KENNEDY TO REQUIRE UPDATED INTELLIGENCE IN IRAQ

OFFERS AMENDMENT FOR NEW NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE - CIVIL WAR, SECURITY, AND ECONOMIC FACTORS DEMAND RE-ASSESSMENT

August 2, 2006

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: Laura Capps/Melissa Wagoner
August 2, 2006 (202) 224-2633




Washington, DC: Today, Senator Edward M. Kennedy offered an amendment that would require the Director of National Intelligence to task the intelligence community to prepare an updated National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq. The last time the NIE was updated was in July 2004, yet much has changed in the security, economy and political stability of Iraq in the last two years. Reports from the Departments of Defense and State and statements from Administration officials on security and stability in Iraq have been troublingly inadequate in assisting Congress with measuring the success of our efforts in Iraq and the safety of our troops, and it is essential to have an up-to-date, objective assessment of Iraq from the intelligence community. The amendment is cosponsored by Senators Harry Reid, Joe Biden, Carl Levin, and Jack Reed.

Senator Kennedy said, “We need a new assessment from the intelligence community so we can adjust our policy in Iraq accordingly. John Adams once said, ‘Facts are stubborn things.’ It is abundantly clear that the facts matter. They mattered before the war and during the war, and they matter now, as we try to deal effectively with the continuing quagmire that is Iraq. A new National Intelligence Estimate is long over-due.”

Below is a summary of the measure as well as Senator Kennedy’s floor remarks upon introduction.
Kennedy National Intelligence Estimate Amendment

The amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence to task the intelligence community to prepare an updated National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq. This amendment is cosponsored by Senators Harry Reid, Carl Levin and Joe Biden. The intelligence estimate would be required by October 1.

The last time the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq was updated was in July 2004. According to press reports, it outlined three possibilities for Iraq through the end of 2005. The worst case was civil war. The best case was an Iraq whose stability would remain tenuous in political, economic and security terms. Much has changed over the last two years and decision makers in the Executive and Legislative Branches urgently need an updated National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq.

The intelligence estimate required in the amendment would require an update on eight key issues:

• Sectarianism. An assessment from the intelligence community on whether Iraq is in a civil war now or is descending into civil war, and what will prevent or reverse a deterioration of conditions promoting civil war.

• Security. The extent to which the Government of Iraq is succeeding in standing up effective security forces, and the actions that will increase the prospects of that occurring, and further the extent to which militias are providing security in Iraq, and the extent to which the Government of Iraq has developed and implemented a credible plan to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militias into government security forces, and is working to obtain a commitment from political parties to ban militias.

• Terrorism. The extent of the threat from violent extremist-related terrorism, including Al Qaeda, in and from Iraq, and the extent to which terrorism in Iraq has increased the threat to United States persons and interests around the world, and actions the intelligence community believes can address the terrorist threat.

• Political Development. Whether Iraq is succeeding in creating a stable and effective unity government, the likelihood that changes to the constitution will be made to address the concerns of the Sunni community, and the actions it believes will increase the prospect of that occurring.

• Economic Reconstruction. Whether Iraq is succeeding in rebuilding its economy and creating economic prosperity for Iraqis, the likelihood that economic reconstruction in Iraq will significantly diminish Iraq’s dependence on foreign aid to meet its domestic economic needs, and the actions the intelligence community believes are needed to increase the likelihood of that occurring.

• Iraq’s Future. An assessment of the optimistic, most likely, and pessimistic scenarios for the stability of Iraq through 2007.

• Impact of Presence of Multinational Forces. An assessment whether, and in what ways, the large-scale presence of multinational forces Iraq helps or hinders the chances of success in Iraq.

• Affect on Regional Relations. An assessment of the extent to which the situation in Iraq is affecting our relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other countries in the region.


FLOOR STATEMENT BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY ON NIE AMENDMENT
(AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY)

Mr. President, I intend to offer an amendment to require the Director of National Intelligence to task the intelligence community to prepare an updated National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq.

The last time the NIE was updated was in July 2004. According to press reports, it outlined three possibilities for Iraq through the end of 2005. The worst case was civil war. The best case was an Iraq whose stability would remain tenuous in political, economic and security terms. Much has changed over the last two years and decision makers in the Executive and Legislative Branches urgently need an updated NIE.

Since 2004, reports from the Departments of Defense and State and comments by Administration officials on security and stability in Iraq have been unconvincing, and it is essential to have an objective assessment of Iraq from the intelligence community.

Our amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence to provide an intelligence assessment by October 1 – two months from now. If he is unable to do so, he must provide a report outlining the reasons.

The intelligence estimate required in our amendment would require an update on eight key issues.

The first is sectarianism. We need an assessment from the intelligence community on whether Iraq is in a civil war now or is descending into civil war, and what will prevent or reverse a deterioration of conditions promoting civil war.

The increasing sectarian violence, the ruthless death squads, the increasingly powerful privately armed militias, and the Administration’s decision to send thousands more U.S. troops to Baghdad are alarming. They underscore the urgency of obtaining an updated assessment from the intelligence community about current conditions so we can adjust our policy accordingly.

The second issue that the new intelligence estimate should address is security. One of the key elements of that assessment should be the militias. Militias are the engines of civil war. All one needs do is look at Bosnia or Lebanon.

As the violence in Lebanon demonstrates, political parties can’t govern with one hand and use militias to terrorize civilians with the other. It didn’t work with Hezbollah in Lebanon. It won’t work with Hamas. And it won’t work in Iraq.
Prime Minister Maliki has acknowledged the militia problem, but he has not articulated a clear vision for how to tackle this critical issue.
It is time for the new government to move beyond vague statements and develop a viable strategy to deal with the militias and prevent Iraq from descending into full-scale civil war.
On this critical issue, we need to know the intelligence community’s assessment of the likelihood that the Government of Iraq will obtain a commitment from the political parties to ban militias. We need to know the extent to which the Government of Iraq has developed and implemented a credible plan to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militias into government security forces. More broadly, we need an assessment from the intelligence community about whether Iraq is succeeding in standing up its own effective security forces, and what actions are needed to increase the prospect of that occurring.

The third issue is terrorism. We need an assessment from the intelligence community about the extent of the threat from violent extremist-related terrorism, including Al Qaeda, in and from Iraq, and the factors the intelligence community believes will address the terrorist threat.

Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki told Congress last week that in addition to the challenge of sectarian violence, his country is “the front line” against terrorism. Is a majority of the violence in Iraq driven by the insurgency, rather than foreign terrorists? Is it still the case that less than 1% of the prison population in Iraq are foreign fighters?

We need to know the current nature and extent of the terrorism threat. Just as important, we need the intelligence community’s assessment on what the Iraqis and we can do to counter this threat.

Fourth, we need an assessment from the intelligence community about whether Iraq is succeeding in creating a stable and effective unity government, the likelihood that changes to the constitution will be made to address the concerns of the Sunni community, and the actions it believes will increase the prospect of that occurring.

Fifth is economic reconstruction. We need an assessment from the intelligence community about whether Iraq is succeeding in rebuilding its economy and creating economic prosperity for Iraqis, the likelihood that economic reconstruction in Iraq will significantly diminish Iraq’s dependence on foreign aid to meet its domestic economic needs, and the actions the intelligence community believes are needed to increase the likelihood of that occurring.

Sixth is the future of Iraq. We need an assessment from the intelligence community of the optimistic, most likely, and pessimistic scenarios for the stability of Iraq through 2007. The future of Iraq is difficult to predict, but certainly the assessment provided in 2004 needs to be updated. We need to know what the intelligence community foresees now.

Seventh is an assessment of the international presence in Iraq, including whether, and in what ways, the large-scale presence of multi-national forces is helping or hindering Iraqis' chances for success.

Eighth and finally, we need an assessment of the extent to which our operations in Iraq are affecting our relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other countries in the region.

A new National Intelligence Estimate is long over-due. John Adams once said, “Facts are stubborn things.” It is abundantly clear that the facts matter. They mattered before the war and during the war, and they matter now, as we try to deal effectively with the continuing quagmire.

I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

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