Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye and distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today and discuss operational test issues involved with building a missile defense testbed that may also have some limited inherent defensive capability. Let me emphasize up front that I strongly support building this testbed as a means of conducting more realistic ballistic missile defense testing. It will provide us with an excellent capability to test the integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) against more challenging targets under more realistic engagement conditions. Designed to accomplish this testing mission, this testbed will have some limited capability to defend against an actual threat, depending, of course, on certain assumptions about intelligence of an imminent attack and the positioning of sensors to acquire, track, and target the threat. Regardless of what we call this initial collection of equipment, communications, and personnel, the fact remains that we must build this test capability and put it in the field before we can test the system. Additionally, it is prudent to develop operational concepts and train personnel in concert with the testbed’s development, so that whatever inherent capability exists in the testing infrastructure could be employed to defend the United States in the event of a ballistic missile attack.
I understand and share the concerns raised by members of Congress with the precedent of fielding operational systems without adequate operational testing. Let me take a moment here to discuss my assessment of this situation. The Missile Defense Agency under General Kadish is proceeding with a design and development strategy that is very proactive when it comes to testing. My staff and I are involved on a daily basis with the Missile Defense Agency and the program managers for the Ballistic Missile Defense System elements. We are reviewing test plans, participating in planning meetings, witnessing tests, providing coordinated advice, and responding in written reports to Congress on the adequacy of the testing programs. I have access to all the information I need to fulfill these responsibilities.
I have completed my assessment of the PAC-3 Initial Operational Test and Evaluation test results, which is documented in a classified Beyond Low Rate Initial Production report, provided last November to the Congress. I have also completed my annual assessment of the MDA testing programs and submitted the report to the appropriate committees of the Congress. In that report, I conclude that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element of the BMDS in essence has not yet demonstrated operational capability. This conclusion is based on the fact that many essential components of the GMD element have not yet been built. We cannot test the system without these critical components, and we cannot test it realistically without the testbed. This was illustrated recently, when the exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) failed to separate from the booster in Integrated Flight Test -10 or IFT-10. MDA subsequently restructured the flight test program, eliminating further testing with the old booster system. This decision considered the poor performance of the surrogate booster system and the risks of diverting booster developers from the objective booster design effort, compared with the advantages of gathering additional data from those flight tests.
Beginning later this fiscal year and prior to the 04 decision, testing will resume with two test flights for each of the candidate boosters and a risk reduction flight for a target launched from the Kodiak target launch site in Alaska. Intercept testing will continue in IFTs-14 and 15, using the new booster. This is followed by integration ground testing of the testbed and culminates in a system test readiness review. Current plans also call for three more intercept flights for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system prior to the end of fiscal year (FY) 2004, with the last flight conducted against a separating threat target. Additional flight testing beyond this point is still in the planning stage. The purpose of the testbed is to establish and define a baseline capability, to realistically integrate and test the components of the BMDS, and to enhance capability incrementally, through block development.
The real challenge is to develop an operational concept for using the testbed that integrates components of the BMDS as they become available, in order to evaluate the operational capability of the system and defend against a ballistic missile attack if so needed. If we don’t develop an operational concept and an attack does come, then we will have failed in a most serious way. On the other hand, if an effort to refine an operational concept for an interim system significantly distracts us from building the objective system in an expeditious fashion, then we risk similar failure against more sophisticated threats down the road.
While the testbed is a research and development system, this does not preclude us from addressing operational test and evaluation issues. In fact, it is common for systems in development to combine developmental and operational test objectives. The testbed, including missiles, will provide an early opportunity to acquire valuable ground test data on intra- and interoperability between the command and control center and the silo/missile complex; on the system and missile health and status or built in testing capability; and on system safety, reliability, maintainability, and logistics supportability. Availability of this data will permit lessons learned from the testbed to be considered in improving the objective Ground-based Midcourse Defense system. Every major GMD ground and flight test, both prior to and after the 2004 testbed is available, formally addresses both developmental testing and Operational Testing objectives, consistent with the maturity level of the system. The Service Operational Test Agencies personnel are dedicated to planning the details of the operational test portions of the ground and flight tests, and analyzing and reporting relevant operational test data. My staff is working with the Operational Test Agencies to define independent evaluation plans for the operational test activities. I will review and approve these Operational Test and Evaluation plans and their associated data requirements. I will use both developmental and operational test data as the basis for my operational assessment, in advising General Kadish and the Defense Acquisition Executive. This assessment will be the basis for my annual report to the Congress.
Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, my staff has worked diligently with the MDA staff to build what I feel is a very effective relationship. I will continue to work closely with General Kadish to ensure that the mission of the testbed, as a testbed, is kept in perspective. I am working with the Service Operational Test Agencies to identify data requirements for an operational evaluation plan that I will review and approve. I will continue to monitor planning and testing activities to ensure that we test as realistically and thoroughly as we can, advise the Director, MDA of operational testing concerns, and report my assessments of progress to the Secretary and to you.
This concludes my opening remarks and I welcome your questions.
