur, and so I hope that the Administration is clear that we are going to work—I would like to see more attention given to Darfur, but I don't think there should be an impact on the support for Southern Sudan.

Also, I would like to, as Mr. Leach said, this question of genocide that was declared by the House and the Senate and by Secretary Powell for the Administration, I was somewhat disturbed at your 2nd of June, 3rd, 4th meeting where you questioned whether genocide declaration was actually Mr. Powell's alone and not necessarily the Administration.

And of course, as Mr. Meeks mentioned, the downplaying of the number of deaths which, of course, are estimated, because they are difficult to get accurate numbers. But you are downgrading from 50,000 to 150,000 to from the 300,000 to 400,000 that had been indicated by NGOs on the ground. I think, in my opinion, that sends a wrong message.

That happened during World War II where one of our assistant secretaries testified before Congress, Breckenridge Long, that 520,000 Jews had been let into the United States at that time in 1942. Half of that number were let into the United States as refugees, and less than half of those were Jews.

So to allude to in one way we escalated numbers and to de-escalate I think, in my opinion, tends to send a wrong message. The fact that we have allowed the head of the intelligence organization from Sudan to come into our country, and now a high-level delegation is here, seems to me to be downplaying what is happening.

I think that the American people, 80 percent say we should be doing more. I have children writing books, sending pictures of where the deaths are happening in Sudan. I am not so sure that our Administration realizes the importance of this.

Just yesterday in New Jersey, a bill was passed to divest $5 billion of funds from the pension funds of New Jersey companies doing business in Sudan, regardless where they are from. The Assemblyman Payne—I am very proud of my brother—had the bill
pass in the House and Senate, and next week it will be signed by
the Governor of New Jersey.

The United States people are outraged. Even to say that in the
Nuremberg trials in 1948 they said it was simply crimes against
humanity. It is a disgrace that that is what it is allowed to be con-
sidered when the holocaust of 6 million Jews occurred. It should
not have occurred in the first place. But then in the Nuremberg
trials, to say it was just against humanity and therefore we should
perhaps not be so disturbed, that crimes against humanity may be
what we should call this and not really genocide.

I think we are going in the wrong direction. We are going down,
rather than up.

The question of tribalism is, you know, is the genocide—the
Janjaweed were recruited from the North. It had nothing to do
with the neighbors of people who lived in Darfur for years and al-
ways had little squabbles but worked it out. They were recruited,
armed, paid for and encouraged by the Government of Sudan; and
to talk about this long herd-versus-farmer issue, I think we are
sending the wrong message.

I think there should be a special envoy, that it is absolutely im-
possible for us to take this seriously without having a special
envoy. The longer we go without a special envoy dealing with this
situation once again proves to me that the Government of this
country is looking to end its policy against Sudan. I think there is
a move to try to normalize—these same people that we are putting
all our faith in were the same ones that allowed Osama bin Laden
to come in, the same ones that helped try to assassinate Mubarak,
the same ones that allowed the terrorist attack on our Embassies
in Dar-es-Salaam and in Nairobi; and these are the same people
that are brought over here with taxpayers money in an executive
jet to come to meet them in the United States.

I think it is wrong. I think the policy is wrong.

I would like to ask, is there going to be a special envoy appointed
for Sudan?

Mr. Zoellick. Congressman Payne, I think you have a number
of comments and questions in there; and I would like to try to ad-
dress them since others have been raised.

Let me start on the deaths, because I know this has been re-
ported. It’s probably of interest to many of you. I don’t know how
many people have died in Darfur. I don’t know of anybody who
does.

Mr. Payne. But you disputed the figures.

Mr. Zoellick. I will explain what I did.

Mr. Payne. Please.

Mr. Zoellick. And it is actually kind of interesting in light of
what you said.

I was asked by a reporter, “Does the State Department have an
estimate?” And rather than dissemble, rather than hide, I gave
them the estimate of our intelligence and research office, which is
now the explanation that is put on the Web site. And I explained
the range estimate, the period, and the covering sort of additional
deaths.

I will point out that the World Health Organization, from which
a lot of this is drawn, also did a collaborating—the Center for Re-
search on Epidemiology released a 42-page document about Darfur counting the deaths and mortality estimates for multiple survey data. And their numbers are about the same as the numbers that came out of our intelligence and research. The UN numbers are pretty close, and they haven’t even explained the origin.

Now you do have one estimate that has come from a group of about a 400,000 range, and that is based on an extrapolation from two sources, including some research that was funded by USAID, that tried to take the highest levels of violence and disease and uniformly apply them over a 26-month period, suggesting there was no change over this period.

Now I will add, Mr. Payne, when I mentioned to the reporters, I said, “I don’t know what the numbers are. There are higher-range estimates.”

It is actually kind of interesting. I was doing what, sometimes, the Congress urges U.S. officials to do, to be honest about their reports, explain the logic, explain the estimates; and then some people find that wrong. Well, to be honest, we want to have a truthful exchange. I am explaining to you what I know, the basis of the numbers. It is on the Web site. It is based by a series of studies. But, you know, people can draw their own estimates. But I frankly don’t think that is a point to be criticized for.

Second, on genocide—and, again, I am glad you raised this because it is important to clarify it. Because I think, and this is where you and I probably have a very strong agreement, there is very intense feeling out there in the country on this. I have talked to Jewish groups, Evangelical Christian groups, African American groups, which you and I are both encountering. So people want to know that their Government, the Executive Branch as well as the Congress, is intensely involved in this. I am trying to explain during the course of this—and people can criticize, make suggestions on how we do it. I don’t mean to presume we have all the solutions.

But on the genocide point, you are exactly right. Secretary Powell talked about it being genocide. The President talked about it being genocide. I talked about it being genocide when I was in Darfur with the Sudanese officials around.

However, the report that you are picking up was, again, another explanation where what I pointed out to some reporters was that after the United States found it was genocide, we urged the UN to do an investigation. The UN did an investigation. They came up—and this goes back to some of the points Mr. Leach mentioned—with crimes against humanity.

I don’t think crimes against humanity is a mild charge. Probably, indeed the reason you didn’t have genocide at the time of the Nuremberg trials, was that the term actually was invented afterward based on that experience. My point is, we find it genocide; the UN finds it crimes against humanity. Either compels our action.

Now other people that you and I work with—for example, President Mbeki is cautious about some of this terminology. My point is, we have got our position. I don’t really think the important thing is for us to get in a fight with the UN and South Africans. I want to try to work the problem. So no difference in terms of the findings, and I appreciate Mr. Leach’s point about what that signals in terms of overall support.
You also asked about the intelligence point, and this is something I think that Chairman Hyde mentioned as well. I think we can try to achieve both aims about counterterrorism and sending a message to the Government in Khartoum, and that is what we are trying to do.

The cooperation on counterterrorism has been important. It will continue to be important. But, again, just to give you a sense of how we try to do this is that, when the intelligence official came to the United States, we coordinated with the intelligence agencies. The State Department actually saw the intelligence official, and we coordinated with our intelligence officials to drive home the message that counterterrorism cooperation was not enough, that we had to have action on Darfur and the implementation of the North-South agreement.

Now let me explain why I think this is very important. There are different power centers in Khartoum. I mean, none of us know for sure about all of the relationships. I want the information going back through every channel of power in that system that we have to have action on Darfur and Sudan. So it is—you know, it is a point that I fully understand people's anxiety that you focus on counterterrorism, not others. That is not what we are doing. So, again, I think we have a shared view on that.

On special envoys, again, I know a point that is of symbolic importance for a lot of people is that—I have been mulling this over—I have talked about this with the Secretary, about whether we should appoint a special envoy on top of it. But here is the real challenge. Right now, I have been serving as the special envoy, and that has certain advantages for the United States. So I am in the meeting with the European Union, with the President, and I can press for food and I can talk to Sulana about this, that and the other thing. I have a rank around the world from past actions, current actions; and the Sudanese are aware of that, the Southerners are aware of that. It actually extends the reach of working on this problem, and that is one reason I was trying to describe it in some depth.

But you are also right. I have a lot of other things to do. So I am trying to figure out actually what combination of special representative, envoy or support—but, again, in the honest spirit that Mr. Lantos suggested, my caution on this is I don't want to suggest actually any lessening of interest. It says something to the world that, frankly, that I have been doing what I have been doing on this and I want to keep doing it. So that is the balance that we need to try to strike. So I am very much open to the idea about how to try to do that in a way that adds to our overall effectiveness.

Chairman Hyde. Mr. Smith of New Jersey.

Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I agree this is a very, very fine presentation, Mr. Secretary, that you provided to the Committee.

Let me just ask you, there is a historical frustration with the inability or the lack of honesty in using the genocide word. We saw it in Rwanda, when the previous Administration would not say that word. We saw it in the Balkans and, interestingly enough, the International Criminal Court meeting on Srebrenica and others,
those who have been held to account, have been convicted on the crime of genocide. But, at the time, there was an inability or an unwillingness to do so. We saw the same thing in Sudan itself, and it is frustrating because there is a degree—both are egregious wrongs. Genocide, and I have read the Genocide Convention many times, does compel action; however, it is not explicit as to what that action must be.

Let me ask you a couple of specific questions. What is the scope of the mandate of the African Union’s mission in Sudan with regards to civilian protection? We have heard some complaints that like Srebrenica, like other Balkans lessons that I hope we have learned—and July 11 will be, as you know, the 10th anniversary of the killing of some 8,000 people with Dutch peacekeepers basically meeting with Mladic and allowing the boarding of buses for people to go to slaughter. There has been some concern about the civilian protection issue, if you could touch on that.

Secondly, the capacity of the African Union peacekeeping mission to do its job, is the number right? Are 7,700 security forces up to 10,000, is that the right number? How is that arrived at? Should there be more? Is it 15,000? Is it 30,000? Do the African countries have that capability and capacity to provide more peacekeepers?

Thirdly, safeguards with regards to trafficking. I have held two hearings this year alone on the issue of rape of 13-year-olds and others in the Congo. And you know that zero tolerance very quickly became zero compliance when it came to many of those peacekeepers. But certainly many did a laudable job and are doing it in the Congo. But that is outrageous. What kind of safeguards are being put into place?

And, finally, on the issue of refugees, we know about Rwanda and other terrible tragedies in the past. Virtually none of those individuals were given the possibility of resettlement elsewhere. We know many people do want to be repatriated into their own homeland, but there are others for whom that is just not a viable option and durable solution. Will there be an effort? Is an effort being made to bring some of these people perhaps to the United States?

And, finally, on food aid, you pointed out 86 percent of the food aid delivered in Darfur is provided by the United States, 90 percent in non-Darfur Sudan. The World Food Programme says that 1.8 million people were fed in May; yet there were many hundreds of thousands that went unfed. What are we going to do to get our friends and allies to fork over more food aid to fill in that gap?

Mr. Zoellick. Okay, Mr. Smith, I think I got them, but fill me in if I haven’t.

On the mandate, the first one, we can get you the precise language about protection. In general, at least as I understand it, the African Union mandate is actually broader than the normal UN peacekeeping mandate. I am not sure that it covers what could be the sort of combat operations sort of side, but earlier this year, when the African Union reviewed its mandate, it came to the conclusion that it had enough flexibility within the current terminology that there is not a need to seek additional authority, but that they should exercise that authority more actively.

We said, by the way, we would always support an extension of the mandate, but, of course, they are an African force, they are Af-
rican boots on the ground. But, in addition, it comes back to what we have seen is, where the African Union forces are present, it has a major effect on the violence. Now that is in part because you no longer have the Government of Sudan and military actions. So this is where the diplomacy intersects. They no longer have the helicopters flying. They no longer have the gun ships. So the African Union is really trying to deal with rebels and Janjaweed militia. That is where that capability is and under that mandate seems to be able to handle, and now it is a question of more of them.

So going into your second question, on capacity, there are at least two elements. One is numbers, and I have described what we are trying to do to get the numbers up. And the Rwandans are ready. I have got a set of different countries, if you would want, that have committed battalions; and the Rwandans are sort of ready to go. We have actually worked out with our air transports starting to bring them in July. There are some that have partially committed, but we don't have it fully sort of nailed down yet.

But, in addition to the numbers, this is where our sort of financial support is important. Because we also have to have some communications, equipment, and others. Because you have a mobility issue here in being able to cover the camps and being able to get out quickly to villages and issues that sort of might be at risk.

I will mention, I guess, some possible risk is I know the Committee took on the peacekeeping fund in a most recent vote. You know, we took the $50 million for the African Union force from that peacekeeping fund. So please don't urge me to do more and then starve me at the same time. I mean, this is where the two really do come together.

In terms of the—I wrote down the trafficking of persons?

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Yes.

Mr. ZOELLICK. I want to make sure I have this. If it is the—in general, on trafficking of persons, you know that the Secretary had Sudan as a tier 3 country again.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. I am speaking about the peacekeepers——

Mr. ZOELLICK. Okay, and——

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY [continuing]. And whether or not they are going to be out training and monitoring to ensure that they don’t do what happened in the Congo.

Mr. ZOELLICK. From what I have seen, it is a very professional group. But it is a good caution and a good warning going forward.

You know, I know you have traveled to lots of different places in the world. I tried to go out to even some of the Northern camps with their smaller units. These are impressive people doing a very difficult job, and so I have had no sign of that, but it is a good caution.

On refugees and return, refugees—as you know, we deal with the non-internally displaced, so that is the people across the border, for example, Chad or some in Libya; and I think in Chad there is an estimate of about 200,000.

I think—again, this is a question that I am not sure any of us can answer today. One of the worries is will refugees or the internally displaced people be willing to go home? The sense that I got from talking to people in Sudan and talking to people who know
Sudan much better than I do is, if the peaceful conditions return, they do want to go home. These are people very tied to the land. But it still has some of these issues here that we talked about in terms of the water and the land rights and sort of others; and that would include, I believe, you know, the refugees in Chad.

So the goal here again is to keep the conditions where people want to go home, feel they are safe to go home, have a chance to rebuild their lives. So we haven't yet gotten to the question of, well, what if they don't, which is the other question I think is inherent in that.

Mr. Smith of New Jersey. The point is, we never got to that question on Rwanda; and the offer of resettlement was not provided to those individuals.

Mr. Zoellick. And then, fifth, on the food aid, we are trying to do a number of things. We are working—and I know you make efforts on this, too—with the World Food Organization to talk to others. The European Union—traditionally, we provide about 50 percent of the food. The European Union normally is a big donor. I think they got caught in some of their own bureaucratic processes.

So I am modestly hopeful, after the push that we have done over the past couple days, that they will expedite it. They provide money to buy the food. We normally provide the food. But it is an issue that, of course, needs bearing attention. And you can all help us on this. There is, obviously, the G–8 Summit. Everybody is talking about concerns for Africa, and I keep saying if Europe is concerned about Africa, help us get some food to these people.


Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Deputy Secretary.

Let me say a couple of things. First of all, the United States is engaged in a major operation of war in Iraq, $350 billion, under the premise that there were weapons of mass destruction. We don’t know when the end of the war will be.

I want to ask you, with regard to Sudan, given the magnitude of the military involvement in Iraq, what have discussions been within the State Department with regard to a peacemaking force in the Sudan? And I am not talking about invading or bombing the country, but I am talking about putting together an international force. I don't believe there was much criticism, and I have to ask you if the African Union is troubled by that.

If, in fact, we wanted to do that in order to stop this horrendous carnage, I don't believe that there was much criticism with regard to the British forces in Sierra Leone or the French and Belgian troops in the Congo. So the first thing I want to know, is what the dialogue has been about that. Again, I am not talking about invading or bombing a country, but I am talking about peacemaking troops.

Secondly, I want to find out from you if the United States is considering lifting sanctions. We hear that you may be, but yet you didn’t mention that, I believe—I don’t believe, in your statement.

Along with Congressman Payne, my State in California, we are moving toward divestment. There are at least 44 companies with the California Pension Retirement System doing business or with investment in the Sudan, 8 billion plus. We are trying to figure out
how much. But the consideration of lifting sanctions, I think, sends
the wrong message if that is what you are trying to do.

And, thirdly, let me ask you, with regard to the Arab world and
Arab leaders, I met with the President of Algeria, high-level Egyp-
tian officials, the President of Egypt. Quite frankly, I was very dis-
appointed with their response in terms of their understanding of
what was taking place as it relates to genocide; and I am won-
dering how we are weighing in with the Arab world to bring this
in focus in terms of the death and destruction and the raping of
the women and the destroying of the villages and all of the geno-
cidal acts that are taking place.

So those would be my three questions to you.

Mr. Zoellick. Okay, let me start with the last one, because it
actually connects to Mr. Payne's a little bit in that this is a bal-
ance, frankly, of sort of time and level, because I work on other
Egyptian issues, including some on the economic side and the de-
mocracy side. I have actually raised with the Prime Minister of
Egypt and others when he was here about the importance of being
able to come back to them and work with them on some of these
exact concerns to send the right message.

Egypt has tended to play a constructive role related to some of
the reconciliation that has been done in the North. There was a re-
cent sort of agreement on this. But I agree with your general point,
that I think the sort of recognition across the Arab world about the
genocide in Darfur has not been as great as one would like it to
be.

Just to take that a step further, it is also—again, where you can
interconnect these pieces—when I was in Jordan and talking with
King Abdullah, who also has some ties with the Government in
Sudan but has been a very good friend of the United States, again,
I was starting to make the point that I may need him at times to
make pressure on some of these players.

Libya plays a role, as al-Ghadafi has tried to play a role. It is
a little uncertain as to whether now it is trying to reach peace or
just add to their influence in the process.

So you know, each country is varied; and we are trying to work
with those players in addition to trying to work with the African
countries as part of creating the right context for the program that
I have outlined here.

Taking it in reverse order, in lifting sanctions, I don't know
where that has come from. We have not had any sort of plans to
lift sanctions.

Now, one thing is you have this Government of National Unity,
and depending on what their actions are over time—John Garang
is part of this government. That is something that, of course, we
may or may not get to the point where we discuss with players,
with the Congress and others, but that requires major change of
actions along the way. It requires a change of the government ac-
cording to the overall strategy. But we don't have any plans to lift
sanctions.

I will add, there are about five or six different types of sanctions,
okay? So one that does get discussed is that there is a—about their
position in terms of cooperation and terrorism, and there is a—I
forgot the right term. They are classified as having not been coop-
ervative to terrorism. Frankly, they have been cooperating on terrorism. But even if that one were changed, you would still have the series of others that wouldn't allow the types of economic interaction.

Then on the peacemaking question—and, again, I don't mean to split terms here, but I am going to try to answer what I think—the focus on peacemaking in that term of art tends to be more of a sort of a military action, and I think what you are focusing on would be more the kind of enforcement or peacekeeping-type of operations. But if I am wrong, correct me, and——

Ms. LEE. Well, yes, but military presence to bring—to help secure the peace.

Mr. ZOELLICK. Okay. On that, I do think, Congresswoman, there would be sensitivities on the African side on this; and that is what I was trying to answer to Mr. Lantos' question.

The African Union has taken this as a belief that Africa needs to empower itself to deal with Africa's problems, of course with the support of others. So we have—and this is one of the things that Secretary Rice is personally engaged in. We talked to President Konare, the former President of Mali, who is now head of the African Union, about making sure they would be comfortable with the NATO support presence. But I do think there would be a difficulty with that.

And there would also be the problem—I think it was Mr. Lantos' question I mentioned—is that if you had the American or western European troops, I honestly don't know what this could trigger with some of the dangerous people you have there. I am thinking here of the Somali incident. I think we all agree you have got some bloodthirsty, cold-hearted killers here. How do they use some of these things against the purpose?

So if we can make the African Union forces work, that is the best of all. Then they can't say, "Oh, it is the United States, or the British or the colonial powers, that are telling Sudan what to do. By the way, let's bring in new terrorist killers to go after them." So that is why the focus has been on trying to get the African Union forces to work.

But we have—to complete this, we have discussed with DoD and others about the type of support and logistics. And sometimes—when I was in Darfur the first time, I was taken around by a Lieutenant Colonel Ron Capps, who is the Foreign Service Officer who was called up as a reservist. He was with me in the Darfur camps, and he is now back on a rotation in the United States, I hope to see him this week. So we did have some forces there.

Ms. LEE. Do you think 10,000 to 12,000 AU troops is sufficient?

Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady's time has expired some time ago. Sorry, Mr. Zoellick.

Mr. ZOELLICK. Sorry.

Chairman HYDE. Ms. McCollum is recognized for 30 seconds.

Ms. McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chair. No more time for questions, but in light of the fact that the U.S. Government is corroborating and collaborating with a state sponsor of terror, a country that is conducting, as we have discussed today, genocide against its own people, I would ask unanimous consent that this Committee formally schedule a classified briefing at the highest security level
possible with senior officials of the Department of State and the CIA to provide Members of this Committee with the counterterrorism and intelligence provided to the United States Government officials that allows us to work so closely with the Government of Sudan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

I seek unanimous consent to include the written testimony of Elizabeth Kidder, Director of Survivors United to Save the Women of Darfur, in the record.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kidder follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. ELISABETH T. KIDDER, DIRECTOR, SURVIVORS UNITED TO SAVE THE WOMEN OF DARFUR

CIVILIAN PROTECTION IN DARFUR IS ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE LASTING PEACE IN THE SOUTH SUDAN

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Lantos, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity for Survivors United to Save the Women of Darfur (Survivors United) to submit written testimony for the record. We appreciate your interest in gathering a variety of perspectives on the important issues of the genocide in Darfur, implementation of the Sudan North-South peace agreement and America's role and responsibilities in relation to the two.

Survivors United is an organization comprised primarily of women who have experienced sexual violence at some point in their lives, and because they intimately know its devastating effects, are committed to bringing about an end to the ongoing genocidal rape of women and girls by Government of Sudan soldiers and their proxy militia, the Janjaweed.

CIVILIAN PROTECTION MATTERS MOST—even if this means unilateral action by the United States armed forces

If you take one thing away from this written testimony, we hope it will be this: there is still time to save lives in Darfur. Please keep civilian protection at the forefront of U.S. policy options. Every day women and girls in Darfur, many already traumatized by the loss of their loved ones and the horrifying living conditions in which they now find themselves, suffer unspeakable horrors at the hands of GoS soldiers and the Janjaweed.

UN and Administration officials continue to call for a “political solution” to the genocide in Darfur, ignoring both the reality on the ground and the lessons of the past. Anthony Lake, who served as President Clinton’s national security advisor during the genocide in Rwanda, now believes that it is incredibly dangerous to rely on “political solutions” or “peace agreements” alone. “[You’re always supposed to be for a peace process,” Lake said during an interview with PBS’s Frontline, “and you’re always supposed to believe they will succeed. In fact, they seldom succeed, if they’re not backed up by the realities on the ground and by the threat or the use of power.”

Romeo Dallaire perhaps said it best: “I am afraid that moral condemnation, trade penalties and military efforts by African countries are simply not going to be enough to stop the killing—not nearly enough.”

THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE THAT THE AFRICAN UNION WILL EVER MEET THE PROTECTION NEEDS IN DARFUR

To maintain security in Bosnia after hostilities ended, NATO sent 50,000 troops, and the same size force was sent to Kosovo in 1999. Kosovo, at roughly 4,000 square miles is 2.5% of the land area of Darfur. At the date of this writing, a total of 2,300 AU troops have been deployed to Darfur. Although the African Union has set a goal of 7,000 troops by September, there is no credible evidence to indicated that this will occur. The GoS equipped the Janjaweed with weaponry such as G4 assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, AK47s, Doshka 12.7mm tripod mounted machine guns, and Hound rocket launcher systems. If the situation were not so tragic, the

NATO's peacekeeping manual advises "mission success requires that the PSF must be adequately led, trained, organized, equipped and armed. This will give it credibility with the parties and thereby the ability to achieve its operational objectives." The manual specifically states that in situations of genocide, "only a PSF prepared for combat can operate in such an environment, curtail human rights abuses, and create a secure environment in which civilian agencies can redress the underlying causes of the conflict and address the requirements of peace building." According to NATO, for any peacekeeping operation to be effective, "it must be credible and perceived as such. The credibility of the operation is a reflection of the parties' assessment of the force's capability to accomplish the mission. . . . There should be no doubt that it is fully capable of carrying out its responsibilities and is supported by the political will to do so. Therefore the national military components must be well equipped and self sufficient, as well as prepared and trained for their mission."4

The African Union is a fledgling security organization, and while their achievements in Darfur are laudable, they are not equipped to accomplish the most vital task of protection.

In an article published in the New York Times in April 2005, Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked, "We know what is happening in Darfur. The question is, why are we not doing more to put an end to it?" Annan continued:

"[G]iving aid without protection is like putting a Band-Aid on an open wound. Unarmed aid workers, while vitally necessary, cannot defend civilians from murder, rape or violent attack. Our collective failure to provide a much larger force is as pitiful and inexcusable as the consequences are grave for the tens of thousands of families who are left unprotected."

Colin Powell, in an interview on the Michael Reagan radio show in September 2004 acknowledged:

"[W]e must bear in mind that the 3,000 to 5,000 troops presently contemplated are not nearly sufficient for a true peacekeeping mission in an area the size of France—facing threats from not only the insurgency forces, but regime-allied militia (Janjaweed) forces, pervasive banditry that has come in the wake of conflict, as well as Khartoum's regular military, security, and "police" forces. . . . Credible assessments by military experts suggest that the necessary peacekeeping force is in the range of 50,000 troops."5

Intervention by a multinational peacekeeping force is the approach favored by the people who really matter to this discussion: the Fur, Masselit and Zagawha tribes targeted by the GoS in Darfur. Samantha Power, author of A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, found that "almost all the displaced Africans [she] spoke with in Darfur said they would trust only Western forces to bring peace. African troops were too susceptible to bribes, they said, and African governments would end up siding with Khartoum, as they had in the past."6 Similarly, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour noted that the IDPs "expressed their faith and total dependence on the international community for protection—this is where they think their security lies."7 On October 15, UN Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guehenno added his voice to those calling for international intervention, arguing that, "[e]fforts by industrialized countries to train troops from Africa in peacekeeping are welcome but cannot substitute for those nations deploying their own forces to the continent."8

Because the force is simply not equipped to do the job, Khartoum has been free to operate in a theatre with zero accountability despite the presence of the African Union. It is imperative that current AU contingent in Darfur be augmented by a peace enforcement force that has the kind of training, interoperability, and communications, intelligence and transport capabilities that is the hallmark of the United States Armed Forces.

3 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS, AJP—3.4.1 ¶ 0209 (March 2002) [hereinafter NATO PSO].
4 NATO PSO at ¶ 0334 (emphasis added).
5 Power, supra.
An end to the genocide in Darfur is critical to the success of the North-South peace agreement. How are Africans in the South supposed to trust in a peace agreement as they watch the GoS slaughter Africans in the West using the exact same means that they used to kill two million South Sudanese? The instability caused by the Darfur crisis further diminishes the already shaky odds that The Comprehensive Peace Agreement will be a success. As Secretary General Kofi Annan pointed out in an article for a recent issue of Foreign Affairs, “[h]alf of all civil wars that appear to have been resolved by peace agreements tragically slide back into conflict within five years. This slip can have catastrophic consequences . . . .”8

Despite the aggressive rhetoric of Khartoum on the subject of foreign military deployment for protection of civilians in Darfur, the North-South peace agreement is more likely to fall apart absent an end to the Darfur genocide. In fact, a study by the Salzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, “empirically demonstrated that the presence of international peacekeepers has an observable positive impact in solidifying peace when compared to situations when belligerents are left to their own devices to make or honor a peace agreement.”9

Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism William Pope recently testified to the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation that, “[f]rom long experience, we know that impersonal training or equipment packages cannot be simply dropped into the hands of our partners and reasonably be expected to get results,” rather, effective peacekeeping operations in Darfur will require, “customized programs, hands-on training, locally appropriate equipment, and ongoing mentoring. . . . [and] frequent, face-to-face contact . . . .”10

FUTURE RESOLUTIONS MUST CONTAIN A CREDIBLE THREAT: THREE POSSIBLE OPTIONS

Before discussing two possible solutions to the protection gap in Darfur that will likely have great influence over the behavior of the GoS, we believe that it is necessary to briefly discuss an option that will not. Survivors United takes the position that a no-fly zone, even if it enforced by the United States, is inadequate to protect the people in Western Sudan. There are several reasons we take this position. First, Khartoum has already destroyed a majority of the African tribes’ villages with aerial bombardment and displaced the population to camps, and while these attacks have by no means stopped, this phase of the genocide is largely over.

Second, the majority of the survivors of the genocide are women and girls who fear not an air attack, but the daily trek to gather firewood. A no-fly zone will not protect them from kidnapping and sexual torture by the Janjaweed. Third, the Security Counsel already put a no-fly provision in the last resolution (1591),11 so an additional one would be illogical backtracking. Furthermore, despite the fact that the Security Council, by authorizing the no-fly zone under Chapter VII in resolution 1591, impliedly threatened Khartoum with military action should they violate it, the bombing has not stopped; the Janjaweed have not been disarmed, the murder and rape continues, and at least 50,000 people have died.

If a no-fly zone is the approach Congress is going to take, it is essential that the Government of Sudan understand, from the language of the resolution itself, that a single violation will result in immediate military action by the United States. Otherwise, the threat will not be taken seriously. If provisions are written in such a way that NATO, the UN or the EU are required to get involved in order for the no-fly zone to be enforced, Khartoum will view them as largely an exercise in impotent political rhetoric.

The wording of future legislation passed by Congress matters greatly a deal. Hollow threats or symbolic legislation will be counterproductive, because it will decrease the credibility of the U.S. and derail the momentum of advocacy groups because the public will believe that the U.S. has taken action to stop the genocide. Included in

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8Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom: Decision Time at the UN, Foreign Affairs (May/June 2005)


the appendices of this testimony is model legislation drafted by Survivors United implementing a no-fly zone over Darfur. It cannot be emphasized enough, however, that a no-fly zone alone, unlike the solutions described below, is not an adequate solution to the civilian protection gap in Darfur.

SOLUTION ONE: A U.S. PEACE ENFORCEMENT BRIGADE

Little could be more counter-productive than a perceived failure of the United States to intervene militarily to stop genocide in a second Muslim nation at this time. "There’s no way to ensure American security without understanding that genocide and allowing it imperils U.S. security," journalist Samantha Power explains. "Not only is it totally wrong to allow it as a global community... but it actually is the case that Bosnia, the failed state that was allowed to rot, became a training ground for Osama Bin Laden."12

Years of inaction in Bosnia left more than 300,000 dead, and damaged the reputation and credibility of the United States in ways that our nation would not fully understand for several years. Three years before the NATO air strikes, a London newspaper ran a piece that angrily denounced UN inaction:

"in Bosnia-Herzegovina... massacres that send shivers in the body and shake the conscience. All of this and the world watch and hear, and not only didn’t respond to these atrocities, but also with a clear conspiracy between the USA and its allies and under the cover of the iniquitous United Nations, the dispossessed people were even prevented from obtaining arms to defend themselves. ... All false claims and propaganda about 'Human Rights' were hammered down and exposed by the massacres that took place against the Muslims."13

Bin Laden’s fatwa, Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places, like the genocide it referenced, barely scratched the surface of American collective consciousness when it was published in 1996. It was not until the message was repeated on a videotape in November 2001 that the real impact of our failure to act in Bosnia came to light. On the tape, bin Laden refers to, "a war of genocide in Bosnia in sight and hearing of the entire world..."14

By ignoring the genocide and continuing to cooperate with Sudan, the U.S. is "sending the wrong signal about U.S. values and intentions," which will inevitably "lead to increased animosity against the U.S., exacerbating the potential for violent rebellion against the regime and its perceived allies."15

On the other hand, living our values will redeem the United States’ reputation in the international community. Reflecting on the genocide in Rwanda, Chaim Kaufmann writes, "The rest of the world does not act because the United States does not."16 Because the Congress, the Secretary of State and the President have all labeled the atrocities in Darfur "genocide", it is essential that the United States lead the effort to protect civilians. The authors of The Responsibility to Protect note that, "[i]n mobilizing political support for intervention for human protection purposes, as for anything else, a great deal comes down to the leadership of key individuals and organizations. Someone, somewhere has to pick up the case and run with it."17 In this case, the United States has already assumed this role, and because of this, another call for a "stronger AU force" or "more AU troops" will be a painfully hollow gesture. As a senior DoD official recently remarked, "the United States can only expect to maintain its credibility as leader in such situations if it demonstrates the willingness to commit its own forces."18

Many people believe that, because of the war in Iraq, the military is "stretched too thin" to intervene in Darfur. This viewpoint is reminiscent of the "peacekeeping fatigue" of the early 1990s (Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti and other conflicts resulted in repeated interventions by the United Nations and United States) that prevented President Clinton from sending troops to Rwanda to stop the genocide in 1994. The
truth is, not only is the United States capable of contributing troops to a multinational intervention force, but it is in the best interest of the military to do so. The ability of the United States Armed Forces to spare the troops required to intervene in Darfur has recently been reaffirmed by both the President and the Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, Congressman Duncan Hunter. The President was recently asked if he felt that the number of troops deployed in Iraq was limiting his options elsewhere in the world. He responded,

“The person to ask that to, the person I ask that to, at least, is to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, my top military advisor. I say, do you feel that we’ve limited our capacity to deal with other problems because of our troop levels in Iraq? And the answer is, no, he doesn’t feel we’re limited. He feels like we’ve got plenty of capacity.”

As was emphasized by Congressman Hunter during his appearance on the Washington Journal television show on C-Span, there are 2.5 million people in America’s defense establishment, and only 140,000—less than 10%—are currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Mr. Hunter said, this country has the capability to put 5000 troops—more than double the current AU force—on the ground in Darfur tomorrow to protect women and girls from gang-rape and children from being burnt alive. Why then, would Congress not authorize the President to deploy that brigade should Khartoum continue to commit unspeakable crimes in Darfur?

**SOLUTION TWO: PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS UNDER U.S. COMMAND AND CONTROL**

If the Congress is unwilling to risk the lives of its soldiers to stop genocide and protect the people of Darfur, another option is to bring the power of the largest economy in the world to bear on Sudan by appropriating the funds necessary to deploy a peace enforcement force provided by private firms operating under U.S. command and control. This option has emerged from the shadow of past debacles, and is now considered to be a workable solution in cases that nations are unable or unwilling to deploy adequate force to intervene in a crisis. Organizations such as the International Peace Operations Association, an association of companies that support international peace and stability operations, have developed detailed codes of conduct and standards, and are often able to deploy faster than even NATO. In fact, the United States already employs these companies in Iraq.

Military provider firms would most likely be the least expensive option, short of deploying U.S. troops. The majority of private security personnel are fully trained former members of the police or military. The findings of Executive Outcomes, a private security firm that operated in the 1990s, are worth quoting at length:

“Executive Outcomes performed a business exploration of whether it would have had the capacity to intervene in Rwanda in 1994. Internal plans claim that the company could have had armed troops on the ground within 14 days of its hire and been fully deployed with over 1,500 of its own soldiers, along with air and fire support (roughly the equivalent of the U.S. Marine force that first deployed into Afghanistan), within six weeks. The cost for a six-month operation to provide protected safe havens from the genocide was estimated at $150 million (around $600,000 a day). This private option compares quite favorably with the eventual U.N. relief operation, which deployed only after the killings. The U.N. operation ended up costing $3 million a day (and did nothing to save hundreds of thousands of lives).”

While Survivors United believes that it is in the best interest of the U.S. military to participate in peacekeeping operations, and would prefer that Congress authorize the President to use United States Armed Forces to stop genocide in Darfur, as we have emphasized, the most important objective is civilian protection, and therefore fully endorse the use of private military provider firms under U.S. command and control.

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21. Contrary to popular wisdom, there are also economic incentives to intervention. As NATO explained, “engagement by a credible PSF will generally prove the most cost effective option in the longer term.” NATO FSO at ¶ 0422.
22. P.W. Singer, Peacekeepers, Inc., POLICY REVIEW.
CONCLUSION

It has been nearly a year since Congress declared that genocide was occurring in Darfur, and since that resolution was passed, more than 350,000 people have died. Again and again, over a period of more than a year, our nation’s leaders have pledged, meaninglessly, never again to stand by without taking action to prevent genocide. It is essential that Congress carefully craft the language of future resolutions so that there is no question in the minds of the leadership in Sudan as to the seriousness of the U.S. government’s commitment to do whatever is necessary to stop the murder and rape of Africans in Darfur.

Thank you again for this chance to share the perspectives of Survivors United to Save the Women of Darfur.

APPENDIX A

AUTHORIZATION OF A NO–FLY ZONE TO PROTECT CIVILIANS IN DARFUR SUDAN

(a) Enforcement of a no-fly zone pursuant to resolution 1591.
(1) The Congress finds that, in resolution 1591 (2005), the Security Council created a no-fly zone prohibiting the Government of Sudan from conducting flights using military air traffic and non-military aircraft performing military missions, including reconnaissance or logistics, in and over the Darfur region of the Sudan.
(2) The President shall take measures, including military action and the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with the no-fly zone described in subsection (1).
(3) In order to carry out his responsibilities for the management during the fiscal year 2005 of operations conducted under subsection (2), the President may——
   (A) utilize options that employ technological capabilities to intercept and jam communications between the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed; and
   (B) make use of equipment such as aerostats, airships, or unmanned aerial vehicles to achieve situational awareness.
   (C) assign members of the Armed Forces of the United States to perform necessary functions with respect to such operations. Members of the Armed Forces assigned under this subsection shall have as their primary functions logistics management, transportation, fiscal management, and contract administration.
   (D) direct the drawdown of commodities and services from the inventory and resources of any agency of the United States Government of an aggregate value not to exceed $100,000,000.00 in any fiscal year.
(4) There are authorized to be appropriated to the President such sums as may be necessary to reimburse the applicable appropriation, fund, or account for commodities and services provided under subsection (3).
(5) It is the sense of the Congress that the U.S. should encourage NATO and the EU to contribute similar support to conduct operations under subsection (2).
As a part of the credible threat, Congress must indicate that, should the President choose to take measures to enforce the no-fly zone, it will be fully funded (see provisions (3)(b) and (4)).

APPENDIX B


SURVIVORS UNITED TO SAVE THE WOMEN OF DARFUR
PRESS RELEASE

Representative Duncan Hunter, Chair of the House Armed Services Committee, appeared on C-Span’s morning talk show, Washington Journal last week. Elisabeth Kidder, Director of Survivors United to Save the Women of Darfur (survivorsunited.com), as a call-in guest, was able to ask Rep. Hunter a question.
Since late 2003, Survivors United has called on the President and Congress to work with the UN, NATO, the EU or act unilaterally if necessary, to ensure that an effective, capable and credible peace enforcement force is deployed to Darfur to protect civilians.

The first line of argument for those who oppose US involvement to stop the genocide usually involves the war in Iraq and its effect on the nation’s military. With this in mind, Kidder asked Rep. Hunter whether the US could “field a brigade [5,000 troops] tomorrow” if necessary, or if critics were correct that the Armed Forces are dangerously overstretched.

The following was Representative Hunter’s answer to the Director’s question:
Oh absolutely! We have, there are about 2.5 million Americans in the defense establishment. That is active and reserve and guard. There’s 140,000 of those personnel, that’s less than 10%, in Iraq and about another 20,000 in Afghanistan. So in terms of personnel you have a 2.5 million person force just to make it very simply broad terms and 140,000 of those persons—that’s less than 10%—are in the war fighting theatres. And you have obviously other Americans deployed around the world. But those are the two war fighting theatres.

So yes, if the question is, are we totally tied down to the point that we couldn’t put a brigade out to handle a brush fire, the answer is, absolutely, we could handle that brush fire. Now if you get to the point where you’re asking about major wars . . . let’s say we had a major land war—we could handle it. We’d have to handle it in a different way than perhaps we’ve handled it in the past.

We could handle a major war. Nonetheless, we put into the defense bill an additional 20,000 Army personnel last year and an additional 2,000 United States Marines and we’re putting in an additional 10,000 on the Army side an additional 1000 marines on the Core side. I think we do need to bolster the force, but again, you have a 2.5 million person military and only 140,000 of those folks are in Iraq and only about 20,000 in Afghanistan.23

Given the confidence of Rep. Hunter in the capability of the United States Armed Forces, Survivors United calls on him to co-sponsor H.R. 1424, the Darfur Genocide Accountability Act, which would give the President the ability to do whatever is necessary to stop the genocide that has taken 400,000 lives in Western Sudan.

Chairman Hyde. The last questioner before our Secretary has to go, Mr. Tancredo.

Mr. Tancredo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Deputy Secretary.

If the Ranking Member’s comments earlier on were correct—and, first of all, I certainly agree with his characterization of your presentation. But if he was correct in that, because you did so well in preparing for this and delivering the information, that from this point on your testimony will always be received by the Full Committee. That is a fulfillment of the old adage that no good deed goes unpunished.

Mr. Zoellick. I was thinking the same thing.

Mr. Tancredo. I am sure you were. I am just saying it for you. I will only ask one question and then yield what time I might have left to Mr. Burton, as he has a question or two also.

Mine deals specifically with the ICC. I met not too long ago with the chief prosecutor. We talked to him about what it is he may need from us, what help he may need from us. I just want to make sure that there are no problems, to the best of your knowledge, that would prevent us from being able to supply him with whatever information he needs in having American officials work with him.

I know, of course, in referring to the fact that we abstained from the resolution, that set the ICC in motion on this issue. But there is, of course, that provision in law in the American Service Members Protection Act which permits the U.S. Government to render assistance in efforts to bring to justice Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, Osama bin Laden, other members of al-Qaeda, other leaders of Islamic Jihad and the other foreign nationals accused of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. So with that proviso and with the amendment that we added to the State Department authorization, do you see any obstacles that would pre-

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vent us from being able to provide the kind of support that you may need to pursue his quest for justice through the ICC?

Mr. Zoellick. I don’t. If I learn of any, I will get back to you on it.

Mr. Tancredo. Thank you.

Mr. Zoellick. The section that you mentioned I looked at too; and I know of the amendment that you had proposed to this.

If I could, Mr. Tancredo——

Mr. Tancredo. Certainly.

Mr. Zoellick. If I could, Mr. Tancredo, I also want to make sure our lawyers talk to your staff. When I read the amendment once, I was worried it might accidently limit us in one way, which I know is not your purpose. So if we could have a little freedom to follow up with you, but the purpose is the same.

Mr. Tancredo. Okay. Although I am intimidated by having your lawyers talk to my staff, because I don’t have any lawyers on my staff.

Mr. Zoellick. Well, they may do better.

Mr. Tancredo. I yield the balance of my time to Mr. Burton.

Mr. Burton. First of all, let me just say that in World War II when Churchill worked with Stalin, he said he would work with the devil himself if it meant the defeat of Hitler, or words to that effect. So I understand sometimes the necessity of sometimes dealing with somebody in a country like the Sudan who may have been involved directly or indirectly with the genocide. I just can’t figure out why they brought him to the United States. Looks like they could have met with these people outside the country, which would have reduced this problem.

One question I have, Mr. Secretary, is that some time ago, during the Clinton Administration—I think even before that—there were several terrorist training camps in and around Khartoum and the Sudan. Al-Qaeda was being trained there and even Osama bin Laden was there one time.

What I would like to know, is there information that there are still training camps in Khartoum or around Khartoum and in the Sudan? If so, are we getting any information on that? If you can give us that.

Mr. Zoellick. I do not know of any. Chairman Wolf, who as we know has a strong interest in these issues, brought to my attention a report—I think it was actually also covered in the Washington Times recently. We brought—some FBI and intelligence people met with the people that had the report. He was kind enough to invite some of the people from the State Department there as well.

They are obviously pursuing it, because of the history that you mention. We do not have any verification of that, you know, at this time, but it is something that one needs to continue to pursue.

Chairman Hyde. Well, I want to thank you, Mr. Zoellick, for your marvelous testimony, very instructive. This is obviously a matter that will continue to occupy our attention, and we look forward to hearing from you again very soon.

Mr. Zoellick. Thank you, Chairman.

Chairman Hyde. Thank you. The Committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:37, the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT MENENDEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

As you all know, Sudan has been ravaged by over two decades of civil war and the recent crisis and genocide in Darfur, in Western Sudan, has only added to that devastation.

The US Congress has declared that the atrocities in Darfur are genocide and the Bush Administration blamed the Government of Sudan for the ongoing genocide. Let us remember that the Sudanese government is responsible for the killing of up to 300,000 people since 2003, and the displacement of 1.9 million people.

And the violence and fear has not ended.

The government supported Janjaweed, and their militia allies, continue to carry out violence against civilians, including the murder of men, women and children.

The government even continues to intimidate and punish those who speak out against rape and violence, including aid workers.

The authoritarian government of Sudan, which seized power in 1989, represses freedom of assembly, association, movement and speech.

That is why, while I am glad that our government took the lead in calling these atrocities genocide, I am concerned by recent Administration statements which seem to be backtracking and the lack of real follow-through in confronting the Khartoum government. I think we must be very cautious about taking it easy on the Government of Sudan either in the name of security or out of fear of disrupting the North-South peace process.

I recall that the President said, in reference to the war on terror, “You are either with us or against us.” I believe, when it comes to stopping genocide, you are either with us or against us. That’s why I cannot understand how the US government could fly a high-level intelligence official from Sudan to meet with government officials here in the United States at tax payer expense. This is a man who is largely responsible for the atrocities in Darfur. What kind of message does that send to the Government of Sudan?

We cannot and should not send a signal of recognition or reconciliation to the Government of Sudan, which our own President has accused of committing genocide.

We must send a clear message that the Government of Sudan must completely divorce itself from the Janjaweed and guarantee that those who participated in or who are complicit in genocide are brought to justice.

I, too, am glad that Sudan is, according to the State Department report on terrorism, improving its cooperation with the US on terrorism. But they still must be held accountable for the devastation and genocide in Darfur.

The Humanitarian Crisis

When it comes to hunger in Darfur, the bottom line right now is that we have the illusion of stability.

But the reality is there is no sustainable source of food in Darfur. There are no crops and there will be no crops. There will be no food and no basis for an economy. The minute that international food aid goes away, the illusion of stability will end.

So we cannot hide behind the current illusion of stability. First, we must take action to guarantee that food supplies will not run out by getting the donor community not only to commit but to actually provide the money for food. Second, we must eventually create a secure environment so that people can return to their homes or find new land to plant their own food, restart their economy and their lives.
We cannot forget that this is the worst humanitarian crisis that the world faces today. And, even if peace came today, that crisis would not be over.

**New Jersey Legislation on Sudan**

I believe that each of us must take action to stop genocide. That is why I am a strong supporter, in my own State of New Jersey, of legislation which would prohibit New Jersey from investing certain public funds in companies that do business in Sudan. The bill will require the State of New Jersey to divest state administered pension funds from companies, banks, and financial institutions that have ties to Sudan, without requiring any premature sale investments that would hurt the State of New Jersey.

As we learned from South Africa, money talks, and we cannot allow our public money to support the genocide in Sudan.

All of us here today, politicians, Americans and global citizens cannot make the same mistakes that we did in the Armenian, the Jewish, the Bosnian, and the Rwandan genocides.

The people of Sudan need our help and they need it now. While the recent pledges of aid to Africa are both welcome and necessary, we must ensure that the money is getting where it needs to go; is helping the people who need it most; and is not taking away from other development/assistance programs. But above all, we must ensure that these promises do in fact turn into food and assistance for the Sudanese people.

There will be no peace in Sudan without the help of the international community. Together, we have an obligation to intervene and put an end to the devastation and human suffering in Sudan and work towards a sustainable peace.

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**RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE ROBERT B. ZOELLICK, DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONSSubmitted FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE DIANE E. WATSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

**Question:**

*What is your expected time-line for the implementation of the measures you outlined in your testimony (e.g. deployment of troops, providing food to displaced persons)?*

**Response:**

We fully support the African Union Mission in Sudan’s (AMIS) planned expansion from approximately 2,700 to 7,700 personnel. Deployment of additional African Union (AU) troops from Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, and Kenya began July 1 and will continue through September 2005.

Food aid programs for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other vulnerable groups in Sudan are ongoing. The United Nations World Food Program (WFP) is responsible for over 90% of food deliveries to all areas of Sudan, including Darfur, southern Sudan, eastern Sudan, and transitional areas. USAID and WFP have identified priority areas for food delivery in southern Sudan and transitional areas like Southern Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains, and Abyei. USAID and WFP will continue to work to ensure that the needs of IDPs, returnees, and other vulnerable people in these areas are met. We are currently funding 86% of food deliveries to Darfur and 90% of food deliveries to southern Sudan. We are also working to leverage other donor resources for food aid to southern Sudan to ensure that the WFP operation has sufficient resources to deliver through the year.

**Question:**

*What more can the United States Government do to compel the Government of Sudan to disarm the militias?*

**Response:**

Disarmament of militias is key to a lasting peace in Darfur. The Government of Sudan (GOS) must comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions demanding that the government cease support for militias in Darfur. We fully support the U.N. Security Council resolutions that call for disarming militias and are pressing the government diplomatically to comply. In every meeting with senior GOS officials in Washington and Khartoum, we underscore the need for the Government of Sudan to take proactive steps to cease support for militias and to take steps to hold those responsible for atrocities accountable.
The United States sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1591 which provides for targeted sanctions, including a visa ban and asset freeze, against those who impede the search for peace, as another expression of our determination to pressure those most responsible for the continuation of the conflict. UN Resolutions also call for a ban on military flights and an arms embargo—all intended to hasten an end to the conflict.

We are also working with the African Union (AU) and other partners to support the expansion of AU forces in Darfur from the current 2700 to over 7700 personnel. The AU mission has been very effective at reducing violence and preventing attacks in areas where it has deployed; expansion of the force will provide additional protection to civilians and displaced persons.

Finally, we are actively supporting AU-led peace talks in Abuja. With U.S. support, the parties signed an important Declaration of Principles July 5 that sets the stage for further negotiations on wealth and power sharing.

The new Government of National Unity, including SPLM Chairman John Garang as First Vice-President scheduled to be sworn in on July 9, 2005, will also change the dynamics, giving the new government additional incentive to end support for the militias and bring the conflict to a close. We will continue to press forward on each of these fronts with the ultimate goal of peace in Darfur.

Question:
What additional resources does the United States Government (State, USAID, and any other agencies) require from Congress in order to provide the most robust possible response to the genocide?

Response:
We appreciate Congress’ indispensable support of our Sudan programs and initiatives, including the $50 million in FY 05 supplemental funds approved to assist with the expansion of the African Union mission in Darfur. Funding requirements are constantly changing as the situation on the ground evolves. The African Union is expanding its force. Drought is exacerbating an already complex humanitarian situation. The Sudanese are just now embarking on the implementation of an extraordinarily complex peace agreement. We all share the goal of helping those who have been displaced to restart normal livelihoods as the security situation allows. We are carefully monitoring the needs and pressing the potential donor sources and will keep Congress informed of additional resources that may be required.

Question:
What steps need to happen in order to get additional international forces into Darfur?

Response:
Planning for the expansion of the African Union mission in Darfur is ongoing in anticipation of the imminent arrival of additional military forces and civilian police. The U.S. has already finished constructing some camps to house additional troops and is in the process of constructing others. In addition, the U.S. has agreed to airlift some of the expanded contingent. NATO and the EU have also agreed to provide transport, logistical and planning support and are gearing up to do so. Deployment of additional AU troops is scheduled to begin in July and to be completed by September 2005. FM Ismail assured Secretary Rice and Deputy Secretary Zoellick during his recent visit to Washington that the Government of Sudan will fully cooperate with the AU and NATO to facilitate AU expansion. The United States will continue to press the GOS to assure their full cooperation. Other donors are providing transport and funds for most operational costs.

Question:
As you are currently acting as your own “Special Envoy for Darfur,” what additional help might you and your office need to permit you to devote additional time and resources to our Darfur efforts?

Response:
I do not work alone on Sudan. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Constance Newman and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Michael Ranneberger, as well as Senior Representative on Sudan Charles Snyder and the Africa Bureau's Sudan Programs Group, all provide support and work the issues on a daily basis. State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is working with all relevant agencies to help coordinate a conflict transformation strategy that can lead to sustainable peace. We have senior U.S. representatives at the African Union-led Abuja peace talks on Darfur, and U.S. advisors supporting implementation of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement. In addition, the small but dedicated staff of the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum plays an important role in supporting and communicating our policies and programs. We are prepared to devote additional staff and resources—and will work with Congress to identify additional needs—as appropriate.