Mister Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, The Associations for America’s Defense (A4AD) are very grateful for the invitation to testify before you about our views and suggestions concerning current and future issues facing the defense appropriations.
Founded in 2002, the Association for America’s Defense is a recently formed adhoc group of Military and Veteran Associations that have concerns about National Security issues that are not normally addressed by The Military Coalition, and the National Military Veterans Alliance. The participants are members from each. Among the issues that are addressed are equipment, end strength, force structure, and defense policy. Collectively, we represent about 2.5 million members.
1 Enlisted National Guard Association of the United States 2 Marine Corps Reserve Association 3 Military Order of World Wars 4 National Association for Uniformed Services 5 Naval Enlisted Reserve Association 6 Naval Reserve Association 7 Navy League of the United States 8 Reserve Officers Association 9 The Retired Enlisted Association 10 Veterans of Foreign Wars
Collectively, the preceding organizations have over two and a half million members who are serving our nation, or who have done so in the past. The number of supporters expands to beyond five million when you include family members and friends of the military.
A4AD, also, cooperatively works with other associations, who provide input while not including their association name to the membership roster.
CURRENT AND FUTURE ISSUES FACING DEFENSE
The Associations for America’s Defense would like to thank this Committee for the stewardship that it has demonstrated on issues of Defense. Its pro-defense and non-partisan leadership sets the example.
In keeping with this, A4AD would like to submit what its membership feel are the top equipment requirements for the Armed Forces. Over the last six months, A4AD has compiled this list to provide the committee with a consolidated listing which does not favor a particular service and is a compilation from numerous sources. Both Active and Reserve requirements are provided for the major four of the uniformed services. The services are not listed in priority order.
Top Equipment Requirements:
Air Force Active: 1. F/A–22’s 2. Tanker Modernization 3. Space-Based Infrared System SBIRS
Air Force Reserve: 1. C-17's (replaces aging C-141) 2. F-16 Upgrades; sensor, targeting pods, displays 3. A-10 Targeting Pods 4. C-40's Medivac (replaces aging C-9A)
Air Guard: 1. C-17's 2. KC-135 Re-engine 3. Litening II targeting pods
Army Active: 1. Recapitalize The M1A1 & M2 force 2. AH-64 and CH-47 Aviation Upgrades 3. Objective Force Future Combat Systems
Army Reserve: 1. Light Medium Tactical Vehicles (LMTV) 2. Medium Tactical Vehicles (MTV) 3. High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) 4. IHFR Radio
Army Guard: 1. UH-60 Black Hawks 2. AH-64 Apaches
Active Marine Corps: 1. JSF Joint Strike Fighter 2. V-22 Osprey Program 3. AAAV Program
Reserve Marine Corps (and Active): 1. F/A-18 ECP-583 Upgrade 2. CH-53E HNVS “B” Kits (Forward Looking Infrared) 3. Initial Issue equipment
Active Navy: 1. Littoral Combat Ship 2. F/A-18 E/F Procurement 3. DD(X) Equipment List continues next page. Equipment List (cont)
Naval Reserve: 1. C-40A’s Airlift Aircraft (replace aging C-9B) 2. LITTORAL SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM, LSS 3. F/A-18 ECP- 560 Upgrades 4. Language delaying decommissioning of Navy’s Coastal Patrol Craft (PCs) and Aviation Squadrons
Equipment requirements on the above equipment list were purposely broken out by Active and Reserve requirements.
Maintaining the Reserve Equipment List
Issue: The Active Duty leadership has fallen short of fulfilling the Congressional mandate of responsibility for funding Reserve as well as Active Duty equipment through budgetary planning. The active solution seems to be suggesting that Reserve equipment should be returned to the Active Duty. This would be a mistake.
Position: The overwhelming majority of Reserve and Guard members join the RC to have hands-on experience with equipment. The training and personnel readiness of Guard and Reserve members depends on constant hands-on equipment exposure. Historical records show that Guard and Reserve units maintain hardware and equipment at or higher than average material readiness and often have better training readiness.
In Operation Iraqi Freedom, Reserve and Guard units have proven their readiness. Current and future war fighting requirements will need these highly qualified units when the Combatant Commanders require fully ready units. The personnel readiness, retention, and training of Reserve and Guard members will depend on them having Reserve equipment that they can utilize, maintain, train on, and deploy with when called upon.
Depending on Active Component hardware has never been successful for many functional reasons. History shows that this can only be accomplished through Reserve and Guard equipment, since the training cycles of Active Components are rarely, if ever, synchronized with the training or exercise times of Guard and Reserve units. The A4AD recommends strengthening the appropriations for Reserve and Guard equipment in order to maintain highly qualified trained Reserve and Guard personnel. We ask this committee to provide appropriations against unfunded equipment requirements. To appropriate funds to Reserve equipment would help emphasize to the Active Duty that it is exploring dead-ends by suggesting the transfer of Reserve equipment away from the Reservists.
Not Combining Active and Reserve Appropriations:
Issue: The FY04 Defense budget request makes it clear that OSD intends to consolidate all pay and O&M; accounts into one appropriation per service. These consolidations would require various legislative changes before they could become law. The rationale for the consolidations is to provide greater flexibility for the Active chiefs to move monies from the Reserve and Guard pay accounts to fund Active component pay and O&M; shortfalls. Managing fewer appropriations would also make managing pay and O&M; easier.
Position: The Associations for America’s Defense strongly opposes the proposed consolidation of all Guard, Reserve and Active pay into one service pay appropriation. We similarly oppose the proposed consolidation of all Guard, Reserve and Active operations and maintenance accounts into one service O&M; appropriation. While we support seeking efficiencies wherever possible, we view the proposed "business" consolidation as ill conceived, misrepresented as inefficient, and as an attempt to reduce Congressional oversight. We oppose it for a variety of other reasons, as well.
Under current law, the Reserve chiefs are the directors for their respective Reserve pay and O&M; appropriations. Public Law 90-168, as amended by the FY97 NDAA, vested in the Reserve chiefs full management and control of their respective Reserve financial resources. Consolidating Reserve and Active pay into one appropriation would divest the Reserve chiefs of this authority and preclude their executing the programs and responsibilities, and maintaining the readiness mandated by Congress.
Much of the Guard and Reserve annual training occurs during the fourth quarter of a fiscal year, the same time frame when the Active components are most likely to run short of funds and may desire to use Reserve pay and O&M; to fund their own shortfalls. Allowing the Active components the “flexibility” to use Reserve funds whenever they need to pay Active component bills means that somewhere a Reserve soldier or sailor will not be paid, a Reserve unit will not be trained for mobilization, or Reservist will not receive the specialized training needed for promotion, and ultimately retention. The Active Component will have flexible funding at the cost of Reserve Readiness.
Opposition to: Proposed Revision to authorization on Appropriations Funding.
Issue: The Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act of 2003 recommends under Title IV, Subtitle A, Section 411, that Section 2214 of title 10 be amended to “enhance General Transfer Authority and allow authority to SECDEF to permit the transfer of 2.5 percent of the total appropriations or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for that fiscal year of working capital funds of DoD for military functions (except MILCON); increasing to five percent in times of war or emergency.
Position: A4AD is opposed to this degree of authority. Two and a half percent of $400 billion is $10 billion dollars. This is the same amount that the Bush Administration asked for in funding, without detailing utilization, which Congress turned down. This is too high a sum of money, and permits a high risk that items authorized by Congress could be stripped of funding to support a DoD project viewed as under funded.
Issue: The Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act of 2003 recommends under Title IV, Subtitle A, Section 412, that Section 2214 of title 10 be amended to permit the transfer of funds to correct specific acquisition.
Position: This requested change from a $10M to a new $20 Million limit of reprogramming of funds provides too much “flexibility” to the Secretary of Defense, reducing Congressional oversight.
Maintaining or Increasing End Strength.
Issues: The United States is at War. While Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has publicly opposed increases, and claims there are no plans for reduction, subtle pressures are to be found encouraging personnel cuts. It has been reported that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld throttled down on the troop presence in Iraq, even though the commanders in the field wanted more. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force General Richard Myers, is already on record saying that, “leaner forces contributed to tactical surprise, success in Iraq.” The Presidential budget suggested an 1100 person cut in the Navy and a 1900 (2.2%) person cut in the Naval Reserve, as a start. DoN planners are suggesting another 11% cut in the Naval Reserve for FY05.
Position: It should be remembered that it is a mixture of legacy forces and 21st century technology is what brought us swift victory against Saddam’s regime. The presence of troops on the ground is enabling us to capture members of the Iraqi regime. While the vision of a “joy stick” warfare, with operators removed from the battle site, is the subject of magazine articles; it is the blood and sweat of our young men and women who capture and win the battleground. We are decades away from bucolic warfare.
A4AD has continuing concerns about the mismatch between reducing active duty and reserve force strengths and the increasing mission requirements. While retention remains at record highs, and military members seem ready and willing to make personal sacrifices on behalf of their country in the War on Terrorism, this luxury of manpower will not last. The Navy, the first service to suffer manpower cuts, set record deployment lengths during Iraqi Freedom. The President/DoD should not be even implying cuts while the U.S.A is at war.
A4AD believes the Administration and Congress must make it a high priority to maintain if not increase end strengths of already overworked military forces, even though DoD seems to want to work these forces even harder. End strengths need to be closely examined by both the House and Senate as a first step in addressing this situation.
Full funding for proposed end strengths is sought by A4AD. We also solicit your input and support for maintaining or increasing end strength in future debates.
The 4% solution.
Issue: Despite increases in the Defense budget, demands will be outstripping the availability of dollars. As money begins to be reprogrammed into Research and Development, the active duty programs will be stressed by perceived shortfalls. Resulting covetous possession will distort long term planning as planners seek to preserve favorite programs, surrendering the vulnerable and obsolete as a means to maintain the “strong”. Such acquisitiveness will stifle innovation, and eradicate retention.
Position: A4AD urges the President of the United States and members of Congress to continue to increase defense spending to a minimum of 4% of Gross Domestic Product. The Armed Forces are an instrument of National Security and Defense, and are in affect an insurance policy to this Country; as demonstrated by events since 9-11-2001. Americans should be willing to invest as much into defense as we do into the personal insurance policies.
Conclusion:
A core of military and veteran associations are looking beyond personnel issues to the broader issues of National Defense. As a group, we will continue to meet in the future, and hope to provide your committee with our inputs.
Thank you for your ongoing support of the Nation, the Armed Services, and the fine young men and women who defend our country.
