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Testimony of

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re
H.R. 4975, the "Lobbying Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006."
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Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:

Thank you for inviting me here to testify today on the important issue of lobbying reform. By way of introduction, I am currently Professor of Law at Capital University in Columbus, Ohio; Senior Advisor to the Center for Competitive Politics, a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization formed to educate the public on the political process and the benefits of political competition; and Of Counsel to the law firm of Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease. From 2000 to 2005 I served as Commissioner on the Federal Election Commission, including a term as Chairman in 2004. In this latter capacity, I was privileged to travel and speak throughout the country with ordinary Americans concerned about corruption in government and the perceived remoteness of Washington to their everyday concerns. Although Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease represents many clients before the government, I am not a registered lobbyist. I address the Committee today on my own behalf and that of the Center for Competitive Politics, and not the law firm of Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease or Capital University.

I want to begin by congratulating the drafters of H.R. 4975 for producing a carefully targeted bill that aims to restore public trust, and prevent lobbying abuses, while minimizing the burden on the vast majority of lobbyists who are honest, dedicated individuals helping citizens to exercise their fundamental Constitutional Rights of Free Speech and the Right to Petition the Government for Redress of Grievances. These are among the most important rights guaranteed by our Constitution. Yet all too often in the past, we have allowed isolated incidents of improper behavior - scandal – to stampede us to hastily conceived, ill-considered measures that restrict these important Constitutional rights while doing little to address the abuses that allegedly justify the restrictions. All of

us here know that lobbyists can provide a valuable function, providing members with useful, important information on public opinion, and also with the information needed to craft wise, beneficial, effective legislation. We know that abuses exist, but that they are the exception, not the rule. Thus, it is important to pass serious, balanced legislation, that addresses specific and real problems, rather than to engage in populist grandstanding. I think that H.R. 4975 largely achieves that goal.

In particular, H.R. 4975 wisely avoids restrictions on efforts to encourage citizens to be in contact with members of Congress - citizen political participation sometimes referred to as "grassroots lobbying." – that is vital to reducing the types of scandals at issue in the Abramoff and Cunningham cases. The attached Policy Primer, written by myself and Stephen Hoersting for the Center for Competitive Politics, lays out general principles that we hope will guide Congress in this area. In particular, we focus on the important role of disclosure in preventing abuses of the right to petition the government. H.R. 4975 largely adopts that approach. It is important to remember that the purpose of disclosure is to provide information to citizens about their government – not to provide government with information about the activities of its citizens, which raises serious First Amendment issues and may discourage contact between ordinary citizens and congress.

Thus, in my view H.R. 4975, by carefully tailoring added disclosure, accompanied by added penalties for violations, to the type of activity that created has created the current situation, has hit the mark. H.R. 4975 is particularly beneficial in requiring improvements to disclosure that make the information about government more readily available and useful for ordinary citizens around the country.

Thank you.

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POLICY PRIMER: Grassroots Lobbying Proposals Seem Not to Further Congress' Interest in Correcting Lobbying Abuses

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Abstract

Of the several policy proposals circulating Capitol Hill to correct lobbying abuses, strengthen the relative voice of citizens, and add accountability to the earmarking process, one policy prescription seems oddly out of place. Proposals for so-called "grassroots lobbying disclosure" do nothing either to sever the link between lobbyist cash and lawmakers' pecuniary interests, or to strengthen the relative voice of citizens. Grassroots lobbying—encouraging or stimulating the general public to contact lawmakers about issues of general concern—is citizen-to-citizen communication that fosters citizen-to-lawmaker communication. It correspondingly weakens the relative strength of lobbyist-to-lawmaker communications, in furtherance of Congress' objective in seeking lobbying reform.

Efforts to limit grassroots lobbying, require disclosure of donors, or compel lobbyists to register with the government to assist groups in contacting fellow citizens, strips donors and consultants of constitutionally guaranteed anonymity, and would deprive organizations championing unpopular causes of skilled representation. This anonymity, long recognized and protected by the Supreme Court, fosters political association, guards against unwarranted invasions of privacy, and protects the citizens who fund or assist groups such as Progress for America or People for the American Way from calumny, obloquy, and possible retribution—including retribution by public officials.

Disclosure is not always a good thing. The rationale for requiring disclosure of contributions to candidate campaigns, and disclosure of direct lobbying activity, is the same for protecting anonymity in the discussion of policy issues: to protect citizens from retribution by abusive officeholders. History demonstrates that while such retribution may be uncommon, it is real. Indeed, even today we read of a Texas prosecutor who has subpoenaed donor records for a group after the group ran grassroots lobbying ads that took a position contrary to that of the prosecutor.

The abuse of non-profit entities by a handful of lobbyists to host golf trips or entertain lawmakers with donations from lobbyist clients can be cured in other ways, without enacting disclosure measures too attenuated to the problem Congress seeks to correct, and that could damage or diminish America's system of information exchange for years to come.

Introduction

Senator Dianne Feinstein recently captured public sentiment when she said that there should "be a wall" between registered lobbyists and the pecuniary interests of Members of Congress.[1] The problem is not the technical and professional information lobbyists provide lawmakers, nor is it information on the opinions of the American people that honorable and ethical lobbyists provide lawmakers everyday. Indeed, it is the relative voice of the average citizen that the Senator wants to strengthen. This is why Senator Feinstein and Senate Rules Committee Chairman Trent Lott have proposed bringing sunlight to the earmarking process and other measures that would weaken the link between lobbyist cash and lawmaker policy.[2] Senators Lott and Feinstein are not alone. Other proposals include gift bans, travel restrictions, other types of earmark reform, revoking floor privileges of former lawmakers, slowing the "revolving door," and limiting lobbyist donations to charities affiliated with Members, to name a few. What all of these proposals seek to do is to limit the direct pecuniary exchange between lobbyists and lawmakers.

Circulating among these provisions, however, is another recommendation that is oddly out of place. It has little or nothing to do with reducing the coziness between lobbyists and lawmakers. These are the so-called "grassroots lobbying disclosure" provisions now under consideration in various quarters, which require organizations and

associations to disclose in detail their efforts to run issue-oriented advertising aimed at fellow citizens, and in some cases, to identify donors.

In proposals to disclose grassroots lobbying, we are witnessing two canons of political law on an apparent collision course: that government corruption is cured by disclosure; and that the right of individuals to speak and associate freely depends upon their ability to do so anonymously. But the conflict is a false one—a byproduct of fuzzy thinking—because both canons achieve the same purpose when each is applied to its proper context. Both protect citizens from abusive officeholders. Disclosure regimes for campaign contributions protect citizens from officeholders who have free will and can confer benefits on large contributors (and pain on opponents) by passing future legislation. Disclosure regimes for true lobbying activities, that is, consultants engaged in face-to-face meetings with officeholders, protects citizens in a similar manner.

Regimes that protect the right to speak anonymously with fellow citizens about issues, even issues of official action or pending legislation, also protect citizens from abusive officeholders by reducing an officeholder's ability to visit retribution on those who would oppose his policy preferences. Citizens learn much about the relative merits of a candidate by knowing who supports him. They learn about the legislative process by knowing who is paying consultants to meet with officeholders directly. But citizens learn little about the relative merits of a clearly presented policy issue by knowing who supports it. Grassroots lobbying registration and disclosure regimes that would provide honest citizens and abusive officeholders alike with knowledge of which groups and individuals support which issues, including the timing and intensity of that support, impose too high a cost for too little benefit in a constitutional democracy.

The Value of Grassroots Lobbying

Far from being part of the current problem, grassroots lobbying is part of the solution to restoring the people's faith in Congress. Polls show that Americans are fed up with what is increasingly seen as a corrupt Washington way of business. Ninety percent of Americans favor banning lobbyists from giving members of Congress anything of value. Two-thirds would ban lobbyists from making campaign contributions. More than half favor making it illegal for lobbyists to organize fundraisers.[3] Seventy six percent believe that the White House should provide a list of all meetings White House officials have had with lobbyist Jack Abramoff.[4] But there is no evidence whatsoever that the public views grassroots lobbying activity as a problem.

Indeed, even the name grassroots "lobbying" (as opposed to "activism," "communication," or other term) is in some sense a misnomer. "Grassroots lobbying" is merely the effort to encourage average citizens to contact their representatives about issues of public concern. It is not "lobbying" at all, as that phrase is normally used outside the beltway, meaning paid, full-time advocates of special interests meeting in person with members of Congress away from the public eye. What the public wants is what Senator Feinstein and others have recognized—they want to break the direct links between lobbyists and legislators, thus enhancing the voice and influence of ordinary citizens. They do not want restrictions on their own efforts to contact members of Congress, or on the information they receive about Congress.

Contact between ordinary citizens and members of Congress, which is what "grassroots lobbying" seeks to bring about, is the antithesis of the "lobbying" at the heart of the Abramoff scandals. It is ordinary citizens expressing themselves. That they are

engaged or "stimulated" to do so by "grassroots lobbying activities" is irrelevant. These are still individual citizens motivated to express themselves to members of Congress.

Regulation that would hamper efforts to inform and motivate citizens to contact Congress will increase the power of professional lobbyists inside the beltway. Regardless of what lobbying reform is passed, not even the most naïve believe it will mean the end of the professional, inside-the-beltway lobbyist. Thus, grassroots voices remain a critical counterforce to lobbying abuse. Recently one member of Congress expressed his concern that Jack Abramoff's Indian Tribal clients were used to contact Christian Coalition members, "to stir up opposition to a gambling bill."[5] But it cannot be denied that the individuals who responded to that grassroots lobbying were ordinary citizens who were, in fact, opposed to a gambling bill. They are precisely the type of people that Congress ought to hear from, rather than or in addition to inside-the-beltway lobbyists. Regardless of how they learned about the issue, they had to make the decision that the issue was important to them, and take the time to call Congress.

Disclosure of the financing, planning, or timing of grassroots lobbying activities adds little, and will often be harmful, leading to exactly the type of favoritism and/or negative pressure that the public abhors. No member of Congress even remotely in touch with his district will be unaware that a sudden volume of calls coming from his or her district is possibly, if not probably, part of an orchestrated campaign to generate public support. But because the callers themselves are real, there is little to be gained by knowing who is funding the underlying information campaign that has caused these constituents to contact their Members. The constituent's views are what they are; the link between lobbyist and Congress is broken by the intercession of the citizen herself.

Disclosure, however, comes with a price. The most obvious is that it re-establishes the link between the lobbyist and the officeholder. When the source behind the grassroots campaign is anonymous—either a donor or consultant—the opportunity for favoritism, and for retaliation, is gone. Mandatory disclosure reintroduces that link. It is true that many financiers of grassroots lobbying campaigns are happy to be publicly identified—for example, George Soros and Steve Bing make no bones about their efforts to educate the public. Unions, and some trade associations, such as the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) in its 1994 ads urging citizens to oppose a national health plan, are more often than not open about their activities. But others prefer anonymity, and there are many reasons for wanting anonymity and for providing it protection.

To use the example of HIAA, under the national health plan proposed by the Clinton Administration in 1994, private insurance companies were to have a major role in administering the plan. But it would be a role achieved through a bidding process. A company donating money or expertise to an HIAA ad campaign against adoption of the plan might sincerely believe that the plan was bad for America, but be prepared to bid to administer the plan had it passed. And even if the plan failed, companies in such a highly regulated industry might wish to avoid retaliation from disappointed lawmakers who had supported the plan. Such a company might therefore prefer anonymity. Anonymity would protect it and its lobbyists from retaliation, favoritism and government pressure—precisely the result that Congress is seeking to achieve in lobbying reform.

Others will have other reasons for anonymity. A prominent Democrat may not want to be identified as having consulted on ads urging citizens to support the nomination

of Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court; a prominent Republican consultant may not want to be identified as being on the other side. Some donors simply don't want to have their donations to grassroots lobbying known so that they will not be approached for added donations. In each case, anonymity not only protects the donor or consultant, it prevents favoritism, retaliation, and improper pressure by government officials.[6] As Justice Stevens stated for the Supreme Court in *McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission*, anonymous speech, "exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation—and their ideas from suppression."[7]

Anonymous speech aimed at rousing grassroots opinion is a long and honored tradition in American politics. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay authored the Federalist Papers anonymously. Most of the opposition to the ratification of the Constitution was also published anonymously by such distinguished Americans as Richard Henry Lee, then New York governor George Clinton, and New York Supreme Court Justice Robert Yates.[8] Other famous Americans known to have engaged in anonymous "grassroots lobbying" include Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Winfield Scott, Benjamin Rush, and New Jersey Governor William Livingston.[9]

Grassroots Lobbying Disclosure Provisions Are Unrelated to the Purpose of Lobbying Reform

Grassroots lobbying disclosure proposals amend the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 to reach any employment of paid lobbyists to urge the general public to contact a Federal official about an issue of general concern. Proposals require "grassroots lobbying firms" (or organizations that employ lobbyists) to register with the Secretary of

the Senate or Clerk of the House of Representatives not later than twenty days after being retained by a client. Most proposals require reporting of all amounts paid for grassroots lobbying activities, or amounts paid to "stimulate" grassroots lobbying, including separate disclosure for all paid advertising. This typically includes monies spent for preparation, planning, research, and background work, as well as monies spent coordinating lobbying activities with other organizations. One approach would expose nonmembers of an organization who donate above a certain level—typically $10,000—as a separate "client" listed on the lobbying disclosure form. Such changes would dangerously expand the scope of an understandable reform effort into uncharted and unconstitutional territory. They would drive many publicly spirited persons on either side of an issue—those who care passionately about nothing more than the proper administration of justice, for example, in the case of the recent Samuel J. Alito confirmation hearings—out into the open, and perhaps, therefore, out of future debates altogether. They would make seasoned lobbyists reluctant to assist unpopular causes or causes contrary to the current administration. Compelled disclosure robs such donors or consultants of constitutionally protected anonymity, often subjecting them to calumny, obloquy and possible retribution by entrenched interests fighting on the other side, especially when the other side is the government itself. This would have a chilling effect on donors to issues organizations on both sides of the aisle, and deprive organizations of the services of talented consultants who make their livings, in part, on Capitol Hill. Indeed, those most likely to abandon the field will often be those motivated by ideology. Those motivated by pecuniary gain will have an added incentive to bear the cost of disclosure and carry on.

To clean up the Abramoff mess there is no reason to smoke out the more generous donors to groups like Progress for America or Alliance for Justice, or to make consultants fearful to assist those organizations with controversial issues. Even if those groups hired lobbyists for any purpose, including as consultants who know best how to craft a message, donations to those groups for grassroots lobbying do not support direct lobbyist-to-lawmaker contact—the source of public concern. (Nobody cares if a lobbyist flies on a corporate jet—what they object to is his giving rides to congressmen on a corporate jet!). Grassroots lobbying fosters citizen-to-citizen communication, and later, citizen-to-lawmaker communication. The message consists of information for citizens, and an appeal to those citizens to take part in a public discussion. Some citizens will get involved because they agree with the message and share its concern; others because they disagree; and still others will not get involved at all. With even the most effective grassroots lobbying, however, there is always an intervening decision made by the citizen to get involved or not to get involved, and to decide on which side of the issue to get involved, to what degree, and in what capacity. The aggregate of those individual decisions is itself critically important and valuable information to the lawmaker. Lawmakers are, after all, representatives of the people. No matter how citizens first hear of a pending legislative issue, when they engage they are engaging in citizen-to-lawmaker communication; the citizens making the calls are not registered lobbyists. With the decision to contact lawmakers, from whatever side of the debate, citizens reduce the relative power of lobbyist-to-lawmaker communication, which is precisely the power shift the public wants to see, and is the shift most needed in an era of unlit, undisclosed earmarking and lobbying scandal.

Grassroots Lobbying Disclosure Provisions May Be Unconstitutional

In addition to complex policy questions surrounding society and its information exchange, regulation of grassroots lobbying raises constitutional concerns. The Supreme Court has recognized that "there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."[10] In *Buckley v. Valeo*, the Supreme Court held that regulation of political speech and association is constitutionally justified only to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption in government, by preventing the exchange of favors that flows from an inordinate connection or nexus between campaign donors and lawmakers.[11] In *McConnell v. FEC*, the Supreme Court extended the rationale to guard against the appearance of corruption created by "access" to politicians.[12] Neither grassroots lobbying aimed at citizens, nor any ensuing contact by citizens to members of Congress, creates the reality or appearance of corruption. And both work to alleviate the problem of unequal access noted in the *McConnell* decision.

Anonymous grassroots lobbying has received unwavering First Amendment protection from the Supreme Court.[13] As recently as 2002, the Supreme Court invalidated a "village ordinance making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy [with fellow citizens] without first registering with the mayor" as a violation of "the First Amendment protection afforded to anonymous … discourse."[14] And there is no doubt that retribution is real. It is not hard to imagine, for example, why the State might have wanted to know the names of all members of the NAACP in 1950s Alabama, and why the Supreme Court said in response to Alabama's desire to learn those names that "[i]t is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups

engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as [other] forms of governmental action."[15] It is also easy to imagine the leverage Alabama could have put on the NAACP, and the potential damper on the civil rights movement, if 1950s Alabama knew about the NAACP what the twenty-first century Congress proposes to learn about grassroots organizations. What could Alabama have done had it known: when the NAACP engaged in preparation, planning, research, or background work; when it coordinated activities with like minded organizations; when the organization proposed to engage its fellow citizens with advertising and in what quantity; or knew the names of the consultants that would assist them in the effort?

Nor are these merely episodes of the past. In what many consider a blatant attempt at intimidation, a Texas county prosecutor recently subpoenaed the donor records of a group called the Free Enterprise Fund after it ran grassroots lobbying ads critical of his behavior in office.[16] It is easy to forget when rushing to correct lobbyist excess, even excess covered by current law, that citizens can be intimidated and harassed by officials. In *McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission*, Margaret McIntyre, a local anti-tax activist who distributed fliers opposing a school levy, was warned she was not properly identified on them. Nonetheless, she distributed fliers at the Middle School, where her children faced potential retaliation from school officials. An assistant schools superintendent who learned McIntyre's identity filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission in what one Ohio Justice characterized as "retribution against McIntyre for her opposition."[17] The Supreme Court of United States invalidated the Ohio statute, stating that "[t]he decision to favor anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official

retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible."[18]

Requiring even the most grizzled or politically connected lobbyists to register and report their attempts to solicit citizens on behalf of an organization is also suspect. In *Thomas v. Collins*, the Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute that required labor organizers—defined as "any person who for … financial consideration solicits [citizens] for membership in a labor union"—to register with the Secretary of State, provide his name and union affiliations, and wear a State-issued organizer's card before soliciting membership in a labor union.[19] The State claimed the statute affected only the right to engage in business as a paid organizer. The Court, however, held there was a "restriction upon the right [of the organizer] to speak and the rights of the workers to hear what he had to say,"[20] and stated that it is "in our tradition to allow the widest room for discussion, and the narrowest range for its restriction, particularly when this right is exercised in conjunction with peaceable assembly."[21] The potential that elite firms and private consultants will avoid unpopular causes to protect their long-range economic interests is not implausible. And, in protecting those interests, it is equally likely that unpopular organizations, or those with interests otherwise contrary to the current administration, will be denied competent representation. Indeed, this is largely the basis for reformers' concerns about the "K Street Project"; a project wherein it is suggested to businesses and other interests that they obtain lobbyists who better understand where the GOP is taking the country.[22]

Lobbyist Abuse of Non-Profit Organizations Can Be Addressed in Other Ways

Jack Abramoff allegedly abused non-profit organizations to cozy up to lawmakers, shelter income, bankroll golf junkets, or bolster the bank account of his Washington restaurant.[23] Some cite this abuse of outside organizations as demonstrating a need to require disclosure of citizen donations to issue campaigns. But Congress may prevent lobbyists from hiding gifts or bribes, or financing golf trips to Scotland in more direct ways. Congress could require disclosure by lobbyists, or perhaps even by non-profit organizations themselves, when the non-profit makes direct contact with a lawmaker, that is, when a non-profit organization hosts or entertains lawmakers with donations from or directed by lobbyists, or when the non-profit accepts gifts from lobbyists with instructions to lavish a portion of it on lawmakers. But the passing of pecuniary interests from lobbyists to lawmakers through non-profit organizations is not a justification for requiring citizens who donate to issue campaigns, or the recipient organizations, to disclose the amount of those donations, the timing of those donations, or the name and home address of the donor.

Conclusion

Anonymous grassroots lobbying is a long and honored tradition, engaged in by many of the greatest Americans, including Lincoln and Jefferson. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that anonymous grassroots lobbying is entitled to the fullest protection of the First Amendment.

The problem of lobbying abuses is one of lobbyist influence outside the light of scrutiny. It is not a problem of citizen influence. Grassroots lobbying encourages

citizens to get involved, and the involvement of citizens breaks the link between lobbyists and lawmakers. Hence, grassroots lobbying should be encouraged in every way possible, not discouraged, as a way to restore the trust of the American people in Congress.

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The Center for Competitive Politics seeks to educate the public on the benefits of free competition, fairness, and dynamic participation in the political process.

Nothing in this primer should be construed as advocacy for or against any legislation.

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[1] Tory Newmeyer, *Hill Eyes a Treasure Trove*, ROLL CALL, Feb. 13, 2006.
[2] Spotlight, *Politics: Earmark Debate Starting to Focus on Transparency, not Reduction*, ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY DAILY, Feb. 9, 2006.
[3] ABC News Washington Post Poll, *Majorities See Widespread Corruption, Want Tougher Lobbying Restrictions*, Jan. 9, 2006, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/PollVault/story?id=1487942.
[4] ABC News Washington Post Poll, *Majorities Disapprove of Bush on Ethics, Favor Release of Abramoff Meeting Records*, Jan. 27, 2006, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/PollVault/story?id=1547685.
[5] Congressional Quarterly, *Transcript of Hearing, Senate Committee for Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs*, Jan. 25, 2006 (comments of Senator Durbin).
[6] *See e.g.* James Nash, *Political Ties Costs Law Firms*, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 15, 2006 at B1.
[7] McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
[8] *Id.* at 343.
[9] Bradley A. Smith, Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform 7, 18 (2001); *McIntyre*, 514 U.S. at 361, 363 (Thomas, J., *concurring in the judgment*.)
[10] Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
[11] Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
[12] McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
[13] *See* McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1956). *See also* First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (non-anonymous corporate speech on public issues protected by First Amendment).
[14] Watchtower Bible v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 at 153, 160 (2002).
[15] NAACP v. Alabama, supra note 13, 357 U.S. at 462 (1956).

[16] Robert Novak, *DeLay Prosecutor Subpoenas Critics*, HUMAN EVENTS ONLINE, Dec. 16, 2005.
[17] Duane St. Clair, *Campaign Pamphlets Must Bear Source, Court Says*, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sep. 26, 1993 at 5B.
[18] McIntyre, supra note 7, 514 U.S at 341-342 (1995).

[19] Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 519, n1 (1945)
[20] *Id.* at 524
[21] *Id.* at 530.
[22] Richard Dunham, Eamon Javers, and Lorrane Woellert, *Shakedown on K Street*, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 20, 2006, Vol. 3972, p.34.
[23] Chuck Neubauer and Richard B. Schmitt, *Abramoff's Charity Began at Home*, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 11, 2006, at A1.