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Shays Statement on Post-War Iraq
I believe in our mission in Iraq and want to do everything
I can to help it succeed.
As Chairman of the House Government Reform Subcommittee
on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations, I have held more than 95 hearings on counter-terrorism
issues, and fifteen of our hearings focused specifically
on the war in Iraq.
I have made 14 trips to see first hand what conditions
are like on the ground. These trips allow me to make
independent assessments of our operations in Iraq, the
training of Iraqi Security Forces, reconstruction, and
political, social and humanitarian efforts. Following
each trip, I report my observations and recommendations
to the White House, Pentagon and State Department in
an effort to improve our operations. I also share my
observations and recommendations with Iraqi government
officials. Click here
to read my letter to the Administration following my
14th oversight trip offering observations and recommendations
to improve security in Iraq and encourage Iraqi political
reconciliation
Based on my oversight work in Congress and in Iraq,
it is clear we need to continue to be engaged with Iraq
economically, militarily and politically. This is a
war the free world can not afford to lose. If we leave
prematurely, either now or in the future, we could see
catastrophic results including a full civil war in Iraq;
a huge victory for Islamist terrorists; and Iran becoming
the dominant player in a region of the world that has
two-thirds of the world's oil reserves. We simply can
not allow this to happen.
We all know a number of serious mistakes were made
as I reported following my trips in 2003 and early 2004.
We did not prevent the looting when coalition forces
first entered Iraq. It is clear we should not have disbanded
their entire military, border patrol or police leaving
just 150,000 coalition soldiers to defend a nation of
26 million Iraqis in a country the size of California.
The Department of Defense (DoD) initially failed to
procure enough of the proper protective gear and armored
vehicles our soldiers needed and we became an occupying
nation.
We started to see progress when we transferred power
to the Iraqis in June of 2004 and began the process
of training their police, military and border patrol.
Significant progress continued for the next 18 months.
Deadlines were established and time after time they
met them. The Iraqis held three successful elections,
wrote and ratified a new constitution, and swore in
a new democratic government. Meanwhile, Iraqi forces
continued to assume more and more of the daily security
responsibilities.
Unfortunately, since January 2006 progress has abated.
Little has happened since the new Iraqi government assumed
power in January, putting everything we have worked
for at risk.
I have become concerned about the apparent lack of
political will and slowed progress when I visited Iraq
in July. At the time, however, Iraqi Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki's government had been in office only
six weeks and had given our congressional delegation
assurances that progress would be made. In August, I
returned to Iraq to find that the tough decisions had
not been made and there was no tangible progress.
It is my conclusion, after my two most recent visits
in July and August, that we need to force the issue,
and the best way to do that is to set firm timelines
for Iraqi security forces to replace our troops who
are doing police work. We need to motivate the Iraqis
to set firm deadlines for provisional elections, reconciliation
and amnesty, and a final drafting of its constitution.
This is absolutely essential if progress is to be made.
U.S. and coalition forces will still be needed in Iraq
to provide military support for logistics, particularly
fixed wing and helicopter air support, and such important
services as medical care. We will also need to maintain
a presence to assist the Iraqis in traditional military
operations against insurgents and to discourage Iraq's
neighbors from entering the country.
I will continue to conduct oversight on our operations
in Iraq, which I believe is one of the most crucial
issues of our time. I will also continue to pressure
the Administration and the Department of Defense to
better define and improve our mission and operations,
to do a better job of ensuring our troops have everything
they need, and to speak clearly and realistically to
the American people about the challenges we face.
You may be interested to know the Subcommittee held
three hearings during the week of September 11, 2006
to examine security force levels; prospects for national
reconciliation; and the consequences of leaving Iraq
immediately, later but still prematurely, or when Iraqis
are capable of taking over for Coalition forces. For
more information about these hearings, please visit
my Subcommittee's website at http://reform.house.gov/NSETIR.
- April, 2003, Umm Qasar: visit with
Save the Children to the Iraqi port city of Umm Qasar.
- August, 2003, Basra, Baghdad, Al Hillah,
Tikrit and Mosul: with Save the Children,
followed by Congressional Delegation fact-finding
trip
- December, 2003,
Baghdad, Al Kut, Village of Hochan, Village
of Seid Abais: with the Mercy Corps.
- January, 2004, Baghdad, Ad Dawr and Tikrit:
to visit 4th Infantry Division and to inspect Saddam
Hussein’s Spider Hole.
- April, 2004,
Irbil, Suleimaniyah, Khannaquin and Baghdad:
with Mercy Corps. Click
here to read the letter written to Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
- August, 2004,
Baghdad and Fallujah (and Amman, Jerusalem,
Beirut and Damascus): to meet US Army and
Marine forces and US Embassy personnel, in and around
Baghdad.
- January, 2005,
Irbil and Baghdad: to observe the election.
- May, 2005,
Baghdad: to meet with Iraqi security forces,
Ministers of Interior and Defense, and Mr. Chalabi.
- July, 2005, Baghdad (and Amman):
one day trip to meet with the Mercy Corps representatives
in Irbil.
- October, 2005,
Baghdad, Al-Anbar and Mosul: trip
to Baghdad and al-Assad airbase in al Anbar province.
- February, 2006,
Baghdad and Tal Afar (and UK and Israel).
- April, 2006,
Baghdad, Ramadi (and Dubai, Jerusalem, Tel
Aviv)
- July, 2006,
Baghdad, Balad and Erbil (and Kuwait, Jordan
and Sarajevo)
- August 17- 25, 2006,
Baghdad and Sulymania (and Israel:
Jerusalem,Haifa; Jordan: Amman; Sudan: Darfur; Lebanon:
Beirut; Italy: Rome; and United Kingdom: London)
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