Generally, when we deploy a weapon system in a traditional mission area, it is appropriate to conduct initial operational testing to ensure that the replacement system provides a better capability than the existing system. Put another way, there is a presumption that the deployed system should be used until a better capability is proven. In the current situation, where we have no weapon system fielded to defend the United States against even a limited attack by ICBMs, that presumption must be re-examined. With the provision of a militarily useful capability, even if it is limited, it is presumed that the capability can be fielded unless it is determined that operating the initial capability is considered to be an unacceptable danger to the operators, or any other similar reality.
USSTRATCOM will factor in all available test information into its military utility assessment of the fielded condition.
Ballistic Missile Defense System Research and Development Program
We have requested $7.6 billion in FY 2005 to continue our investment in missile defense RDT&E.; Why do we need this level of investment in RDT&E;? We need to press forward with our missile defense research and development if we are to improve the system by integrating upgraded or more advanced components and by exploiting new basing modes to engage threat missiles in, for example, the boost phase of flight. We have to lay the RDT&E; foundation for evolutionary improvements to the BMD system. We intend to improve the capability of the midcourse phase while adding additional layers.
The RDT&E; program is working. The ability to make trade-offs among our development activities has allowed us to focus on the development of the most promising near-term elements, namely, GMD, Aegis BMD and PAC-3. GMD and Aegis BMD make up elements of the midcourse defense layer while PAC-3 provides capability in the terminal layer. The GMD FY 2005 budget request is $3.2 billion; the request for Aegis is $1.1 billion. In this budget we increase investment in the development of a boost layer. Two program elements, a high energy laser capability and a new kinetic energy interceptor (KEI) or “hit to kill” capability, represent parallel paths and complement each other. Achieving capability in the boost phase as soon as practicable would be a revolutionary, high-payoff improvement to the BMD system. Although the technologies are well known, the engineering and integration required to make them work are very high risk. Therefore, having parallel approaches, even on different timelines, is a very prudent program management approach. We expanded our efforts in the boost phase as soon as we were able after withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, which specifically prohibited boost phase development against long-range missiles.
The Airborne Laser (ABL) program has been in development since 1996. Development of an operational high energy laser for a 747 aircraft is a difficult technical challenge. Although we have had many successes in individual parts of the program, we have not been able to make some of our key milestones over the past year. The last 20% of the program effort has proven to be very difficult, and some of the risks we took early in the program have impaired our present performance. Consequently, I reviewed the program late last year and directed a restructure that focused on our near-term efforts, delaying the procurement of the second aircraft until we could gain more confidence in our ability to meet schedules. I have adjusted the resources accordingly.
We no longer plan for ABL to deliver a contingency capability in Block 2004. There have been, nevertheless, several technical accomplishments to date. We have demonstrated the capability to track an ICBM in the boost phase using ABL technologies and improved beam control and fire control technologies. At this time there is no reason to believe that we will fail to achieve this capability. This is such a revolutionary and high payoff capability; I believe we should again be patient as we work through the integration and test activities. But the risks remain high. The FY 2005 budget request is $474 million for ABL.
We undertook the KE boost effort in response to a 2002 Defense Science Board Summer Study recommendation. In December 2003 we awarded the contract for development of the KEI boost effort. This was the first competition unconstrained by the ABM Treaty. It was also the first to use capability-based spiral development as a source selection strategy. The contract requires development of a boost phase interceptor that is terrestrial-based and can be used in other engagement phases as well—including the midcourse and possibly exo-atmospheric terminal phases. In other words, it could provide boost phase capability as well as an affordable, competitive next-generation replacement for our midcourse interceptors and even add a terminal phase capability should it be required. In 2005, we will begin conducting Near-Field Infrared Experiments to get a close-up view from space of rocket plumes to support the development of the terrestrial-based interceptor seeker and provide additional data needed for the development of a space test bed.
We have budgeted about $500 million for the KE boost effort for FY 2005. I believe this funding is necessary for a successful start. Those who would view this amount as a significant increase that is unwarranted for a new effort do not understand the importance of prudent programming and the preparatory work required to make such a program ultimately succeed. There are many examples of an under-funded systems engineering effort, where engineering costs sky-rocketed because adequate upfront work was not done. Mr. Chairman, I urge the committee to look carefully at our proposal and allow us to get a solid start on this essential piece of the layered BMD system.
Other Budget Highlights
Funding in the FY 2005 request supports the Block 2004 initial configuration as well as activities to place the BMD system on alert. It also lays the foundation for the future improvement of the system. We are requesting $9.2 billion to support this program of work, which is approximately a $1.5 billion increase over the FY 2004 request. The increase covers costs associated with fielding the first GMD, Aegis BMD, sensor, and command, control and battle management installments and will allow us to purchase long-lead items required for capability enhancements in Block 2006.
We have made a successful transfer of the PAC-3 program to the Army and remain convinced that the Department made the right decision in doing so. In the Patriot system, missile defense and air defense are so intertwined that attempting to manage them separately would be difficult if not futile. We continue to believe that the Army is in the best position, given the maturity of the PAC-3, to manage future enhancements and procurements. Meanwhile MDA remains fully cognizant of the Army's efforts and maintains the PAC-3 in the BMD system as a fully integrated element, with interfaces controlled by our configuration management process. PAC-3 is part of our ongoing system development and testing. The FY 2005 funding request will buy equipment to ramp up the testing of THAAD, which, once fielded, will add endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric terminal capabilities to the BMD system to defeat medium-range threats. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is progressing well and will add capabilities to engage in the late midcourse and terminal layers. THAAD recently completed the Design Readiness Review, and development hardware manufacturing is underway. The FY 2005 budget request is $834 million for THAAD. Delivery of the THAAD radar was completed ahead of schedule and rolled out this month. Flight testing is scheduled to begin in the first quarter of FY 2005 at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.
We will be able to begin assembly and integration of two Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites. The FY 2005 budget request for STSS is $322 million.
We will continue development of the C2BM/C “backbone” to provide real-time sensor-netting to the warfighter for improved interoperability and decision-making capability. Additional BMD system C2BM/C suites and remote capability will be deployed to Combatant Commanders as the system matures.
We also have several Science and Technology initiatives to increase BMD system firepower and sensor capability and extend the engagement battle space of terminal elements. One of our main efforts is to increase BMD system effectiveness in the midcourse phase by placing Multiple Kill Vehicles on a single booster, thus reducing the discrimination burden on BMD sensors. We also are conducting important work on advanced systems to develop laser technology and laser radar, advanced discrimination, improved focal plane arrays, and a high-altitude airship for improved surveillance, communication, and early warning. In support of this, we have requested about $200 million in the FY 2005 budget request for the development of advanced systems.
International Partnerships
In December 2003, through a formal Cabinet Decision, the Government of Japan became our first ally to proceed with acquisition of a multi-layered BMD system, basing its initial capability on upgrades of its Aegis destroyers and acquisition of the SM-3 missile. In addition, Japan and other allied nations will upgrade their Patriot units with PAC-3 missiles and improved ground support equipment. We have worked closely with Japan since 1999 to design and develop advanced components for the SM-3 missile. This project will culminate in flight tests in 2005 and 2006 that incorporate one or more of these components. These decisions represent a significant step forward with a close ally and we look forward to working together on these important efforts.
We are undertaking major initiatives in the international arena in this budget. Interest among foreign governments and industry in missile defense has risen considerably over the past year. We have been working with key allies to put in place mechanisms that would provide for lasting cooperative efforts.
We will begin in FY 2005 to expand international involvement in the program by encouraging international industry participation and investment in the development of alternative boost/ascent phase element components, such as the booster, kill vehicle, launcher, or C2BM/C. This approach reduces risk, adds options for component evolution for potential insertion during Block 2012, and potentially leads to an indigenous overseas production capability. We intend to award a contract for this effort this year.
In 2003 the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Ballistic Missile Defense with the United Kingdom and an annex enabling the upgrade of the Fylingdales early warning radar. We are continuing our consultations with Denmark regarding the upgrade of the Thule radar site in Greenland. Australia has announced plans to participate in our efforts, building on its long-standing defense relationship with the United States. Canada also has entered into formal discussion on missile defense and is considering a BMD role for the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Our North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners have initiated a feasibility study for protection of NATO territory against ballistic missile attacks, which builds upon ongoing work to define and develop a NATO capability for protection of deployed forces.
We are continuing work with Israel to implement the Arrow System Improvement Program and enhance its missile defense capability to defeat the longer-range ballistic missile threats emerging in the Middle East. We are also establishing a capability in the United States to co-produce specified Arrow interceptor missile components, which will help Israel meet its defense requirements more quickly and maintain the U.S. industrial work share. We are intent on continuing U.S.-Russian collaboration and are now working on the development of software that will be used to support the ongoing U.S.-Russian Theater Missile Defense exercise program.
We have other international interoperability and technical cooperation projects underway as well and are working to establish formal agreements with other governments. Our international work is a priority that is consistent with our vision and supportive of our goals.
World-Class Systems Engineering—The Key Success Factor
The President’s direction to defeat ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases of flight drove us to develop and build a single integrated system of layered defenses and forced us to transition our thinking to become more system-centric. We established the Missile Defense National Team to solve the demanding technical problems ahead of us and capitalize on the new engineering opportunities created by our withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The National Team brings together the best, most experienced people from the military and civilian government work forces, industry, and the federal laboratories to work aggressively and collaboratively on one of the nation’s top priorities. No single contractor or government office has all the expertise needed to design and engineer an integrated and properly configured BMD system. Let me give a perspective on why the National Team is so important.
What we have accomplished is an unprecedented integration of sensors communications infrastructure, and weapons that cut across Service responsibilities on a global scale. Even our first engagement sequence involves an unparalleled accomplishment.
The BMD system will engage a long-range ballistic missile threat across 9,500 miles. Threat messages sent by an Aegis destroyer will pass this data across eight BMD system communication nodes. System data travels across approximately 48,000 miles of communication lines. The engagement takes place 3,500 from Fort Greely at an altitude of 100 kilometers. At no time in history has there been an engagement performed by detection and weapon engagement systems separated by such distances. Over the past year and a half, we have rapidly built confidence in this weapon engagement capability through the use of proven systems and technologies coupled with robust integrated tests and exercises.
The National Team’s job has not been easy. System engineers work in a changed procurement and fielding environment, which in the missile defense world means making engineering assessments and decisions based on technical objectives and goals and possible adversary capabilities rather than on specifications derived from more traditional operational requirements documents. This unified industry team arrangement does not stifle innovation or compromise corporate well-being. There is firm government oversight and greater accessibility for all National Team members to organizations, people, and data relevant to our mission. We accomplished this without abandoning sound engineering principles, management discipline, or accountability practices.
Significant benefits have resulted from this unique approach. Early on, this team brought to the program several major improvements, including: system-level integration of our command and control network; adoption of an integrated architecture approach to deal with countermeasures; development of a capability-requirement for forward-based sensors, such as the Forward Deployable Radar and the Sea-Based X-Band Radar; and identification of initial architecture trades for the boost/ascent phase intercept mission. The National Team also developed and implemented an engagement sequence group methodology, which optimizes performance by looking at potential engagement data flows through the elements and components of the system independent of Service or element biases. If we had retained the traditional element-centric engineering approach, I am doubtful that any one of the element prime contractors would have entertained the idea of a forward-based radar integrated with a “competing” system element. The National Team is central to this program.
Responsible and Flexible Management
Congressional support for key changes in management and oversight have allowed us to execute the Missile Defense Program responsibly and flexibly by adjusting the program to our progress every year, improving decision cycle time, and making the most prudent use of the money allocated to us.
One of the key process changes we made in 2001 was to engage the Department’s top leadership in making annual decisions to accelerate, modify, or terminate missile defense activities. We take into account how each development activity contributes to effectiveness and synergy within the system, technical risk, schedules, and cost, and we then assess how it impacts our overall confidence in the effort. We have successfully used this process over the past three years. Today’s program is significantly different from the program of three years ago. In 2001 and 2002 we terminated Space-Based Laser development in favor of further technology development; restructured the Space-Based Infrared Sensors (Low) system, renaming it the Space Tracking and Surveillance System, to support more risk reduction activities; cancelled the Navy Area program following significant cost overruns; and accelerated PAC-3’s deployment to the field. We also proposed a modest beginning in fielding the BMD system and put Aegis BMD and its SM-3 interceptor on track to field.
This year we have restructured the ABL program to deal more effectively with the technical and engineering challenges before us and make steady progress based on what we know. We also decided to end the Russian-American Observation Satellite (RAMOS) project because of rising levels of risk. After eight years of trying, RAMOS was not making the progress we had expected in negotiations with the Russian Federation. So we are refocusing our efforts on new areas of cooperation with our Russian counterparts. These periodic changes in the RDT&E; program have collectively involved billions of dollars—that is, billions of dollars that have been invested in more promising activities, and billions of dollars taken out of the less efficient program efforts. The ability to manage flexibly in this manner saves time and money in our ultimate goal of fielding the best defenses available on the shortest possible timeline.
Such decisive management moves were made collectively by senior leaders in the Department and in MDA. I believe these major changes are unprecedented in many respects and validate the management approach we put in place. The benefits of doing so are clearly visible today. When something is not working or we needed a new approach, we have taken action.
Closing
Mr. Chairman, I would like to recognize the many talented and dedicated people across this country who have made, and are continuing to make, our efforts successful. I have met with people from manufacturing facilities, R&D; centers, and test centers. I have met with people from many different parts of the world who are working on our international efforts. Our fellow citizens should be proud of the talent, commitment, and dedication that every one of these people provides.
We take our responsibilities very seriously. We have an obligation to the President, the Congress, and the American people to get it right. With the continued strong support of Congress and this committee, we will continue our progress in defending the United States, our troops, and our allies and friends against all ranges of ballistic missiles in all phases of flight.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
