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PURPOSE

BACKGROUND

WITNESSES

The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation will meet to review the circumstances that led to a discharge of oil from the M/V ATHOS I into waters of the Delaware River on November 26, 2004, and the response to the discharge by the vessel owner, and the Federal agencies. The Subcommittee will examine the response of Federal and State agencies to the spill and whether these agencies had all assets necessary to minimize the environmental and economic damages from this incident.

M/V ATHOS I Oil Spill Incident

On Friday, November 26th, the M/V ATHOS I, a 750-foot, single-hull tanker, struck a submerged object while being maneuvered to a berth at a Citgo facility on the Delaware River near Paulsboro, New Jersey. At the time of the incident, the vessel was under the control of a licensed river pilot, and was being aided by a tug. The grounding caused the vessel to lose power and resulted in a release of heavy crude oil from the vessel’s oil storage tanks.

Inspection of the vessel’s hull revealed a six-foot by two-foot hole in the aft centerline tank and a one-foot by two-foot puncture hole in the aft wing tank. After an investigation by a survey team comprised of members of the U.S. Coast Guard, Army Corps of Engineers, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and a representative for the vessel owner, the cause of the breaches in the hull was determined to be large section of iron pump housing that was partially submerged in river sediments. The housing weighed approximately 12 tons and was approximately 12’6” long, 6’3” high and 3’4” wide (see attached photos).

The housing was located approximately 700 yards from the Citgo pier in an Army Corps of Engineers designated anchorage and was positioned directly in the path the M/V ATHOS I. The existence of the bottom debris was unknown to the maritime community and was not included on any navigational chart or in any notice to mariners. Other vessels had used the anchorage and pier in the days immediately prior to the accident. As such, negligence on the part of the pilot and the vessel’s crew has been discounted as a cause of the incident and the resultant release of oil.

The Corps last dredged the anchorage in 1985. Sand was mined from the area under a Corps approved permit in 1997.

Incident Response

Following notification of a discharge of oil by the vessel’s operator, the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office/Group in Philadelphia initiated a spill response at the scene of the incident. The National Contingency Plan, which governs the Federal response to oil and hazardous material spills, designates the Coast Guard as the lead agency for oil spill response in coastal waters.

The Coast Guard established a Unified Command which also included the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control, and representatives of the vessel’s owner to coordinate response activities.

The Coast Guard has estimated that 264,355 gallons of heavy crude oil were discharged into the waters of the Delaware River. Reports indicate that approximately 150 miles of shoreline in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland were impacted by oil that was discharged from the ATHOS I. Of that area, approximately 11 miles of shoreline were heavily impacted. More then 124,000 feet of protective booms was deployed around environmentally sensitive areas. Oil skimming units and shoreline teams continue to recover and remove oil and oil-contaminated water and sediments. Up to 1,700 workers from federal, state and local government agencies, as well as the private sector, were involved in the clean up at the height of the response efforts.

Numerous actions were taken to prevent the spread of discharged oil into uncontaminated areas. The Coast Guard established a 27.5-mile safety zone that restricted vessel traffic in the most heavily oiled areas. The Coast Guard also established entry restrictions for vessels with a draft greater than 34 feet during low tide in order to minimize the release of oil that had settled onto the river bottom.

The Unified Command coordinated vessel movement in and out of the zone to minimize traffic delays and to decontaminate vessels before departure from the port of Philadelphia. Fish and Wildlife officials in New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware issued advisories to prevent the transport of oil by anglers, hunters and boaters to uncontaminated areas and to preclude waterfowl from inadvertently being flushed from inland roosting and resting areas out into portions of the Delaware River that may be impacted by the oil spill from the M/V ATHOS I.

Additionally, the Salem Nuclear Power Plant was temporarily shutdown as a precautionary measure when small amounts of oil were detected in the plant’s cooling water intake systems. The plant remained offline until the likelihood of oil impact had passed.

As of January 4, 2005, 172 birds have died due to the oil spill. 90 birds have been captured and are currently being rehabilitated. Approximately 230 birds have been rehabilitated and released to the wild. Some of these birds were transported to Blackwater National Wildlife Refuge in Dorchester County, Maryland to avoid reintroduction to the oiled areas of the Delaware River.

The Coast Guard Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) reports total response costs of the oil spill incident of approximately $84 million dollars as of January 3, 2005. Of this total, the responsible party has spent $80 million dollars and the FOSC has spent $4 million dollars from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. The final total cost as a result of the spill, including the costs of continuing response activities and damages, cannot be reasonably estimated at this time.

A map showing the affected area is attached.

M/V ATHOS I History

The ATHOS I is a Cypriot-flagged, single hulled tank vessel that was built in 1983, and is owned by the Tsakos Shipping and Trading SA, a Greek citizen. The ATHOS I authorization to operate as a single hull vessel is scheduled to expire on January 1, 2006. However, based upon an inspection by Marine Safety Officer Philadelphia, following the incident in November, the Coast Guard discovered that the vessel had undergone a major renovation, which included adding a double side layer to the vessel's hull. If the second layer is within the width requirements listed in 33 CFR 157.10(d), the Coast Guard will revise the hull examination letter to extend the phase out date by five years, as allowed under Section 3707a of title 46, United States Code.

The ATHOS I has also been involved in a number of reportable marine casualty incidents over the past decade. On July 29, 1996, the ATHOS I, under a previous name of STELLA MAR, grounded near Ponce, Puerto Rico, damaging the rudder and rudderstock. The Coast Guard faulted the crew for not monitoring the water depth. The vessel also reported marine casualties that occurred in Alameda, California in 1997 and in Norfolk, Virginia in 1993.

Prohibition on the Obstruction of Navigable Waters

The Coast Guard is continuing its investigation into the origins of the housing and the party that is responsible for placing the object in an active shipping channel. Preliminary analysis of the housing suggests it has been in the area for some time. Under Subchapter C of title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, owners of objects that could obstruct navigation in U.S. waters must mark and report the existence of the obstruction. In cases where an object is lost overboard, the Coast Guard is generally notified as to the location and the nature of the object, and the Service notifies vessels that operate in the area of the presence of the object through immediate broadcast and Notices to Mariners. In this case, the Coast Guard never received any notification of a loss of a pump housing or similar object in the area of the incident.

Section 403 of title 33, United States Code, prohibits the creation of any obstruction to navigation in the waters of the United States that has not been recommended and approved by the Army Corps of Engineers and the Secretary of the Army. If the Coast Guard identifies the party that is responsible for the placement of the obstruction in the Delaware River, the Service may consider legal action against the offending party under the authority of this statute.

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), P.L. 101-380, was enacted in response to the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill that discharged more than 11 million gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound, Alaska on March 24, 1989. The systems established by OPA focus on the prevention of oil spills and rapid, effective response to spills that do occur. OPA

• requires that response to oil spills in U.S. waters be included in the National Contingency Plan; and
• establishes
• liability and limits on liability for oil spills;
• a system to compensate victims of oil spills;
• the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund; and
• tank vessel construction standards.

National Contingency Plan:

OPA amended the National Contingency Plan by requiring that the Federal government coordinate all response efforts to oil spills. The Plan previously applied only to hazardous material spills. Under the Plan, Area Committees consisting of Federal, State and local officials establish detailed Area Contingency Plans for responding to oil spills in a particular location, and that operators of vessels and facilities develop detailed Facility Response Plans. The Act also required the establishment of specialized Coast Guard district response groups to respond to oil spills as quickly as possible. The National Contingency Plan designates the Coast Guard as the lead Federal agency for oil spills in coastal waters. Coastal waters are defined as the waters of the United States that are subject to the tide and includes certain ports and harbors on inland waters. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is designated as the lead Federal agency for oil spills occurring in inland waters

Tank Vessel Construction Standards:

The Act also established a schedule that began to phase out single hull tankers in 1995, and requires that all tank vessels over 5,000 gross tons be constructed with or refitted with double hulls by the year 2015. The ATHOS I is required to be fitted with a double hull by 2006 or by 2011 should the Coast Guard determine that the double sides that were added to the vessel meet Coast Guard specifications.

Liability and Compensation under OPA:

Under OPA, liability for oil spills rests with a “responsible party” who is usually the owner or operator of a vessel. In the event of a spill, the responsible party must pay removal costs incurred by the government or others, and damages to claimants who are injured by the spill. Damages may include natural resources damages, damages to real or personal property, damages for loss of use of a natural resource (fishery, etc.), damages for lost revenue or profit caused by a spill, and damages for the cost of government programs necessitated by the spill.

In addition to broadly expanding the scope of liability, OPA also significantly raised the total liability of the responsible party beyond the historic maritime standard, which had been the value of the vessel and its cargo. Section 1004 of OPA outlines the Federal limits of liability of a responsible party for each oil spill incident. The OPA liability limit in this case is approximately $45.5 million. Since OPA does not preempt the authority of a state to establish additional oil spill liability requirements, responsible parties face unlimited liability for oil spills in certain states.

Liability limits do not apply in cases where the responsible party is found negligent. Liability is waived in cases resulting from an act of God, an act of war, or an act or omission of an unrelated third party.

To ensure that vessel operators have the resources to respond to an oil spill and pay damages that may result from a spill, OPA requires that vessel owners or operators have the financial responsibility (certificates of financial responsibility or COFR’s) to meet the Federal limits of liability in order to operate in U.S. waters.

Beyond damages, OPA contains a strict schedule of penalties, both civil and criminal. For example, failure to notify the Federal government of a discharge is punishable by a fine of not more than $250,000 for an individual or $500,000 for an organization, and imprisonment of not more than three years.

Federal Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF)

While liability for the costs associated with responding to an oil spill rests with the responsible party, a Federal trust fund was established by OPA to pay damages resulting from oils spills under certain circumstances. These situations include incidences when the responsible party cannot be identified, when the responsible party has a valid defense to an oil spill claim, and when claims exceed a responsible party’s Federal limit of liability. The OSLTF was capitalized in the amount of $1 billion, primarily through a five-cent per barrel tax on oil. The Fund can provide up to $1 billion for any one oil pollution incident, including up to $500 million for the initiation of natural resource damage assessments and claims in connection with any single incident.

The Fund is commonly used to provide expenditures for State access for removal actions, payments to Federal, state, and Indian tribe trustees to carry out natural resource damage assessments and restorations, payment of claims for uncompensated removal costs and damages, and Research and development and other specific appropriations.