Iraq Update 10/19/06

“Victory in the Field Goes To the Best Trained, the Best Equipped and the Smartest Force”

  The Iraqi Government is Working to Secure Iraq

"The Iraqi government is a government of national unity that came to power through the will of the Iraqi people…The Iraqi people are the only authorized party that can remove this government or allow it to continue."  (Nouri al-Maliki, Prime Minister of Iraq, 10/18/06) 

Iraq's Premier in Talks With Key Shiite (Abdul-Hussein Ridha, AP, 10/18/06) Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki consulted with Iraq's Shiite spiritual leader and a radical, anti-U.S. cleric Wednesday in a bid to enlist support for efforts to build political consensus and tackle widening sectarian violence.  Al-Maliki's call on Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Muqtada al-Sadr came as the Shiite prime minister faces growing U.S. pressure to show more resolve in dealing with the daily carnage of sectarian bombings and attacks.  "I came (to see al-Sistani) so that the security and political situation can be stabilized, allowing the government to turn its attention to reconstruction," al-Maliki told reporters after his meeting with al-Sistani in the holy city of Najaf .  Al-Maliki, whose more than four months in office have seen a marked deterioration in security, also sought to project the independence of his government from perceived U.S. influence.  "The Iraqi government is a government of national unity that came to power through the will of the Iraqi people," he said. "The Iraqi people are the only authorized party that can remove this government or allow it to continue."  Al-Sistani, who usually shuns the media, had no immediate comment, but the visit underscored the influence wielded by Iraq 's top Shiite cleric on the government… Al-Maliki also called on al-Sadr, whose support was crucial to the prime minister's election to his job earlier this year.  Al-Sadr is the founder and leader of Iraq 's most feared militia, the Mahdi Army, which is blamed for much of the sectarian violence in Iraq . His supporters, however, have 30 of parliament's 275 seats and are part of the Shiite alliance that won last December's general elections.  "We are in a very difficult security situation," al-Maliki said after his talks with al-Sadr. "It is constantly the concern that we carry to every meeting with the political and religious centers of power." …  Al-Maliki's talks with al-Sistani and al-Sadr in Najaf coincided with the announcement in Baghdad earlier Wednesday that a much-anticipated national reconciliation conference would be start in the Iraqi capital Nov. 4.  The conference, which was originally scheduled to start this Friday, is designed to try and build a political consensus to deal with the country's deepening economic and security woes. 

The Enemy has a Plan As Well

“…they will beat the U.S. they said, on that thing -- and they pointed to a television.” (Michael Ware, CNN's Situation Room, 10/19/06)   

BLITZER: Some commentators, Michael, have compared it to the Tet offensive during the Vietnam War, when the Vietcong went on a major military offensive against the U.S. in Vietnam, with one eye on U.S. public opinion, to try to kill as many as Americans as possible, hoping that would demoralize the American public, which, in turn, would put pressure on LBJ and [other] administration officials to start withdrawing.  Are they sophisticated enough -- do they see a parallel to what happened in Vietnam ?

WARE: Oh, absolutely, Wolf. I mean we're seeing an upsurge in violence. This is merely a part of the fourth holy month of Ramadan offensive since the war began. So it's an upsurge for this holy month. We've seen this before.  But in terms of Vietnam , I mean the backbone of the insurgency, Wolf, is not al Qaeda. That's the most spectacular pocket of the insurgency. But the backbone are the members of Saddam's former military and security apparatus… these fellows are behind the bulk of the day to day attacks against U.S. forces. I sat with these guys back in 2003.  They said to me then that they know they won't defeat the U.S. on the battlefield, they will beat the U.S. they said, on that thing-- and they pointed to a television. They say we've read Ho Chi Minh. We've read Bodin Juanju (ph), the Vietnamese general. They studied Vietnam . They said that we believe we can wear down American public stamina in support of this war because our endurance for the bloodletting can out sustain that American political will. So they're very, very closely watching the parallels -- Wolf. 

The Most Adaptable Force Will Win

“Since the beginning of combat operations in Iraq in March 2003, coalition forces have continuously adapted to a changing environment, not only to respond and react to a thinking enemy, but to also develop better tactics to defeat the enemy's own… weaknesses.” (Mark Kimmitt, Deputy Secretary of Defense for the Middle East , 19/19/06)

Opposing view: Our strategy is not static: To win, our coalition is continually adapting to changing environment. (Mark Kimmitt, USA Today, 10/19/06) Most militaries know that success in war argues against an inflexible approach to strategy and tactics. Militaries that remain foolishly consistent and unable to react to an evolving tactical environment are likely to fail. The enemy we face in Iraq , Afghanistan and elsewhere in the war on terrorism is a thinking enemy, and a thinking enemy will always seek to find an operational advantage, a seam in our defenses, or a weakness in our plan and tactics.  That is not happening. Since the beginning of combat operations in Iraq in March 2003, coalition forces have continuously adapted to a changing environment, not only to respond and react to a thinking enemy, but to also develop better tactics to defeat the enemy's own seams, weaknesses and disadvantages. Some have gone so far as to suggest that our forces are simply reacting to the evolving tactics of the enemy. Quite the opposite; operations in Iraq are developed from a position of advantage and superiority and do not cede initiative, nor innovation, to the enemy. We are empowering Iraqi security forces to take on more and more of the security responsibilities, and helping to strengthen Iraq 's unity government. The permanent, democratically elected government has been in place for fewer than 150 days, while most of the Iraqi battalions in the field today have existed for fewer than two years. The idea that coalition forces have pursued a static tactical policy in Iraq is a myth and a disservice to our innovative, creative and adaptable troops. Our troops know that the fight in 2006 is far different from the fight in 2003, and they know the importance of changing their tactics correspondingly. They know that victory in the field goes to the best trained, the best equipped and the smartest force, and the high price to be paid if they do not adapt and prevail. They know that, tactically, staying the course is the wrong way to defeat an enemy, but they also recognize that consistency in strategic guidance, combined with patience and persistence to see the job through, is the right way to win.  Mark Kimmitt is deputy secretary of Defense for the Middle East . 

Bringing it All Together

“So what you end up having within Iraq is not only attempts to continue to adjust the security tactics so that you can meet the ongoing challenges in Baghdad and elsewhere, but also the political conditions that are going to persuade some of the people who may have been contributing to the violence to stop committing acts of violence, to join the political process…” (Tony Snow, White House Press Briefing, 10/19/06)

“In a time of war, you constantly reassess what you're doing, and you constantly do what you can and use your ingenuity and your flexibility to be more effective in your aims.  And what you have seen is going into Baghdad, into a lot of these areas -- and it's also worth noting that it is not simply the case that our forces are the only -- are kind of sitting ducks, and they're the only ones who are taking a hit.  This -- there have been a number of very effective actions against terror fighters in Baghdad and elsewhere.  There have been seizures of arm caches and that sort of stuff, and that gets reported regularly. But it is something that we anticipated going into Ramadan, but it is not something that we want to have continue forever.  What we want to do is to continue to have -- to build military tactics that go after the bad guys, and at the same time, work on the political strategy. This is why we not only had meetings yesterday with Prime Minister Maliki, Muqtada al Sadr, and Ali al Sistani, you also had the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Hashimi, who has lost three family members to violence, also working with Sunni forces.  So what you end up having within Iraq is not only attempts to continue to adjust the security tactics so that you can meet the ongoing challenges in Baghdad and elsewhere, but also the political conditions that are going to persuade some of the people who may have been contributing to the violence to stop committing acts of violence, to join the political process, and to build the economic opportunities that are going to let some of those who might otherwise be inclined to join terror to choose a more peaceful path.”