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July 21st, 2005 - -
Today, we are reconvening the hearing on the Coast Guard’s Revised Deepwater Implementation Plan – a continuation to the hearing that took place one month ago. We are pleased to welcome back the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Thomas Collins, and the Deepwater Program Executive Officer, Rear Admiral Patrick Stillman. Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before the Subcommittee today.
When we left our June hearing, we tasked the Coast Guard with answering seven direct questions about the revised, post-9/11 Deepwater plan. These questions – which are displayed on the monitors before you – were intended to clarify what the Coast Guard presented to the Subcommittee in late May: a submittal that included four plans, ranging in cost from $19 to $24 billion over a time period of 20 to 25 years. Simply put, we wanted the Coast Guard to be more direct in their justification of the Deepwater program. We needed to understand exactly which plan the Coast Guard was going to use, how much it was going to cost, what we will be buying, and how the Coast Guard was going to measure the performance of this vital homeland security program.
Today, after six months of missed deadlines and insufficient information, the Coast Guard has finally complied with the Subcommittee’s direction and submitted its one, final, post-9/11 Deepwater plan. Admiral, it is disappointing that it took us this long to get to this point. Although we now have the “final” plan, I have some significant concerns about it and they are all related to one simple, yet vital thing: management.
Failing to adequately plan is a hallmark of poor management and that is precisely why I have been so strict with my oversight of this program. Specifically, what I am getting at is:
- The final plan does not include a basis for comparing the performance of the Deepwater system against the performance of the current fleet (e.g. before and after). Simply put, how do the taxpayers know we are buying a more efficient, more effective system than what is currently deployed?
- The final plan does not provide a sufficient baseline inventory or management plan of legacy assets. How are you ensuring that the men and woman of the Coast Guard – who routinely place themselves in harm’s way – feel confident in operating your rapidly deteriorating legacy assets?
- The final plan does not resolve numerous questions about how the Coast Guard will fulfill critical security missions using the 110-foot patrol boats, an asset that is operating with major maintenance problems 75 percent of the time. How do you intend on managing your patrol boat operations with cutters that are limping along until the 110-foot replacement, the Fast Response Cutter, is fully deployed in 2018?
Admiral, what we want to do today is simple – we want to use our time to discuss these issues and better understand this “final” Deepwater plan. With so much at stake, I want to get this ship righted and ensure the Coast Guard is effectively managing this critical acquisition.
Let me be perfectly clear—no one is more supportive of the Coast Guard and the Deepwater program than this Subcommittee. We have never disputed the need to replace your aging ships and aircraft or increase the mission capabilities of the Coast Guard. However, we have expressed our displeasure with the Coast Guard’s management and justification of this multi-billion dollar effort.
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