Wyden Releases Additional Views on Senate Intelligence Report
July 9, 2004
WASHINGTON, DC – U.S. Senator Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), a member
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today released his
Additional Views on the Committee’s report on Intelligence
Failures leading to the war in Iraq.
On June 17, the Intelligence Committee members unanimously approved
the findings and conclusions in the report released today. Wyden
attached to the report his Additional Views, which expand upon the
findings found in the report. His views provide a more complete
understanding of the intelligence and policy failures relating to
decision to go to war in Iraq.
“It is clear today that the intelligence community made serious
mistakes in its analysis of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction
programs,” stated Wyden. “But, bad intelligence and
bad policy decisions are not mutually exclusive. It is clear that
the Administration compounded the failures of the intelligence community
by exaggerating and manipulating the Community’s conclusions
to the public. Now, we need improved accountability and real change
from the top down in the way intelligence is gathered, analyzed
and used.”
Following are Senator Wyden’s Additional Views.
###
Senator Wyden
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Review of Intelligence on Iraq, Additional Views
I commend my fellow Members and the staff of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence for their review of and report regarding
the U.S. Intelligence Community’s collection and analysis
of intelligence information concerning Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction programs and support for terrorism.
The report produced by the Committee has found glaring weaknesses
in how intelligence was collected, and obvious faults in how that
information was analyzed. Its descriptions of failures in information
sharing, of the publication of poor analysis when better-supported
alternative interpretation was available, and of the outright manipulation
of the analytical process reflect a community in dire need of reform.
The intelligence failures preceding September 11th and regarding
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq show that the management structure
of the Intelligence Community is broken. Walls between organizations
prevent information from being shared. Walls between organizations
prevent the shifting of human and financial resources to address
changing threats. Walls between organizations hinder the coordination
of effort against a common target and foe.
The Intelligence Community needs broad, overall reform to help
assure that U.S. policymakers receive better support when faced
with decisions crucial to the security of our nation and the use
of military forces. Congress and the Administration must use the
work of both the Joint Inquiry Into The Terrorist Attacks of September
11, 2001 and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (the 9-11 Commission), as well as this Committee’s
review of pre-war intelligence on Iraq, as both impetus and guide
on how to transform the IC to best address the threats of the 21st
century.
However, reform of the Intelligence Community will not resolve
all the mistakes and miscues that led to the invasion and occupation
of Iraq. The CIA and other elements of the Intelligence Community
did perform poorly in their collection and analysis of Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction programs and its actual possession of
these weapons. The Intelligence Community did fail the Bush Administration,
the Congress, and the American public when it provided such poor
intelligence on Iraqi WMD. But ultimately, poor intelligence collection
and analysis do not absolve the Bush Administration of the decision
to go to war. These events did not occur simply because the Bush
Administration relied upon poor intelligence. In reality, the Administration
repeatedly and independently made the case for war not by relying
on U.S. intelligence, but by ignoring or directly contradicting
the same. Therefore, I feel the inclusion of additional views is
essential to the completion of a thorough report from the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence.
Exaggeration of the Threat
Bad intelligence and bad policy decisions are not mutually exclusive
– that is, both can exist simultaneously yet quite independently
of each other in the same situation. This is true of the U.S. march
to war against Iraq. The Bush Administration used the Intelligence
Community’s poor intelligence on Iraq’s WMD programs
to support its decision to go to war, but just as the Intelligence
Community’s conclusions were more definitive than the information
warranted, the urgency expressed by President Bush and members of
his administration was unsupported even by the faulty intelligence.
The Bush Administration independently compounded the failure of
the Intelligence Community by exaggerating the Community’s
conclusions to the public – an inappropriate course of action
that could have occurred even if the intelligence had been sound.
The Committee’s second phase of its review will hopefully
delve more deeply into this issue and detail how policymakers’
public statements on Iraq’s threat to the U.S. did not match
the classified intelligence analysis. Nevertheless, there is already
enough information available publicly to fault the Administration
for its seemingly single-minded pursuit of war to remove Saddam
Hussein from power. Accurate intelligence information reflecting
the marginal threat Saddam posed to the U.S. and its allies was
available well before the March 2003 start of the war.
To further illustrate this, following are examples of the Administration’s
exaggeration of intelligence regarding Iraq.
“A Mushroom Cloud”
“Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final
proof - the smoking gun - that could come in the form of a mushroom
cloud.”
President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat; Remarks by the President
on Iraq, White House (10/7/2002).
The phrase “mushroom cloud” conveys the globally recognized
specter of a nuclear explosion. These words remind the listener
of the nightmarish images of nuclear explosions and their ghastly
aftermath. When President Bush uttered these words, simultaneously
citing “clear evidence,” a listener would obviously
infer that Iraq either had or soon would have nuclear weapons and
a means to use them against the United States.
However, the Intelligence Community believed otherwise at the
time of this statement. In its unclassified October 2002 “white
paper” entitled “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction
Programs,” the Intelligence Community made a much less urgent
judgment. The paper stated simply that “if left unchecked,
(Iraq) probably would have a nuclear weapon during this decade.”
It further stated:
“Iraq is unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons-grade
material for a deliverable nuclear weapon until the last half of
this decade; Baghdad could produce a nuclear weapon within a year
if it were able to procure weapons-grade fissile material abroad.”
While noting Iraq’s continuing interest in nuclear weapons,
the foremost intelligence analysis prior to the war does not include
any information suggesting that Iraq did have a nuclear weapon.
President Bush’s statement about a “mushroom cloud”
was not phrased to directly contradict the analysis of the Intelligence
Community at that time. It was not a simple “lie.” However,
the effect of this statement, if not the intention behind it, was
alarmist. It conveyed an urgency that was not supported by the Community’s
assessment of the situation at that time. In the aftermath of Saddam’s
overthrow, it became clear that Iraq was in fact even farther away
from a nuclear weapon than the Intelligence Community had judged.
Capability vs. Intent
“Year after year, Saddam Hussein has gone to elaborate lengths,
spent enormous sums, taken great risks to build and keep weapons
of mass destruction. But why? The only possible explanation, the
only possible use he could have for these weapons, is to dominate,
intimidate, or attack.”
President Bush Delivers “State of the Union,” White
House (1/28/2003)
While the Intelligence Community characterized Saddam Hussein
as having an ongoing interest in developing nuclear weapons, the
Intelligence Community concluded that Iraq was already in possession
of chemical and biological weapons. While these weapons are not
as devastating and horrifying as nuclear weapons, they are capable
of killing and maiming hundreds or thousands at a time if spread
efficiently among a military force or population. Efficient deployment
of these types of weapons to cause mass casualties, however, is
a difficult technological feat, especially if the target of the
attack is thousands of miles away. Two questions, then, were essential
to the appropriate use of this intelligence for policymaking purposes.
First, was Iraq capable of attacking the U.S. or its allies with
chemical or biological weapons? Saddam Hussein did not have the
capability to launch a chemical or biological attack against the
U.S. homeland using missiles or airplanes launched from Iraq. In
the 1980s, Saddam Hussein had used chemical weapons closer to home:
against his own people and against Iran. Pre-war intelligence suggested
Iraq could still effectively use biological weapons against his
enemies within or close to its borders. So, Iraq arguably possessed
the technological capability to attack American troops and allied
nations in the area.
However, to launch a chemical or biological assault, Saddam Hussein
had to be willing to deal with the consequences of such an attack
on our far more advanced and overpowering military or those the
U.S. would likely aid if attacked.
So the second key question has a much less certain answer. Did Saddam
intend, or was he likely, to use WMD to attack U.S. troops or its
allies in the region? The Intelligence Community’s assessment
was that he was not – as long as the threat of an imminent
American-led invasion to overthrow his regime did not enter the
picture. In an October 7, 2002 letter to then-SSCI Chairman Bob
Graham, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet provided declassified
testimony from a Senior Intelligence Witness concerning the possibility
that Saddam Hussein would initiate an attack using a weapon of mass
destruction if he was not threatened. The witness’ assessment
was as follows: “My judgment would be that the probability
of him initiating an attack – let me put a time frame on it
– in the foreseeable future, given the conditions we understand
now, the likelihood I think would be low.”
In October 2002, when Congress was weighing a resolution to authorize
the use of military force to remove Saddam Hussein from power, the
United States’ intelligence analysis was that he was not a
threat to our troops or allies even in the region. Yet the President’s
public statements exaggerated the Intelligence Community’s
assertion of Saddam’s capability into an insufficiently supported
pronouncement of his intention to attack U.S. interests.
Terrorist Threat from Iraq
“Before September the 11th, many in the world believed that
Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses,
and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine
those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other planes -- this time
armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one
crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none
we have ever known.”
President Delivers "State of the Union", White House
(1/28/2003).
President Bush’s comments above present a nightmare scenario
of terrorists armed with Saddam Hussein-supplied chemical or biological
weapons attacking the U.S. homeland. His statement is noteworthy
for its reliance on hypothetical examples which, as hypothetical
examples do, dealt with possibilities that might or might not be
likely occurrences. There are innumerable possibilities, but only
limited numbers of truly likely events. Before going to war, a President
should be assured that there is a significant likelihood that the
scenarios being used as a basis for attack will actually occur.
The Intelligence Community did not believe that Saddam Hussein
was likely to use his own forces or an outside group like al Qaeda
to attack the United States – with one important caveat. The
Intelligence Community believed that an impending U.S.-led attack
to remove Hussein from power would increase the likelihood of a
terror attack. Again in the October 7, 2002 letter to Chairman Graham,
members of the Intelligence Community stated:
“Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting
terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States.
“Should Saddam conclude that a US-led attack could no longer
be deterred, he probably would become much less constrained in adopting
terrorist actions. Such terrorism might involve conventional means,
as with Iraq’s unsuccessful attempt at a terrorist offensive
in 1991, or CBW (chemical or biological weapons).
“Saddam might decide that the extreme step of assisting Islamic
terrorists in conducting a WMD attack against the United States
would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number
of victims with him.”
The intelligence analysis presented as devastating a scenario as
President Bush described in his State of the Union Address, with
one vitally important distinction. President Bush outlined what
he believed would occur if no action was taken against Saddam Hussein.
But, according to the Intelligence Community, a war to remove Saddam
Hussein from power would make terrorist attacks against the U.S.
more likely than a continuance of the policy then in place. With
these public statements, President Bush directly contradicted the
intelligence information he had been given. A war undertaken ostensibly
to remove a threat, the war to remove Saddam, would actually increase
the possibility of attacks against the United States and its citizens.
Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda
“If the world fails to confront the threat posed by the Iraqi
regime, refusing to use force, even as a last resort, free nations
would assume immense and unacceptable risks. The attacks of September
the 11th, 2001, showed what the enemies of America did with four
airplanes. We will not wait to see what terrorists or terrorist
states could do with weapons of mass destruction.”
President’s Radio Address - “War on Terror,”
White House (3/8/2003).
The September 11 attacks were a direct assault on the United States
homeland. Strikes on the World Trade Center and Pentagon awakened
Americans to their vulnerability, ended any misconceived notions
of inviolability to catastrophic terrorism, and introduced all Americans
to the shadowy organization known as al Qaeda. The basis for making
war on al Qaeda after September 11 seemed more or less straightforward
to most Americans. The basis for making war on Saddam Hussein because
of an alleged connection to al Qaeda was much more complex, much
less clear-cut, than portrayed by the Administration.
In his address to the United Nations Security Council in February
5, 2003, Secretary of State Powell outlined the extent of what the
Intelligence Community knew about Saddam’s interactions with
al Qaeda. His remarks noted contacts between the Iraqi government
and al Qaeda dating back to the mid-1990s, reports that Iraq provided
training to al Qaeda, including possibly in chemical and biological
weapons, and the presence of al Qaeda members both in Baghdad and
in the Kurdish areas of northeastern Iraq, presumably with the knowledge
and acquiescence of the Saddam regime. The connections described
by Secretary Powell at first glance might seem provocative, but
upon closer inspection the conclusions do not present as ominous
a picture. Also, it is important to note what the Intelligence Community
did not say.
Secretary Powell did not describe, and the Intelligence Community
never concluded that there was, cooperation between Iraq and al
Qaeda on terrorist operations, nor did they actively support each
other with resources or personnel. Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda are
not natural allies; far from it, they are natural foes. Secular
Arab regimes like Saddam Hussein’s were threatened by religious
fundamentalists like those within al Qaeda. Likewise, al Qaeda’s
fierce Islamists would be wary of cooperation for fear of being
associated with or co-opted by a dictator like Saddam.
The Iraqi government likely had contacts at various levels with
al Qaeda. Yet the same could be said of many other governments inside
and outside the region, especially with regard to state intelligence
services trying to collect information about al Qaeda and whether
it threatened their nations’ interests. Secretary Powell mentioned
the possibility that Iraq had given chemical and biological training
to al Qaeda. His careful choice of words reflected the level of
uncertainty in the Intelligence Community surrounding this information.
As for the presence of al Qaeda in Iraq, Powell did not say that
Saddam knew al Qaeda operatives were in Baghdad or elsewhere in
Iraq, or that he could have done anything to prevent the use by
al Qaeda of Iraqi territory such as the Kurdish areas not under
his control.
In their public comments, the Bush Administration never claimed
directly that Iraq was involved in the September 11 attacks. President
Bush himself said on September 17, 2003, “No, we've had no
evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September the 11th.”
However, President Bush clearly did not refrain from associating
Saddam Hussein and Iraq with al Qaeda and thereby with the attacks
against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Repeated associations
helped build the case for war against Iraq, despite the absence
of a real connection between Iraq and September 11. According to
an August 2003 Washington Post poll, almost 70 percent of Americans
believed that Iraq was complicit in the September 11 attacks.
Advertising executives know the power of association when trying
to convince customers to purchase a product. Advertisers do not
have to promise specific benefits from that product; they only have
to associate the product with the benefit.
White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card used a business analogy
to explain the timing of the public debate on military action against
Iraq: "from a marketing point of view, you don't introduce
new products in August." In his warning about “terrorists
or terrorist states” and in other comments regarding Iraq
and al Qaeda, President Bush seemed to be using marketing-based
associative techniques to attempt to convince the American public
of a connection not explicitly stated in his remarks: that Iraq
was somehow involved in the September 11 attacks. It was not.
No Imminent Threat
“The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion:
Saddam Hussein’s regime is a grave and gathering danger.”
President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,
White House (9/12/2002)
Just as he never said Iraq was involved with September 11, President
Bush never said explicitly that Saddam Hussein’s regime was
an imminent threat to the United States. Nevertheless, as in the
remark above, he repeatedly drove home the image of an Iraq that
had attacked its neighbors in the past, that had used and likely
still possessed chemical and biological weapons, that was pursuing
nuclear weapons, and that had defied the will of the international
community by refusing to abide by United Nations Security Council
resolutions. Iraq was presented by President Bush as a problem that
needed to be addressed immediately.
The Intelligence Community never considered Iraq an “imminent
threat.” In fact, DCI Tenet made that clear in his February
5, 2004 speech describing the Intelligence Community’s performance
in assessing Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs.
Referring to the analysts who worked on the National Intelligence
Estimate on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, Tenet
specifically noted, “They never said there was an ‘imminent’
threat.”
Clearly, the United States and the international community were
wise to maintain focus on the intransigence and threatening actions
of Saddam Hussein. The policy of containment toward Iraq had weakened
since the removal of United Nations weapons inspectors in 1998,
and a renewed effort was needed to strengthen the restrictions put
in place to prevent Saddam Hussein from further destabilizing the
region. The Bush Administration was right to rebuild the resolve
of the United Nations (UN) and to get the weapons inspectors back
into Iraq. However, the UN weapons inspectors were only in Iraq
for less than three months before the U.S.-led military campaign
to overthrow Saddam from power began. At that point, the weapons
inspections process had not yet confirmed the disarming of Saddam,
but it had clearly and significantly thwarted his weapons programs
and was the best source of information on his efforts.
Why, then, was it necessary to attack Iraq in March 2003? Iraq,
as understood then, was not an “imminent threat,” and,
as understood today, did not present even the “grave and gathering
danger” President Bush described.
The U.S. was in the midst of the continuing effort to find, capture
or kill Osama bin Laden, members of al Qaeda and members of affiliated
groups seeking to attack the U.S. and its allies. Instead of being
able to maintain a single-minded focus to find and root out the
terrorists who committed the September 11 attacks and who continue
to threaten American lives, the United States military, intelligence
agencies, diplomatic corps, and the rest of the national security
apparatus were forced to shift their primary attention to an issue
that the facts reveal to have been far less urgent. While Saddam
Hussein has been captured, Osama bin Laden remains at large and
his al Qaeda organization continues to plan attacks against the
U.S. homeland. Despite this imminent threat, the situation in Iraq
remains the primary focus of our national security apparatus. The
US has 130,000 troops now in Iraq and will likely need similar numbers
for the foreseeable future if security in that nation is to be established
and maintained.
Conclusion
It was not a conspicuous rationale before the war, but President
Bush and members of his administration today note prominently that
the Iraqi people are better off now than under the regime of Saddam
Hussein. The security situation in Iraq, although still tenuous,
would have to deteriorate significantly for that not to be the case.
Yet, however noble a goal, freeing the Iraqi people was not the
foremost reason presented to the American people for going to war.
President Bush said Iraq was a threat to the United States and that
removing Saddam Hussein from power was necessary to improve the
security of Americans.
Are Americans safer today? Are Americans less likely to suffer a
terrorist attack because Saddam is out of power? Can the U.S. military,
intelligence agencies, and the remainder of our government better
protect our citizens and interests around the world than it could
before Operation Iraqi Freedom? Unfortunately, the answer to all
these questions is no. But they are questions that are appropriately
posed to the Bush Administration – not the U.S. Intelligence
Community – in the aftermath of the Iraq war. These are the
issues by which the decision to invade and occupy Iraq must be judged.
|