

RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL C. V. CHRISTIANSON  
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4  
UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FIRST SESSION, 109TH CONGRESS

ON THE ARMY'S REQUIREMENTS TO RECONSTITUTE MILITARY  
EQUIPMENT RETURNING FROM OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND  
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

APRIL 6, 2005

NOT FOR PUBLICATION  
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES



**Lieutenant General C.V. (Chris) Christianson**  
**Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4**  
**Headquarters, Department of the Army**

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Lieutenant General Claude V. (Chris) Christianson assumed his duties as the Deputy Chief of Staff, G4, Department of the Army, on October 2nd, 2003. Lieutenant General Christianson, a Distinguished Military Graduate of the Army ROTC program at North Dakota State University was commissioned as an Ordnance Officer in 1971.

From 1971-1974, General Christianson was assigned to the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas; first as Weapons Platoon Leader, then Executive Officer in the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 18<sup>th</sup> Infantry, and later as a Shop Officer and the S2/3 (Operations Officer) in the 701<sup>st</sup> Maintenance Battalion. He was assigned to Thailand in 1974 for two years, where he served as the Chief of Shop Operations with the United States Army Support Group in Samae San, and later as a Customs Officer with the JUSMAG-THAI in Bangkok. From 1977 to 1979, he was assigned to the 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington, as the Commander of a Forward Support Maintenance Company in the 709<sup>th</sup> Maintenance Battalion, and later as the operations Officer in the Division Support Command. From 1979 to 1982, General Christianson was an Assistant Professor of Military Science at Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado. From 1983 to 1986, he served as the Army Guard Maintenance Programs and Policy Officer with the National Guard Bureau, Washington, DC. In 1986, he was assigned to the Southern European Task Force in Vicenza, Italy, where he served as the Director of Logistics for the 22<sup>nd</sup> Area Support Group, for three years. From 1989 to 1991, General Christianson commanded the 725<sup>th</sup> Main Support Battalion, 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. In 1992, after completion of the Army War College, he returned to Hawaii as the Assistant Chief of Staff G4, 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (Light). In 1993, General Christianson was assigned as the Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) at the American Embassy, Rome, Italy, where he served for nearly two years. From 1995 to 1997, General Christianson commanded the 3<sup>rd</sup>, and later, the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division Support Commands in Kitzingen, Germany. After command, he was assigned as the G4 for the U.S. V Corps in Heidelberg, Germany. After his selection to Brigadier General, General Christianson was assigned as the Deputy Commanding General for the 21<sup>st</sup> Theater Support Command in Kaiserslautern, Germany, where he served from 1998 to 2000. From 2000 to 2002, General Christianson served as the Assistant Chief of Staff, C4/J4/G4 United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea/Deputy Commanding General (Support), Eight United States Army, Republic of Korea. From August 2002 to July 2003 he assumed the duties as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, Headquarters Department of the Army with duty as Chief, Logistics, Coalition Forces Land Component Command, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.



General Christianson has a Bachelor's Degree in Industrial Engineering from North Dakota State University. His military education includes the Infantry Officer's Basic Course, Ordnance Officer's Advanced Course, the Armed Forces Staff College and the Army War College. His awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, Korea Defense Service Medal, Armed Forces Service Medal and the NATO Medal, Expert Infantryman's, Parachutist, Air Assault and Army General Staff Identification Badge plus the Ranger Tab.

STATEMENT BY  
LIEUTENANT GENERAL C.V. CHRISTIANSON  
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4, ARMY

Chairman Hefley, Ranking Member Ortiz, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to talk about the work being done to reconstitute our Army equipment in preparation for the next mission. All of the services face a similar challenge: that is, to maintain the operational readiness necessary to win the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) while transforming capabilities to defeat any future threat to our nation. Nothing we do is more urgent or pressing than to ensure that our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines have the equipment they need to meet tomorrow's missions.

Our task would be impossible without the tremendous support we receive from you, the Committee Members, and your staffs. On behalf of our Soldiers, civilian employees, and family members, I would like to thank you for that support. Over the past year, your support has helped us make tremendous strides forward in transforming the Army and enhancing the capabilities of our Soldiers, their units and their equipment. Your support is helping the Army achieve its most profound transformation of the last half century. This transformation will enable us to defeat today's dangerous, adaptive enemy even as we prepare to meet an uncertain future. Fundamental to the Army's ability to meet future threats is the absolute requirement that we rapidly return our operational units to an effective level of readiness upon their return from operational employment.

Over the past three years (2003-2005), the Army has deployed over 40% of its equipment to Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF). Currently, the Army has approximately 15% of its equipment deployed. That percentage includes 16% of our Apaches, 20% of our Blackhawks, 14% of our Abrams tanks, 15% of our Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and 15% of our Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTT). In addition, over 10% of the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) fleet and over 30% of the Stryker fleet is currently deployed in OIF.

The operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and consequent wear on the Army's deployed equipment greatly exceeds that experienced during our peacetime training environment. According to the Army's recent stress studies and the Congressional Budget Office, Army helicopters are experiencing usage rates roughly twice peacetime rates; tanks and other tracked vehicles are being used at roughly five times peacetime rates; and our truck fleet is operating at three to five times peacetime rates. The Army truck fleet, in particular, is experiencing some of the more pronounced problems of excessive wear because of the high OPTEMPO, the harsh desert environment and the addition of heavy armor. These operational conditions shorten the military useful life of our equipment and demand a larger investment in depot maintenance at a much earlier stage than expected or programmed. (Military useful life includes readiness, reliability, enhanced capabilities, and economic considerations)

The increased OPTEMPO, combined with an already-aging fleet and the significant combat losses, challenges the Army's ability to sustain operational availability. Additionally, the demand to be ready to respond

to the next contingency and the compelling need to transform the Army create a significant readiness challenge for our Army. This challenge can only be met with a structured, formal, fully-funded program to RESET the Army's equipment when it returns from the operational area complemented by a long-term Recapitalization (RECAP) program to ensure we can sustain the readiness of our systems over their life span.

### RESET

The term RESET is used to define a series of actions taken to restore unit equipment to a desired level of combat capability after returning from contingency operations. RESET is required to address the readiness challenges resulting from increased usage and stress. The sole purpose of RESET is to bring unit equipment to combat-ready condition either for its next rotation in support of current operations or for other, unknown future contingencies. RESET actions include the repair of existing equipment, the replacement of equipment lost during operations and the RECAP of equipment that needs extensive refurbishment. RESET repairs are conducted in accordance with applicable Army maintenance standards (Technical Manual 10/20 for ground platforms and Special Technical Inspection and Repair Standards for aviation) and address damages incurred due to harsh environmental conditions.

The costs to RESET the Army have not been programmed since they are incremental costs over and above what we normally need to sustain the Army. In accordance with DoD policy and intent, we rely on supplemental funds to pay for our RESET program. In fiscal year 2003, the Army received \$1.2 billion to execute RESET, and in fiscal year 2004,

we received \$3.7 billion. In this year's supplemental, we requested \$6.5 billion to support our projected RESET requirements. At the time we built the fiscal year 2005 supplemental we estimated everything the Army could execute during the year.

While we know the number of brigades expected to return from the next rotation, we cannot be certain of the total fiscal year 2006 RESET requirements until the combatant commander identifies his total force requirements. If the operational theater stabilizes or becomes more secure in fiscal year 2006, it is possible that the combatant commander may reduce the forces required in theater. If that were to happen, the amount of equipment returning to home station, and the resulting RESET requirements, would increase.

As we developed our RESET program, we wanted to categorize our equipment in order to put some discipline into the requirements process. There are four categories of equipment being used in current operations -- each drives the type and the timing of RESET actions. The categories are: Deployed Equipment, Stay-Behind Equipment (SBE), Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS), and Battle Losses.

#### Deployed Equipment

Deployed equipment is that group of equipment that deploys with a unit and returns back to home station with the same unit. Rapid RESET of this category of equipment is crucial and is tied directly to unit mission requirements. It is imperative that this equipment be brought back to

combat capability quickly so the unit is prepared to respond to the next contingency requirement, which in many cases is a return to the OIF/OEF operational area.

The OIF1 workload consists of approximately 1,000 aviation systems, 124,400 communications and electronics systems, 5,700 combat/tracked vehicles, 45,700 wheeled vehicles, 1,400 missile systems, 9 Patriot battalions, and about 232,200 various other systems. The Army has nearly completed RESET of the equipment that was redeployed as part of OIF1. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division, and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division have completed RESET. Other major units, such as the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division and 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division, are nearing completion.

While the RESET of OIF1 units continues, the Army is receiving equipment from 17 Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) redeploying from OIF/OEF 04-06 (the second OIF rotation) now. Over the course of fiscal year 2005, we expect to RESET over 35,000 wheeled vehicles, 5,000 tracked vehicles, and over 500 aircraft. Of that number, more than 10,000 of these major platforms will be going into our depots for RESET.

In fiscal year 2006, 19 BCTs will return to home station from combat operations in OIF/OEF. In summary, the Army has nearly completed the RESET of OIF1 equipment; OIF/OEF 04-06 equipment is arriving now; and OIF/OEF 05-07 equipment is coming next year.

## Stay Behind Equipment

The second category of equipment is identified as stay behind equipment (SBE). It deploys with a unit and is left behind in the operational area to be used by follow-on units. SBE offers two major benefits to the Army. First, leaving critical equipment in the operational area provides Soldiers with enhanced capability. For example, all up-armored vehicles have been designated as SBE to ensure we maximize force protection capabilities where they are needed most. Second, keeping major systems in the operational area significantly reduces the strategic transportation requirements and costs and enables us to conduct transition operations more quickly. In addition to the armored vehicles, examples of SBE include critical communications infrastructure, equipment procured to provide new technology needed by our Soldiers, explosive detection capabilities, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).

Everyday, SBE is maintained by our logisticians forward. Because we do not know when SBE will come out of theater, it is not yet programmed for RESET. To illustrate this point, we project SBE RESET requirements will include 10,000 Up Armored HMMWVs and 26,500 Add-on-Armored vehicles. As the operating environment allows us the opportunity to draw down the SBE pool, we will request funding to begin RESET of that equipment.

## Army Pre-positioned Stocks

Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS) includes equipment that the Army has maintained for the sole purpose of rapidly responding to



contingency operations around the world. We used our APS to support OIF/OEF. Today, there are 14,000 items of APS, ranging from night vision goggles to tanks, in use in the operational area. Of the 14,000 items, approximately 350 are tracked vehicles and approximately 3,500 are wheeled vehicles. Much like SBE, this equipment is being maintained everyday by our logisticians forward, and like SBE, we have a bow wave of work to do when we are able to draw down the APS stocks. This cost assumes depot RESET of tracked and wheeled vehicles and returning war reserve stocks to mission-ready levels.

Like SBE, the Army can begin to repair and replace this equipment only upon reduction and/or cessation of hostilities, and we believe that APS will be the last category of equipment that we redeploy from the operational area. Based on that assumption, we estimate that it will take at least two years after the end of the conflict to fully repair and to replace Army pre-positioned equipment used in this operation.

### Battle Losses

The last category of equipment includes equipment that has been lost to the Army inventory and must be replaced. The Army's inventory losses can be broken down into two categories - battle losses as a result of combat action and equipment that is lost because it cannot be repaired. The latter is referred to as "washed out" equipment. There is an important distinction between battle losses to a tactical commander and battle losses to the Army. A battle loss to a commander is any equipment that is damaged or destroyed and must be evacuated out of the

commander's area for repair. The Army replaces those commander's losses with other assets. However, a battle loss to the Army is a piece of equipment that cannot or should not be repaired at any level; it is dropped from the Army inventory.

Battle losses to the Army inventory since the beginning of OIF/OEF include 51 helicopters, 97 combat vehicles, 76 heavy wheeled vehicles, 217 light wheeled vehicles, and 62 medium wheeled vehicles. These quantities are as of the second quarter of fiscal year 2005.

The estimate of equipment determined to be "washed out" is based on what we saw from equipment used during OIF1. We estimate that losses will be: 3% for aviation, 2% for tracked vehicles, 2% for missile systems, and 12% for wheeled vehicles. This "washout rate" is directly related to up-armoring our wheeled vehicles and the hard driving and heavy usage required in combat operations.

In the fiscal year 2005 emergency supplemental submitted to Congress, the Army requested \$552.95 million for the replacement of over 800 major pieces of equipment, to include 18 helicopters, 350 wheeled vehicles, and 50 tracked vehicles. Of the 51 aircraft lost in theater, we have requested funding to replace 18 (13 Apache and 5 Blackhawks) this year; we replaced 15 using previous supplementals and congressional additions. The replacement of 18 Kiowa (OH-58) helicopters has been deferred to await the fielding of the new Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters (ARH).

## Recapitalization (RECAP)

The Army's RESET program is complemented by the Army's Recapitalization or RECAP program. RECAP is the Army's long-term investment strategy to sustain the readiness of the Army. RECAP is a depot-level maintenance activity that completely rebuilds a system and returns it to a like-new, zero-miles or zero-hours standard and is used to introduce, or spiral in, selected upgrades to the current fleet. Our fiscal year 2005 supplemental request includes \$2 billion to support the RECAP of several critical systems as they return from operational deployment. The M1 Abrams tank and the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle are examples of systems in which RECAP is used to produce like-new systems at less cost than new procurement. The objectives of the RECAP process include: extending service life, reducing operating and support costs, enhancing capability, and improving system reliability, maintainability, safety and efficiency.

The actions described in this statement describe a comprehensive approach to providing our forces with ready and capable equipment, even in the midst of conflict. The RESET program outlined here will: (1) ensure that the forward commanders have the combat power they need while minimizing the load on the strategic transportation system; (2) ensure that returning units will be rapidly returned to an operationally-ready condition – prepared for whatever mission comes their way; (3) ensure that, as we are able to draw down our forward forces, we can RESET the equipment that we have kept in the operational area; (4) ensure that APS equipment is brought back to readiness condition for its mission; and (5) ensure that we have in place a long-term program to sustain the operational readiness

of all of our critical systems over their life-spans. RESET and RECAP are essential to the Army's ability to meet readiness requirements. It is absolutely critical that we get the necessary funding to support them.

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of our Soldiers, their families and our professional civilians, we greatly appreciate the support of the Congress, and especially this Committee in addressing our needs. Your support for the President's Budget and the emergency supplemental appropriations has given us a solid foundation upon which we are building a stronger, more relevant and ready Army. We are your Army at war. We see ourselves as a full member of the joint and interagency team, and we stand prepared to respond. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to answering your questions.