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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE September 8, 2006 |
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ROCKEFELLER SAYS PARTIAL RELEASE OF PHASE II REPORTS PAINT CLEARER PICTURE OF MISTAKES MADE IN LEAD UP TO IRAQ WAR Washington, D.C. – The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence today released two out of five sections of its Phase II report that seeks to understand how intelligence was prepared and used by policy makers in the lead up to the war with Iraq. The two reports released today address: 1) a comparison of prewar assessments with postwar findings on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program and potential links to al-Qa’ida terrorists; and 2) the role of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) in providing prewar intelligence. Phase II builds on the Committee’s July 2004 report on the Intelligence Community’s failures prior to the Iraq war. In a statement today on the Senate floor, Senator John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV, the Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said that, “The Committee’s investigation into prewar intelligence on Iraq has revealed that the Bush Administration’s case for war in Iraq was fundamentally misleading. The Administration pursued a deceptive strategy of using intelligence reporting that the Intelligence Community had already warned was uncorroborated, unreliable, and in critical instances, fabricated.” (Full statement attached.) Rockefeller added, “These reports are about accountability. They are about identifying the mistakes that led us to war, and they are about making sure those mistakes never happen again. “These reports lay out the facts and show that the Administration did not use intelligence the way it was intended – to inform policy makers. Instead, Administration officials cherry-picked, exaggerated, or ignored intelligence to justify the decision they had already made to go to war with Iraq.” The following are Key Judgments released in today’s reports: Key Judgments of the Report Comparing Pre-War Intelligence to Post-war Findings:
Key Judgments of the Report on the Iraqi National Congress (INC)
“Today’s reports show that the Administration’s repeated allegations of a past, present and future relationship between al-Qa’ida and Iraq were wrong and intended to exploit the deep sense of insecurity among Americans in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks. The Administration sought and succeeded in creating the false impression that al-Qa’ida and Iraq presented a single unified threat to the United States,” Rockefeller concluded. The Committee has yet to complete the remaining three reports that deal with: 1) the quality of prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq; 2) whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information; 3) any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Senator Rockefeller's Floor Statement on the Senate Floor on Phase II ###
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