

STATEMENT OF  
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BEFORE THE  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
REGIONAL POWERS PANEL  
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Mr. Chairman, Members of the House Armed Services Regional Power Panel, thank you for the opportunity to present my views regarding regional threats and our Nation's ability to effectively counter them.

At the turn of the last century, Theodore Roosevelt challenged the Nation to "walk softly and carry a big stick." He went on in that speech to explain that the big stick the Nation most needed to influence events overseas was a "strong and highly trained navy." Today, we find ourselves here, once again, to address Roosevelt's questions: Will the Nation maintain its ability to influence events overseas? Will we maintain our strong navy today and build the navy we need for tomorrow? Can the nation accept the consequences if we don't?

I believe that our naval forces do three things. First, they provide overseas presence and show the flag. History has shown that a tenacious U.S. presence is the key to long term political stability in our regions of interest. Second, our forces engage our allies, war-fighting partners and developing nations, influencing how they will interact with the rest of the world. And finally, we react to contingencies. The order of precedence of these tasks can vary daily depending on the world environment.

Today, U.S. forces train for and execute a myriad of missions and for many of these missions there is significant overlap. There are two missions however that belong exclusively to the U.S. Navy; these access missions are Anti-Submarine Warfare and Mine Warfare. The U.S. Navy's ability to insure access in the littoral environment depends on the capability to establish and maintain undersea superiority. The uncontested undersea superiority experienced during recent conflicts is unlikely to be repeated against more determined adversaries who are developing

asymmetrical means of disrupting access to the littoral. Submarines – especially in significant numbers that include modern designs – could effectively deny the United States access to the likely littoral regions where projection of American power may be needed to assure peace and stability, deter conflict, or prevail should events turn hostile. At the same time, such a force may have the ability to disrupt the sea lines of communication, especially at global maritime choke points, creating devastating global economic effects.

Access to littoral regions and uninhibited traffic through maritime check points cannot be assumed. Instead it requires robust mine and anti-submarine warfare capabilities tailored to the most likely threat and environment. It is essential that the United States have the capability to forcibly gain access to any littoral region, protect our maritime forces enabling sustained power projection ashore and conduct strategic mine (MW) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) campaigns to eliminate the threat of disruption of maritime support to joint operations and global trade.

Given the above, I believe the worst case scenario regarding access denial is a conflict with China over the Taiwan issue. One could debate this issue for days and clearly there are many initiatives being pursued by the world community to minimize this concern. The bottom line here is that most Chinese understand that the United States has no conscious desire to humiliate China or remind it of past degradations. But each time the forces of independence grow in Taiwan, China's leaders are backed into a corner with very limited political options. Hence, they feel obligated to speak strongly that any move Taiwan makes toward independence will be met with military retaliation.

Should this ever occur, I can foresee our Navy proceeding to the area of conflict as quickly as possible as we have done for previous contingencies. If access to our forces is denied due to

asymmetric warfare from submarines and mines, American power and prestige around the world will be destroyed and life as we have known it will be forever changed.

Tragically, our behavior over the past decade is leading us down a path where this access denial could soon become a reality. Instead of instilling strict discipline in access missions of mine and anti-submarine warfare, we appear to ignore study after study regarding shortfalls in platforms, training, concepts of operations and have replaced these truly “transformational”, proven methods with a desire to find the “Holy Grail.”

Despite the Navy’s evaluation of ASW and MW as top warfighting requirements, coordinated capabilities require additional improvement. In particular, the current MW and ASW concepts of operations, training, equipment, acquisition programs, force structure, and force disposition are inadequate to establish the desired undersea superiority in the most difficult scenarios.

Evaluation of technical progress reveals some promising technical developments that may significantly enhance ASW and MW capabilities if they deliver as promised. None of these technologies, however, has the potential to deliver a “transparent littoral ocean” or to constitute a quantum leap in ASW and MW capabilities in the foreseeable future. Instead, revitalizing ASW and MW will require renewed training continuums which implement Battle Group and Theater concepts of operations reinforced by a disciplined approach to Network Centric Warfare that includes selected technical upgrades. Only a comprehensive approach that cuts across training, selected new technologies, force disposition, and force levels can assure real improvement in these mission areas in the near to mid term. Farther term improvements can be achieved by developing and deploying distributed sensor fields and unmanned systems (UUVs and UAVs) to operate in concert with an adequate number of MPA, SSNs, Littoral Combat Ships and Battle Group assets.

Prior to allowing current systems to decline in numbers and modernization in favor of these distributed sensor fields and unmanned systems we must realize that warfighting is a continuum and a disciplined approach must be taken in training, concepts, and modernization in order to get the most out of what we presently possess. We must investigate the statements listed below regarding future distributed sensor systems (DDS) prior to allowing our current forces to decline in numbers and atrophy due to lack of modernization:

1. What is the Concept of Operations for distributed sensor systems (DDS)?
2. There appears to be lack of basic end-to-end systems engineering for many DSS concepts and programs.
3. Major DSS acquisition programs of the past decade have had significant technical and programmatic upheavals, and it is not clear that a robust operational capability will be realized. Examples include the LMRS UUV program and the Advanced Deployable System (ADS).
4. If we read Sea Power 21, there is no major requirement for DSS. Sea Power 21 is platform centric. Heavy emphasis on organic assets. Credible evaluation of what missions and roles can be played by future DSS capabilities is needed.
5. There are no data fusion capabilities under development (no common underwater picture showing undersea situation awareness) – basic visualization tools continue to have challenges in combining and presenting data from multiple sources.
6. There is no integrated networked system definition, bandwidth, connectivity, processing requirements and costs for DDS.
7. There is minimal consideration in DDS concepts of potential adversary countermeasures (e.g. jamming, spoofing, network attacks, etc.)
8. Satellite communications will either not be there or will be too limited/and or vulnerable.
9. No clear assured access to communications channels that are available.
10. While several promising speed and depth communications technologies have been pursued in recent years (e.g. Acomms ATD, special radio for ADS and Submarine BCA, blue-green laser, etc.), successful transition to an operational capability remains elusive. Unclear this is understood and being addressed.
11. Many DSS concepts have overly optimistic assumptions of the maturity and basic feasibility of automated detection.

SUMMARY:

We as a Nation must be prepared for the unthinkable. Access will be critically important should we ever be required to enter conflict over Taiwan or any other conflict in the world.

We err by assuming that systems exist that make the oceans transparent. We err doubly when we don't take actions today that preserve and improve our warfighting capabilities.

Self discipline in moving forward is required if we are to remain dominant in these access missions. General concepts used in conducting these missions will never change. As new systems are developed they will find their place in the overall concept of operations and enhance our warfighting ability.

Thank you very much for your time today.