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For Immediate Release
October 3, 2006 |
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Shays Offers Observations,
Recommendations to Improve Security in Iraq, Encourage Iraqi
Political Reconciliation
Bridgeport, CT – Congressman Christopher Shays (R-CT),
Chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats and International Relations, this week provided observations
and recommendations from his 14th oversight trip to Iraq to
the Administration, Congressional colleagues and various foreign
policy thought leaders, including the Iraq Study Group.
The full text of Shays’ letter detailing his observations
and recommendations follows:
In August I traveled to Iraq for the fourteenth time since
April 2003, leading a bi-partisan Congressional Delegation
that held meetings with US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, General
George Casey, Iraqi President Jalal Talibani, and Prime Minister
Nouri Al-Maliki.
Three weeks ago my Subcommittee held a
three day hearing on Iraq with testimony from
thirteen witnesses, including US Defense and State Department
officials, US counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism experts,
and Iraqi representatives of the main political groups in
Iraq. The purpose of the Congressional Delegation and hearing
was to conduct oversight, and to assess the security situation
and political developments in Iraq.
When I traveled to Iraq in July for my thirteenth visit I
urged the Iraqi political leadership to take decisive control
of their country and turn their words of good intent into
actions to end the violence and achieve national reconciliation.
In my observations
and recommendations letter after my thirteenth visit,
I recommended that we “Be blunt with the Iraqi leadership
that if they are unwilling to make peace among themselves
the United States will have no choice but to draw down its
troops and leave Iraq.”
During my last visit, I found Iraqi leaders were still not
taking decisive action. Moreover, during our meetings in Baghdad
and at our hearings, US officials questioned whether Iraqi
leaders had the political will to do so.
I made it clear to Prime Minister Al-Maliki that while I
continue to support our joint efforts to bring democracy and
stability to Iraq, the American people have every right to
expect Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds will resolve their differences,
end the violence, and move to replace Coalition Forces with
Iraqi Security Forces in police operations and combat patrolling.
The following observations and recommendations are based
on my most recent visit and hearing held in the Subcommittee
on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations
on September 11, 13, and 15, entitled “Iraq: Democracy
or Civil War.”
Observation: Sunnis comprise forty percent
of Baghdad’s population but are not represented on city
and neighborhood councils due to the Sunni boycott of the
January 2005 elections. This under-representation is true
in other provinces around the country.
Recommendation: Urge the Iraqi Government
to hold provincial elections as soon as possible to provide
true representation in Baghdad, and all other provinces.
Observation: The main cause of Iraq’s
violence and instability is political, and requires a political
solution. Iraq’s leaders are not demonstrating the will
to compromise and reach agreements required to resolve the
issues dividing them. This division is a principal cause of
the insurgent and sectarian violence.
We recognize the complexity of national reconciliation. We
also recognize Iraqis have overcome many obstacles and made
tremendous strides. Since June 2004, a number of significant
deadlines were met: Iraq held elections for a transitional
government; drafted a Constitution and approved it in a national
referendum; elected a Council of Representatives (parliament);
and formed a government under the new Constitution. There
are no such deadlines in effect today to motivate Iraqi leaders
to move forward with Prime Minister Al-Maliki’s national
reconciliation plan.
Recommendation: The United States should
encourage Iraqi leaders to establish a timeline for each
element of Prime Minister Maliki’s national reconciliation
plan. There should be dates certain for provincial elections,
the rollback of de-Baathification, amnesty, allocation of
oil revenues, and central government control of militias,
or their disbandment.
Observation: The Iraqi Council of Representatives
has appointed the Parliamentary Committee to review the Iraqi
Constitution and make recommendations for amendments under
the agreement brokered by US Ambassador Khalilzad on October
12, 2005 and embodied in Article 142 of the Constitution.
Sunnis expect issues important to them will be addressed not
only through national reconciliation and legislation, but
also considered in a Constitutional revision process.
Recommendation: Urge the Parliamentary
Committee to make constitutional amendment recommendations
to the Council of Representatives as swiftly as possible
so they can be considered, adopted, and submitted to the
Iraqi people for referendum.
Observation: Iraqi leaders said they believe
the insurgents and terrorists have better weapons than the
Iraqi Security Forces, and if their forces were issued more
lethal weapons, they could replace US forces in police operations
and combat patrolling sooner.
Recommendation: Establish a joint Iraq-US
program to examine whether the quality of weapons for the
Iraqi Security Forces is adequate to combat the insurgents
and foreign terrorists, and if not, upgrade those weapons.
Observation: Iran is interfering and negatively
influencing developments in Iraq. Iran is financing militias,
smuggling weapons and explosives used by insurgents against
Coalition troops and Iraqi Security Forces, and is seeking
to influence the Iraqi political process.
Recommendation: Request European Foreign
Ministers, now negotiating with Iran on the nuclear issue,
demand Iran halt its financing of militias and infiltration
of weapons and agents in Iraq.
Observation: Small projects managed by US
Agency for International Development (USAID) private sector
partners such as Mercy Corps under the Community Action Program
are very successful in achieving their objectives and creating
jobs for Iraqis.
Recommendation: USAID should increase
its funding of the Community Action Program’s use
of private sector partners to achieve development and to
increase Iraqi employment.
Observation: Last week, there were only
4.7 hours a day of electricity in Baghdad, and 11.3 hours
nationwide. Regretfully, electricity output was 6 percent
below that of the same period in 2005.
Recommendation: The US Secretary of Energy
should provide technical and management experts and greater
financial aid to assist the Iraqi Government in boosting
electricity production and distribution.
Observation: No flow meters measuring the
amount of oil and gas produced and distributed are known to
exist in Iraq since Saddam Hussein removed them to subvert
the Oil-for-Food program and illegally export crude oil.
The theft of oil in Iraq is estimated in excess of 200,000
barrels of petroleum per day, which equates to $100 million
per day at a price of $50 per barrel. The insurgency and militias
are believed to be engaged in this theft and able to finance
their anti-Coalition attacks and operations with money from
stolen oil.
Recommendation: A comprehensive flow metering
system, coupled with remote telemetry monitoring, should
be installed at each producing well-site and throughout
the oil and gas distribution system in Iraq. Security for
the system must be increased.
Observation: The Iraq Study Group, co-chaired
by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman
Lee Hamilton, was established by Congress to provide a fresh
assessment of Iraq and to make recommendations in a report
to the President, the Congress, and the American people. On
September 19, the Co-Chairs stated they will submit their
report sometime after the upcoming November Congressional
elections but no later than March 15, 2007.
There are substantial questions about the accuracy of Department
of Defense statistics and evaluations, particularly regarding
the numbers of Iraqi Security Force personnel present for
duty and the capabilities of the units comprising the Iraqi
Security Forces.
Recommendation: The Iraq Study Group should
submit a preliminary report not later than December 1, 2006
that focuses on the Iraqi Security Forces, and submit its
full report as soon thereafter as possible.
Observation: The Department of Defense use
of stop-loss and the extension of duty tours in Iraq to meet
force requirements are causing hardship to troops and their
families. This action will ultimately have a detrimental effect
on our recruitment and retention capabilities. To require
units to stay a day longer in Iraq or be recalled from inactive
duty is devastating for the families, and for the affected
Soldiers and Marines. It will also undermine public support
for our operations in Iraq.
Recommendation: Discontinue stop-loss
and extension of duty tours in Iraq. Instead, adopt realistic
plans for the number of troops needed in Iraq and for rotations
based on those numbers.
Observation: The Department of Defense is
locked in to defending a policy based on a number of serious
mistakes. These mistakes have damaged the effort to achieve
our goals in Iraq. Additionally, the Department has been reluctant
to provide adequate statistics and readiness assessments for
Iraqi Security Forces to Members of Congress and the Government
Accountability Office.
Recommendation: Serious consideration
should be given to bringing in a new team to lead the Department
of Defense.
Recommendation: The Congressional Committees
that authorize and appropriate funding of operations in
Iraq should be more engaged in oversight.
Observation: Units in the Iraqi Security
Force have combat experience ranging from three years (those
that were formed in mid-2003) to six months. United States
military commanders state some of these units are at a high
state of readiness and are taking the lead in police operations
and combat patrolling.
Recommendation: The President said as
the Iraqis step up, we step down. That has not happened
because we have not reached the total number of security
forces needed to secure Iraq. Once we surpass the required
number with Iraqi Security Forces, American and Coalition
forces should begin to step down based on a predictable,
firm timeline. We need to give the Iraqis a firm timeline
so they know we will not be there forever and begin to take
the difficult but necessary diplomatic and political steps
required to unite their country and reduce the violence.
Observation: The 325,000 Iraqi Security
Force level to be reached on December 31, 2006 is not adequate
to provide internal security, nor is it adequate to counter
any external security threat.
Experts testified at the Subcommittee’s hearings that
successful counter-insurgencies have historically required
20 security personnel per 1,000 of population, which in the
case of Iraq’s 26 million people would be 520,000 security
personnel.
There are approximately 4 million Kurds who live in the provinces
governed by the Kurdistan Regional Government. They are protected
by approximately 70,000 Kurdish security forces (the Peshmerga)
and there is not the insurgent and sectarian violence in Kurdistan
that there is elsewhere in Iraq. Hence, the Kurdish population
need not be included in this calculation.
The remaining 22 million people in the non-Kurdish area of
Iraq require approximately 440,000 security personnel. Until
the Iraqis establish a capable and loyal force at this force
level, stability will not be achieved, nor will Coalition
forces be able to draw down.
Recommendation: Urge the Iraqi government
in conjunction with the Multi-National Force-Iraq to increase
as quickly as possible the size of the Iraqi Security Forces
from the present planned strength of 325,000 to at least
440,000 security forces in the non-Kurdish areas of Iraq.
It is up to the Iraqis to take the political and military
steps to end the violence among themselves and create stability.
The United States and the Coalition can support the Iraqi
effort, but it is the Iraqis that must fight and win the battle
for their country.
We offer these observations and recommendations in the hope
of moving Iraq toward the goals set out in the National Strategy
for Victory in Iraq: “a democratic society at peace
with its neighbors.”
Contact: Sarah Moore, 202/225-5541
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