

Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee

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Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify about Improving Interagency Coordination for the Global War on Terror and Beyond. We must bring all elements of our national power to bear in this struggle against global terrorism, and we can only do that through effective Interagency Coordination at every level.

Improving Interagency Coordination has been a goal of our government for decades, certainly since the National Security Act of 1947, and most likely even before that time. The current structure for Interagency Coordination is the result of much hard-won integration, capped most recently by National Security Policy Directive (NSPD-1): "Organization of the National Security Council (NSC) System." All this effort has produced a system that works well in crisis, but that still preserves Agency equities in a way that sometimes makes more mundane but critically important changes in policy difficult. Of course changes in policy should not always be easy: the key is to ensure that all affected areas of the government have ample opportunity to present the President the best advice available in a timely manner.

The Interagency's current process is organized with six regional and fifteen functional Policy Coordinating Committees (PCCs), like the Counterterrorism

Security Group, of which I am a member. The PCCs feed issues to the Deputies Committee for review and eventual decision by the Principals Committee. This process ensures diversity of inputs and enables cross-talk among the various Federal Departments and Agencies. PCCs, chaired by the NSC staff, serve to address individual priorities but better fusion of priorities across Departments/Agencies must still occur, and that is the proper role of the Deputies Committee. Once an interagency position is reached, recommendations can properly be made to act in accordance with our national policies. But we now recognize a need for greater integration before issues enter the NSPD-1 process. We need to better integrate our strategic planning and our operations in the field.

The recently published 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) accurately states that we are in a long war that is irregular in nature. This long war is characterized by dispersed, global terrorist networks with radical political aims that directly and indirectly threaten the United States and our Allies and our way of life. The nature of this long war requires the U.S. Armed Forces to adopt unconventional and indirect approaches to ultimately prevail in this historic struggle. The nature of this kind of enemy places a premium on Interagency Operations. Today's challenge is different in kind but similar in scale to the challenge presented by the Cold War – requiring major shifts in the strategic concepts for national security and the role of military power. The kinds of missions we need to undertake make interagency coordination more important today than ever before – and need interagency processes to develop.

Cooperation across the Federal Government must begin in the field with the development of shared perspectives and a better understanding of each Agency's

role. At an operational level, we are doing a lot. We have adopted interagency augmentees at various levels to reinforce cooperation. Such augmentation has contributed much in the past, particularly in our military Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs), and is currently adding great value to our operations in Iraq. More recently, Joint Interagency Coordination Groups have been established within each combatant command to function as a coordination and advisory staff to develop and coordinate Global War on Terror (GWOT) operations with other government agencies. In turn, we at OSD and the Joint-Staff are forging stronger linkages among planners in the Military Services and the Combatant Commands to ensure operations better reflect the President's National Security Strategy.

To support improved interagency coordination, DoD has sought to improve the synchronization of internal activities relating to the GWOT. The President has designated USSOCOM the lead combatant commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks. In this role, Commander US Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM) leads a global collaborative planning process leveraging other combatant command capabilities and expertise integrate DoD strategy, plans, intelligence priorities, plan campaigns against designated terrorist networks. Moreover, US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has been allocated the role of lead Joint Force Integrator, responsible for recommending changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities to improve the integration of Service, Defense Agency, and Combatant Command actions with interagency capabilities.

At the strategic level, DoD has partnered with State to integrate regional priorities at the interagency through the regional action plans to combat terrorism. These plans serve to coordinate and de-conflict combating terrorism activities, synchronize the efforts of the various agencies and provide a mechanism for monitoring progress in solving terrorist related challenges by region. These have now been transferred to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and it is there that much of our most recent progress in Interagency Coordination is taking place.

The interagency process we have today can work well under crisis, but even with all our efforts, the GWOT presents coordination challenges not previously faced by the NSC and there clearly is work to be done.

Through the QDR, the Defense Department developed several recommendations to help realize the vision of unified effort by all elements of national power. We cannot make these things happen on our own, but we know the benefits would be great. Our recommendations include the creation of National Security Planning Guidance to direct the development of both military and non-military plans and institutional capabilities. The planning guidance would set priorities and clarify national security roles and responsibilities to reduce capability gaps and eliminate redundancies. We will also strongly urge Congress to provide our civilian sister agencies the resources requested in the President's Budget to develop capabilities to quickly and effectively deploy in response to contingencies – U.S. servicemen and women need their civilian colleagues' expertise in the field. We will provide better support to civilian agencies at home by further opening DoD training to the Department of Homeland Security and others and by supporting their planning

efforts. These are just a few of our initiatives to build true, coordinated interagency capabilities. We think such changes are critical for our chances of success in the long war. But we cannot make them real without the help of partner agencies and Congress.

I would like to thank this Committee and the Congress for your emphasis on this vitally important issue. Your continued interest will be invaluable as we continue the War on Terror.

I welcome your questions.