THE THIRD WAY NATIONAL SECURITY PROJECT

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The Bush Defense Record by the Numbers

A Third Way Report

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Our nation—this generation—will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail.

President George W. Bush (Address to Joint Session of Congress, September 20, 2001)

Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to the region. When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace. As for the reaction of the Arab 'street,' the Middle East expert Professor Fouad Ajami predicts that after liberation, the streets in Basra and Baghdad are 'sure to erupt in joy in the same way the throngs in Kabul greeted the Americans.' Extremists in the region would have to rethink their strategy of Jihad. Moderates throughout the region would take heart. And our ability to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process would be enhanced, just as it was following the liberation of Kuwait in 1991.

> Vice President Dick Cheney (Speech to the VFW in Nashville, August 26, 2002)

North Korea is firing missiles. Iran is going nuclear. Somalia is controlled by radical Islamists. Iraq isn't getting better, and Afghanistan is getting worse... I give the president a lot of credit for hanging tough on Iraq. But I am worried that it has made them too passive in confronting the other threats.

William Kristol, Editor of *The Weekly Standard* (*The Washington Post*, July 6, 2006)

Things aren't getting better; they're getting worse. The White House is completely disconnected from reality... The reality is that we're losing in Iraq.

Senator Chuck Hagel (*Philadelphia Daily News*, September 2, 2005)

Overview

Like all presidents before him, President George W. Bush came to office promising to keep America safe, strong, secure, and the leader of the world. There are some who believe that the President has kept this promise. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and others inside the Bush Administration have continued to maintain that America's national security strategy—and in particular, the strategy in Iraq—has been successful. But there are many who disagree—even leading conservatives. William Kristol, one of the intellectual leaders behind the Bush foreign policy, now regards America's national security situation as dire. Several retired senior military officers have leveled a barrage of criticism at Bush, with calls for the firing of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, breaking a tradition among retired military against publicly criticizing the commanderin-chief.

In this report, Third Way analyzes the Bush Administration record and measures its success or failure. Vice President Dick Cheney and Senior Advisor Karl Rove have repeatedly argued that "everything changed on 9-11" and that America must have a "post-9-11 worldview." We hold the Administration to its own words and measure success or failure in the post-9-11 world across seven key national security indicators: Iraq, terrorism (broadly), Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea, the condition of the American military, and China.

In this report, the evidence leads us to conclude that the Bush Administration has failed. The number of terrorist attacks and recruits are up worldwide; many of our enemies are stronger; their reach is greater; their weapons of mass destruction are more developed, plentiful and available. At the same time, American influence with our allies has weakened: our "friends" are not with us in Iraq. And a prolonged and troop-intensive war in Iraq has stretched our military and has left America less able to project power in troublesome hot spots than before 9-11.

The data leave little doubt that incompetence on the part of senior members of the Bush Administration has helped lead us to this dangerous situation. The data also suggest that the Bush Administration has failed in a more fundamental strategic sense. This Administration has underestimated our enemies, walked away from the negotiating table with emerging nuclear powers, selectively interpreted intelligence to suit prescribed solutions, fallen deeply in debt with one of our nation's toughest competitors, watched helplessly as allies ignored or shunned America's leadership, burned out the military, and put the capture and execution of one of the greatest mass murderers in American history on the back-burner. The numbers don't lie—the Bush strategy is not working.

Iraq

What Bush Promised

In Iraq, a dictator is building and hiding weapons that could enable him to dominate the Middle East and intimidate the civilized world—and we will not allow it. This same tyrant has close ties to terrorist organizations, and could supply them with the terrible means to strike this country—and America will not permit it... A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region... Success in Iraq could also begin a new stage for Middle Eastern peace, and set in motion progress towards a truly democratic Palestinian state. The passing of Saddam Hussein's regime will deprive terrorist networks of a wealthy patron that pays for terrorist training, and offers rewards to families of suicide bombers. And other regimes will be given a clear warning that support for terror will not be tolerated.

> President George W. Bush (*"The Future of Iraq,"* February 26, 2003)

The Facts, Then and Now

There is some doubt as to whether Saddam Hussein actually posed a threat to the United States by 2003, but there is no doubt at all that the situation in Iraq today poses grave—and wholly new—threats. Iraq has become a terrorist haven and recruiting magnet where it was not before. Al-Qaeda has a base in Iraq where as recently as three years ago it had none. Iraq is on the brink of a full-scale civil war that could entice its neighbors to exploit Iraq's weakness for their own gain. The Middle East has been profoundly destabilized by this war. Most of America's closest allies shunned, walked away from, or will soon leave our "Coalition of the Willing". And after thousands of American deaths, tens of thousands of injuries, and hundreds of billions of dollars expended, we have more than 100,000 American troops stranded with no end in sight. All of this in a country that had been effectively contained for more than a decade.

SECURITY

THEN

NOW

Collaborative operational links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda: 0¹ Estimated number of foreign fighters operating in Iraq in July 2006: Between 800 and 2000²


IRAQ (cont'd)

SECURITY	
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Estimated number of insurgents in Iraq in 2003: 5,000 ³	Estimated number of insurgents in Iraq in July 2006: More than 20,000 ⁴
Bush Administration estimates of Saddam Hussein's WMD arsenal: 18 mobile biological weapons labs, 25,000 liters of anthrax, 550 artillery shells with mustard, 30,000 empty munitions and enough precursors to increase the stockpile to as much as 500 tons of chemical agents, 1,000 tons of chemical agent from 6,500 bombs left over from the Iran-Iraq war, 100-500 tons of chemical agent, high specification aluminum tubes, 36 Scud missiles (600-900 km range), R&D for a 1,200 km missile. ⁵	Number of operational weapons of mass destruction found in Iraq: 0



Average Weekly Attacks by Time Period: January 2004 to May 2006

Source: Michael E. O'Hanlon and Nina Kamp, "The Iraq Index, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in the Post-Saddam Iraq," The Brookings Institution, August 24, 2006, p. 24. http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex

IRAQ (cont'd)


COST	THEN	NOW
	Actual cost of Desert Storm: \$61.1 billion ⁶	Cost of current Iraq War: \$290 billion ⁷
	Amount of the \$61.1 billion Desert Storm cost paid for by non-US contributors: \$48.4 billion or 79.9% ⁸	
	Cost of containment of Saddam from 1991-2003: \$30 billion ⁹	
	Estimated cost of Iraq War by Administration officials: \$50-60 billion ¹⁰	Estimated total cost by war's end: \$549 billion to \$1.27 trillion ¹¹
	Response by Donald Rumsfeld when told the war could cost \$300 billion: "Baloney." ¹²	
IRAQI LIFE	THEN	NOW
	Number of Iraqis killed in the first year of the war: 6,331 ¹³	Number of Iraqis killed in the first half of 2006: 14,338 ¹⁴
	Electric capacity in Iraq (in megawatts) prior to invasion, March 2003: 4,500 ¹⁵	Electric capacity in Iraq (in megawatts) in March 2006: 4,000 ¹⁶
	Number of Iraqis with sewage system coverage prior to invasion: 6.2 million ¹⁷	Number of Iraqis with sewage system coverage as of March 2006: 5.6 million ¹⁸
	Number of Iraqis with access to potable water prior to invasion: 12.9 million ¹⁹	Number of Iraqis with access to potable water as of March 2006: 9.7 million ²⁰
	Average oil output prior to invasion (barrels per day): 2.5 million ²¹	Average oil output for the week of July 3–9, 2006 (barrels per day): 2.27 million ²²

IRAQ

(cont'd)

ALLIANCES	THEN	NOW
	Desert Storm troop contributions from Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, France, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates: 217,900 ²³	Operation Iraqi Freedom (OFI) troop contribution from Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, France, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates: 0 ²⁴
	Desert Storm troop contributions from Macedonia, Estonia, Fiji, Kazakhstan, Nicaragua, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Albania: 0 ²⁵	OIF troop contributions from Macedonia, Estonia, Fiji, Kazakhstan, Nicaragua, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Albania: 1,697 ²⁶

Number of US Troops vs. Number of Troops from Coalition Partners



Sources: US Troops in Desert Storm: General Accounting Office, "Operation Desert Storm: Lack of Accountability Over Materiel During Redeployment," September 1992. Troops from Coalition Partners in Desert Storm: Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, An Interim Report to Congress, July 1991, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/foi/reading_room/305.pdf (p. 191-192). US Troops and Troops from Coalition Partners in OIF: The Brookings Institution, "The Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Stability in Post-Saddam Iraq," August 24, 2006, www.brookings.edu/iraqindex

Terrorism

What Bush has promised:

We have arrested, or otherwise dealt with, many key commanders of al-Qaeda. Across the world, we are hunting down the killers one by one. We are winning. And we're showing them the definition of American justice.

> President George W. Bush (*"The Future of Iraq,"* February 26, 2003)


The Facts, Then and Now

After 9-11, all Americans knew that the war on terror would be a long one. But terrorism experts agree that our progress in defeating terrorists has not outstripped their progress in recruiting new terrorists. In a recent anonymous survey, 86% of America's foremost experts on terrorism and the military said that the United States is less safe since 9-11.

TERRORISM	THEN	NOW
	Estimated number of al-Qaeda members worldwide in 2001: 20,000 ²⁷	Estimated number of al-Qaeda members worldwide in 2006: 50,000 ²⁸
	Number of al-Qaeda terrorist attacks in the five years before 9-11: 3 ²⁹	Number of al-Qaeda attacks in the five years since 9-11: 30 ³⁰
		Number of days Osama bin Laden has been at large since US military operations commenced in Afghanistan: 1,784 ³¹
		Number of audio or video tapes bin Laden has released to global circulation since 9-11: 24 ³²
	Number of significant global terrorist attacks reported by the US State Department in 2003: 175 ³³	Total number of worldwide global terrorist attacks reported by the US Government's National Counter- terrorism Center in 2004: 3,194 ³⁴
		Total number of worldwide global terrorist attacks reported by the US Government's National Counter- terrorism Center in 2005: 11,111 ³⁵


TERRORISM (cont'd)

Survey of National Security Experts: Is the world safer today for the US and Americans?



Source: Data for this chart were drawn and consolidated from the responses to "Q.1 Thinking about the present situation, would you say that the world is becoming safer or more dangerous for the United States and the American people?" Respondents chose between "Much safer", "Somewhat safer", "Stayed the same", "Somewhat more dangerous", and "Much more dangerous". This question and the results can be found in "The Terrorism Index, A Survey of US National Security Experts on the War on Terror," released by the Center for American Progress and Foreign Policy. June 2006.

Survey of National Security Experts: We are winning the war on terror, Agree or Disagree?



Source: Data for this chart were drawn and consolidated from the responses to "Q.4 President Bush has stated that the United States is winning the war on terror. Please choose the option below which best describes how you feel about that statement." Respondents chose between "Strongly disagree", "Somewhat disagree", "Neutral", "Somewhat agree", and "Strongly agree". This question and the results can be found in "The Terrorism Index, A Survey of US National Security Experts on the War on Terror," released by the Center for American Progress and Foreign Policy. June 2006.

Afghanistan

What Bush Has Promised

We have joined with the Afghan people to bring down the Taliban regime—the protectors of the al-Qaeda network—and aided a new, democratic government to rise in its place.

National Security Strategy of the United States, March 16, 2006

The Facts, Then and Now

While a pro-western, largely democratic government may have replaced the Taliban, the situation that government faces is perilous. Afghanistan is now backsliding into chaos and turmoil and is once again becoming a haven for religious extremists, terrorists, and drug lords.

No one believed that a country as deeply troubled as Afghanistan could be fixed in 76 days (the amount of time it took to defeat the Taliban and establish an interim government). But America's commitment and attention to Afghanistan decreased as soon as the Bush Administration turned its attention to Iraq. This relative lack of attention and resources is the proximate cause of Afghanistan's destabilization. Most troubling, this year has seen a resurgence of the Taliban. They have established strongholds in several regions and have waged war on the ruling government and on the Western forces in the country. In addition, Afghanistan has reestablished itself as the world's major source of heroin.


THEN

NOW

Number of Taliban attacks from 2001–2003: 22 ³⁶	Number of Taliban attacks from 2004–2006: 284 ³⁷
Number of suicide attacks from 2001–2004: 9 ³⁸	Number of suicide attacks from 2005–2006: 64 ³⁹
Goal for number of NATO & US trained soldiers in Afghan army: 70,000 ⁴⁰	Number of trained soldiers in the Afghan Army: About 26,900 ⁴¹

AFGHANISTAN (cont'd)

THEN	NOW
Hectares in Afghanistan devoted to poppy cultivation in 1999: 51,500 ⁴²	Hectares in Afghanistan devoted to poppy cultivation in 2005: 107,000 ⁴³
	Estimated opium produced from Afghanistan's crops: 4,475 metric tons ⁴⁴
	Percent of global opiate supply originating in Afghanistan: 90% ⁴⁵



Taliban Attacks by Month

December 2001 - August 2006

Source: National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, MIPT Terrorist Incident Report. Report includes attacks committed by Taliban from the day after Hamid Karzai was sworn in (December 23, 2001) to present (August 28, 2006).

Iran

What Bush has Promised

I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.

> President George W. Bush (State of the Union Address, Jan 29, 2002)

The Facts, Then and Now

In the flush of post-9-11 bravado, President Bush named Iran as part of the "Axis of Evil." At the time, there was reason for hope with Iran—pro-western reformers were gaining strength. Today, by contrast, Iran is living up to its moniker.

Now Iran is run by a cabal of hardliners who are erasing recent reforms and cranking up anti-western action and rhetoric—and they are closer to producing nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration outsourced the task of containing Iran's nuclear program to the Europeans and the UN, and they have been unsuccessful in restraining Iran. At best, Iran is using its nuclear ambition to blackmail western powers into meeting Iranian demands for economic acceptance and political influence. At worst, it is determined to possess these weapons to establish itself as the leader of the Islamic world. Moreover, American policymakers openly fear that the vacuum created by the war in Iraq could lead to Iranian intrusion and influence in that country.

IRAN	THEN	NOW
	Number of known operational nuclear reactors in Iran as of 2000: 0 ⁴⁶	Number of operational centrifuges capable of enriching uranium Iran claimed to have as of April 2006: 164 ⁴⁷
		Number of centrifuges Iran plans to have by the end of 2006: 3,000 ⁴⁸
		Amount of uranium gas Iran claimed to produce as of April 2006: 110 tons ⁴⁹

IRAN (cont'd)

THEN

NOW

Number of nuclear warheads Iran could produce in 2000: 0⁵⁰ Number of nuclear warheads that could be produced from 110 tons of uranium gas: 10⁵¹

Estimated range of Iranian Shahab-3 missiles tested in 2004: 1,500 km⁵²

Estimated range of Iranian Shahab-5 missiles under development: 3,000 to 5,000 km⁵³



Known Nuclear Facilities in Iran

Source: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/research/iran/images/mapbig.gif

North Korea

What Bush has Promised

We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies' efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. So we must be prepared to defeat our enemies' plans, using the best intelligence and proceeding with deliberation.

> National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002

The Facts, Then and Now

During the Bush Administration, North Korea went from being a containable problem to a legitimate threat to US security. It is now actively producing nuclear weapons, where before it had frozen production. It has made progress on long-range missiles, including one that may some day be capable of reaching the United States with a nuclear warhead. Moreover, as North Korea has become more powerful, America has been unable to set a course that other nations in the region wish to follow.

NORTH KOREA	THEN	NOW
	Estimated number of simple fission- type nuclear weapons produced by Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) prior to 2001: Between 0 and 2 ⁵⁴	Number of nuclear weapons in DPRK arsenal: Between 3 and 9 ⁵⁵
		Number of nuclear weapons DPRK will be able to manufacture annually, with reactors now operational or under

construction: Approximately 30⁵⁶

NORTH KOREA (cont'd)

THENNOWNumber of medium or long-range
"Taepodong" missiles tested before
2000: 157Number of medium or long-range
"Nodong" or "Taepodong" missiles
tested: Between 6-10 missiles tested on
July 4th 2006, possibly including an
ICBM capable of hitting US territory.58Number of US forces definitely in range
of operational DPRK missiles: 30,61959

Number of forces that would be in range of recently tested missiles: 72,868⁶⁰

The US Military

What Bush has Promised

The problem comes with open-ended deployments and unclear military missions. In these cases we will ask, 'What is our goal, can it be met, and when do we leave?' ... we will not be permanent peacekeepers, dividing warring parties. This is not our strength or our calling... America's goal should be to deter wars—and to win wars when deterrence fails. Sending our military on vague, aimless, and endless deployments in the swift solvent of morale.

President George W. Bush (Campaign Speech at the Citadel, September1999)

[T]he United States will transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.

National Security Strategy of the United States, March 2002

The Facts, Then and Now

America remains the most powerful country in world history with the most powerful military. Our superiority is unquestioned. But over the past four years, the President has stretched the military to a crisis point. Troop deployments are longer, training is shorter, rest periods are minimized, and recruitment has suffered. Equipment is wearing out and being depleted—and without sufficient funding for replacement and refurbishment. Further, the National Guard and Reserve are taxed far beyond what is reasonable for "citizen soldiers." Several prominent former military leaders warn that this prolonged over-deployment could break the force.⁶¹

When George Bush first ran for President in 2000, he expressed concerns about the state of the US military. At the time, the Clinton Administration was just starting to reverse a decade of downsizing, as it became clear that America's new global role would demand more of US forces than was anticipated after the fall of the Soviet Union. There was some disagreement about how real the "readiness crisis" really was.

Today, there is little disagreement—there is good reason to be concerned about the state of the US military. It would be unreasonable, however, to make a side-by-side comparison of US forces at peace in the 1990s and at war in the 2000s. 9-11, after all, initiated a war in Afghanistan that was not of our choosing. The invasion of Iraq, however, was a matter of choice, certainly in the timing. We can measure, therefore, how ready our military was for the mission the President chose to send it on. We can also measure whether the Bush Administration is living up to its own promises when it comes to our men and women in uniform.

US MILITARY	THEN	NOW
	"We have seen a steady erosion of American power and an unsteady exercise of American influence. Our military is low on parts, pay and morale. If called on by the commander-in-chief today, two entire divisions of the Army would have to report Not ready for duty, sir."	Number of Army divisions deemed not ready for combat in late 2003 in the event of a conflict in Korea or elsewhere: 5 ⁶²
	Governor George W. Bush, Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention, August, 3, 2000.	
		Number of Army units deemed not ready today: classified, but according to a memo by Rep. Joel Hefley (R-CO), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Readiness: "In many cases, units deploying to OIF/OEF have lower C- ratings than previously would have been allowed data suggests that overall readiness ratings of the Army are continuing to decline." ⁶³
		Army National Guard units considered combat ready: less than 1/3. ⁶⁴
	"If we are going to send US military forces overseas to engage in military operations, we must be willing to spend the money to make sure those forces are properly supported." Stephen Hadley, Online News Hour, September 2000. ⁶⁵	Cost to reconstitute equipment lost by the Marine Corps in Iraq: \$12.8 billion ⁶⁶
		Amount Marine Corps has received so far to "reset": \$5.1 billion ⁶⁷
		Cost to "reset" Army equipment used in Iraq and Afghanistan—for FY 2007 alone: \$17.1 billion ⁶⁸
		Estimated future annual costs to "reset" Army equipment used in Iraq and Afghanistan: \$12–\$13 billion per year ⁶⁹

US MILITARY (cont'd)

THEN

NOW

"The fact that we are using the National Guard and Reserves for longer deployments more frequently when these are part-time soldiers means that the American armed services need to be funded better, equipped better and their mission needs to be clarified."

Condoleezza Rice, St. Louis University, November 2, 2000⁷⁰ Amount of Army National Guard combat battalions and special operations units mobilized since 9-11: 95 percent⁷¹

Since 9-11, amount of National Guard mobilized for more than 18 consecutive months: 60 percent⁷²

Cost to correct shortfalls of equipment for the Army National Guard today: \$21 billion⁷³

Amount of essential warfighting equipment available to nondeployed Army National Guard units as of July 2005: 34 percent⁷⁴

Examples of Current Mobilization Equipment Shortages Among Nondeployed Army National Guard Units

	Number of items authorized	Number of items on hand	Percentage of authorized in inventory
Equipment for handling truck containers	25	4	16
Machine guns	1,088	150	14
Chemical decontamination equipment	514	73	14
Armament carrier humvees	2,240	220	10
Truck flatbed semitrailers	2,287	180	8
Lightweight rifles	16,839	788	5
Individual night vision goggles	127,000	1,000	1
Weapon night vision sights	11,400	0	0
Up-armored scout humvees	3,922	0	0
Chemical agent monitoring equipment	7,200	0	0

Source: GAO analysis of National Guard Bureau data as of May 2006.

US MILITARY (cont'd)

THEN	NOW	
	Earliest date at which Army National Guard units are expected to be fully equipped with materiel comparable in quality to that in the active duty force: 2011 ⁷⁵	
	Number of Army Reservists President Bush requested cut in the FY 2007 budget: 17,000 ⁷⁶	
"If you ask yourself, 'Is the US military better off today than it was eight years ago?' the answer is 'no'The military has not been as well-treated as it should have been." Dick Cheney, Lakeland Florida, October 16, 2000 ⁷⁷	Number of months after US invasion of Iraq that all American soldiers received body armor: 18 ⁷⁸	
	Number of Army personnel under "stop-loss" orders today: 12,000 ⁷⁹	
	Total number of Army personnel subject to "stop-loss" since 2001: 80,000 ⁸⁰	
	Number of Marine Reservists subject to involuntary recall, as of August 22, 2006: 59,000 ⁸¹	
Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) for Army units as of 2003: 1 year deployed, 2 years in garrison. ⁸²	OPTEMPO for Army units as of 2006: 1 year deployed, 1 year in garrison ⁸³	
	OPTEMPO for Marine Corps units as of 2006: 7 months deployed, 7 months in garrison ⁸⁴	
"There is enormous amounts of evidence out there, Tim, that the question in terms of readiness and morale, the problems with recruiting, problems with the retention, that the military is in trouble todayThe big part of the difficulty out there today is that the force is spread so thin." Dick Cheney, Meet the Press with Tim Russert, August 27, 2000.	Number of countries where US Army is deployed today: 120 ⁸⁵	

US MILITARY (cont'd)

THEN

NOW

	Number of recruits by which the Army missed its FY 2005 recruiting goal: 6,627 ⁸⁶
	Approximate number of troops Army is expected to be short (in junior ranks) by the end of FY 2006: 30,000 ⁸⁷
	Number of the 6 Reserve Components that fell short of their FY 2005 recruiting goals: 4 ⁸⁸
	Shortfall in recruits for the 6 Reserve Components in FY 2005: 18,864 ⁸⁹
"The world needs America's strength and leadership, and America's armed forces need better equipment, better training, and better pay. We will give our military the means to keep the peace, and we will give it one thing more a commander-in-chief who respects our men and women in uniform, and a commander-in-chief who earns their respect. A generation shaped by Vietnam must remember the lessons of Vietnam. When America uses force in the world, the cause must be just, the goal must be clear, and the victory must be overwhelming." Governor George W. Bush, Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention, August, 3, 2000.	"What's particularly troubling about this year's budget request is the apparent decision by the Department of Defense to prioritize transformation efforts ahead of the services' current readiness needs. The subcommittee has found underfunding in numerous operations, maintenance, and training accounts that fails to support even basic peacetime requirements." Representative Joel Hefley (R-CO), April 27, 2006. ⁹⁰

China

What Bush has Promised

The President [Clinton] has called the relationship with China a strategic partnership. I believe our relationship needs to be redefined as competitor. Competitors can find areas of agreement, but we must make it clear to the Chinese that we don't appreciate any attempt to spread weapons of mass destruction around the world, that we don't appreciate any threats to our friends and allies in the Far East.

President George W. Bush During the 2000 Campaign (GeorgeWBush.com /News/"Cox Report", May 25, 1999)

The Facts, Then and Now

Under President Bush, our China policy has drifted, and the result has been that the prediction he made in 1999 has come true—we may be losing a potential partner and gaining a serious rival. China today is our largest creditor, and it was able to finance the doubling of its military budget on American debt. It has become a powerful regional power broker, often acting against the interests of America in the areas of North Korea and Iran. It has formed alliances with America's adversaries in South America. And it has supported corrupt and abusive governments in Africa that harbor terrorists and suborn genocide.

CHINA


THEN

NOW

China's holdings of US debt in 2001: \$60 billion⁹¹ China's holdings of US debt in 2006: \$328 billion⁹²

Source: Note that 41% of the budget increase between 1999 and 2005 happened in a single year (between 2004 and 2005). See Anthony Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, "The Asia Conventional Military Balance in 2006," Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 26, 2006, p. 11.

China's Annual Defense Budget



Endnotes

¹ The 9-11 Commission Report, pg. 66.

² Michael E. O'Hanlon and Nina Kamp, "The Irag Index, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in the Post-Saddam Irag," The Brookings Institution, August 24, 2006. http://www.brookings.edu/iragindex

³ Michael E. O'Hanlon and Nina Kamp, "The Irag Index, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in the Post-Saddam Iraq," The Brookings Institution, August 24, 2006. http://www.brookings.edu/iragindex

⁴ Michael E. O'Hanlon and Nina Kamp, "The Irag Index, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in the Post-Saddam Iraq," The Brookings Institution, August 24, 2006. http://www.brookings.edu/iragindex

⁵ Colin L. Powell, Presentation to the UN Security Council, February 3, 2003.

⁶ Democratic Caucus of the House Budget Committee, "Assessing the Cost of Military Action Against Irag: Using Desert Shield/Desert Storm as a Basis for Estimates," prepared by the Democratic Staff of the House Budget Committee, September 23, 2002, p. 5. http://www.house.gov/budget_democrats/analyses/spending/iragi_cost_report.pdf

⁷ Congressional Budget Office, "Estimated Funding for Operations in Irag on the War on Terrorism," August 25, 2006.

⁸ Democratic Caucus of the House Budget Committee, "Assessing the Cost of Military Action Against Irag: Using Desert Shield/Desert Storm as a Basis for Estimates," prepared by the Democratic Staff of the House Budget Committee, September 23, 2002, p. 5.

http://www.house.gov/budget democrats/analyses/spending/iragi cost report.pdf

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